What rational political actors can expect

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 139-165

  Grafstein, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Conditional expected utility; Rationality; Turnout; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036104342     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/095169280201400201     Document Type: Review

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