Distrust

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 81, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 495-522

  Hardin, Russell ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035634044     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (98)

1. See Jane Mansbridge, Altruistic Trust, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 290, 290-301 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999) (arguing that trust can be morally praiseworthy if altruistic reasons motivate trusting beyond what objective probabilistic expectations would call for).
2. RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 5, on file with author). I have spelled out varied implications of such trust and compare this conception to others elsewhere. See id. at 32-74 (discussing the multiple grounds of trustworthiness).
3. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 100-01 (1990) (providing a mathematical explanation for the difference between misplaced and foregone trust).
4. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-51 (2d ed. 1963) (discussing the implications that result from a lack of trust during infancy). See generally HARDIN, supra note 2, at 143-69 (reflecting on the implications of distrust).
5. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-51 (2d ed. 1963) (discussing the implications that result from a lack of trust during infancy). See generally HARDIN, supra note 2, at 143-69 (reflecting on the implications of distrust).
6. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 99 (explaining that foregoing trust creates no change in utility while placing trust creates an opportunity to benefit).
7. Ted Rall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, § 4, at 6.
8. Thresholds for behavior may be important and asymmetric here. We may tip from trust to distrust only when big enough news comes in. It may be generally harder to tip from distrust to trust. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, Trust: A Mechanism for the Reduction of Social Complexity, in TRUST AND POWER: TWO WORKS BY NIKLAS LUHMANN 73-75 (photo reprint 1988) (1979) (noting that distrust occurs when subjectively created thresholds are passed).
9. See HARDIN, supra note 2, at 143 (stating that a person's past experience with trust will affect that person's willingness to trust in the future); see also John G. Holmes, Trust and the Appraisal Process in Close Relationships, in 2 ADVANCES IN PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 57, 63 (Warren H. Jones and Daniel Perlman eds., 1991) (stating that "[c]ooperators indeed showed a 'readiness to trust'").
10. See HARDIN, supra note 2, at 143 (stating that a person's past experience with trust will affect that person's willingness to trust in the future); see also John G. Holmes, Trust and the Appraisal Process in Close Relationships, in 2 ADVANCES IN PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 57, 63 (Warren H. Jones and Daniel Perlman eds., 1991) (stating that "[c]ooperators indeed showed a 'readiness to trust'").
11. Id. at 95.
12. See ALBERT BRETON & RONALD WINTROBE, THE LOGIC OF BUREAUCRATIC CONDUCT: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION, EXCHANGE, AND EFFICIENCY IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 70 (1982) (discussing the impact of indicators on the formation of relationships).
13. See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 200-05 (1982) (explaining the changes in behavior that result when end-game effects are applied to the prisoner's dilemma).
14. GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 311-12 (Kurt H. Wolff trans. & ed., Free Press 1950) (1908).
15. Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 6 (1998).
16. Virginia Woolf comments on the thoughts of a family listening to the paterfamilias expound on politics: "All of them bending themselves to listen thought: 'Pray heaven that the inside of my mind may not be exposed,' for each thought, 'The others are feeling this. They are outraged and indignant with the government about the fishermen. Whereas, I feel nothing at all.'" VIRGINIA WOOLF, TO THE LIGHTHOUSE 109 (Everyman's Library 1992) (1938).
17. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences was "utilized" by the Department of Health and Human Services within the meaning of the term as used in the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and thus is subject to its provisions).
18. See Andrew Lawler, Government Bows Out of Academy Case, 278 SCIENCE 28, 28 (1997) (summarizing concerns of Academy officials in response to the D.C. Circuit's decision).
19. See Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 345, 410-12 (2000) (stating that the secrecy of the American Constitutional Convention resulted in debates "remarkably free from cant and remarkably grounded in rational argument," while the French Assemblee Constituante was "heavily tainted by rhetoric, demagoguery, and overbidding").
20. Nagel, supra note 13, at 6 ("If I don't tell you everything I think and feel about you, that is not a case of deception, since you don't expect me to do so and would probably be appalled if I did.").
21. LUHMANN, supra note 7, at 71 ("Distrust . . . is also a functional equivalent for trust.").
22. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between trust and distrust).
23. See, e.g., LUHMANN, supra note 7, at 4-8 (claiming that trust reduces complexity in society and creates "increased possibilities for experience and action").
