A model of dominance and resource division among a group of animals of differing quality

Population Ecology

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 213-220

  Broom, M ^a   Ruxton, G D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Dominance hierarchy; Escalation; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Fighting cost; Fixed reward

Indexed keywords

AGGRESSION; DOMINANCE; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY;

ANIMALIA;

EID: 0035717538     PISSN: 14383896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10144-001-8185-5     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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2. Evolution in knockout conflicts. The variable strategy case
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5. Partitioning of reproduction in animal societies
6. A game model for dominance relations among group living animals
7. The logic of asymmetric contests
8. The Hawk-Dove game revisited: Effects of continuous variation in resource-holding potential on the frequency of escalation
9. Towards a theory of dominance hierarchy: Effects of assessment, group size and variation in fighting ability
10. Dynamics and evolution: Evolutionary stable attractors, invasion exponents and phenotype dynamics
11. Relatedness asymmetry and reproductive sharing in animal societies
12. A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts
13. A model for the evolution of despotic versus egalitarian societies