Modeling instrumental rationality, land tenure and conflict resolution

Computational Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 251-257

  Amman, Hans M ^a,c   Duraiappah, Anantha Kumar ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT   (Canada)

^c EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Conflict resolution; Environmental degradation; Game theory; Institutional failure; Land tenure

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035735438     PISSN: 09277099     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1014811703866     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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