A folk theorem for repeated sequential games

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 493-512

  Wen, Quan ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036054811     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00214     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting
2. The folk theorem for repeated games: A NEU condition
3. Survey of repeated games
4. Finitely repeated games
5. Perfect equilibria in a negotiation model
6. Unobservable mixed disagreement actions in the negotiation model
7. A folk theorem for stochastic games
8. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information
9. On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
10. A non-cooperative equilibrium of supergames
11. Monotone games with positive spillovers
12. Genericity and Markovian behavior in stochastic games
13. Asynchronous choice in repeated coordination games
14. Are "anti-folk theorems" repeated games nongeneric?
15. Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
16. Remarks on infinitely repeated extensive-form games
17. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect finite horizon folk theorem
18. A note on repeated extensive games
19. The "folk" theorem for repeated games with complete information
20. A folk theorem for asynchronously repeated games