Ideology, democracy and the limits of equilibrium: A Schumpeterian critique

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 355-388

  Medearis, John ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035635716     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S000712340100014X     Document Type: Article

References (174)

1. Kenneth Arrow, 'Economic Equilibrium', in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 376-89, at p. 376.
2. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass:. Harvard University Press, 1971).
3. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
4. Peter C. Ordeshook, 'Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry: A Comment on William Riker's "Implications for the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions"', in P. C. Ordeshook and K. A. Shepsle, eds, Political Equilibrium (Boston, Mass.: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 25-31, at p. 25.
5. Tom Bottomore, Between Marginalism and Marxism: The Economic Sociology of J. A. Schumpeter (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992); John Medearis, 'Schumpeter, the New Deal, and Democracy', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 819-32, at p. 821; Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 12-21; Yuichi Shionoya, 'The Origin of the Schumpeterian Research Program: A Chapter Omitted from Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1990), 314-27; Richard Swedberg, Joseph A. Schumpeter: His Life and Work (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
6. Tom Bottomore, Between Marginalism and Marxism: The Economic Sociology of J. A. Schumpeter (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992); John Medearis, 'Schumpeter, the New Deal, and Democracy', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 819-32, at p. 821; Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 12-21; Yuichi Shionoya, 'The Origin of the Schumpeterian Research Program: A Chapter Omitted from Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1990), 314-27; Richard Swedberg, Joseph A. Schumpeter: His Life and Work (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
7. Tom Bottomore, Between Marginalism and Marxism: The Economic Sociology of J. A. Schumpeter (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992); John Medearis, 'Schumpeter, the New Deal, and Democracy', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 819-32, at p. 821; Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 12-21; Yuichi Shionoya, 'The Origin of the Schumpeterian Research Program: A Chapter Omitted from Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1990), 314-27; Richard Swedberg, Joseph A. Schumpeter: His Life and Work (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
8. Tom Bottomore, Between Marginalism and Marxism: The Economic Sociology of J. A. Schumpeter (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992); John Medearis, 'Schumpeter, the New Deal, and Democracy', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 819-32, at p. 821; Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 12-21; Yuichi Shionoya, 'The Origin of the Schumpeterian Research Program: A Chapter Omitted from Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1990), 314-27; Richard Swedberg, Joseph A. Schumpeter: His Life and Work (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
9. Tom Bottomore, Between Marginalism and Marxism: The Economic Sociology of J. A. Schumpeter (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992); John Medearis, 'Schumpeter, the New Deal, and Democracy', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 819-32, at p. 821; Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 12-21; Yuichi Shionoya, 'The Origin of the Schumpeterian Research Program: A Chapter Omitted from Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146 (1990), 314-27; Richard Swedberg, Joseph A. Schumpeter: His Life and Work (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
10. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3d edn (New York: Harper Torchbooks, [1942] 1976).
11. Peter Ordeshook, 'Constitutional Stability', Constitutional Political Economy, 3 (1992), 137-75; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Przeworski, 'Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense', in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds, Democracy's Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 23-55; Barry R. Weingast, 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Federalism, Markets, and Economic Development', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11 (1995), 1-31; Weingast, 'The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 245-63.
12. Peter Ordeshook, 'Constitutional Stability', Constitutional Political Economy, 3 (1992), 137-75; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Przeworski, 'Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense', in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds, Democracy's Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 23-55; Barry R. Weingast, 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Federalism, Markets, and Economic Development', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11 (1995), 1-31; Weingast, 'The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 245-63.
13. Peter Ordeshook, 'Constitutional Stability', Constitutional Political Economy, 3 (1992), 137-75; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Przeworski, 'Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense', in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds, Democracy's Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 23-55; Barry R. Weingast, 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Federalism, Markets, and Economic Development', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11 (1995), 1-31; Weingast, 'The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 245-63.
