New threats, new identities and new ways of war: The sources of change in national security doctrine

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 43-76

  Goldman, Emily O ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035642633     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390108565554     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. See Glenn Chavetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, 'Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy', Security Studies 8/2-3 (Winter 1998/99-Spring 1999) p.xiii.
2. See for example, Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996).
3. As one study of Israel's national security puts it, 'If the old Israeli security environment was dangerous and unforgiving, it at least offered the advantages of relative clarity and predictability. Israelis knew who and what they were up against.The peace process has proved to be a mixed blessing for Israel. It has spawned new, sometimes deadly threats while simultaneously fostering higher expectations among Israeli citizens regarding peace and security. In the new environment, danger remains, but clarity and predictability have given way to ambiguity, uncertainty and a sense that the geopolitical setting in which Israeli military planners must operate remains highly unstable.' Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt and Andrew J. Bacevich, 'Israel's Revolution in Security Affairs', Survival 40/1 (Spring 1998) p.52.
4. How one identifies threats is often taken for granted by international relations theorists. Stephen Walt's notion of balancing against threats begs this important question. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1987).
5. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Evolution of U.S. National Strategy', in Daniel J. Kaufman et al. (eds.) US National Security for the 1990s (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1991) pp.11-12.
6. Richard K. Betts, 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe', International Security 17/1 (Summer 1992) p.34.
7. 'The Forgotten Dimension of Strategy', in Michael Howard (ed.) The Causes of War and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1983) pp.101-15.
8. For an overview of prospect theory, see Jack S. Levy, 'Introduction to Prospect Theory', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.171-86; Robert Jervis, 'Political Implications of Loss Aversion', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.187-204; and Jack S. Levy, 'Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.283-310. For an application of prospect theory to US post-Cold War strategy and foreign policy, see Emily O. Goldman and Larry Berman, 'Engaging the World: First Impressions of the Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy', in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (eds.) The Clinton Legacy (NY: Chatham House Publishers 2000) pp.238-42.
9. For an overview of prospect theory, see Jack S. Levy, 'Introduction to Prospect Theory', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.171-86; Robert Jervis, 'Political Implications of Loss Aversion', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.187-204; and Jack S. Levy, 'Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.283-310. For an application of prospect theory to US post-Cold War strategy and foreign policy, see Emily O. Goldman and Larry Berman, 'Engaging the World: First Impressions of the Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy', in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (eds.) The Clinton Legacy (NY: Chatham House Publishers 2000) pp.238-42.
10. For an overview of prospect theory, see Jack S. Levy, 'Introduction to Prospect Theory', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.171-86; Robert Jervis, 'Political Implications of Loss Aversion', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.187-204; and Jack S. Levy, 'Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.283-310. For an application of prospect theory to US post-Cold War strategy and foreign policy, see Emily O. Goldman and Larry Berman, 'Engaging the World: First Impressions of the Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy', in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (eds.) The Clinton Legacy (NY: Chatham House Publishers 2000) pp.238-42.
11. For an overview of prospect theory, see Jack S. Levy, 'Introduction to Prospect Theory', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.171-86; Robert Jervis, 'Political Implications of Loss Aversion', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.187-204; and Jack S. Levy, 'Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems', Political Psychology 13/2 (1992) pp.283-310. For an application of prospect theory to US post-Cold War strategy and foreign policy, see Emily O. Goldman and Larry Berman, 'Engaging the World: First Impressions of the Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy', in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (eds.) The Clinton Legacy (NY: Chatham House Publishers 2000) pp.238-42.
12. See Goldman and Berman (note 8) pp.233-38 for a discussion of Clinton's enlargement strategy.
13. Peter Trubowitz and Edward Rhodes, 'Explaining American Strategic Adjustment', in Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Rhodes (eds.) The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions and Interests (NY: Columbia UP 1999) p.8.
14. Edward Rhodes, 'Constructing Power: Cultural Transformation and Strategic Adjustment in the 1890s', in Trubowitz et al. (note 10) pp.29-78.
