Economies of scope in endangered-species protection: Evidence from interest-group behavior

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 312-332

  Ando, Amy Whritenour ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENDANGERED SPECIES; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION; SPILLOVER EFFECT; WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0035705152     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.2000.1145     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Waiting to be protected under the Endangered Species Act: The political economy of regulatory delay
2. Species distributions, land values, and efficient conservation
3. A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence
4. Separating economic from political influences on government decisions
5. The determinants of pesticide regulation: A statistical analysis of EPA decision making
6. Geographic distribution of endangered species in the United States
7. Economic growth and the environment
8. Patterns of behavior in endangered species preservation
9. Conflicts and choices in biodiversity preservation
10. Toward a more general theory of regulation
11. Embedding in market demand systems
12. The case for diminishing marginal existence values
13. The theory of economic regulation
14. What exactly is an endangered species? An analysis of the U.S. endangered species list: 1985-1991