14. Peter Ordeshook, 'Constitutional Stability', Constitutional Political Economy, 3 (1992), 137-75; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Przeworski, 'Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense', in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds, Democracy's Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 23-55; Barry R. Weingast, 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Federalism, Markets, and Economic Development', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11 (1995), 1-31; Weingast, 'The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 245-63.
15. Peter Ordeshook, 'Constitutional Stability', Constitutional Political Economy, 3 (1992), 137-75; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Przeworski, 'Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense', in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds, Democracy's Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 23-55; Barry R. Weingast, 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Federalism, Markets, and Economic Development', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11 (1995), 1-31; Weingast, 'The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law', American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 245-63.
16. Much critique of rational choice theory throws doubt on the idea that the model of a human agent as a rational maximizer is adequate for social science or philosophy. This article does not provide such a critique of rational choice theory. Such criticisms typically focus on the importance of the meaningful and communicative dimensions of conduct, on 'commitment', altruistic behaviour, and norm-or value-governed behaviour. The contributions to this discussion are too numerous to cite. But for some basic statements and the way in which such critiques have been viewed, answered and incorporated by some rational choice theorists, see Jon Elster, 'Selfishness and Altruism', in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 44-53; John Ferejohn, 'Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England', in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 279-305; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. I, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984), esp. pp. 75-101; Mansbridge, 'The Rise and Fall of Self-interest in the Explanation of Public Life', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest; Amartya K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory', in Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 87-109; Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds, Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 25-71; Albert S. Yee, 'Thick Rationality and the Missing "Brute Fact": The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 1001-39. A different approach, reviewing the track record of rational choice approaches, is taken by Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).
17. Much critique of rational choice theory throws doubt on the idea that the model of a human agent as a rational maximizer is adequate for social science or philosophy. This article does not provide such a critique of rational choice theory. Such criticisms typically focus on the importance of the meaningful and communicative dimensions of conduct, on 'commitment', altruistic behaviour, and norm-or value-governed behaviour. The contributions to this discussion are too numerous to cite. But for some basic statements and the way in which such critiques have been viewed, answered and incorporated by some rational choice theorists, see Jon Elster, 'Selfishness and Altruism', in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 44-53; John Ferejohn, 'Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England', in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 279-305; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. I, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984), esp. pp. 75-101; Mansbridge, 'The Rise and Fall of Self-interest in the Explanation of Public Life', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest; Amartya K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory', in Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 87-109; Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds, Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 25-71; Albert S. Yee, 'Thick Rationality and the Missing "Brute Fact": The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 1001-39. A different approach, reviewing the track record of rational choice approaches, is taken by Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).
18. Much critique of rational choice theory throws doubt on the idea that the model of a human agent as a rational maximizer is adequate for social science or philosophy. This article does not provide such a critique of rational choice theory. Such criticisms typically focus on the importance of the meaningful and communicative dimensions of conduct, on 'commitment', altruistic behaviour, and norm-or value-governed behaviour. The contributions to this discussion are too numerous to cite. But for some basic statements and the way in which such critiques have been viewed, answered and incorporated by some rational choice theorists, see Jon Elster, 'Selfishness and Altruism', in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 44-53; John Ferejohn, 'Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England', in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 279-305; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. I, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984), esp. pp. 75-101; Mansbridge, 'The Rise and Fall of Self-interest in the Explanation of Public Life', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest; Amartya K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory', in Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 87-109; Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds, Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 25-71; Albert S. Yee, 'Thick Rationality and the Missing "Brute Fact": The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 1001-39. A different approach, reviewing the track record of rational choice approaches, is taken by Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).