15. 'Israel at 50', The Economist (25 April-1 May 1998) p.7.
16. The literature on revolutions in military affairs, both historical and contemporary, is a broad one. See Clifford J. Rogers (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview 1995); Andrew Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions', The National Interest (Fall 1994) pp.10-42; Eliot A. Cohen, 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs 75/2 (March/April 1996) pp.37-54; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'Cyberwar is Coming!' Comparative Strategy 12/2 (April-June 1993) pp. 141-65; Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (NY: Warner 1993).
17. The literature on revolutions in military affairs, both historical and contemporary, is a broad one. See Clifford J. Rogers (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview 1995); Andrew Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions', The National Interest (Fall 1994) pp.10-42; Eliot A. Cohen, 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs 75/2 (March/April 1996) pp.37-54; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'Cyberwar is Coming!' Comparative Strategy 12/2 (April-June 1993) pp. 141-65; Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (NY: Warner 1993).
18. The literature on revolutions in military affairs, both historical and contemporary, is a broad one. See Clifford J. Rogers (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview 1995); Andrew Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions', The National Interest (Fall 1994) pp.10-42; Eliot A. Cohen, 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs 75/2 (March/April 1996) pp.37-54; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'Cyberwar is Coming!' Comparative Strategy 12/2 (April-June 1993) pp. 141-65; Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (NY: Warner 1993).
19. The literature on revolutions in military affairs, both historical and contemporary, is a broad one. See Clifford J. Rogers (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview 1995); Andrew Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions', The National Interest (Fall 1994) pp.10-42; Eliot A. Cohen, 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs 75/2 (March/April 1996) pp.37-54; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'Cyberwar is Coming!' Comparative Strategy 12/2 (April-June 1993) pp. 141-65; Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (NY: Warner 1993).
20. The literature on revolutions in military affairs, both historical and contemporary, is a broad one. See Clifford J. Rogers (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview 1995); Andrew Krepinevich, 'Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions', The National Interest (Fall 1994) pp.10-42; Eliot A. Cohen, 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs 75/2 (March/April 1996) pp.37-54; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'Cyberwar is Coming!' Comparative Strategy 12/2 (April-June 1993) pp. 141-65; Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (NY: Warner 1993).
21. For a discussion of the cascading effects of revolutionary military change, see Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (eds.) Adaptive Enemies, Reluctant Friends: The Impact of Diffusion on Military Practice, manuscript under review.
22. Thomas G. Mahnken, 'Why Third World Space Systems Matter', Orbis 35/4 (Fall 1991) pp.563-79.
23. Gregorian (see below) pp.142-7 argues Third World countries have a strong incentive to introduce new innovative systems, like GPS, that will significantly enhance their military capabilities. Moreover, GPS eliminates two major obstacles Third World countries have faced: incompatibility with existing systems and dependence on suppliers. GPS is easy to integrate into current systems and can be bought commercially, eliminating any major obstacle to technology acquisition. Finally, targeting for GPS-guided munitions though satellite reconnaissance is an avenue now open to many developing states. Raffi Gregorian, 'Global Positioning Systems: A Military Revolution for the Third World?' SAIS Review 13/1 (Winter-Spring 1993) pp.133-48.
24. Richard J. Harknett, 'The Information Technology Network and the Ability to Deter: The Impact of Organizational Change on 21st Century Conflict', Paper prepared for the JCISS/Security Studies Conference on the Revolution in Military Affairs, Monterey, CA, 26-29 Aug. 1996, pp.32-4; Arquilla and Ronfeldt (note 13).
25. Cohen (note 13) pp.45-6; Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare; Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway (NY: Thunder's Mouth Press 1996).
26. Donald E. Ryan Jr, 'Implications of Information-Based Warfare', Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1994-95) p. 115.
27. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (note 13) pp.144-6.
