Israeli war objectives into an era of negativism

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 176-201

  Kober, Avi ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035631550     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390108565557     Document Type: Article

References (128)

1. Israel Tal, Lecture, Israeli National Defense College, 25 March 1978.
2. Emanuel Wald, Kilelet Hakelim Hashvurim [The Curse of the Broken Vessels] (Tel Aviv: Shoken 1987) [Hebrew].
3. Zehava Ostfeld, An Army Is Born (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1994) [Hebrew] p.755.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War [1833] (Princeton UP 1976) pp.86-7. For a comparative analysis of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini with regard to 'the primacy of politics and the military commander', see Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass 1996) Ch.6.
5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War [1833] (Princeton UP 1976) pp.86-7. For a comparative analysis of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini with regard to 'the primacy of politics and the military commander', see Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass 1996) Ch.6.
6. For victory defined in terms of the relationship between war objectives and war outcomes, see for example: Raymond G. O'Connor, 'Victory in Modern War', Journal of Peace Research 4 (1969) p.367; Berenice Carroll, 'How Wars End: An Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses', ibid, p.305.
7. For victory defined in terms of the relationship between war objectives and war outcomes, see for example: Raymond G. O'Connor, 'Victory in Modern War', Journal of Peace Research 4 (1969) p.367; Berenice Carroll, 'How Wars End: An Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses', ibid, p.305.
8. Clausewitz (note 4) pp.90, 77; B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: Faber 1943) p.20; Avi Kober, 'Military Decision in War: A Framework for Research', Armed Forces & Society 22/1 (Fall 1995) pp.66-82.
9. Clausewitz (note 4) pp.90, 77; B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: Faber 1943) p.20; Avi Kober, 'Military Decision in War: A Framework for Research', Armed Forces & Society 22/1 (Fall 1995) pp.66-82.
10. Clausewitz (note 4) p.87.
11. On 'self-destructive persistence', see Fred C. Iklé, Every War Must End (NY: Columbia UP 1971) p.34. On the tension between the expressive and instrumental elements in war, see: C.R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (London: Macmillan 1981) p.26; Yehoshfat Harkabi, War and Strategy (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1990) [Hebrew] pp.46-50.
12. On 'self-destructive persistence', see Fred C. Iklé, Every War Must End (NY: Columbia UP 1971) p.34. On the tension between the expressive and instrumental elements in war, see: C.R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (London: Macmillan 1981) p.26; Yehoshfat Harkabi, War and Strategy (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1990) [Hebrew] pp.46-50.
13. On 'self-destructive persistence', see Fred C. Iklé, Every War Must End (NY: Columbia UP 1971) p.34. On the tension between the expressive and instrumental elements in war, see: C.R. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (London: Macmillan 1981) p.26; Yehoshfat Harkabi, War and Strategy (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1990) [Hebrew] pp.46-50.
14. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane 1975) p.160.
15. Israelis have traditionally considered 'current security' - their name for 'low-intensity conflicts' - to be a minor challenge relative to the 'basic security' challenges posed by the regular armies of Arab states. For the distinction between current and basic security, see Shimon Peres, The Next Phase (Tel Aviv: Am Hasseffer 1965) pp.9-15.
16. Luttwak and Horowitz (note 9) pp.151-3; Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (Jerusalem: Edanim 1976) [Hebrew] p.277; Motti Golani, There Will Be War Next Summer: The Road to the Sinai War. 1955-1956 (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1997) [Hebrew] pp.456-60).
17. Luttwak and Horowitz (note 9) pp.151-3; Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (Jerusalem: Edanim 1976) [Hebrew] p.277; Motti Golani, There Will Be War Next Summer: The Road to the Sinai War. 1955-1956 (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1997) [Hebrew] pp.456-60).
18. Dayan (note 11) p.471.
19. Carmit Gai, Bar-Lev: A Biography (Tel Aviv: Am Oved 1998) [Hebrew] p. 140.
20. On the tension between Ben-Gurion and the military during the initial stages of the War of Independence, see Anita Shapira, The Army Controversy, 1948: Ben-Gurion's Struggle for Control (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hame'uhad 1985) [Hebrew].
