Compacts, Conventions, and Codes: Initiatives for Higher International Labor Standards

Cornell International Law Journal

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 487-500

  Basu, Kaushik ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035734008     PISSN: 00108812     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (56)

1. This view of ILS is explicit in Kaushik Basu, International Labor Standards and Child Labor, 42 CHALLENGE 80, 89 (1999) ; NANCY H. CHAU & RAVI KANBUR, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM, FROM THE BOTTOM (Cornell University, CEPR Working Paper No. 2687, 2000), available at http://www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/Kanbur/ck15.pdf.
2. This view of ILS is explicit in Kaushik Basu, International Labor Standards and Child Labor, 42 CHALLENGE 80, 89 (1999) ; NANCY H. CHAU & RAVI KANBUR, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM, FROM THE BOTTOM (Cornell University, CEPR Working Paper No. 2687, 2000), available at http://www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/Kanbur/ck15.pdf.
3. See Stanley Engerman, The History and Political Economy of International Labor Standards, mimeo: Rochester University (2001), available at http://www.egdi/gov.se/ pdf/study/study1.pdf; see also Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L. LAB. REV. 565 (1987).
4. See Stanley Engerman, The History and Political Economy of International Labor Standards, mimeo: Rochester University (2001), available at http://www.egdi/gov.se/ pdf/study/study1.pdf; see also Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L. LAB. REV. 565 (1987).
5. See FLORENCE KELLEY, SOME ETHICAL GAINS THROUGH LEGISLATION 3-104 (1905).
6. See id.; see also Carolyn M. Moehling, State Child Labor Laws and the Decline of Child Labor, 36 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 72, 74-78 (1999).
7. Kelley, supra note 3, at 91.
8. Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation and 'Fair Trade' Demands: Addressing the Environmental and Labour Standards Issues, 18 WORLD ECON. 745 (1995).
9. Engerman, supra note 2.
10. Alejandro Portes, When More Can be Less: Labor Standards, Development, and the Informal Economy, in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 219 (1990); KEITH E. MASKUS, SHOULD CORE LABOR STANDARDS BE IMPOSED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY? 4-7 (The World Bank, Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper, 1997); Nirvikar Singh, The Impact of International Labor Standards: A Survey of Economic Theory, mimeo: University of California, Santa Cruz (2001), available at http://www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/study/study2.pdf.
11. Alejandro Portes, When More Can be Less: Labor Standards, Development, and the Informal Economy, in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 219 (1990); KEITH E. MASKUS, SHOULD CORE LABOR STANDARDS BE IMPOSED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY? 4-7 (The World Bank, Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper, 1997); Nirvikar Singh, The Impact of International Labor Standards: A Survey of Economic Theory, mimeo: University of California, Santa Cruz (2001), available at http://www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/study/study2.pdf.
12. Alejandro Portes, When More Can be Less: Labor Standards, Development, and the Informal Economy, in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 219 (1990); KEITH E. MASKUS, SHOULD CORE LABOR STANDARDS BE IMPOSED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY? 4-7 (The World Bank, Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper, 1997); Nirvikar Singh, The Impact of International Labor Standards: A Survey of Economic Theory, mimeo: University of California, Santa Cruz (2001), available at http://www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/study/study2.pdf.
13. For discussion, see Kenneth A. Swinnerton, An Essay on Economic Efficiency and Core Labour Standards, 20 WORLD ECON. 73, 76-84 (1997).
14. Id.
15. Kaushik Basu, Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1083 (1999).
16. S. 613, 103rd Cong. (1993).
17. This is argued by JO BOYDEN & DEBORAH LEVINSON, CHILDREN AS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (EGDI Working Paper No. 1, 2000), available at http://www.edgi.gov.se/pdf/workpaper.pdf.
18. There is a lot of evidence that it is poverty that drives households to send their children to work. For cross-country evidence, see Alan Krueger, International Labor Standards and Trade, in THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1996 (Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1997). And for evidence based on inter-temporal micro data, see Eric Edmonds, Will Child Labor Decline with Improvements in Living Standards?, mimeo: Dartmouth College, available at http:// www.dartmouth.edu/-eedmonds/vnivc.pdf, and see also infra note 29.