28. Harknett (note 17) p.37 notes while 'the United States may have required an advanced technological infrastructure to produce the global positioning satellite system ... ... now all one has to do is go down to Radio Shack to purchase a GPS monitor to access the system.'
29. Chris C, Demchak, 'Watersheds in Perception and Knowledge: Twenty Years of Military Technology', draft manuscript (June 1999) p.15.
30. Chris C. Demchak, 'Creating the Enemy: Global Diffusion of the IT-Based Military Model', in Goldman and Eliason, (note 14).
31. Chris C. Demchak, 'RMA in Developing States: Botswana, Chile and Thailand; Dilemmas of Image, Operations and Democracy', paper prepared for National Security Studies Quarterly Conference, 'Buck Rogers or Rock Throwers? Technology Diffusion, International Military Modernization, and the International Response to the Revolution in Military Affairs', 14 Oct. 1999, Washington DC, p.5.
32. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984); Paul Kennedy (ed.) Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1991); Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.) The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1993).
33. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984); Paul Kennedy (ed.) Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1991); Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.) The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1993).
34. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984); Paul Kennedy (ed.) Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1991); Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.) The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1993).
35. John Braeman, 'Power and Diplomacy: The 1920s Reappraised', Review of Politics 44 (July 1982) p.345.
36. Joao Resende-Santos, 'Anarchy and Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organizations and Technology in South America, 1870-1930', Security Studies 5/3 (Spring 1996) p.196.
37. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979) p.127.
38. Jan S. Breemer, 'Technological Change and the New Calculus of War: The United States Builds a New Navy', in Turbowitz et al. (note 10) p.218.
39. Chaim Kaufman and Charles L. Glaser, 'Establishing the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory', paper presented at the NATO Symposium on 'Military Stability', 12-14 June, 1995, Brussels, pp.12-13.
40. This definition is adopted from Kaufman and Glaser (note 30) p.20. For similar definitions, see Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics 30/2 (Jan. 1978) p. 188; Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help', International Security 19/3 (Winter 1994/95) pp.61-2. Jack S. Levy, 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis', International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984) pp.222-30 lists other definitions. Most depend upon territorial conquest. For Jervis (p.187), an offensive advantage means that 'it is easier to destroy the other's army and take its territory than it is to defend one's own' and a defensive advantage means that 'it is easier to protect and hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take'. George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (NY: Wiley 1977) p.15, writes 'the territorial fixation logically establishes our distinction between offense and defense.'
41. This definition is adopted from Kaufman and Glaser (note 30) p.20. For similar definitions, see Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics 30/2 (Jan. 1978) p. 188; Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help', International Security 19/3 (Winter 1994/95) pp.61-2. Jack S. Levy, 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis', International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984) pp.222-30 lists other definitions. Most depend upon territorial conquest. For Jervis (p.187), an offensive advantage means that 'it is easier to destroy the other's army and take its territory than it is to defend one's own' and a defensive advantage means that 'it is easier to protect and hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take'. George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (NY: Wiley 1977) p.15, writes 'the territorial fixation logically establishes our distinction between offense and defense.'
42. This definition is adopted from Kaufman and Glaser (note 30) p.20. For similar definitions, see Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics 30/2 (Jan. 1978) p. 188; Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help', International Security 19/3 (Winter 1994/95) pp.61-2. Jack S. Levy, 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis', International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984) pp.222-30 lists other definitions. Most depend upon territorial conquest. For Jervis (p.187), an offensive advantage means that 'it is easier to destroy the other's army and take its territory than it is to defend one's own' and a defensive advantage means that 'it is easier to protect and hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take'. George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (NY: Wiley 1977) p.15, writes 'the territorial fixation logically establishes our distinction between offense and defense.'
