On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 147-165

  Hougaard, Jens Leth ^a   Peleg, Bezalel ^b   Thorlund Petersen, Lars ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^c Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Balanced games; Lorenz maximal imputations; The core

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035734028     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820100070     Document Type: Article

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