19. There is a lot of evidence that it is poverty that drives households to send their children to work. For cross-country evidence, see Alan Krueger, International Labor Standards and Trade, in THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1996 (Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1997). And for evidence based on inter-temporal micro data, see Eric Edmonds, Will Child Labor Decline with Improvements in Living Standards?, mimeo: Dartmouth College, available at http:// www.dartmouth.edu/-eedmonds/vnivc.pdf, and see also infra note 29.
20. See UNICEF, Girls in Especially Difficult Circumstances: An Action Report, Kathmandu: UNICEF; Drusila Brown et al., US Trade and other Policy Options and Programs to Deter Foreign Exploitation of Child Labor (University of Michigan, Discussion Paper No. 433, 1999), available at http://www.spp.umich.edu/RSIE/workingpapers/wp.html.
21. See UNICEF, Girls in Especially Difficult Circumstances: An Action Report, Kathmandu: UNICEF; Drusila Brown et al., US Trade and other Policy Options and Programs to Deter Foreign Exploitation of Child Labor (University of Michigan, Discussion Paper No. 433, 1999), available at http://www.spp.umich.edu/RSIE/workingpapers/wp.html.
22. A superior extra-national legal action is the Sander's Amendment of the Tariff Act of 1930, which seeks to ban imports of goods that use forced child labor. This move towards distinguishing between different forms of child labor is a move in the right direction.
23. See Kaushik Basu & Pham Hoang Van, The Economics of Child Labor, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 412 (1998).
24. Robert Staiger, The International Organization and Enforcement of Labor Standards, mimeo: University of Wisconsin, available at http://www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/study/ study4.pdf.
25. Much has been written about the dangers of giving WTO the power to uphold ILS. E.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation and 'Fair Trade' Demands: Addressing the Environmental and Labour Standards Issues, 18 WORLD ECON. 745 (1995); see also T. N. Srinivasan, International Trade and Labor Standards from an Economic Perspective, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Pitou van Dijck & Gerrit Faber eds., 1996).
26. Much has been written about the dangers of giving WTO the power to uphold ILS. E.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation and 'Fair Trade' Demands: Addressing the Environmental and Labour Standards Issues, 18 WORLD ECON. 745 (1995); see also T. N. Srinivasan, International Trade and Labor Standards from an Economic Perspective, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Pitou van Dijck & Gerrit Faber eds., 1996).
27. Matt Moffett, Citrus Squeeze: U.S. Child-Labor Law Sparks a Trade Debate Over Brazilian Oranges, WALL ST. J., September 9, 1998, at A1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. For a very interesting suggestion of how to organize a flexible system, see Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 4. Their scheme shares the spirit of the UN Global Compact in one respect-they both place the primary responsibility for upholding standards on the corporations. However, the scheme does have important flaws. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Some Up, Some Down; Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap?; Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking; David Moberg, Union and the State; Guy Standing, Human Development; Heather White, Educating Worker; and Kaushik Basu, The View from the Tropics, in id.
31. For a very interesting suggestion of how to organize a flexible system, see Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 4. Their scheme shares the spirit of the UN Global Compact in one respect-they both place the primary responsibility for upholding standards on the corporations. However, the scheme does have important flaws. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Some Up, Some Down; Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap?; Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking; David Moberg, Union and the State; Guy Standing, Human Development; Heather White, Educating Worker; and Kaushik Basu, The View from the Tropics, in id.
32. For a very interesting suggestion of how to organize a flexible system, see Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 4. Their scheme shares the spirit of the UN Global Compact in one respect-they both place the primary responsibility for upholding standards on the corporations. However, the scheme does have important flaws. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Some Up, Some Down; Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap?; Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking; David Moberg, Union and the State; Guy Standing, Human Development; Heather White, Educating Worker; and Kaushik Basu, The View from the Tropics, in id.
33. For a very interesting suggestion of how to organize a flexible system, see Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 4. Their scheme shares the spirit of the UN Global Compact in one respect-they both place the primary responsibility for upholding standards on the corporations. However, the scheme does have important flaws. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Some Up, Some Down; Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap?; Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking; David Moberg, Union and the State; Guy Standing, Human Development; Heather White, Educating Worker; and Kaushik Basu, The View from the Tropics, in id.
