Experience and structure: Philosophical history and the problem of consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 15-33

  Livingston, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036005153     PISSN: 13558250     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. Troubles with functionalism
2. Inverted earth
3. Agony in the schools
4. The physicalist language as the universal language of science
5. On protocol sentences
6. Functionalism, qualia, and intentionality
7. The "mental" and the "physical"
8. Explanations in psychology
9. The views of Charles Peirce on the given in experience
10. Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap
11. The sentiment of rationality
12. Zombies vs. Materialists
13. On leaving out what it's like
14. Qualia: Intrinsic, relational, or what?
15. An argument for the identity theory
16. Qualia: Now showing at a theater near you
17. What is the subjectivity of the mental?
18. Rigid designators and mind-brain identity
19. Unity of science as a working hypothesis
20. On a new list of categories
21. Should we expect to feel as if we understand consciousness?
22. Sensations and brain processes
23. Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos?