Duties to animals: The failure of Kant's moral theory

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 541-559

  Skidmore, J ^a  

^a IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035649875     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013708710493     Document Type: Review

References (49)

1. See Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 132-158; Thomas Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 67-75; and Thomas Hill, Autonomy and Self-respect (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
2. See Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 132-158; Thomas Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 67-75; and Thomas Hill, Autonomy and Self-respect (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
3. See Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 132-158; Thomas Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 67-75; and Thomas Hill, Autonomy and Self-respect (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
4. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, Louis Infield, trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 373.
5. Allen W. Wood, "Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (1998, suppl.), p. 194.
6. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981), p. 429.
7. See Thomas Hill, "Humanity as an End in Itself," Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory, p. 39, and Christine Korsgaard, "Formula of Humanity," Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 110.
8. See Thomas Hill, "Humanity as an End in Itself," Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory, p. 39, and Christine Korsgaard, "Formula of Humanity," Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 110.
9. See William Wright, "Treating Animals as Ends," Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (1993).
10. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 428.
11. See Korsgaard, op. cit., pp. 114-119.
12. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 428.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 436.
15. Ibid., p. 433.
16. Ibid., p. 434.
17. Korsgaard, op. cit., p. 131.
18. Ibid.
19. Wood, op. cit., p. 196.
20. Ibid., p. 198.
21. Ibid., p. 197.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 200.
24. Ibid.
25. See Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 446.
26. Herman, op. cit., p. 228.
27. Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 64.
28. Wood, op. cit., p. 208.
29. Ibid., p. 200.
30. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 150.
31. Ibid., p. 153.
32. Ibid., p. 152.
33. Ibid., p. 153.
34. Ibid., p. 152.
35. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 421.
36. Günther Patzig, Ökologische Ethik - innerhalb der Grenzen bloβer Vernunft, my trans. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), p. 14.
37. See Barbara Herman, op. cit., pp. 45-72.
38. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), esp. pp. 136-142.
39. O'Neill, op. cit., p. 84.
40. Herman, op. cit., p. 75.
41. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
42. Ibid., p. 54.
43. Christine Korsgaard, "Two Distinctions in Goodness," Creating the Kingdom of Ends, p.178.
44. Ibid., p. 181.
45. See Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 437.
46. Dan Egonnson, "Kant's Vegetarianism," Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (1997); and Lara Denis, "Kant's Conception of Duties Regarding Animals: Reconstruction and Reconsideration," History of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (2000).
47. Dan Egonnson, "Kant's Vegetarianism," Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (1997); and Lara Denis, "Kant's Conception of Duties Regarding Animals: Reconstruction and Reconsideration," History of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (2000).
48. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 36.
49. I owe thanks to several people. Norman Dahl and Sarah Holtman provided invaluable feedback on earlier drafts, and I benefited as well from comments made by Dale Jamieson and an anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Value Inquiry.