Can mixed strategies be stable in asymmetric games?

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 210, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-14

  Binmore, Ken ^a   Samuelson, Larry ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANALYTIC METHOD; ANIMAL BEHAVIOR; ANIMAL MODEL; ARTICLE; CONFLICT; NONHUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; THEORY;

ACCIPITRINAE; ANIMALIA;

EID: 0035820668     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2083     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Evolutionarily stable mixed strategies in asymmetric games
2. Owner-intruder conflict, Grafen effect and self-assessment. The bourgeois principle re-examined
3. Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players
4. Games with randomly distributed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
5. The logic of animal conflict
6. A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal contests
7. On the definition of an evolutionarily stable strategy