Economics of personnel and human resource management

Human Resource Management Review

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 431-452

  Gunderson, Morley ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Economics of human resource management; Personnel economics; Personnel phenomenon

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035648855     PISSN: 10534822     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1053-4822(01)00048-1     Document Type: Article

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