19. Much critique of rational choice theory throws doubt on the idea that the model of a human agent as a rational maximizer is adequate for social science or philosophy. This article does not provide such a critique of rational choice theory. Such criticisms typically focus on the importance of the meaningful and communicative dimensions of conduct, on 'commitment', altruistic behaviour, and norm-or value-governed behaviour. The contributions to this discussion are too numerous to cite. But for some basic statements and the way in which such critiques have been viewed, answered and incorporated by some rational choice theorists, see Jon Elster, 'Selfishness and Altruism', in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 44-53; John Ferejohn, 'Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England', in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 279-305; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. I, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984), esp. pp. 75-101; Mansbridge, 'The Rise and Fall of Self-interest in the Explanation of Public Life', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest; Amartya K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory', in Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 87-109; Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds, Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 25-71; Albert S. Yee, 'Thick Rationality and the Missing "Brute Fact": The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 1001-39. A different approach, reviewing the track record of rational choice approaches, is taken by Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).
20. Much critique of rational choice theory throws doubt on the idea that the model of a human agent as a rational maximizer is adequate for social science or philosophy. This article does not provide such a critique of rational choice theory. Such criticisms typically focus on the importance of the meaningful and communicative dimensions of conduct, on 'commitment', altruistic behaviour, and norm-or value-governed behaviour. The contributions to this discussion are too numerous to cite. But for some basic statements and the way in which such critiques have been viewed, answered and incorporated by some rational choice theorists, see Jon Elster, 'Selfishness and Altruism', in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 44-53; John Ferejohn, 'Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England', in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 279-305; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. I, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984), esp. pp. 75-101; Mansbridge, 'The Rise and Fall of Self-interest in the Explanation of Public Life', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest; Amartya K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory', in Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 87-109; Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds, Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 25-71; Albert S. Yee, 'Thick Rationality and the Missing "Brute Fact": The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 1001-39. A different approach, reviewing the track record of rational choice approaches, is taken by Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).
21. Much critique of rational choice theory throws doubt on the idea that the model of a human agent as a rational maximizer is adequate for social science or philosophy. This article does not provide such a critique of rational choice theory. Such criticisms typically focus on the importance of the meaningful and communicative dimensions of conduct, on 'commitment', altruistic behaviour, and norm-or value-governed behaviour. The contributions to this discussion are too numerous to cite. But for some basic statements and the way in which such critiques have been viewed, answered and incorporated by some rational choice theorists, see Jon Elster, 'Selfishness and Altruism', in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 44-53; John Ferejohn, 'Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England', in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 279-305; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. I, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984), esp. pp. 75-101; Mansbridge, 'The Rise and Fall of Self-interest in the Explanation of Public Life', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest; Amartya K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory', in Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 87-109; Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds, Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 25-71; Albert S. Yee, 'Thick Rationality and the Missing "Brute Fact": The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 1001-39. A different approach, reviewing the track record of rational choice approaches, is taken by Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).
22. Much critique of rational choice theory throws doubt on the idea that the model of a human agent as a rational maximizer is adequate for social science or philosophy. This article does not provide such a critique of rational choice theory. Such criticisms typically focus on the importance of the meaningful and communicative dimensions of conduct, on 'commitment', altruistic behaviour, and norm-or value-governed behaviour. The contributions to this discussion are too numerous to cite. But for some basic statements and the way in which such critiques have been viewed, answered and incorporated by some rational choice theorists, see Jon Elster, 'Selfishness and Altruism', in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 44-53; John Ferejohn, 'Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England', in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 279-305; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. I, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984), esp. pp. 75-101; Mansbridge, 'The Rise and Fall of Self-interest in the Explanation of Public Life', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest; Amartya K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory', in Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 87-109; Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds, Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 25-71; Albert S. Yee, 'Thick Rationality and the Missing "Brute Fact": The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 1001-39. A different approach, reviewing the track record of rational choice approaches, is taken by Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).
23. Much critique of rational choice theory throws doubt on the idea that the model of a human agent as a rational maximizer is adequate for social science or philosophy. This article does not provide such a critique of rational choice theory. Such criticisms typically focus on the importance of the meaningful and communicative dimensions of conduct, on 'commitment', altruistic behaviour, and norm-or value-governed behaviour. The contributions to this discussion are too numerous to cite. But for some basic statements and the way in which such critiques have been viewed, answered and incorporated by some rational choice theorists, see Jon Elster, 'Selfishness and Altruism', in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 44-53; John Ferejohn, 'Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England', in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 279-305; Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. I, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984), esp. pp. 75-101; Mansbridge, 'The Rise and Fall of Self-interest in the Explanation of Public Life', in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest; Amartya K. Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory', in Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 87-109; Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds, Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 25-71; Albert S. Yee, 'Thick Rationality and the Missing "Brute Fact": The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of Norms and Ideas', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 1001-39. A different approach, reviewing the track record of rational choice approaches, is taken by Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).
24. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 192.
25. Arrow, 'Economic Equilibrium', p. 376; and see Mark Addleson, Equilibrium versus Understanding: Toward the Restoration of Economics as Social Theory (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 22-3. Of course, equilibrium analysis may also attempt to show the absence of any equilibrium condition.
26. Arrow, 'Economic Equilibrium', p. 376; and see Mark Addleson, Equilibrium versus Understanding: Toward the Restoration of Economics as Social Theory (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 22-3. Of course, equilibrium analysis may also attempt to show the absence of any equilibrium condition.
27. Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 41.
28. Schumpeter, 'Preface to the Japanese Edition of "Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung"', in R. V. Clemence, ed., Essays of J. A. Schumpeter (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1951), pp. 158-63, at pp. 159-60; Schumpeter, 'The Instability of Capitalism', in Clemence, ed., Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 47-52, at p. 50; emphasis added.
29. Schumpeter, 'Preface to the Japanese Edition of "Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung"', in R. V. Clemence, ed., Essays of J. A. Schumpeter (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1951), pp. 158-63, at pp. 159-60; Schumpeter, 'The Instability of Capitalism', in Clemence, ed., Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 47-52, at p. 50; emphasis added.
30. See, e.g., Schumpeter, History, p. 889.
31. When Kenneth Arrow points out that completeness is a necessary condition for equilibrium, in 'Economic Equilibrium', at p. 376, he is obviously referring to the completeness of the relevant model. For it is not at all clear what meaning could be attached to the idea of the 'completeness' or 'incompleteness' of the social world. This reinforces my point about abstraction. The concept of completeness here also has a mathematical interpretation, referring to the possibility of solving a series of simultaneous equations.
32. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, p. 41.
33. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: HarperCollins, 1957), p. 171.
34. Przeworski, Democracy, p. 20.
35. Ordeshook, in 'Political Disequilibrium', at p. 26, thus calls an equilibrium a 'prediction, for a pre-specified circumstance, about the choice of people and the corresponding outcomes'; see also P. C. Ordeshook, ed., Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. xiii.
36. Ordeshook, in 'Political Disequilibrium', at p. 26, thus calls an equilibrium a 'prediction, for a pre-specified circumstance, about the choice of people and the corresponding outcomes'; see also P. C. Ordeshook, ed., Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. xiii.
37. William H. Riker, 'Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions', American Political Science Review, 74 (1980), 432-46, at p. 432.
38. Schumpeter, 'Preface to the Japanese Edition', p. 159.
39. Schumpeter, History, p. 889.
40. Schumpeter, History, p. 17.
41. Debra Satz and John Ferejohn, 'Rational Choice and Social Theory', Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), 71-87, at pp. 74, 87.
42. Satz and Ferejohn, 'Rational Choice and Social Theory', p. 79.
43. Downs, Economic Theory, pp. 3, 164-204.
44. Schumpeter, 'Preface to the Japanese Edition', p. 159.
45. Schumpeter, 'Preface to the Japanese Edition', p. 159.
46. Schumpeter, History, p. 967.
47. Schumpeter, 'Preface to the Japanese Edition', p. 159.
48. Schumpeter, 'Preface to the Japanese Edition', pp. 159-60; emphasis added.
49. Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, trans. Redvers Opie (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 64.
50. Schumpeter, Theory of Economic Development, p. 66.
51. Schumpeter, 'The Instability of Capitalism', pp. 71-2.
52. Schumpeter, History, p. 21, emphasis added.
53. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, p. 96.
54. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, p. 144.
55. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 235-302, esp. p. 269.
56. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 256-64, 270.
57. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 284-5.
58. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 250, 269.
59. Medearis, 'Schumpeter, the New Deal, and Democracy'.
60. Medearis, 'Schumpeter, the New Deal, and Democracy'.
61. Joseph A. Schumpeter, 'Sozialistische Möglichkeiten von heute', Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 48 (1920-1), 305-60.
62. Schumpeter, 'Sozialistische Möglichkeiten', p. 337; my translation.
63. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 297.
64. Schumpeter, 'An Economic Interpretation of Our Time: The Lowell Lectures', in R. Swedberg, ed., The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 339-400, at pp. 343, 360; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 214, 298-9; Schumpeter, 'The March into Socialism', in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 415-25, at p. 417.
65. Schumpeter, 'An Economic Interpretation of Our Time: The Lowell Lectures', in R. Swedberg, ed., The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 339-400, at pp. 343, 360; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 214, 298-9; Schumpeter, 'The March into Socialism', in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 415-25, at p. 417.
66. Schumpeter, 'An Economic Interpretation of Our Time: The Lowell Lectures', in R. Swedberg, ed., The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 339-400, at pp. 343, 360; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 214, 298-9; Schumpeter, 'The March into Socialism', in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 415-25, at p. 417.
67. Schumpeter, The History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 21; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 11, 12; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics," in Clemence, ed. Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 282-95, at pp. 287, 289; Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology', in Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 267-81, at pp. 269-71; Schumpeter, 'Review: The Road to Serfdom', Journal of Political Economy, 54 (1946), 269-70, at p. 270.
68. Schumpeter, The History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 21; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 11, 12; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics," in Clemence, ed. Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 282-95, at pp. 287, 289; Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology', in Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 267-81, at pp. 269-71; Schumpeter, 'Review: The Road to Serfdom', Journal of Political Economy, 54 (1946), 269-70, at p. 270.
69. Schumpeter, The History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 21; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 11, 12; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics," in Clemence, ed. Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 282-95, at pp. 287, 289; Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology', in Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 267-81, at pp. 269-71; Schumpeter, 'Review: The Road to Serfdom', Journal of Political Economy, 54 (1946), 269-70, at p. 270.
70. Schumpeter, The History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 21; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 11, 12; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics," in Clemence, ed. Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 282-95, at pp. 287, 289; Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology', in Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 267-81, at pp. 269-71; Schumpeter, 'Review: The Road to Serfdom', Journal of Political Economy, 54 (1946), 269-70, at p. 270.
71. Schumpeter, The History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 21; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 11, 12; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics," in Clemence, ed. Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 282-95, at pp. 287, 289; Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology', in Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 267-81, at pp. 269-71; Schumpeter, 'Review: The Road to Serfdom', Journal of Political Economy, 54 (1946), 269-70, at p. 270.
72. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 11, 121; Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology', pp. 269-70; Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 33.
73. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 11, 121; Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology', pp. 269-70; Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 33.
74. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 11, 121; Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology', pp. 269-70; Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 33.
75. Schumpeter, 'Review: The Road to Serfdom', p. 270; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 10-12; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics', pp. 287-9.
76. Schumpeter, 'Review: The Road to Serfdom', p. 270; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 10-12; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics', pp. 287-9.
77. Schumpeter, 'Review: The Road to Serfdom', p. 270; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 10-12; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics', pp. 287-9.
78. Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology'; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics', p. 286, n. 8; Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 33-47.
79. Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology'; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics', p. 286, n. 8; Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 33-47.
80. Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology'; Schumpeter, 'The Communist Manifesto in Sociology and Economics', p. 286, n. 8; Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 33-47.
81. Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology'; Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 33-47; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 264-8.
82. Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology'; Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 33-47; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 264-8.
83. Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology'; Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 33-47; Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 264-8.
84. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
85. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
86. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
87. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
88. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
89. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
90. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
91. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
92. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem
93. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
94. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
95. The conception presented here draws on Schumpeter's work cited above and several other sources; Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, [1936] 1985); and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I & III (New York: International Publishers, 1960). Scholarly discussions of these sources, especially of Marx and Mannheim, all too often focuses on whether any precinct of thought can be saved from the 'ideological' label, and on the problem of whether a particular conception of ideology commits one to a self-undermining admission that even one's own perspective is ideological. Generally speaking, like Schumpeter, I am convinced that the problems of uncertainty, perspective, and the social conditioning of thought - usually associated with the term 'ideology' - are endemic to all forms of knowledge and investigation, including those we deem (more or less justifiably) scientific. With this in mind, my conception of ideology also draws on a number of sources that would normally be considered as contributions not to the theory of ideology, but to epistemology, the theory of language, and the philosophy of science. These sources include: J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975); John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, [1949] 1920); Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, rev'd edn (London: Verso, 1988); John Gunnell, Philosophy, Science and Political Inquiry (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 1-23; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, pp. 91-189; W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 26-39.
96. For those who wish to pursue the point, my argument here is directly analogous to Quine's portrayal of knowledge, in 'Two Dogmas', at p. 37, as a 'man-made fabric' or a 'field' so 'underdetermined' by experience 'that there is much latitude of choice as to what statement to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience'.
97. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 250-2, 264-8.
98. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 29.
99. Schumpeter, 'Science and Ideology', in Clemence, ed., Essays of J. A. Schumpeter, pp. 267-81, at p. 272.
100. Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, p. 218.
101. Galileo, for example, did not merely refute Aristotelian astronomical ideas with facts; he did so with telescopic observations, which in turn rested on a theory of optics (Lakatos, 'Falsification', p. 98).
102. E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 2-3.
103. Schumpeter, 'Sozialistische Möglichkeiten', p. 337.
104. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 'Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes - Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements', in D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, eds, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-20, at p. 2.
105. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 265, 266-7.
106. Sean Wilentz, 'Many Democracies: On Tocqueville and Jacksonian America', in A. S. Eisenstadt, ed., Reconsidering Tocqueville's Democracy in America (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), pp. 207-28.
107. Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', p. 220.
108. Samuel P. Huntington, 'Democracy's Third Wave', in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner, eds, The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 2nd edn (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 3-25, at p. 21.
109. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1960)
110. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', The Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991); G. D. H. Cole, Guild Socialism: A Plan for Economic Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1920); John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
111. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', The Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991); G. D. H. Cole, Guild Socialism: A Plan for Economic Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1920); John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
112. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', The Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991); G. D. H. Cole, Guild Socialism: A Plan for Economic Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1920); John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
113. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', The Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991); G. D. H. Cole, Guild Socialism: A Plan for Economic Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1920); John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
114. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'On the Social Contract', The Basic Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991); G. D. H. Cole, Guild Socialism: A Plan for Economic Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1920); John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
115. C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 77.
116. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 282; and see p. 279.
117. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 269.
118. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 285.
119. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 283.
120. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 21.
121. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 271. This, of course, invites criticisms that Schumpeter's elite conception of democracy is not very democratic. But that is not my point here.
122. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 964-5.
123. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 270-1, 275-6.
124. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 270.
125. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 269.
126. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 283.
127. Downs, Economic Theory, p. 3.
128. Downs, Economic Theory, pp. 28, 29, note 11, p. 284. In fact, Downs twice quotes Schumpeter's summary argument from Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 282, quoted above.
129. Downs, Economic Theory, pp. 28, 29, note 11, p. 284. In fact, Downs twice quotes Schumpeter's summary argument from Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 282, quoted above.
