"Third down with a yard to go": Recursive expected utility and the Dixit-Skeath conundrum

Economics Letters

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 275-286

  Grant, Simon ^a,b   Kajii, Atsushi ^c   Polak, Ben ^d  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b Fac Econ Comm Australian N   (Australia)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA   (Japan)

^d YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

C72; Comparative statics; D81; Non expected utility; Recursive expected utility; Strictly competitive games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035642072     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00496-7     Document Type: Article

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