34. For a very interesting suggestion of how to organize a flexible system, see Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 4. Their scheme shares the spirit of the UN Global Compact in one respect-they both place the primary responsibility for upholding standards on the corporations. However, the scheme does have important flaws. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Some Up, Some Down; Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap?; Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking; David Moberg, Union and the State; Guy Standing, Human Development; Heather White, Educating Worker; and Kaushik Basu, The View from the Tropics, in id.
35. For a very interesting suggestion of how to organize a flexible system, see Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 4. Their scheme shares the spirit of the UN Global Compact in one respect-they both place the primary responsibility for upholding standards on the corporations. However, the scheme does have important flaws. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Some Up, Some Down; Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap?; Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking; David Moberg, Union and the State; Guy Standing, Human Development; Heather White, Educating Worker; and Kaushik Basu, The View from the Tropics, in id.
36. For a very interesting suggestion of how to organize a flexible system, see Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 4. Their scheme shares the spirit of the UN Global Compact in one respect-they both place the primary responsibility for upholding standards on the corporations. However, the scheme does have important flaws. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Some Up, Some Down; Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap?; Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking; David Moberg, Union and the State; Guy Standing, Human Development; Heather White, Educating Worker; and Kaushik Basu, The View from the Tropics, in id.
37. For a very interesting suggestion of how to organize a flexible system, see Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards: How Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, BOSTON REV., Feb./Mar. 2001, at 4. Their scheme shares the spirit of the UN Global Compact in one respect-they both place the primary responsibility for upholding standards on the corporations. However, the scheme does have important flaws. See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Some Up, Some Down; Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap?; Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking; David Moberg, Union and the State; Guy Standing, Human Development; Heather White, Educating Worker; and Kaushik Basu, The View from the Tropics, in id.
38. For analyses of product labeling, see Drusilla K. Brown, A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of International Child Labor Standards, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICY (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000); ARNAB K. BASU ET AL., GUARANTEED MANUFACTURED WITHOUT CHILD LABOR (Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics, Cornell University, Working Paper 2000-04, 2000); S.L. Bachman, The Political Economy of Child Labor and Its Impact on International Business, 35 BUS. ECON. 30 (2000).
39. For analyses of product labeling, see Drusilla K. Brown, A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of International Child Labor Standards, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICY (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000); ARNAB K. BASU ET AL., GUARANTEED MANUFACTURED WITHOUT CHILD LABOR (Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics, Cornell University, Working Paper 2000-04, 2000); S.L. Bachman, The Political Economy of Child Labor and Its Impact on International Business, 35 BUS. ECON. 30 (2000).
40. For analyses of product labeling, see Drusilla K. Brown, A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of International Child Labor Standards, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICY (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000); ARNAB K. BASU ET AL., GUARANTEED MANUFACTURED WITHOUT CHILD LABOR (Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics, Cornell University, Working Paper 2000-04, 2000); S.L. Bachman, The Political Economy of Child Labor and Its Impact on International Business, 35 BUS. ECON. 30 (2000).
41. These and other statistics were compiled by the ILO in ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATIONS: ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, 1950-2010 (International Labor Organization CD-ROM, 1996).
42. For an interesting study in the context of Bangladesh of how global monitoring can backfire, see NAILA KABEER, THE POWER TO CHOOSE: BANGLADESHI WOMEN AND LABOUR MARKET DECISIONS IN LONDON AND DHAKA (2000).
43. E.g., Avinash Dixit, Comment on A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of International Child Labor Standards, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICY (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000); Saqib Jafarey & Sajal Lahiri, Will Trade Sanctions Reduce Child Labour? The Role of Credit Markets, mimeo: University of Essex.
44. E.g., Avinash Dixit, Comment on A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of International Child Labor Standards, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICY (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000); Saqib Jafarey & Sajal Lahiri, Will Trade Sanctions Reduce Child Labour? The Role of Credit Markets, mimeo: University of Essex.
45. See supra note 17; see also Swinnerton et al., The Economics of Child Labor: Comment, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1382 (1999). Very different kinds of problems arise with street children, but unfortunately on this there are as yet few studies, an exception being William Myers, Alternative Services for Street Children: The Brazilian Approach, in COMBATTING CHILD LABOR (Assefa Bequele & Jo Boyden eds., 1988).
