Explaining the United States' Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 85-106

  Malvesti, Michele L ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035617578     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546550109609682     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. A debate exists over the precise nature of terrorism and thus a universally accepted definition remains elusive. Since this research project focuses on the US response to anti-US international terrorism, the United States government's definition of terrorism is employed: 'premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.' Within the parameters of this definition the United States also makes clear the term 'noncombatant' is not restricted to civilians; rather, noncombatants can include military personnel who are either unarmed or off-duty at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the US also considers acts of terrorism attacks that are directed against military facilities or armed military personnel when there is not a state of military hostilities. International terrorism is an act thus defined but which involves the territory or citizens of more than one state. United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (Washington, DC: Department of State April 1999), pp.vi-vii.
2. Data gathered from United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism series for the years 1983-98.
3. See, for example, United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987 (Washington, DC: Department of State August 1988), p.iii and United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (note 1), p.iii.
4. See, for example, United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987 (Washington, DC: Department of State August 1988), p.iii and United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (note 1), p.iii.
5. See, for example, Louis J. Freeh, U.S. Government's Response to International Terrorism, 3 September 1998. Available http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/98archives/terror.html
6. The preference for the law enforcement approach, which most likely emanates from the lawful context in which the instrument is applied as well as from its ability to bring to fruition a tangible success - namely, the apprehension and prosecution of a terrorist - in the war against terrorism, is exemplified in the increasing responsibilities, roles and capabilities the US has extended to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with respect to anti-US international terrorism. For example, the FBI not only is the lead agency with respect to terrorism executed on US soil but also has jurisdiction when US interests are attacked overseas: 'The FBI's counter-terrorism responsibilities were further expanded in 1984 and 1986, when Congress passed laws permitting the Bureau to exercise federal jurisdiction overseas when a US National is murdered, assaulted, or taken hostage by terrorists, or when certain US interests are attacked', Freeh (note 4).
7. Controversy surrounds the decision to strike the EI Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan. US officials claimed the plant was producing deadly chemical agents and was part of bin Laden's infrastructure to acquire a chemical weapons capability. Information revealed since the strike, however, indicates otherwise. See, among others, Vernon Loeb, 'US Wasn't Sure Plant Had Nerve Gas Role', Washington Post, 21 August 1999; and James Risen, 'To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debates Rankle', New York Times, 27 October 1999.
8. Controversy surrounds the decision to strike the EI Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan. US officials claimed the plant was producing deadly chemical agents and was part of bin Laden's infrastructure to acquire a chemical weapons capability. Information revealed since the strike, however, indicates otherwise. See, among others, Vernon Loeb, 'US Wasn't Sure Plant Had Nerve Gas Role', Washington Post, 21 August 1999; and James Risen, 'To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debates Rankle', New York Times, 27 October 1999.
9. Based on information compiled from the United States Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism series, 1983-98. Hizballah is known to be responsible for the deaths of more than 260 US citizens: the April 1983 suicide vehicle bombing of the US embassy in Beirut, Lebanon (17 US killed); the October 1983 bombing of the US Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut (241 US killed); the January 1984 shooting of Malcolm Kerr, President of the American University of Beirut (1 US killed); the March 1984 abduction in Beirut and subsequent death of CIA station chief William Buckley (1 US dead); the suicide truck bombing of the US embassy annex in east Beirut in September 1984 (2 US dead); the singling out and subsequent murder of two US Agency for International Development employees during the December 1984 hijacking of Kuwaiti Airlines flight 221 (2 US killed); the murder of US navy diver Robert Stethem during the June 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 (1 US killed); and the February 1988 abduction and subsequent murder of Lt. Col. William Higgins in Lebanon (1 US killed). Hizballah may also be indirectly responsible for the death of US citizen Peter Kilburn, an American University of Beirut librarian. The group abducted Kilburn in November 1984. His body was discovered on 17 April 1986; Libyan involvement - probable retaliation for the April 1986 US air strikes against Tripoli - is suspected in his death.