130. Downs, Economic Theory, p. 140.
131. Downs, Economic Theory, p. 49.
132. Schumpeter, History, p. 17.
133. Satz and Ferejohn, 'Rational Choice and Social Theory' pp. 74, 87.
134. Downs, Economic Theory, pp. 82-95.
135. Downs, Economic Theory, p. 83.
136. In Economic Theory, at pp. 79 and 83, Downs clearly equates information with data or facts.
137. Downs, Economic Theory, p. 83.
138. Cf. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 29, quoted above (ID2).
139. Schumpeter, 'Sozialistische Möglichkeiten', p. 337; my translation.
140. Downs, Economic Theory, p. 98.
141. Downs, Economic Theory, p. 98; emphasis added.
142. Downs, Economic Theory, p. 220-37.
143. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 21.
144. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 283, p. 270.
145. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 269-83.
146. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, pp. 264-8.
147. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 266; emphasis added.
148. Downs, Economic Theory, pp. 23-4.
149. Downs, Economic Theory, p. 23, n. 5. Standing on purely terminological grounds, one might acquit Downs of the charge of contradiction by pointing out that 'universal suffrage' and 'manhood' suffrage have often been used synonymously. But the overall point would be the same. Downs's failure to recognize the real, practical and principled contradiction between universal suffrage and the exclusion of women and 'resident aliens' from voting was emblematic of his larger failure to make the establishment of democracy and battles about the meaning of democracy part of his supposedly comprehensive theory of democracy.
150. Downs, Economic Theory, pp. 261-76.
151. Downs, Economic Theory, p. 267.
152. Brian Barry noted this problem almost thirty years ago in Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970), pp. 13-23. More recently, Green and Shapiro have traced the broader rational choice literature deriving from Downs's prediction of 'rational abstention' (Pathologies of Rational Choice, pp. 47-71). Both Barry and Green and Shapiro argue that since Downs postulated voting as a collective action problem, his conjecture that some voters may feel very committed to the continuance of democratic practices could no more account for their voting than could self-interested calculation (Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, p. 20; Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice, pp. 50-1), but this is beyond the scope of my interests here.
153. Brian Barry noted this problem almost thirty years ago in Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970), pp. 13-23. More recently, Green and Shapiro have traced the broader rational choice literature deriving from Downs's prediction of 'rational abstention' (Pathologies of Rational Choice, pp. 47-71). Both Barry and Green and Shapiro argue that since Downs postulated voting as a collective action problem, his conjecture that some voters may feel very committed to the continuance of democratic practices could no more account for their voting than could self-interested calculation (Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, p. 20; Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice, pp. 50-1), but this is beyond the scope of my interests here.
154. Brian Barry noted this problem almost thirty years ago in Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970), pp. 13-23. More recently, Green and Shapiro have traced the broader rational choice literature deriving from Downs's prediction of 'rational abstention' (Pathologies of Rational Choice, pp. 47-71). Both Barry and Green and Shapiro argue that since Downs postulated voting as a collective action problem, his conjecture that some voters may feel very committed to the continuance of democratic practices could no more account for their voting than could self-interested calculation (Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, p. 20; Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice, pp. 50-1), but this is beyond the scope of my interests here.
155. Brian Barry noted this problem almost thirty years ago in Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970), pp. 13-23. More recently, Green and Shapiro have traced the broader rational choice literature deriving from Downs's prediction of 'rational abstention' (Pathologies of Rational Choice, pp. 47-71). Both Barry and Green and Shapiro argue that since Downs postulated voting as a collective action problem, his conjecture that some voters may feel very committed to the continuance of democratic practices could no more account for their voting than could self-interested calculation (Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, p. 20; Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice, pp. 50-1), but this is beyond the scope of my interests here.
156. Ordeshook, 'Constitutional Stability'; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Weingast, 'Economic Role of Political Institutions'; Weingast, 'Political Foundations of Democracy'.
157. Ordeshook, 'Constitutional Stability'; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Weingast, 'Economic Role of Political Institutions'; Weingast, 'Political Foundations of Democracy'.
158. Ordeshook, 'Constitutional Stability'; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Weingast, 'Economic Role of Political Institutions'; Weingast, 'Political Foundations of Democracy'.