43. This definition is adopted from Kaufman and Glaser (note 30) p.20. For similar definitions, see Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics 30/2 (Jan. 1978) p. 188; Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help', International Security 19/3 (Winter 1994/95) pp.61-2. Jack S. Levy, 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis', International Studies Quarterly 28 (1984) pp.222-30 lists other definitions. Most depend upon territorial conquest. For Jervis (p.187), an offensive advantage means that 'it is easier to destroy the other's army and take its territory than it is to defend one's own' and a defensive advantage means that 'it is easier to protect and hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take'. George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (NY: Wiley 1977) p.15, writes 'the territorial fixation logically establishes our distinction between offense and defense.'
44. One common critique of the offense-defense approach is the difficulty of classifying different technologies as offensive or defensive.This may not be a problem for our purposes since the critical issue is how weapons are incorporated into an overall military strategy. At this level, it is possible to distinguish offensive from defensive strategies and to determine which bundles of weapons favor a strategy of political consolidation and which favor a strategy of local defense.See Kaufman and Glaser (note 30) pp.69-75.
45. Resende-Santos (note 27) p.218.
46. Ibid, p.217.
47. Ibid, pp.219-20.
48. Richard J. Harknett and the JCISS Study Group, 'The Risks of a Networked Military', Orbis 44 (Winter 2000) p.132.
49. Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics (NY: Harcourt, Brace, and World 1942) p.447.
50. Arnold Wolfers, 'The Determinants of Foreign Policy', in idem, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press 1962) p.42.
51. Michael I. Handel, 'The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity in the Quest for Absolute Security', in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds.) The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (NY: Cambridge UP 1994) pp.534-35.
52. Donald Cameron Watt, Too Serious a Business: European Armed Forces and the Approach to the Second World War (Berkeley: U. of California Press 1975) p.95.
53. See Posen (note 25); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Kimberly Martin Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 (Princeton UP 1993).
54. See Posen (note 25); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Kimberly Martin Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 (Princeton UP 1993).
55. See for example Rosecrance and Stein (note 25).
56. Peter Trubowitz, 'Geography and Strategy: The Politics of American Naval Expansion', in Trubowitz et al. (note 10) pp.105-29.
57. Ibid. pp.126-29.
58. Rhodes (note 11).
59. Miroslav Nincic, Roger Rose, and Gerard Gorski, 'The Social Foundations of Strategic Adjustment', in Trubowitz et al. (note 10) p.179.
60. See Posen (note 25); Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1977); Timothy David Moy, 'Hitting the Beaches and Bombing the Cities: Doctrine and Technology for Two New Militaries, 1920-1940', (PhD Dissertation, U. of California at Berkeley 1987); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown 1971); Edward L. Katzenbach Jr, 'The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy Response', Public Policy 7 (1958) pp.120-49; and Herbert Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change (University: U. of Alabama Press 1971).
61. See Posen (note 25); Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1977); Timothy David Moy, 'Hitting the Beaches and Bombing the Cities: Doctrine and Technology for Two New Militaries, 1920-1940', (PhD Dissertation, U. of California at Berkeley 1987); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown 1971); Edward L. Katzenbach Jr, 'The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy Response', Public Policy 7 (1958) pp.120-49; and Herbert Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change (University: U. of Alabama Press 1971).
62. See Posen (note 25); Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1977); Timothy David Moy, 'Hitting the Beaches and Bombing the Cities: Doctrine and Technology for Two New Militaries, 1920-1940', (PhD Dissertation, U. of California at Berkeley 1987); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown 1971); Edward L. Katzenbach Jr, 'The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy Response', Public Policy 7 (1958) pp.120-49; and Herbert Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change (University: U. of Alabama Press 1971).
63. See Posen (note 25); Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1977); Timothy David Moy, 'Hitting the Beaches and Bombing the Cities: Doctrine and Technology for Two New Militaries, 1920-1940', (PhD Dissertation, U. of California at Berkeley 1987); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown 1971); Edward L. Katzenbach Jr, 'The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy Response', Public Policy 7 (1958) pp.120-49; and Herbert Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change (University: U. of Alabama Press 1971).