24. These arguments are drawn primarily from FREDRIK BARTH, ORAL COMMENTS AT THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY - RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION CONFERENCE (1995).
25. See FREDRIK BARTH, 2 FEATURES OF PERSON AND SOCIETY IN SWAT: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON PATHANS 18 (1981) (asserting that any centralized political institutions that do exist are a recent, and weak, development).
26. See id. at 109 (explaining that members "absent themselves periodically from their wives").
27. See BARTH, supra note 22.
28. See Judith Miller, Exotic Oman Opens Its Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1998, § 5, at 11 (noting the trading history of the country).
29. Oman opened to tourists only in the mid-1990s, and it now seems, in one account, to be a remarkably hospitable society. Presumably the change is largely due to a relatively benign ruler, Sultan Qabus bin Said. See id. at 11 (relating the experience of a trip to Oman).
30. See RICHARD NISBETT & DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR 7 (1996) (explaining that Scotch-Irish immigrants settled the South).
31. See id. at 38. (describing Southern conduct and social norms).
32. See Orlando Patterson, Liberty Against the Democratic State: On the Historical and Contemporary Sources of American Distrust, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 151, 175, 190-91(Mark E. Warren ed., 1999) (citing data from the General Social Survey for the years 1972-1994). On the idea of generalized trust, see generally HARDIN, supra note 2, at 68-113; 237-75 (discussing trust in society).
33. See Orlando Patterson, Liberty Against the Democratic State: On the Historical and Contemporary Sources of American Distrust, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 151, 175, 190-91(Mark E. Warren ed., 1999) (citing data from the General Social Survey for the years 1972-1994). On the idea of generalized trust, see generally HARDIN, supra note 2, at 68-113; 237-75 (discussing trust in society).
34. Letter from Robert K. Merton to Russell Hardin (May 4, 1995) (on file with author).
35. See ROBERT K. MERTON, MASS PERSUASION: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF A WAR BOND DRIVE 84, 145 (1946) (describing the perception of Smith as a "symbol of sincerity, of truth amid duplicity, of forthrightness amid deceit, honesty amid guile").
36. See id. at 101 (describing the ease and success with which Smith became a "flag-wrapped symbol, inseparably associated with . . . abiding patriotism").
37. See id. at 142 (citing interview subjects as contrasting Smith's integrity with the "pretenses, deception and dissembling which they observe in their daily experience").
38. THE LISLE LETTERS: AN ABRIDGEMENT, 154 (Muriel St. Clare Byrne, ed., 1983).
39. Id. at 154.
40. See id. at 153 (relating the situation in Calais at the time).
41. See id. at 410-11 (describing the impact of the letters).
42. Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 247 (1986).
43. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39-40 (James W. Ellington trans., 2d ed. 1981) (hypothesizing that rational beings will legislate universal laws to which they will be subject).
44. Baier, supra note 39, at 249.
45. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 1 (1988) (classifying social contract theory as "[t]he most famous and influential political story of modern times").
46. See id. at 68-69 (explaining the theories of Grotius and Pufendorf).
47. See David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY, 465, 465-87 (Eugene Miller, ed., Liberty Press 1987) (1748) (criticizing social contact theory); see also RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-140, 149 (1999) (arguing that the United States' form of government arose out of coordination rather than contract).
48. See David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY, 465, 465-87 (Eugene Miller, ed., Liberty Press 1987) (1748) (criticizing social contact theory); see also RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-140, 149 (1999) (arguing that the United States' form of government arose out of coordination rather than contract).
49. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10-11, 14-15 (rev. ed. 1999) (1971) (referring to the basis for a social contract).
50. See PATEMAN, supra note 42, at 1-4, 221 (describing the patriarchal roots of the social contract).
51. This discussion is taken from Karen S. Cook & Russell Hardin, Norms of Cooperativeness and Networks of Trust, in SOCIAL NORMS 329-46 (Karl-Dieter Opp & Michael Hechter eds., 2001).
52. EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY 83 (1958) (defining an amoral familist as one who seeks to "[m]aximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family"). In his 1950's study of the fictional Southern Italian village of Montegrano, Banfield chronicled a pervasive distrust of all social units beyond the family. Terming this paradigm "amoral familism," Banfield noted that in communities where its practice was prevalent, social cooperation was limited, as "no one [would] further the interest of the group or community except as it [was] to his private advantage to do so." Id. at 83-84. Likewise, moral and ethical obligations were strictly confined to the family, diminishing notions of community interest or public good. In fact, according to Banfield, "the hope of material gain in the short-run [would] be the only motive for concern with public affairs." Id. at 84 (emphasis added); see also John L. Aguilar, Trust and Exchange: Expressive and Instrumental Dimensions of Reciprocity in a Peasant Community, 12 ETHOS 3, 3-29 (1984) (identifying the presence of amoral familistic tendencies in peasant Mexican communities): George H. Westacott & Lawrence K. Williams, Interpersonal Trust and Modern Attitudes in Peru, 13 INT'L. J. CONTEMP. SOC. 117. 117-137 (1976) (finding, a similar paradigm in Peruvian subsistence communities). See generally TRUDY GOVIER, SOCIAL TRUST AND HUMAN COMMUNITIES 135-146 (1997) (providing an overview of anthropological literature surrounding amoral familism, and arguing that the harsh constraint of poverty may itself create a limitation on societal cooperation).
53. EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY 83 (1958) (defining an amoral familist as one who seeks to "[m]aximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family"). In his 1950's study of the fictional Southern Italian village of Montegrano, Banfield chronicled a pervasive distrust of all social units beyond the family. Terming this paradigm "amoral familism," Banfield noted that in communities where its practice was prevalent, social cooperation was limited, as "no one [would] further the interest of the group or community except as it [was] to his private advantage to do so." Id. at 83-84. Likewise, moral and ethical obligations were strictly confined to the family, diminishing notions of community interest or public good. In fact, according to Banfield, "the hope of material gain in the short-run [would] be the only motive for concern with public affairs." Id. at 84 (emphasis added); see also John L. Aguilar, Trust and Exchange: Expressive and Instrumental Dimensions of Reciprocity in a Peasant Community, 12 ETHOS 3, 3-29 (1984) (identifying the presence of amoral familistic tendencies in peasant Mexican communities): George H. Westacott & Lawrence K. Williams, Interpersonal Trust and Modern Attitudes in Peru, 13 INT'L. J. CONTEMP. SOC. 117. 117-137 (1976) (finding, a similar paradigm in Peruvian subsistence communities). See generally TRUDY GOVIER, SOCIAL TRUST AND HUMAN COMMUNITIES 135-146 (1997) (providing an overview of anthropological literature surrounding amoral familism, and arguing that the harsh constraint of poverty may itself create a limitation on societal cooperation).
54. EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY 83 (1958) (defining an amoral familist as one who seeks to "[m]aximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family"). In his 1950's study of the fictional Southern Italian village of Montegrano, Banfield chronicled a pervasive distrust of all social units beyond the family. Terming this paradigm "amoral familism," Banfield noted that in communities where its practice was prevalent, social cooperation was limited, as "no one [would] further the interest of the group or community except as it [was] to his private advantage to do so." Id. at 83-84. Likewise, moral and ethical obligations were strictly confined to the family, diminishing notions of community interest or public good. In fact, according to Banfield, "the hope of material gain in the short-run [would] be the only motive for concern with public affairs." Id. at 84 (emphasis added); see also John L. Aguilar, Trust and Exchange: Expressive and Instrumental Dimensions of Reciprocity in a Peasant Community, 12 ETHOS 3, 3-29 (1984) (identifying the presence of amoral familistic tendencies in peasant Mexican communities): George H. Westacott & Lawrence K. Williams, Interpersonal Trust and Modern Attitudes in Peru, 13 INT'L. J. CONTEMP. SOC. 117. 117-137 (1976) (finding, a similar paradigm in Peruvian subsistence communities). See generally TRUDY GOVIER, SOCIAL TRUST AND HUMAN COMMUNITIES 135-146 (1997) (providing an overview of anthropological literature surrounding amoral familism, and arguing that the harsh constraint of poverty may itself create a limitation on societal cooperation).
55. EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY 83 (1958) (defining an amoral familist as one who seeks to "[m]aximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family"). In his 1950's study of the fictional Southern Italian village of Montegrano, Banfield chronicled a pervasive distrust of all social units beyond the family. Terming this paradigm "amoral familism," Banfield noted that in communities where its practice was prevalent, social cooperation was limited, as "no one [would] further the interest of the group or community except as it [was] to his private advantage to do so." Id. at 83-84. Likewise, moral and ethical obligations were strictly confined to the family, diminishing notions of community interest or public good. In fact, according to Banfield, "the hope of material gain in the short-run [would] be the only motive for concern with public affairs." Id. at 84 (emphasis added); see also John L. Aguilar, Trust and Exchange: Expressive and Instrumental Dimensions of Reciprocity in a Peasant Community, 12 ETHOS 3, 3-29 (1984) (identifying the presence of amoral familistic tendencies in peasant Mexican communities): George H. Westacott & Lawrence K. Williams, Interpersonal Trust and Modern Attitudes in Peru, 13 INT'L. J. CONTEMP. SOC. 117. 117-137 (1976) (finding, a similar paradigm in Peruvian subsistence communities). See generally TRUDY GOVIER, SOCIAL TRUST AND HUMAN COMMUNITIES 135-146 (1997) (providing an overview of anthropological literature surrounding amoral familism, and arguing that the harsh constraint of poverty may itself create a limitation on societal cooperation).
56. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 52 (William Popple trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 2d. ed. 1955) ("Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.").
57. Anthony Pagden, The Destruction of Trust and Its Economic Consequences in the Case of Eighteenth-century Naples, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 127, 127-28 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).
58. See ANN CHIH LIN, REFORM IN THE MAKING: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL POLICY IN PRISON 115-32 (2000) (arguing that a dooming facet of traditional prison reform is our societal emphasis on outright control of inmates, stressing prisoner incapacitation over rehabilitation).
59. STANLEY ELKIN, A BAD MAN (1965).
60. Elkin related the visit to the author in Bellagio, Italy, in May 1988.
61. See Pagden, supra note 50, at 128 (discussing Doria's work).
62. See id. at 133 (describing honor as "the single defining characteristic of Spanish culture").
63. See Russell Hardin, Hobbesian Political Order, 19 POL. THEORY 156, 169 (1991) (discussing Hobbes's view on the function of government as a means to secure order).
64. See FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR 54 (1994) (defining an "honor group" as members of a population that follow the same code of honor and recognize each other as doing so). In Bedouin society, Stewart argues that honor is itself status-conferring, guaranteeing "the right to be treated with a certain worth." Id. at 21. For an examination of the role of honor in Swat Pathan culture, see BARTH, supra note 23, at 115-17 (discussing personal identity and social structure in Pathan society). The rise of dueling as a practice defending individual honor in seventeenth century France may also illustrate the exclusive status honor sanctions. Only aristocrats could legally participate in the activity, and it served as a principal method of upper-class dispute resolution, distinguishing French nobility from commoners. See RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF GROUP CONFLICT 90-100 (1995) (describing the practice of dueling).
65. See FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR 54 (1994) (defining an "honor group" as members of a population that follow the same code of honor and recognize each other as doing so). In Bedouin society, Stewart argues that honor is itself status-conferring, guaranteeing "the right to be treated with a certain worth." Id. at 21. For an examination of the role of honor in Swat Pathan culture, see BARTH, supra note 23, at 115-17 (discussing personal identity and social structure in Pathan society). The rise of dueling as a practice defending individual honor in seventeenth century France may also illustrate the exclusive status honor sanctions. Only aristocrats could legally participate in the activity, and it served as a principal method of upper-class dispute resolution, distinguishing French nobility from commoners. See RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF GROUP CONFLICT 90-100 (1995) (describing the practice of dueling).
66. See FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR 54 (1994) (defining an "honor group" as members of a population that follow the same code of honor and recognize each other as doing so). In Bedouin society, Stewart argues that honor is itself status-conferring, guaranteeing "the right to be treated with a certain worth." Id. at 21. For an examination of the role of honor in Swat Pathan culture, see BARTH, supra note 23, at 115-17 (discussing personal identity and social structure in Pathan society). The rise of dueling as a practice defending individual honor in seventeenth century France may also illustrate the exclusive status honor sanctions. Only aristocrats could legally participate in the activity, and it served as a principal method of upper-class dispute resolution, distinguishing French nobility from commoners. See RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF GROUP CONFLICT 90-100 (1995) (describing the practice of dueling).