46. See supra note 17; see also Swinnerton et al., The Economics of Child Labor: Comment, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1382 (1999). Very different kinds of problems arise with street children, but unfortunately on this there are as yet few studies, an exception being William Myers, Alternative Services for Street Children: The Brazilian Approach, in COMBATTING CHILD LABOR (Assefa Bequele & Jo Boyden eds., 1988).
47. See supra note 17; see also Swinnerton et al., The Economics of Child Labor: Comment, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1382 (1999). Very different kinds of problems arise with street children, but unfortunately on this there are as yet few studies, an exception being William Myers, Alternative Services for Street Children: The Brazilian Approach, in COMBATTING CHILD LABOR (Assefa Bequele & Jo Boyden eds., 1988).
48. There is ample evidence for the luxury axiom. For empirical studies that shed light on this axiom see, for instance, Ranjan Ray, Child Labor, Child Schooling, and Their Interaction with Adult Labor: Empirical Evidence for Peru and Pakistan, 14 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 347 (2000); Sonia Bhalotra, Is Child Work Necessary?, mimeo: University of Cambridge (2000); Patrick Emerson & Andre Souza Portela, Is There a Child Labor Trap? Inter-generational Persistence of Child Labor in Brazil, mimeo: Cornell University (2000), available at http://econ.cudenver.edu/emerson/childlabor/pdf; Samuel Freije and Luis F. Lopez-Calva, Child Labor, School Attendance, and Poverty in Mexico and Venezuela, mimeo: Cornell University (2000).
49. There is ample evidence for the luxury axiom. For empirical studies that shed light on this axiom see, for instance, Ranjan Ray, Child Labor, Child Schooling, and Their Interaction with Adult Labor: Empirical Evidence for Peru and Pakistan, 14 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 347 (2000); Sonia Bhalotra, Is Child Work Necessary?, mimeo: University of Cambridge (2000); Patrick Emerson & Andre Souza Portela, Is There a Child Labor Trap? Inter-generational Persistence of Child Labor in Brazil, mimeo: Cornell University (2000), available at http://econ.cudenver.edu/emerson/childlabor/pdf; Samuel Freije and Luis F. Lopez-Calva, Child Labor, School Attendance, and Poverty in Mexico and Venezuela, mimeo: Cornell University (2000).
50. There is ample evidence for the luxury axiom. For empirical studies that shed light on this axiom see, for instance, Ranjan Ray, Child Labor, Child Schooling, and Their Interaction with Adult Labor: Empirical Evidence for Peru and Pakistan, 14 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 347 (2000); Sonia Bhalotra, Is Child Work Necessary?, mimeo: University of Cambridge (2000); Patrick Emerson & Andre Souza Portela, Is There a Child Labor Trap? Inter-generational Persistence of Child Labor in Brazil, mimeo: Cornell University (2000), available at http://econ.cudenver.edu/emerson/childlabor/pdf; Samuel Freije and Luis F. Lopez-Calva, Child Labor, School Attendance, and Poverty in Mexico and Venezuela, mimeo: Cornell University (2000).
51. There is ample evidence for the luxury axiom. For empirical studies that shed light on this axiom see, for instance, Ranjan Ray, Child Labor, Child Schooling, and Their Interaction with Adult Labor: Empirical Evidence for Peru and Pakistan, 14 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 347 (2000); Sonia Bhalotra, Is Child Work Necessary?, mimeo: University of Cambridge (2000); Patrick Emerson & Andre Souza Portela, Is There a Child Labor Trap? Inter-generational Persistence of Child Labor in Brazil, mimeo: Cornell University (2000), available at http://econ.cudenver.edu/emerson/childlabor/pdf; Samuel Freije and Luis F. Lopez-Calva, Child Labor, School Attendance, and Poverty in Mexico and Venezuela, mimeo: Cornell University (2000).
52. Basu, supra note 1; CHAU & KANBUR, supra note 1.
53. I have discussed the role and consequences of "triadic" threats in my PRELUDE TO POLICITAL ECONOMY: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS (2000).
54. http://www.conservative.org/columnists/helms01202000.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2001) (my italics-but also my hunch that those would be Helms' italics).
55. See Jeffrey J. Schott & Jayashree Watal, Decision Making in the WTO, in INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE, 283, 285-286 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000).
56. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ADVISORY COMMISSION (2000), available at http://www.house/gov/jec/imf/meltzer.pdf.