Differing disciplinary perspectives on the origins of trust

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 81, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 479-494

  Fukuyama, Francis ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035617016     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (80)

1. See generally DIEGO GAMBETTA, TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (1988); NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (1979) (offering a more direct discussion of trust); BARBARA A. MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1996); ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST 6, 7 (1997) (discussing the origins and development of trust in the public and private sphere).
2. See generally DIEGO GAMBETTA, TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (1988); NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (1979) (offering a more direct discussion of trust); BARBARA A. MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1996); ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST 6, 7 (1997) (discussing the origins and development of trust in the public and private sphere).
3. See generally DIEGO GAMBETTA, TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (1988); NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (1979) (offering a more direct discussion of trust); BARBARA A. MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1996); ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST 6, 7 (1997) (discussing the origins and development of trust in the public and private sphere).
4. See generally DIEGO GAMBETTA, TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (1988); NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (1979) (offering a more direct discussion of trust); BARBARA A. MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1996); ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST 6, 7 (1997) (discussing the origins and development of trust in the public and private sphere).
5. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990) (explaining in greater detail Coleman's views on the theories underlying the development and evolution of social capital); see also James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. SUPP. 95, 98 (1998) (defining social capital as the aspects of social structure that facilitate certain actions between and among actors, individuals and institutions, as well as the conditions under which social capital arises).
6. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990) (explaining in greater detail Coleman's views on the theories underlying the development and evolution of social capital); see also James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. SUPP. 95, 98 (1998) (defining social capital as the aspects of social structure that facilitate certain actions between and among actors, individuals and institutions, as well as the conditions under which social capital arises).
7. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000) (defining social capital as "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them"); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 67 (1995) [hereinafter Putnam, Bowling Alone].
8. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000) (defining social capital as "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them"); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 67 (1995) [hereinafter Putnam, Bowling Alone].
9. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000) (defining social capital as "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them"); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 67 (1995) [hereinafter Putnam, Bowling Alone].
10. See Putnam, Bowling Alone, supra note 3, at 67.
11. See Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and Civil Society 3 (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. WP/00/74, 2000) (discussing social capital, its economic and political functions and origins, as well as suggesting how social capital can be cultivated).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 4 (arguing that "social solidarity in human communities is often purchased at the price of hostility toward out-group members").
16. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999).
17. See id. at 146 (noting that these norms tend to be recorded in religious documents, constitutions, and regulations).
18. See id. at 147 (such norms may lack similar tangible written sources and are more commonly encompassed in oral folk lore).
19. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 4, 147-48 (1991) (defining the "legal centralist" as viewing that the "state functions as the soul creator of the operative rules of entitlement among individuals," and the "legal peripheralist" as viewing the state established legal system as ineffective and regarding society itself as the source of entitlement rules).
20. See id.
21. See FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 147-48 (noting that rational choice theory is equally applicable to norms devised hierarchically or spontaneously).
22. See id. (noting that the nature of these disciplines, chiefly the emphasis placed on the study of humans, necessitates the study of norms).
23. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (1973). But see DONALD BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALISTS 5, 6 (1991) (arguing that there are some base concepts that are universal to all cultures and that these universals form a heterogeneous set with human biology and evolutionary psychology as key elements to understanding these sets).
24. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (1973). But see DONALD BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALISTS 5, 6 (1991) (arguing that there are some base concepts that are universal to all cultures and that these universals form a heterogeneous set with human biology and evolutionary psychology as key elements to understanding these sets).
25. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1930).
26. See MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 85 (1990) (defining "control theories" as those classical theories that emphasis crime prevention through the painful consequences to the individual for violating the law); see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 27-28 (1989) (noting that control theory assumes individuals will engage in criminal behavior unless controlled through the creation of a social bond composed of 4 elements: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief).
27. See MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 85 (1990) (defining "control theories" as those classical theories that emphasis crime prevention through the painful consequences to the individual for violating the law); see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 27-28 (1989) (noting that control theory assumes individuals will engage in criminal behavior unless controlled through the creation of a social bond composed of 4 elements: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief).
28. See generally GEORGE C. HOMANS, THE HUMAN GROUP 156-89 (1950) (offering a classic sociological account of small group behavior through the analysis of Italian New York neighborhoods).
29. See FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 150.
30. See Max Weber, The Sociology of Charismatic Authority, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 245-52 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, trans. 1946).
31. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 1996).
32. See id. (explaining that Weber incorporated Nietzsche's view of the importance of ideas into his discussions).
