Contract design and bargaining power

Economics Letters

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 171-176

  Inderst, Roman ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Regulation; Screening

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036006538     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00545-6     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Competitive price discrimination
2. Quality distortion by a discriminating monopolist
3. A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm
4. Screening in a matching market
5. Contract design in a market with frictions
6. Participation constraints in adverse selection models
7. The theory of incentives: An overview
8. Adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement
9. Optimal bypass and creamskimming
10. Inflexible rules in incentive problems
11. Renegotiation and optimality in agency contracts
12. Nonlinear pricing and oligopoly