10. In April 1999, more than seven years after the US and British governments issued indictments, Tripoli surrendered two Libyans accused of planting the bomb on the aircraft. In January 2001, a Scottish court seated in the Netherlands convicted Libyan intelligence agent Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi of 270 counts of murder. He was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 20 years. Co-defendant Lamen Khalifa Fhima was acquitted.
11. Ronald Reagan, 'Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya', Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1986, Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO 1988), pp.468-69.
12. Ibid., p.469.
13. Ibid.
14. Information regarding Clinton's statements are taken from the following two sources: William J. Clinton, 'Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters', Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO 1994), pp.938-39 and William J. Clinton, 'Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters', Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO 1994) pp.940-41.
15. Information regarding Clinton's statements are taken from the following two sources: William J. Clinton, 'Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters', Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO 1994), pp.938-39 and William J. Clinton, 'Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters', Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, Book 1 (Washington, DC: GPO 1994) pp.940-41.
16. Clinton, 'Address to the Nation' (note 12), p.938.
17. Clinton, 'Letter to Congressional Leaders' (note 12), p.940.
18. Clinton, 'Address to the Nation' (note 12), pp.938-39.
19. William J. Clinton, 'Statement by the President, Edgartown Elementary School, Martha's Vineyard', 20 August 1998. Available http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-.../oma.eop. gov.us/1998/8/20/2.text.1.
20. Reagan (note 9), p.468 (emphasis added).
21. For examples of prior anti-US terrorism incidents perpetrated by Iraqi agents see United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990 (Washington, DC: Department of State 1991), and United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991 (Washington, DC: Department of State 1992).
22. For examples of prior anti-US terrorism incidents perpetrated by Iraqi agents see United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990 (Washington, DC: Department of State 1991), and United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991 (Washington, DC: Department of State 1992).
23. Clinton, 'Address to the Nation' (note 12), p.938 (emphasis added).
24. Clinton, 'Statement by the President' (note 16).
25. For use of the word 'imminent' see William J. Clinton, Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 22 August 1998. Available http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs/980822-wh.3.htm
26. United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988 (Washington, DC: Department of State 1989), p.81.
27. Reagan (note 9) (emphasis added).
28. Clinton, 'Address to the Nation' (note 12), p.938 (emphasis added).
29. Clinton, 'Statement by the President' (note 16) (emphasis added).
30. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990 (note 18), p.44.
31. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (note 1), p.78.
32. See United States Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism series for the years 1983-98.
33. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (note 1), p.1.
34. Douglas Jehl, 'U.S. Cited Evidence in a Plot on Bush', New York Times, 9 May 1993.
35. David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism (New York: Harper & Row 1988), p.285.
36. Ibid., p.286.
37. Ibid.
38. Madeleine K. Albright and Sandy Berger, Press Briefing on U.S. Strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan, 20 August 1998. Available http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/ 1998/980820.html
39. Ibid.
40. Jehl (note 30).
41. Clinton, 'Address to the Nation' (note 12), p.938.
42. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991 (note 18), p.32.
43. John Lancaster, 'Compromising Positions', Washington Post Magazine (9 July 2000), p.22.
44. See Tim Zimmerman, 'Coercive Diplomacy and Libya', in Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994), pp.201-28.
45. Bernard Gwertzman, 'U.S. Navy Exercises Starts Off Libya', New York Times, 15 January 1986.
46. John Kifner, 'Qaddafi Threatens a Wider Struggle', New York Times, 26 March 1986.
47. Clinton, 'Address to the Nation' (note 12), p.938.
48. Madeleine K. Albright, 'Albright Addresses UN Security Council', Cable News Network Transcript #432-3, 27 June 1993.
49. Karl Vick, 'Assault on a U.S. Embassy: A Plot Both Wide and Deep', Washington Post, 23 November 1998.
50. United States Department of State, Fact Sheet: Usama bin Ladin, 21 August 1998. Available http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/fs_bin_ladin.html
51. Ibid.
52. Martin and Walcott (note 31), p.280.
53. Ibid., p.289.
54. Colin Powell, 'General Colin Powell Discusses US Air Attack on Baghdad', Cable News Network Transcript #430-1, 27 June 1993.
55. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 1998 (Washington, DC: CIA 1998), p.3.
56. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (note 1), p.78.