21. Dan Schueftan, A Jordanian Option (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hame'uhad 1986) [Hebrew] pp.81, 96; Gershon Rivlin and Elhanan Oren (eds.) The War of Independence: Ben-Gurion's Diary (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence 1982) [Hebrew] p.900.
22. Dan Schueftan, A Jordanian Option (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hame'uhad 1986) [Hebrew] pp.81, 96; Gershon Rivlin and Elhanan Oren (eds.) The War of Independence: Ben-Gurion's Diary (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence 1982) [Hebrew] p.900.
23. Ben-Gurion's Diary (note 15) pp.914-18; John and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War (London: Secker & Warburg 1960); Netanel Lorch, Israel in the Grip of Superpowers (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1990) [Hebrew] pp.17-147.
24. Ben-Gurion's Diary (note 15) pp.914-18; John and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War (London: Secker & Warburg 1960); Netanel Lorch, Israel in the Grip of Superpowers (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1990) [Hebrew] pp.17-147.
25. Zeev Schiff, 'A Moment before the Fatal Snow', Ha'aretz, 20 June 1997. The Hebrew initials of the Peace for Galilee Operation create the Hebrew word 'snow'.
26. David Ben-Gurion, Tzava Uvittahon [Army and Security] (Tel Aviv: Ma'archot 1955) [Hebrew] p.151.
27. Shapira (note 14) pp.36-7.
28. For an excellent analysis of civil-military and political-military relations in Israel, see Yoram Perri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1983). See also Yehuda Ben-Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel (NY: Columbia UP 1995).
29. For an excellent analysis of civil-military and political-military relations in Israel, see Yoram Perri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1983). See also Yehuda Ben-Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel (NY: Columbia UP 1995).
30. Iklé (note 8) pp.1-16.
31. Avi-Shai, 'Egypt's War Objectives and Offensive Plan for the Yom Kippur War', Ma'arachot 250 (July 1976) p.33.
32. Zeev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (NY: Macmillan 1985) p.132; Luttwak and Horowitz (note 9) pp.231-3.
33. Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sherut (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv 1979) p.182.
34. Dayan (note 11) pp.474-5; Rabin (note 24) pp.191, 194, 200; Eytan Haber, Mahar Tifrotz Milhama [Tomorrow a War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Edanim 1987) [Hebrew] p.250; Aharon Yariv, 'Strategic Decisions in War', in Cautious Assessment: Writings by Aharon Yariv (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1999) [Hebrew] pp.139-47.
35. Dayan (note 11) pp.474-5; Rabin (note 24) pp.191, 194, 200; Eytan Haber, Mahar Tifrotz Milhama [Tomorrow a War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Edanim 1987) [Hebrew] p.250; Aharon Yariv, 'Strategic Decisions in War', in Cautious Assessment: Writings by Aharon Yariv (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1999) [Hebrew] pp.139-47.
36. Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1988) p.152; Rabin (note 24) p.261. For the Egyptian perspective, see: Dan Schueftan, Attrition: Egypt's Post-War Political Strategy, 1967-1970 (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1989) [Hebrew] pp.245-52.
37. Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1988) p.152; Rabin (note 24) p.261. For the Egyptian perspective, see: Dan Schueftan, Attrition: Egypt's Post-War Political Strategy, 1967-1970 (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1989) [Hebrew] pp.245-52.
38. The tension between the defensive and the offensive ethos is analyzed in-depth in Anita Shapira, Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948 (NY: Oxford UP 1992).
39. Yehezkel Dror, A Grand Strategy for Israel (Jerusalem: Academon 1989) [Hebrew] p.165-73.
40. Benjamin Peled, 'Security Without Limits', in Zvi Ofer and Avi Kober (eds.) The Price of Power (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1984) [Hebrew] pp.75-80.
41. This point was made by Menachem Begin and Raphael Eytan. See Efraim Inbar, The Outlook on War of the Political Elite in the Eighties (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Inst. for Int. Relations 1988) pp.17, 24.