64. See Posen (note 25); Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1977); Timothy David Moy, 'Hitting the Beaches and Bombing the Cities: Doctrine and Technology for Two New Militaries, 1920-1940', (PhD Dissertation, U. of California at Berkeley 1987); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown 1971); Edward L. Katzenbach Jr, 'The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy Response', Public Policy 7 (1958) pp.120-49; and Herbert Kaufman, The Limits of Organizational Change (University: U. of Alabama Press 1971).
65. Posen (note 25); Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War', International Security 9/1 (Summer 1984) pp.58-107; Jack Snyder, 'Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984', International Security 9/1 (Summer 1984) pp.108-46; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984).
66. Posen (note 25); Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War', International Security 9/1 (Summer 1984) pp.58-107; Jack Snyder, 'Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984', International Security 9/1 (Summer 1984) pp.108-46; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984).
67. Posen (note 25); Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War', International Security 9/1 (Summer 1984) pp.58-107; Jack Snyder, 'Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984', International Security 9/1 (Summer 1984) pp.108-46; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984).
68. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1957).
69. Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1995); Elizabeth Kier, 'Culture and Military Doctrine: France' Between the Wars', International Security 19/4 (Spring 1995); Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996).
70. Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1995); Elizabeth Kier, 'Culture and Military Doctrine: France' Between the Wars', International Security 19/4 (Spring 1995); Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996).
71. Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1995); Elizabeth Kier, 'Culture and Military Doctrine: France' Between the Wars', International Security 19/4 (Spring 1995); Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996).
72. John Child, 'Organizational Structure, Environment, and Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice', Sociology 6/1 (1972) pp.1-22; Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royster Greenwood, 'The Structuring of Organizational Structures', Administrative Science Quarterly 25/1 (1980) pp.1-17; Rosen, Winning the Next War (note 41).
73. John Child, 'Organizational Structure, Environment, and Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice', Sociology 6/1 (1972) pp.1-22; Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royster Greenwood, 'The Structuring of Organizational Structures', Administrative Science Quarterly 25/1 (1980) pp.1-17; Rosen, Winning the Next War (note 41).
74. John Child, 'Organizational Structure, Environment, and Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice', Sociology 6/1 (1972) pp.1-22; Stewart Ranson, Bob Hinings, and Royster Greenwood, 'The Structuring of Organizational Structures', Administrative Science Quarterly 25/1 (1980) pp.1-17; Rosen, Winning the Next War (note 41).
75. Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (NY: Columbia UP 1994).
76. It is interesting that despite some provocative recent scholarship that casts serious doubt on bureaucratic interpretations of the military (see in particular Edward Rhodes, 'Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings From the Case of the US Navy', World Politics 47/1 (Oct. 1994), this model continues to hold tremendous sway in the academic and policy communities. A survey of recent writings on military behavior reveals that scholars always feel the need to engage the bureaucratic interpretation, regardless of what particular perspective they are championing. Rhodes discusses some of the reasons why this may be so.
77. Posen (note 25).
78. Handel (note 39) pp.555, 563.
79. Louis Morton, 'Interservice Cooperation and Political-Military Collaboration', in Harry L. Coles (ed.) Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military (Columbus: Ohio State UP 1962) p.149; Ernest R. May, 'The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States', Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955) pp.161-80.
80. Louis Morton, 'Interservice Cooperation and Political-Military Collaboration', in Harry L. Coles (ed.) Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military (Columbus: Ohio State UP 1962) p.149; Ernest R. May, 'The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States', Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955) pp.161-80.
81. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1993).
82. James Kurth, 'The Real Clash', The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994) p.13.
83. Jonathan Mercer, 'Anarchy and Identity', International Organization 49/2 (Spring 1995) pp.229-52.
84. Kal J. Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', International Studies Quarterly 14/3 (Sept. 1970) pp.233-309.
85. Richard Hermann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, 'Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model', International Organization 49/3 (Summer 1995) pp.415-50.
