How to dissolve a partnership

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 158, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 66-80

  Moldovanu, Benny ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036004276     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456022975619     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (22)

1. The market for Lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism
2. Dissolving a partnership efficiently
3. Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
4. Ex ante incentive-efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
5. Mechanism theory
6. Efficient design with interdependent valuations
7. How (not) to sell nuclear weapons
8. Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
9. Convex potentials with an application to mechanism design
10. Auctions and privatizations
11. Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
12. Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
13. Optimal auction design
14. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
15. Bargaining under asymmetric information
16. Incentive efficiency of double auctions