42. Zvi Lanir, 'Political and Military Objectives in Israeli Wars', in idem, War by Choice (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1985) [Hebrew] pp.117-56.
43. Yigal Allon, Kellim Shluvim (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hame'uhad 1980) [Hebrew] p.111.
44. Inbar (note 30) p.23.
45. Both left-wing and right-wing figures in Israel have expressed themselves on the limits to Israeli use of force and its inability to force its will on the Arabs. For expressions made to this affect by Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Hayim Bar-Lev, Mordechat Gur, Moshe Arens, and Mordechai Zippori, see Inbar (note 30) pp.14-15, 22.
46. Rabin (note 24) p.22.
47. Israel Tal, National Security: The Few Against the Many (Tel Aviv: Dvir 1996) [Hebrew] pp.54-6.
48. Uri Dromi, 'Reflections on Israeli Use of Force', Skira Hodshit Nos. 2-3 (1986) pp.38-47.
49. Israel Bär, 'The War of Independence: Operational Aspects', Ma'arachot 62-63 (July 1950) p.63; Elhanan Oren, 'The War of Independence: Objectives and Results', Ma'arachot 118-19 (1959) p.53.
50. Israel Bär, 'The War of Independence: Operational Aspects', Ma'arachot 62-63 (July 1950) p.63; Elhanan Oren, 'The War of Independence: Objectives and Results', Ma'arachot 118-19 (1959) p.53.
51. For a detailed and thorough study of the processes that preceded the Sinai War from the Israeli perspective, see Golani (note 11).
52. Ibid, pp.401-5; Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv: Am Oved 1977) [Hebrew] pp.1234-1235. Ben-Gurion had toyed with the idea of annexing the West Bank since the early 1950s. He considered Jordan to be an unstable and unnatural entity that might disintegrate due to internal or external developments. See Moshe Zak, 'The Corridor to Gaza Separated between Ben-Gurion and Abdallah', Ma'ariv, 17 Oct. 1986.
53. Ibid, pp.401-5; Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv: Am Oved 1977) [Hebrew] pp.1234-1235. Ben-Gurion had toyed with the idea of annexing the West Bank since the early 1950s. He considered Jordan to be an unstable and unnatural entity that might disintegrate due to internal or external developments. See Moshe Zak, 'The Corridor to Gaza Separated between Ben-Gurion and Abdallah', Ma'ariv, 17 Oct. 1986.
54. Ibid, pp.401-5; Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv: Am Oved 1977) [Hebrew] pp.1234-1235. Ben-Gurion had toyed with the idea of annexing the West Bank since the early 1950s. He considered Jordan to be an unstable and unnatural entity that might disintegrate due to internal or external developments. See Moshe Zak, 'The Corridor to Gaza Separated between Ben-Gurion and Abdallah', Ma'ariv, 17 Oct. 1986.
55. Dan Horowitz, Israel's Concept of Defensible Borders (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Inst. for Int. Relations 1975); Yigal Allon, 'Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders', Foreign Affairs 55/1 (Oct. 1976) pp.38-53.
56. Dan Horowitz, Israel's Concept of Defensible Borders (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Inst. for Int. Relations 1975); Yigal Allon, 'Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders', Foreign Affairs 55/1 (Oct. 1976) pp.38-53.
57. I distinguish between casi belli and red lines per the severity of the threats involved and the means used to cope with them. According to these criteria, casi belli refer to situations that severely threaten the state's national security, let alone existence, and therefore need to be coped with by an a priori commitment to go to war should such threats materialize. Red lines, on the other hand, represent threats of a less severe nature that can be handled first with easier means than war, such as diplomatic or economic pressures. For an approach that prefers to treat casi belli as types of red lines, in general, and in the Israeli case in particular, see Micha Bar, Red Lines in Israel's Deterrence Strategy (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1990) [Hebrew] pp.103-119.