67. See Pagden, supra note 50, at 136-37 (discussing the Spanish judicial system).
68. See id. at 127 (explaining that the Spanish destroyed trust in Naples "in order to increase their social and political control over the kingdom").
69. See Diego Gambetta, Mafia: The Price of Distrust, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 158, 162-63 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (explaining that the Sicilian Mafia was formed because distrust of the State led people to seek social mobility in small groups at the expense of other groups).
70. See HARDIN, supra note 57, at 142-82 (explaining the motivation for numerous violent conflicts).
71. Banfield notes that the threat of community violence may spur Montegranan villagers to keep their ventures strictly within the family. Because successful villagers frequently suffer from acts of vandalism at the hands of jealous onlookers, community members frequently make their ventures private and open only to the family, so that neighbors and community members remain unaware - and hence, unenvious - of any gains. See BANFIELD, supra note 48, at 116.
72. See generally ANTON BLOK, THE MAFIA OF A SICILIAN VILLAGE, 1860-1960: A STUDY OF VIOLENT PEASANT ENTREPRENEURS 89-102 (1974) (describing the creation and evolving function of the Mafia). This anthropological look at a century of Mafia behavior (defined as unlicensed public violence aimed to affect the community) explores the rise of the mafiosi (members of the Mafia) and their relationship to corporate legal structures. While often immune from formal law, the mafiosi linked the otherwise isolated political establishment with society itself. They served as political power brokers between citizens and national leaders whose success depended on community support. In return, they acquired an extra-legal position and a symbiotic relationship with the government that sustained a malfunctioning political order.
73. See Gambetta, supra note 60, at 163-64 (explaining that the Mafia exploited distrust by positioning itself as "men capable of enforcing privately that public justice that the Spaniards had eroded).
74. See id. at 166-67 (describing how democratic leaders used the Mafia for its vote-mobilizing capability).
75. BRETON & WINTROBE, supra note 10, at 140-46. Large Japanese firms have cultivated a work atmosphere in which workers face intense pressure to, remain loyal to the firm. These firms provide incentives such as seniority-based promotion and awards of luxury benefits to senior associates in the hope of discouraging individuals from leaving the firm. Moreover, intense supervision and co-opted, industry-run labor unions prevent laborers from organizing themselves and demanding reform.
76. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 184 (Penguin 1986) (1651) ("[T]herefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse [sic] they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and . . . endeavor to destroy or subdue one an other [sic].").
77. See Gambetta, supra note 60, at 158 (outlining the harmful social effects of the Mafia-controlled society). As Gambetta notes, the Mafia might grant someone's request to fraudulently sell goods. See id. at 173 (relating how the "Mafioso succeeded in helping [people] to sell a blind horse as a good one"). This implicitly makes clear that distrust of one's fellows is rational even without Mafia protection, although competition that would benefit almost everyone is undercut.
78. ee id at 158-59 (describing the Mafia as "the quintessence" of the structure of behavioral patterns). Moreover, Gambetta cites other factors that further burden Sicilian society. For example, economic backwardness produces little opportunity for advancement. A standard way to advance is to prevail over others in one's own society - hence, advancement is a positional good. See id. at 163 (explaining the economic factors that led to the creation of, and enduring support for, the Mafia).
79. For example, John Hart Ely argues that the framers of the Constitution favored judicial intervention when the political system itself malfunctioned and became "undeserving of trust." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980) (citing majority-sanctioned obstacles that leave minorities unable to participate in the political process as an example of a situation calling for judicial intervention); see also, Mark E. Warren, Democratic Theory and Trust, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 310, 310-45 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999) (concluding that democracy is grounded in social distrust and public suspicion of a powerful government).
80. For example, John Hart Ely argues that the framers of the Constitution favored judicial intervention when the political system itself malfunctioned and became "undeserving of trust." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980) (citing majority-sanctioned obstacles that leave minorities unable to participate in the political process as an example of a situation calling for judicial intervention); see also, Mark E. Warren, Democratic Theory and Trust, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 310, 310-45 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999) (concluding that democracy is grounded in social distrust and public suspicion of a powerful government).