86. The rational-natural-open systems typology of organizations is presented in W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems, 3rd ed. (NJ: Prentice Hall 1992), and adopted by Theo Farrell in his fine review of the literature on military innovation.Theo Farrell, 'Figuring Out Fighting Organizations: The New Organisational Analysis In Strategic Studies', Journal of Strategic Studies 19/1 (March 1996) pp.122-35.
87. The rational-natural-open systems typology of organizations is presented in W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems, 3rd ed. (NJ: Prentice Hall 1992), and adopted by Theo Farrell in his fine review of the literature on military innovation.Theo Farrell, 'Figuring Out Fighting Organizations: The New Organisational Analysis In Strategic Studies', Journal of Strategic Studies 19/1 (March 1996) pp.122-35.
88. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Uncertainty of the Past: Organizational Learning Under Ambiguity', European Journal of Political Research 3 (1975) pp.147-71.
89. Ibid. pp.147-8.
90. Ibid. p. 168. There have been attempts to examine military organizations from an open systems perspective, but little work that takes an organizational learning perspective. See Emily O. Goldman, 'The US Military in Uncertain Times: Organizations, Ambiguity, and Strategic Adjustment', Journal of Strategic Studies 20/2 (Spring 1997) pp.41-74 for an organizational learning perspective on military innovation.
91. Ibid. p. 168. There have been attempts to examine military organizations from an open systems perspective, but little work that takes an organizational learning perspective. See Emily O. Goldman, 'The US Military in Uncertain Times: Organizations, Ambiguity, and Strategic Adjustment', Journal of Strategic Studies 20/2 (Spring 1997) pp.41-74 for an organizational learning perspective on military innovation.
92. Jack S. Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield', International Organization 48/2 (Spring 1994) p.296.
93. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (eds.) Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge, UK: CUP 1982).
94. Lynn Eden defines frames as 'ways of knowing and doing by those in an organization, coherent sets of organizing ideas and social practices, that structure how actors in organizations identify problems and find solutions. Frames incorporate assumptions and knowledge about the world, articulate or assume purpose, define problems, and shape the search for solutions.' Lynn Eden, 'Constructing Destruction: The Making of Organizational Knowledge about the Effects of US Nuclear Weapons', (1995) draft manuscript cited in Theo Farrell, 'Innovation in Military Organizations Without Enemies', paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA, 16-20 April 1996, pp.6-7.
95. Lynn Eden defines frames as 'ways of knowing and doing by those in an organization, coherent sets of organizing ideas and social practices, that structure how actors in organizations identify problems and find solutions. Frames incorporate assumptions and knowledge about the world, articulate or assume purpose, define problems, and shape the search for solutions.' Lynn Eden, 'Constructing Destruction: The Making of Organizational Knowledge about the Effects of US Nuclear Weapons', (1995) draft manuscript cited in Theo Farrell, 'Innovation in Military Organizations Without Enemies', paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA, 16-20 April 1996, pp.6-7.
96. Barbara Levitt and James G. March, 'Organizational Learning', Annual Review of Sociology 14 (1988) p.324.
97. Goldman, 'The US Military in Uncertain Times' (note 64).
98. Shelley Taylor, 'The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction', in Kahneman et al. Judgment Under Uncertainty, (note 67) pp. 190-200; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability', Cognitive Psychology 5 (1973) pp.207-32; idem, 'Judgment Under Uncertainty', Science 185 (1974) pp.1124-31.
99. Shelley Taylor, 'The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction', in Kahneman et al. Judgment Under Uncertainty, (note 67) pp. 190-200; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability', Cognitive Psychology 5 (1973) pp.207-32; idem, 'Judgment Under Uncertainty', Science 185 (1974) pp.1124-31.
100. Shelley Taylor, 'The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction', in Kahneman et al. Judgment Under Uncertainty, (note 67) pp. 190-200; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability', Cognitive Psychology 5 (1973) pp.207-32; idem, 'Judgment Under Uncertainty', Science 185 (1974) pp.1124-31.