58. Shimshoni (note 26) p.132.
59. Schueftan, Attrition (note 26) pp.246-8.
60. Dayan raised the idea of occupying the city of Port Sa'id, on the north-eastern corner of the Suez Canal. He also spoke about the need to establish a bridgehead on the western bank of the canal in order to destroy Egyptian surface-to-air missile bases and regain command of the air over the Bar-Lev line. Another objective mentioned by Dayan was gaining control of oil production sites in the Gulf of Suez in case of an Egyptian attempt to deny Israel free passage of oil through the Gulf of Eilat. Finally, Dayan referred to the need to occupy territory in Lebanon and the Golan Heights so as to drive a wedge between Syria and Lebanon and between Syria and Jordan, and would improve Israeli radar control capability in the vicinity of Mount Hermon. Uri Bar-Joseph, The Way to Israel's Pearl Harbor (forthcoming).
61. Ya'acov Hisdai, Be'et Barzel (Jerusalem: Laor 1983) [Hebrew] p.46; Dayan (note 11) pp.578, 601.
62. War by Choice (note 31) pp.157-163.
63. Ehud Ya'ari and Zeev Schiff, Milhemet Sholal (Jerusalem: Shoken 1984) [Hebrew]; Arye Naor, Cabinet at War (Tel Aviv: Lahav 1986) [Hebrew] pp.48-49; Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1984); Raphael Eytan, Story of a Soldier (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv 1985) p.286; Inbar, The Outlook on War (note 30) pp.24-25; Gad Barzilai, 'Democracy in War'(Jerusalem: PhD Dissertation 1987) p.198; Reuven Avi-Ran, The War of Lebanon - Arab Documents: The Road to War (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1987) [Hebrew] p.152; Avigdor Ben-Gal, 'Military Operations and Lessons of War', in Shmuel Meir (ed.) The Lebanon War: A View from 1987 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1988) [Hebrew] p.57.
64. Ehud Ya'ari and Zeev Schiff, Milhemet Sholal (Jerusalem: Shoken 1984) [Hebrew]; Arye Naor, Cabinet at War (Tel Aviv: Lahav 1986) [Hebrew] pp.48-49; Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1984); Raphael Eytan, Story of a Soldier (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv 1985) p.286; Inbar, The Outlook on War (note 30) pp.24-25; Gad Barzilai, 'Democracy in War'(Jerusalem: PhD Dissertation 1987) p.198; Reuven Avi-Ran, The War of Lebanon - Arab Documents: The Road to War (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1987) [Hebrew] p.152; Avigdor Ben-Gal, 'Military Operations and Lessons of War', in Shmuel Meir (ed.) The Lebanon War: A View from 1987 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1988) [Hebrew] p.57.
65. Ehud Ya'ari and Zeev Schiff, Milhemet Sholal (Jerusalem: Shoken 1984) [Hebrew]; Arye Naor, Cabinet at War (Tel Aviv: Lahav 1986) [Hebrew] pp.48-49; Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1984); Raphael Eytan, Story of a Soldier (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv 1985) p.286; Inbar, The Outlook on War (note 30) pp.24-25; Gad Barzilai, 'Democracy in War'(Jerusalem: PhD Dissertation 1987) p.198; Reuven Avi-Ran, The War of Lebanon - Arab Documents: The Road to War (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1987) [Hebrew] p.152; Avigdor Ben-Gal, 'Military Operations and Lessons of War', in Shmuel Meir (ed.) The Lebanon War: A View from 1987 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1988) [Hebrew] p.57.
66. Ehud Ya'ari and Zeev Schiff, Milhemet Sholal (Jerusalem: Shoken 1984) [Hebrew]; Arye Naor, Cabinet at War (Tel Aviv: Lahav 1986) [Hebrew] pp.48-49; Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1984); Raphael Eytan, Story of a Soldier (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv 1985) p.286; Inbar, The Outlook on War (note 30) pp.24-25; Gad Barzilai, 'Democracy in War'(Jerusalem: PhD Dissertation 1987) p.198; Reuven Avi-Ran, The War of Lebanon - Arab Documents: The Road to War (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1987) [Hebrew] p.152; Avigdor Ben-Gal, 'Military Operations and Lessons of War', in Shmuel Meir (ed.) The Lebanon War: A View from 1987 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1988) [Hebrew] p.57.
