Heresthetical maneuvering on the US supreme court

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 93-122

  Epstein, Lee ^a   Shvetsova, Olga ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Heresthetics; Nested games; Political manipulation; Sequential equilibrium; Supreme court

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036101437     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/095169280201400106     Document Type: Review

References (62)

1. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) 431 U.S. 209.
2. Banks, Jeffrey S. (1990) 'Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information', Quarterly Journal of Economics 105: 445-64.
3. Baron, David P. and John Ferejohn (1987) 'Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures', American Economic Review 77: 303-9.
4. Baron, David P. and John Ferejohn (1989) 'Bargaining in Legislatures', American Political Science Review 83: 1181-1206.
5. Bendor, Jonathan and Terry M. Moe (1986) 'Agenda Control, Committee Capture, and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics', American Political Science Review 80: 1187-1207.
6. Black, Elizabeth (1986) Mr. Justice and Mrs. Black. New York: Random House.
7. Calvert, Randall L. and Richard F. Fenno (1994) 'Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate', Journal of Politics 56: 349-76.
8. Cameron, Charles M. (1994) 'Decision-Making and Positive Political Theory (Or, Using Game Theory to Study Judicial Politics)', Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Conference Group on the Scientific Study of Judicial Politics, Columbus, Ohio.
9. Carsey, Thomas M. (1995) 'Cleavages in United States Gubernatorial Elections', PhD dissertation, Political Science, Indiana University.
10. City of Mobile v. Bolden (1980) 446 U.S. 55.
11. Cohen, Youseff (1991) The Heresthetics of Coup Making', Comparative Political Studies 24: 344.
12. Collie, Melissa P. and Brian E. Roberts (1992) 'Trading Places: Choice and Committee Chairs in the U.S. Senate, 1950-1986', Journal of Politics 54: 231-45.
13. Davis v. Passman (1979) 442 U.S. 228.
14. Denzau, Arthur, William H. Rikker and Kenneth Shepsle (1985) 'Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Homestyle', American Political Science Review 79: 1117-34.
15. Eavey, Cheryl L. and Gary J. Miller (1984) 'Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or Bargaining?', American Political Science Review 78: 719-33.
16. Edelman, Paul H. and Jim Chen (1996) The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics', Southern California Law Review 70: 63-102.
17. Elrod v. Burns (1976) 427 U.S. 347.
18. Enelow, James M. (1984) 'A New Theory of Congressional Compromise', American Political Science Review 78: 708-18.
19. Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight (1998) The Choices Justices Make. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
20. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 457 U.S. 596.
21. Hammond, Thomas H., Chris W. Bonneau and Reginald S. Sheehan (1999) 'Toward a Rational Choice Spatial Model of Supreme Court Decision-Making: Making Sense of Certiorari, the Original Vote on the Merits, Opinion Assignment, Coalition Formation and Maintenance, and the Final Vote on the Choice of Legal Doctrine', Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia.
22. In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358.
23. Johnson, Timothy R. (1999) 'Do Supreme Court Justices Utilize Information that They Obtain from Oral ARguments?', Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois.
24. Knight, Jack and Itai Sened (eds) (1995) Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
25. Krehbiel, Keith and Douglas Rivers (1990) 'Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration', Journal of Politics 52: 548-78.
26. Mackie, Gerry (2001) 'Is Democracy Impossible?: Riker's Mistaken Accounts of Antebellum Politics', Mimeo, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
27. Maltzman, Forrest and Paul J. Wahlbeck (1996a) 'Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court', American Political Science Review 90: 581-92.
28. Maltzman, Forrest and Paul J. Wahlbeck (1996b) 'Inside the U.S. Supreme Court: The Reliability of the Justices' Conference Records', Journal of Politics 58: 528-39.
29. Maltzman, Forest, James F. Spriggs II and Paul J. Wahlbeck (2000) Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
30. Martin, Andrew D. (1998a) 'Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers', American Political Science Review 95: 361-78.
31. Martin, Andrew D. (1998b) 'Public Policy, the Supreme Court, and the Separation of Powers', Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, at Boston, Massachussets.
32. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528.
33. McLean, Iain (2001) 'Has the Riker Program any Life Left in It?', Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, at San Antonio, Texas.
34. McLean, Iain and C. Bustani (1999) 'Irish Potatoes and British Politics: Interests, Ideology, Heresthetic, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws', Political Studies 47: 817-36.
35. Murphy, Walter F. (1964) Elements of Judicial Strategy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
36. Nagel, Jack H. (1993) 'Populism, Heresthetics and Political Stability: Richard Seddon and the Art of Majority Rule, British Journal of Political Science 23: 139-74.
37. Nagel, Jack H. (1998) 'Social Choice in a Pluralitarian Democracy: The Politics of Market Liberalization in New Zealand', British Journal of Political Science 28: 223-65.
38. Niskanen, W.A. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
39. Paine, Scott C. (1989) 'Persuasion, Manipulation, and Dimension', Journal of Politics 51: 36-49.
40. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 478 U.S. 1.
41. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980) 448 U.S. 555.
42. Riker, William H. (1965) 'Arrow's Theorem and Some examples of the Paradox of Voting', in J. M. Claunch (ed.) Mathematical Applications of Political Science. Dallas: SMU Press.
43. Riker, William H. (1982) Liberealism against Populism. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
44. Riker, William H. (1983) 'Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics', in Ada Finifter (ed.) Political Science: The State of the Discipline. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.
45. Riker, William H. (1984) The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice', American Political Science Review 78: 1-16.
46. Riker, William H. (1986) The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press.
47. Riker, William H. (1990) 'Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model', in James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinch (eds) Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
48. Riker, William H. (ed.) (1993) Agenda Formation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
49. Riker, William H. (1996) in Randall L. Calvert, John Mueller and Rick K. Wilson (eds) The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
50. Rogers v. Lodge (1982) 458 U.S. 613.
51. Schickler, Eric and Andrew Rich (1997) 'Party Government in the House Reconsidered: A Response to Cox and McCubbins', American Journal of Political Science 41: 1387-94.
52. Schofield, Norman (2000) 'Core Beliefs in America at the War of Independence and at the Ratification of the Constitution', Homo Oeconomics 16: 433-62.
53. Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1979) 'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models', American Journal of Political Science 23: 27-59.
54. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast (1987) The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power', American Political Science Review 81: 84-104.
55. Segal, Jeffrey A. (1997) 'Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Law and Courts', American Political Science Review 91: 28-44.
56. Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth (1993) The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model. New York: Cambridge University Press.
57. Sinclair, Barbara (1992) 'The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives', Journal of Politics 54: 657-84.
58. Spaeth, Harold J. and Jeffrey A. Segal (1999) Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court. New York: Cambridge University Press.
59. Stearns, Maxwell L. (2000) Constitutional Process: A Social Choice Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Making. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
60. Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) 478 U.S. 30.
61. Weimer, David L. (1992) 'Claiming Races, Broiler Contracts, Heresthetics, and Habits: Ten Concepts for Policy Design', Policy Sciences 25: 135-39.
62. Weingast, Barry R. (1989) 'Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule', American Political Science Review 83: 795-815.