101. H. Suganami, 'Japan's Entry into International Society', in Peter Kornicki (ed.) Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History 1868-1912, Vol.1 (London: Routledge 1998) p.9; Emily O. Goldman, 'The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan', in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds.) The Sources of Military Change: Military Organizations and Their Changing Environments (forthcoming, Lynne Rienner).
102. H. Suganami, 'Japan's Entry into International Society', in Peter Kornicki (ed.) Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History 1868-1912, Vol.1 (London: Routledge 1998) p.9; Emily O. Goldman, 'The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan', in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds.) The Sources of Military Change: Military Organizations and Their Changing Environments (forthcoming, Lynne Rienner).
103. Akira Iriye, 'Japan's Drive to Great-Power Status', in Kornicki (note 72) p.48.
104. Ibid, pp.48, 57-8.
105. Ibid, pp.60-1.
106. See Demchak, 'Creating the Enemy' (note 23); Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, 'Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Cornell UP 1996) pp.79-113.
107. See Demchak, 'Creating the Enemy' (note 23); Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, 'Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Cornell UP 1996) pp.79-113.
108. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', American Sociological Review 48 (April 1983) p.148.
109. Demchak, 'Creating the Enemy' (note 23).
110. DiMaggio and Powell (note 77).
111. D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1987) pp.28-31.
112. Theo Farrell, 'World Culture and Military Change in Post-Revolutionary Ireland', in Farrell and Terriff, The Sources of Military Change (note 72) p.30.
113. See George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (U. of Chicago Press 1951) esp. pp.23-37.
114. Melvyn Leffler, 'Political Isolationism, Economic Expansion or Diplomatic Realism? American Policy Toward Western Europe, 1921-1933', Perspectives in American History 8 (1974) pp.413-61.
115. It is important to have several ways to assess these distinctions in resource allocation priorities because technological changes may render some of the characterizations obsolete over time. In particular, in the information age, distinguishing between civilian and military technologies has become very difficult because commercial technologies increasingly have military applications. Moreover, information technologies are driven as much by the civilian commercial economy as by government-sponsored military research and development.
116. This continuum challenges the characterization of diplomatic posture as isolationist or interventionist.The isolationist-interventionist continuum obscures important variation in the nature of intervention or engagement.
117. One scholar studying the relationship between strategic choice and strategic culture recently argued the benefits of examining a limited, ranked set of grand strategic preferences instead of the menu of strategic options approach that I adopt. Johnston contends that using ranked preferences eases cross-societal analysis because one can more easily compare the weights assigned to different choices across societies.The use of ranked preferences as the empirical referent should, he argues, also yield more explicit predictions about choice than an unranked menu of choices.Toward this end, Johnston develops a central paradigm of strategic culture, which consists of assumptions about the role of war (inevitable or aberrant), the nature of the threat (zero-sum or variable sum), and the efficacy of force.These three dimensions are designed to capture the nature of the strategic environment.They produce a continuum spanning from hard realpolitik to soft idealpolitik. Strategic options, or actual grand strategy, should flow logically from a state's strategic paradigm, spanning offensive, militaristic strategies to accommodationist, diplomatic approaches. Setting the notion of strategic culture aside, the key issue raised is how to operationalize the dependent variable, strategic choice or response.The typological approach ties different strategy types primarily to how the threat is defined. It seeks to expand the conceptualization of the threat beyond zero-sum-variable sum dichotomy so that we do not lose the richness of grand strategy content. See Alastair lain Johnston, 'Thinking About Strategic Culture', International Security 19/4 (Spring 1995) pp.46-9.
118. George Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: The White House 1990) p.7.
119. Fred C. Bergsten, 'The Primacy of Economics', in Eugene R. Witkopf (ed.) The Future of American Foreign Policy (NY: St Martin's Press 1994) p.96.
120. Paul Kennedy, 'American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning from the European Experience', in Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace (note 25) p.184.