67. Ehud Ya'ari and Zeev Schiff, Milhemet Sholal (Jerusalem: Shoken 1984) [Hebrew]; Arye Naor, Cabinet at War (Tel Aviv: Lahav 1986) [Hebrew] pp.48-49; Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1984); Raphael Eytan, Story of a Soldier (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv 1985) p.286; Inbar, The Outlook on War (note 30) pp.24-25; Gad Barzilai, 'Democracy in War'(Jerusalem: PhD Dissertation 1987) p.198; Reuven Avi-Ran, The War of Lebanon - Arab Documents: The Road to War (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1987) [Hebrew] p.152; Avigdor Ben-Gal, 'Military Operations and Lessons of War', in Shmuel Meir (ed.) The Lebanon War: A View from 1987 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1988) [Hebrew] p.57.
68. Ehud Ya'ari and Zeev Schiff, Milhemet Sholal (Jerusalem: Shoken 1984) [Hebrew]; Arye Naor, Cabinet at War (Tel Aviv: Lahav 1986) [Hebrew] pp.48-49; Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1984); Raphael Eytan, Story of a Soldier (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv 1985) p.286; Inbar, The Outlook on War (note 30) pp.24-25; Gad Barzilai, 'Democracy in War'(Jerusalem: PhD Dissertation 1987) p.198; Reuven Avi-Ran, The War of Lebanon - Arab Documents: The Road to War (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1987) [Hebrew] p.152; Avigdor Ben-Gal, 'Military Operations and Lessons of War', in Shmuel Meir (ed.) The Lebanon War: A View from 1987 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1988) [Hebrew] p.57.
69. Ehud Ya'ari and Zeev Schiff, Milhemet Sholal (Jerusalem: Shoken 1984) [Hebrew]; Arye Naor, Cabinet at War (Tel Aviv: Lahav 1986) [Hebrew] pp.48-49; Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1984); Raphael Eytan, Story of a Soldier (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv 1985) p.286; Inbar, The Outlook on War (note 30) pp.24-25; Gad Barzilai, 'Democracy in War'(Jerusalem: PhD Dissertation 1987) p.198; Reuven Avi-Ran, The War of Lebanon - Arab Documents: The Road to War (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1987) [Hebrew] p.152; Avigdor Ben-Gal, 'Military Operations and Lessons of War', in Shmuel Meir (ed.) The Lebanon War: A View from 1987 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1988) [Hebrew] p.57.
70. Ehud Ya'ari and Zeev Schiff, Milhemet Sholal (Jerusalem: Shoken 1984) [Hebrew]; Arye Naor, Cabinet at War (Tel Aviv: Lahav 1986) [Hebrew] pp.48-49; Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1984); Raphael Eytan, Story of a Soldier (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv 1985) p.286; Inbar, The Outlook on War (note 30) pp.24-25; Gad Barzilai, 'Democracy in War'(Jerusalem: PhD Dissertation 1987) p.198; Reuven Avi-Ran, The War of Lebanon - Arab Documents: The Road to War (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1987) [Hebrew] p.152; Avigdor Ben-Gal, 'Military Operations and Lessons of War', in Shmuel Meir (ed.) The Lebanon War: A View from 1987 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1988) [Hebrew] p.57.
71. On these concepts, see for example: Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton UP 1961) pp.104-5; Robert Harkavy, Preemption and Two-Front Conventional Warfare (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Inst. for Int. Relations 1977) pp.6-11. For Israeli conception of prevention and preemption, see: Avi Kober, [Battlefield] Decision in the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948-1982 (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1995) [Hebrew] pp.168-71.
72. On these concepts, see for example: Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton UP 1961) pp.104-5; Robert Harkavy, Preemption and Two-Front Conventional Warfare (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Inst. for Int. Relations 1977) pp.6-11. For Israeli conception of prevention and preemption, see: Avi Kober, [Battlefield] Decision in the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948-1982 (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1995) [Hebrew] pp.168-71.
73. On these concepts, see for example: Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton UP 1961) pp.104-5; Robert Harkavy, Preemption and Two-Front Conventional Warfare (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Inst. for Int. Relations 1977) pp.6-11. For Israeli conception of prevention and preemption, see: Avi Kober, [Battlefield] Decision in the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948-1982 (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1995) [Hebrew] pp.168-71.
