District formation and local social capital: A (tacit) co-opetition approach

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 65-92

  Soubeyran, Antoine ^a   Weber, Shlomo ^b,c  

^a Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

^b SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CORE ^*  (Belgium)

Author keywords

Agglomeration equilibrium; Dispersed equilibrium; Industrial districts; Local social capital; Spillovers

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036048832     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0094-1190(02)00005-0     Document Type: Article

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