159. Ordeshook, 'Constitutional Stability'; Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Weingast, 'Economic Role of Political Institutions'; Weingast, 'Political Foundations of Democracy'.
160. Przeworski, Democracy, p. 15. He poses the problem similarly in 'Minimalist Conception of Democracy', at pp. 46 and 49, as part of a broader argument in favour of what he terms, at p. 23, a 'Schumpeterian conception of democracy'.
161. Przeworski, Democracy, p. 15. He poses the problem similarly in 'Minimalist Conception of Democracy', at pp. 46 and 49, as part of a broader argument in favour of what he terms, at p. 23, a 'Schumpeterian conception of democracy'.
162. Przeworski, Democracy, p. 15. He poses the problem similarly in 'Minimalist Conception of Democracy', at pp. 46 and 49, as part of a broader argument in favour of what he terms, at p. 23, a 'Schumpeterian conception of democracy'.
163. Weingast, 'Political Foundations'.
164. See, e.g., Przeworski, Democracy, p. 27.
165. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, p. 22; Weingast, 'Political Foundations', p. 245.
166. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, p. 22; Weingast, 'Political Foundations', p. 245.
167. Weingast, 'Political Foundations', pp. 245-6.
168. It was only after decades of Jim Crow oppression that many Americans recognized even the most blatant transgressions of African Americans' democratic rights. See, e.g., Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 109. There were at least two intertwined aspects to the ideological shift brought about by African-American insurgency. McAdam refers to one of these as 'cognitive liberation', the process by which some African Americans themselves came to recognize what Weingast would call 'transgressions' as problems they could challenge by collective action. As McAdam points out, in Political Process, at p. 35, 'structural inequities may be constant, but the collective perception of the legitimacy and mutability of those conditions is likely to vary a great deal over time'. The other aspect is the shift in the ideological response of 'other groups to blacks', which McAdam largely attributes to a sense of legitimacy won by the Civil Rights movement through the tactic for forcing the federal government to intervene on its behalf (Political Process, pp. 108, 163-6, 169-72).
169. It was only after decades of Jim Crow oppression that many Americans recognized even the most blatant transgressions of African Americans' democratic rights. See, e.g., Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 109. There were at least two intertwined aspects to the ideological shift brought about by African-American insurgency. McAdam refers to one of these as 'cognitive liberation', the process by which some African Americans themselves came to recognize what Weingast would call 'transgressions' as problems they could challenge by collective action. As McAdam points out, in Political Process, at p. 35, 'structural inequities may be constant, but the collective perception of the legitimacy and mutability of those conditions is likely to vary a great deal over time'. The other aspect is the shift in the ideological response of 'other groups to blacks', which McAdam largely attributes to a sense of legitimacy won by the Civil Rights movement through the tactic for forcing the federal government to intervene on its behalf (Political Process, pp. 108, 163-6, 169-72).
170. It was only after decades of Jim Crow oppression that many Americans recognized even the most blatant transgressions of African Americans' democratic rights. See, e.g., Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 109. There were at least two intertwined aspects to the ideological shift brought about by African-American insurgency. McAdam refers to one of these as 'cognitive liberation', the process by which some African Americans themselves came to recognize what Weingast would call 'transgressions' as problems they could challenge by collective action. As McAdam points out, in Political Process, at p. 35, 'structural inequities may be constant, but the collective perception of the legitimacy and mutability of those conditions is likely to vary a great deal over time'. The other aspect is the shift in the ideological response of 'other groups to blacks', which McAdam largely attributes to a sense of legitimacy won by the Civil Rights movement through the tactic for forcing the federal government to intervene on its behalf (Political Process, pp. 108, 163-6, 169-72).
171. Schumpeter, History, p. 21.
172. Przeworski, Democracy, pp. 23-6.
173. Przeworski, Democracy, p. 19. On pp. 29-31, he also offers a formal elaboration of this argument.
174. Weingast, 'Political Foundations', p. 255.