74. Kober, ibid.
75. Dan Horowitz, 'The Israeli Concept of National Security and the Prospects of Peace in the Middle East', in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.) Dynamics of a Conflict (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1975) pp.235-75.
76. Clausewitz (note 4), p.358; B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Faber 1967) p.163.
77. For a discussion on the meaning of strategic depth in general and in Israel in particular, see: Aharon Yariv, 'Strategic Depth', The Jerusalem Quarterly 17 (Fall 1980) pp.3-12.
78. David Ben-Gurion, Behilahem Israel (Tel Aviv: Mapai 1952) [Hebrew] p.90.
79. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics 30/2 (Jan. 1978) p.203.
80. Ibid. p.187.
81. Kober, [Battlefield] Decision (note 49) pp. 162-6. For a detailed analysis of the logic of Israeli traditional offensive approach, see Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Jerusalem Post 1989).
82. Kober, [Battlefield] Decision (note 49) pp. 162-6. For a detailed analysis of the logic of Israeli traditional offensive approach, see Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Jerusalem Post 1989).
83. See Avi Kober, 'A Paradigm in Crisis? Israel's Doctrine of Military Decision', Israel Affairs 2/1 (Autumn 1995) pp.195-7.
84. Dayan (note 11) p.242.
85. Ibid, p.444.
86. Moshe Arens, 'Ending Wars', Ma'arachot 292-3 (March-April 1984) p.3; Avner Yaniv, 'Deterrence and Defense in Israel's Strategy', Medinah, Mimshal Ve-yahasim Benle'umiyim 24 (Summer 1985) pp.53-4; Lanir (note 31) p.129.
87. Moshe Arens, 'Ending Wars', Ma'arachot 292-3 (March-April 1984) p.3; Avner Yaniv, 'Deterrence and Defense in Israel's Strategy', Medinah, Mimshal Ve-yahasim Benle'umiyim 24 (Summer 1985) pp.53-4; Lanir (note 31) p.129.
88. Chief of Staff Elazar defined Israel's war objectives in terms of battlefield decision in a discussion held at the IDF's GHQ, 16 April 1973, see Bar-Joseph (note 45). For Defense Minister Rabin's definition of Israel's military war objectives in terms of battlefield decision, reached through the destruction of enemy forces and occupying enemy territory, see Ha'aretz, 29 Sept. 1989.
89. For a detailed discussion of Israeli battlefield decision conception, see Kober, [Battlefield] Decision (note 49) Ch.6.
90. Dayan (note 11) p.578.
91. Efraim Inbar, 'Israel's Strategy Since the Yom Kippur War', Ma'arachot 289-90 (Oct. 1983).
92. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America [1835, 1840] (NY: Vintage Books 1954) pp.292-293.
93. Ben-Gurion, Behilahem Israel (note 54) pp. 14, 127, 132, 244, 289; Peres, Tomorrow is Now; pp.249-50; Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security (NY: Oxford UP 1987) p.103; Israel Tal, 'Offense and Defense in the Wars of Israel', Ma'arachot 311 (March 1988) p.6; Moshe Bar Kochva, 'Changes and Trends in the IDF's Structure', Skirah Hodshit 3-4 (1988) p.24.
94. Ben-Gurion, Behilahem Israel (note 54) pp. 14, 127, 132, 244, 289; Peres, Tomorrow is Now; pp.249-50; Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security (NY: Oxford UP 1987) p.103; Israel Tal, 'Offense and Defense in the Wars of Israel', Ma'arachot 311 (March 1988) p.6; Moshe Bar Kochva, 'Changes and Trends in the IDF's Structure', Skirah Hodshit 3-4 (1988) p.24.
95. Ben-Gurion, Behilahem Israel (note 54) pp. 14, 127, 132, 244, 289; Peres, Tomorrow is Now; pp.249-50; Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security (NY: Oxford UP 1987) p.103; Israel Tal, 'Offense and Defense in the Wars of Israel', Ma'arachot 311 (March 1988) p.6; Moshe Bar Kochva, 'Changes and Trends in the IDF's Structure', Skirah Hodshit 3-4 (1988) p.24.