81. See generally CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans. & eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
82. See generally CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans. & eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
83. An examination of the 18th century debate surrounding the drafting of the Constitution indicates that much of the framers' deliberation centered on the complex relationship between citizen and government, and the relative distrust between them. In fact, the principal debate between Anti-Federalists and Federalists was whether the federal government could be trusted to adequately safeguard the interests of particular communities. See HARDIN, supra note 44, at 82-141 (discussing the background of the Constitutional convention).
84. Locke held that society turns power over to its governors, "whom the society hath set over it self, with this express or tacit Trust, That it shall be imployed for their good, and the preservation of their Property[.]" JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 171 at 399 (Peter Laslett, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2d ed., 1967) (1690). See also HARDIN, supra note 2, at 201-35 (explaining how trust affects government functions).
85. Locke held that society turns power over to its governors, "whom the society hath set over it self, with this express or tacit Trust, That it shall be imployed for their good, and the preservation of their Property[.]" JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 171 at 399 (Peter Laslett, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2d ed., 1967) (1690). See also HARDIN, supra note 2, at 201-35 (explaining how trust affects government functions).
86. HUME, supra note 44, at 42-46 (discussing the organization of government institutions).
87. The political structure of American government is designed to explicitly prevent government officers from assuming too much control over each other or the government itself. This system of supplying "opposite and rival interests" is designed to limit the role of each officer to her task alone. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51. at 322-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For further discussion, see HARDIN, supra note 2, at 201-35 (arguing that, while it is plausible for a typical citizen to distrust government, it is not plausible for her to trust it in any meaningful sense of "trust").
88. The political structure of American government is designed to explicitly prevent government officers from assuming too much control over each other or the government itself. This system of supplying "opposite and rival interests" is designed to limit the role of each officer to her task alone. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51. at 322-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For further discussion, see HARDIN, supra note 2, at 201-35 (arguing that, while it is plausible for a typical citizen to distrust government, it is not plausible for her to trust it in any meaningful sense of "trust").
89. Organizations have, of course, many capacities for which to recommend them. In particular, they can organize collective actions that could not plausibly be organized by spontaneous individual action. But they are also very important in mediating between potential partners who do not trust each other.
90. Hobbes argues that the state's principal purpose of procuring "the safety of the people" allows citizens to enjoy a life of competition and acquisition; by providing conditions that allow them to live securely - while still functioning autonomously-the government can foster social cooperation. HOBBES, supra note 67, at 376, 376-94 (discussing the role of the sovereign).
91. See COLEMAN, supra note 3, at 102-16 (arguing that an institution's role in providing accurate and reliable information regarding transactions, allows it to create a foundation for an individual's subsequent trust).
92. Third party established trust involves one party trusting a third party, not involved in the transaction, instead of directly trusting the promising other party. This form of trust has been critical for a variety of financial innovations, including the development of paper money and banking. See id. at 186-88.
93. According to Coleman, "[t]hird party trust in economic systems seems to be viable only in conjunction with a generally accepted unit of account, so that some value can be placed on the obligations of the third party to make them fungible in exchange." Noneconomic social systems have difficulty developing a corollary system of valuation, a difficulty which makes third party trust relationships rare in these settings. Id. at 187.
94. By examining both a market and voluntary approach to blood donation, Arrow argues that reliance upon altruism should "be confined to those circumstances where the price system breaks down," and that "[w]holesale usage of ethical standards is apt to have undesirable consequences. We do not wish to use up recklessly the scarce resources of altruistic motivation[.]" Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 354-55 (1972).
95. Howard Margolis proposes a model of altruism in which the individual has two different sets of desires: self-interested or selfish, and other-directed or altruistic. As humans, we balance between these, indulging more in altruism for a while and then in selfishness. See generally HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982).
96. Virtually the whole of political philosophy is relevant to this issue, and the political and economic philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment in particular were almost entirely concerned with it. See David Hume, Of the First Principles of Government in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY, 32, 32-36 (Eugene Miller, ed., Liberty Press 1987) (1748) (describing the development of government in Great Britain).
97. See HARDIN, supra note 57, at 3 (describing how a participant in the riot "was carried away by the spirit of the riot and lost touch with rational sense
98. John Dunn, Trust and Political Agency, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 73, 85 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).