57. In accordance with its preference for law enforcement action, the US government supported the legal efforts of the Philippine government in response to the NPA's anti-US terrorist activity. For instance, the Philippine government convicted two NPA operatives for the 1989 assassination of US Army Colonel James Rowe; both were sentenced to life imprisonment in 1991, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991 (note 18), p.5. The US is not known to have pursued a 'power approach' against the NPA; rather, the US has worked bilaterally with the Philippine government on counter-terrorism measures, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990 (note 18), p.6.
58. In accordance with its preference for law enforcement action, the US government supported the legal efforts of the Philippine government in response to the NPA's anti-US terrorist activity. For instance, the Philippine government convicted two NPA operatives for the 1989 assassination of US Army Colonel James Rowe; both were sentenced to life imprisonment in 1991, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991 (note 18), p.5. The US is not known to have pursued a 'power approach' against the NPA; rather, the US has worked bilaterally with the Philippine government on counter-terrorism measures, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990 (note 18), p.6.
59. 'Arab Press Rails Against Clinton', Mideast Mirror, 28 June 1993 (emphasis added).
60. 'Why Washington's Arab Allies Won't Support Its Missile Strikes', Mideast Mirror, 24 August 1998.
61. George D. Moffett III, 'Tallying Diplomatic Score of US Raid on Libya', Christian Science Monitor, 16 April 1986, p.1.
62. Data regarding US public opinion is taken from the following sources: James Reston, 'Leave it to the People?', New York Times, 20 April 1986; Reuters, 'Americans Favor Killing Saddam Hussein', Los Angeles Times, 29 June 1993; John Diamond, 'At War With Terror; US Missile Attacks Kill at Least 21', Buffalo News, 21 August 1998.
63. Data regarding US public opinion is taken from the following sources: James Reston, 'Leave it to the People?', New York Times, 20 April 1986; Reuters, 'Americans Favor Killing Saddam Hussein', Los Angeles Times, 29 June 1993; John Diamond, 'At War With Terror; US Missile Attacks Kill at Least 21', Buffalo News, 21 August 1998.
64. Data regarding US public opinion is taken from the following sources: James Reston, 'Leave it to the People?', New York Times, 20 April 1986; Reuters, 'Americans Favor Killing Saddam Hussein', Los Angeles Times, 29 June 1993; John Diamond, 'At War With Terror; US Missile Attacks Kill at Least 21', Buffalo News, 21 August 1998.
65. Martin and Walcott (note 31), p.312.
66. Ibid.
67. A sufficient condition is defined as 'X is sufficient for Y if the occurrence of X implies the occurrence of Y'. Douglas Dion, 'Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study', Comparative Politics 30/2 (1998), p.128.
68. A full, in-depth case study of the 61 additional anti-US terrorist incidents that met the initial four-factor model yet failed to incite the US to military action was beyond the scope of this research project but a cursory examination of the 61 incidents reveals that none of these incidents also meets every one of the five additional critical conditions. If the results of this cursory examination hold true under an in-depth study they would add credence to the criticality of the five additional conditions. More research into this area will help improve the decisional model.
69. Table sources: US Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism annual series, 1983-98; and the US Department of Defense's Terrorist Group Profiles (Washington, DC: GPO 1988), an outgrowth of then-Vice President Bush's Task Force on Combating Terrorism. Despite the availability of various databases that record international terrorism statistics, only the Terrorist Group Profiles publication and the Patterns of Global Terrorism series were used as sources. Employing these US government-published documents gave uniformity to the data, as there is an active debate regarding what is and is not an act of terrorism. Since this article attempts to account for the disparity in the US government's decision to initiate overt military action in response to terrorism crises, it was important to use data the US government considers to be anti-US international terrorist incidents.
70. This author notes that while the data used for this article is restricted to the years 1983-98, some of the terrorist groups under examination came into existence and had conducted terrorist attacks prior to 1983. Accordingly, an incident that may appear to be the first or second executed by a group in the timeframe noted actually may be the fourth or fifth. The author acknowledges this anomaly presented by the restricted scope of the research and concedes it presents a methodological inconsistency but contends it does not negate either the overall methodology or the conclusions of this article.
71. See note 7.