96. Ben-Gurion, Behilahem Israel (note 54) pp. 14, 127, 132, 244, 289; Peres, Tomorrow is Now; pp.249-50; Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security (NY: Oxford UP 1987) p.103; Israel Tal, 'Offense and Defense in the Wars of Israel', Ma'arachot 311 (March 1988) p.6; Moshe Bar Kochva, 'Changes and Trends in the IDF's Structure', Skirah Hodshit 3-4 (1988) p.24.
97. Ben-Gurion, Behilahem Israel (note 54) pp. 14, 127, 132, 244, 289; Peres, Tomorrow is Now; pp.249-50; Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security (NY: Oxford UP 1987) p.103; Israel Tal, 'Offense and Defense in the Wars of Israel', Ma'arachot 311 (March 1988) p.6; Moshe Bar Kochva, 'Changes and Trends in the IDF's Structure', Skirah Hodshit 3-4 (1988) p.24.
98. Edward N. Luttwak, 'Where Are the Great Powers?' Foreign Affairs 73/4 (July/Aug. 1994) pp.23-8; 'Toward Post-Heroic Warfare', ibid. 74/3 (May/June 1995) pp.109-22; 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', ibid. 75/4 (July/Aug. 1996) pp.33-44.
99. Edward N. Luttwak, 'Where Are the Great Powers?' Foreign Affairs 73/4 (July/Aug. 1994) pp.23-8; 'Toward Post-Heroic Warfare', ibid. 74/3 (May/June 1995) pp.109-22; 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', ibid. 75/4 (July/Aug. 1996) pp.33-44.
100. Edward N. Luttwak, 'Where Are the Great Powers?' Foreign Affairs 73/4 (July/Aug. 1994) pp.23-8; 'Toward Post-Heroic Warfare', ibid. 74/3 (May/June 1995) pp.109-22; 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', ibid. 75/4 (July/Aug. 1996) pp.33-44.
101. Mordechai Gur, Chief of the General Staff, 1974-1978 (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot 1998) [Hebrew] p.404.
102. An interview with Barak, Ha'aretz, 30 July 1993.
103. Press conference with the Northern Command's Chief of Staff, Brigadier R., Ha'aretz, 29 July 1993.
104. Interview to Israeli Radio, Channel 2, 6 Oct. 1999.
105. Deterrence is elusive because it depends very heavily on psychology; early warning at the national level is elusive, due to its dependence on the intellectual skills of a few intelligence evaluators; arms control is elusive because it is strongly based on mutual confidence.
106. In 1982, Egypt refrained from coming to Syria's help. In its peace agreement with Israel it had undertaken not to give its inter-Arab obligations priority over its commitment to peace with Israel. It was also unwilling to either risk its new territorial achievements as a result of the peace process or jeopardize the prospects of economic recovery. Its army was still in a process of modernization, and its relations with Syria and the PLO - two of the most outspoken radical rejectionists in the Arab world - were tense. It also realized that any hostility against Israel would harm its close relations with the United States, the political, military and economical support of which was considered to be vital. Dan Schueftan, 'The Lebanon War and the Arab World', Ma'arachot 284 (Sept. 1982) p.64; Itamar Rabinowitz, 'The Arab World in the Lebanon War', in Meir, The Lebanon War (note 48) p.11; Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (Jerusalem: Edanim 1983) [Hebrew] pp.291-2.
107. In 1982, Egypt refrained from coming to Syria's help. In its peace agreement with Israel it had undertaken not to give its inter-Arab obligations priority over its commitment to peace with Israel. It was also unwilling to either risk its new territorial achievements as a result of the peace process or jeopardize the prospects of economic recovery. Its army was still in a process of modernization, and its relations with Syria and the PLO - two of the most outspoken radical rejectionists in the Arab world - were tense. It also realized that any hostility against Israel would harm its close relations with the United States, the political, military and economical support of which was considered to be vital. Dan Schueftan, 'The Lebanon War and the Arab World', Ma'arachot 284 (Sept. 1982) p.64; Itamar Rabinowitz, 'The Arab World in the Lebanon War', in Meir, The Lebanon War (note 48) p.11; Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (Jerusalem: Edanim 1983) [Hebrew] pp.291-2.
108. In 1982, Egypt refrained from coming to Syria's help. In its peace agreement with Israel it had undertaken not to give its inter-Arab obligations priority over its commitment to peace with Israel. It was also unwilling to either risk its new territorial achievements as a result of the peace process or jeopardize the prospects of economic recovery. Its army was still in a process of modernization, and its relations with Syria and the PLO - two of the most outspoken radical rejectionists in the Arab world - were tense. It also realized that any hostility against Israel would harm its close relations with the United States, the political, military and economical support of which was considered to be vital. Dan Schueftan, 'The Lebanon War and the Arab World', Ma'arachot 284 (Sept. 1982) p.64; Itamar Rabinowitz, 'The Arab World in the Lebanon War', in Meir, The Lebanon War (note 48) p.11; Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (Jerusalem: Edanim 1983) [Hebrew] pp.291-2.
109. See Yehezkel Dror, 'Modern Technology as a Basis for a War Doctrine', paper presented at a conference on Technology and War, BESA Center for Strategic Studies, 27 Jan. 1998.
110. Shlomo Brom and Yiftah Shapir (eds.) The Middle East Military Balance, 1999-2000 (Cambridge, MA: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies & MIT Press 1999) p.414.
111. Interview with Uzi Rubin, head of Israeli program of defense against ballistic missiles, Ha'aretz, 28 Oct. 1997.
112. Kober, [Battlefield] Decision (note 49) pp.369-72.
113. Ibid, pp.411-17.
114. Hanoch Bartov, Dado (Tel-Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1978) [Hebrew] Vol. I, pp.266-7.
115. Arens (note 61) p.3.
116. Stephen P. Rosen, 'War and the Willingness to Suffer', in Bruce M. Russett (ed.) Peace, War and Numbers (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1972) pp.167-83.
117. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works (London: Lawrence & Wishart 1954), 'Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War', Ch. 2; Che Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare (NY: Praeger 1961) p.11; Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1961) pp.28-30.
118. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works (London: Lawrence & Wishart 1954), 'Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War', Ch. 2; Che Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare (NY: Praeger 1961) p.11; Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1961) pp.28-30.
119. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works (London: Lawrence & Wishart 1954), 'Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War', Ch. 2; Che Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare (NY: Praeger 1961) p.11; Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1961) pp.28-30.
120. In this particular case, the loss ratios do not include civilians, since both sides have agreed to refrain from attacking civilian targets. In 1995 the loss ratios (human casualties) were 3.9 to 1 in Israel's favor; in 1996, they declined to 2.3 to 1; and, in 1997, they declined even further to 1.7 to 1, only (the helicopter crashes of Feb. 1997 excluded). The above figures are based on the IDF Spokesman and Hizballah Internet sites (www.israel-mfa.gov.il/idf; www.moqawama.org), and the Lebanese newspaper Al-Hayat (Ha'aretz, 26 Dec. 1997).
121. Ha'aretz, 15 Sept. 1998.
122. Feldman and Rechnitz-Kijner (note 48) p.33.
123. Kober, [Battlefield] Decision (note 49) pp.420-2.
124. Naor (note 48) p.82; Yehuda Ben-Meir, Lecture, Symposium on 'Strategic Decisions in War', Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1985; Ariel Sharon (with David Chanoff), Warrior (Tel Aviv: Steimatzky 1989) pp.468-9.
125. Naor (note 48) p.82; Yehuda Ben-Meir, Lecture, Symposium on 'Strategic Decisions in War', Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1985; Ariel Sharon (with David Chanoff), Warrior (Tel Aviv: Steimatzky 1989) pp.468-9.
126. Ha'aretz Supplement, 29 Sept. 1989.
127. Address by Yitzhak Rabin at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 10 June 1991.
128. See Ariel Sharon's lecture at Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 12 Sept. 1989.