33. See Ronald A. Heiner, Origins of Predictable Behavior: Further Modeling and Applications, 75 AM. ECON. REV. no. 2, at 391 (1985) (noting that economic theory assumes that individuals engage in pleasure maximization and rationalization, regardless of the actual complexity of the decision); Ronald A. Heiner, The Origins of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 561 (1983) (explaining that in a world free from uncertainty, human behavior would be less, rather than more, predicable because the environment itself would not create discernable patterns of behavior); see also FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 149 (explaining that, while rational choice is clearly applicable to the study of human norms, it is not the sole source of analysis for the development of these norms).
34. See Ronald A. Heiner, Origins of Predictable Behavior: Further Modeling and Applications, 75 AM. ECON. REV. no. 2, at 391 (1985) (noting that economic theory assumes that individuals engage in pleasure maximization and rationalization, regardless of the actual complexity of the decision); Ronald A. Heiner, The Origins of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 561 (1983) (explaining that in a world free from uncertainty, human behavior would be less, rather than more, predicable because the environment itself would not create discernable patterns of behavior); see also FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 149 (explaining that, while rational choice is clearly applicable to the study of human norms, it is not the sole source of analysis for the development of these norms).
35. See Ronald A. Heiner, Origins of Predictable Behavior: Further Modeling and Applications, 75 AM. ECON. REV. no. 2, at 391 (1985) (noting that economic theory assumes that individuals engage in pleasure maximization and rationalization, regardless of the actual complexity of the decision); Ronald A. Heiner, The Origins of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 561 (1983) (explaining that in a world free from uncertainty, human behavior would be less, rather than more, predicable because the environment itself would not create discernable patterns of behavior); see also FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 149 (explaining that, while rational choice is clearly applicable to the study of human norms, it is not the sole source of analysis for the development of these norms).
36. FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 149.
37. See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Institutional Economics: Surveying the 'Old' and the 'New,' 44 METROECONOMICA 1-28 (1993) (describing new institutionalism and how it differs from the older variety).
38. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) (defining institutions as the "rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the human devised constraints that shape human interaction").
39. See id.
40. See generally JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAME AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944) (describing the origin of game theory and the formulas used in the analysis).
41. Dennis Wrong, The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology, 26 AM. SOC. REV. 183-96 (1961).
42. See FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 170-71.
43. See id. at 146 (noting the role of politics and political science in the formulation of social norms).
44. See id.
45. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 31, 32 (1962) (analyzing the theoretical role and perspective of individual and collective rational choice in decision making); see generally BARRY R. WEINGAST ET. AL., ANALYTIC NARRATIVES (1998) (summarizing the state of the art with respect to this approach).
46. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 31, 32 (1962) (analyzing the theoretical role and perspective of individual and collective rational choice in decision making); see generally BARRY R. WEINGAST ET. AL., ANALYTIC NARRATIVES (1998) (summarizing the state of the art with respect to this approach).
47. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994).
48. See FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 152 (discussing the generation of certain norms that are firmly rooted in biology and as such, belong in the spontaneously generated category of social norms).
49. See id. at 159-60.
50. See J.R. FOX, THE RED LAMP OF INCEST (1983); see also FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 159-60; J.R. Fox, Sibling Incest. 13 BRIT. J. SOC. 128, 146-47 (1962).
51. See J.R. FOX, THE RED LAMP OF INCEST (1983); see also FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 159-60; J.R. Fox, Sibling Incest. 13 BRIT. J. SOC. 128, 146-47 (1962).
52. See J.R. FOX, THE RED LAMP OF INCEST (1983); see also FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 159-60; J.R. Fox, Sibling Incest. 13 BRIT. J. SOC. 128, 146-47 (1962).
53. See FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 152-53 (discussing sociology's emphasis on hierarchically-generated, a-rational norms).
54. Id.
55. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 24 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1967).
56. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 21 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1968).
57. FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION, supra note 10, at 73.
58. See Andrew Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. No. 4, at 85 (1980) (describing the communal driftwood gathering practices of a Yorkshire fishing village); see also ANDREW SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE (1986).
59. See Andrew Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. No. 4, at 85 (1980) (describing the communal driftwood gathering practices of a Yorkshire fishing village); see also ANDREW SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE (1986).
60. See ELLICKSON, supra note 13, at 192 (offering Herman Melville's explanation from MOBY DICK as to why whalers needed a system of peaceful norms to resolve conflicting claims over whale ownership).
61. See id. (noting that, although no formal hierarchical trade association developed to create a formal structure for these norms, Anglo-American whaling norms developed spontaneously over time, which were regarded as law by both the whalers and the courts).
62. See id. at 231-32 (discussing the development of a system of self-help and gossip by Shasta County farmers and ranchers as an informal method of protecting their property interests).
63. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION XV (1990) (explaining the method of case study compilation for common pool resources in subjects ranging from rural sociology to human ecology).
64. Id. at 2, 3 (listing numerous historical, political, and environmental events, such as the Sahelian Famine, congressional overspending, and acid rain, that implicate the tragedy of the commons).
65. See id. at 14 (illustrating the centralist view that a "central authority must assume continuing responsibility" for resource decision making and the privatization view that a "central authority should parcel out ownership rights" and then allow each individual to maximize their own welfare).
66. See id. (arguing that individuals are not inevitably trapped by the tragedy of the commons, but rather that individuals have the ability to extradite themselves from these situations depending on the specific circumstances of the situation).
67. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
68. See OSTROM, supra note 39, at 6 (mirroring Mancur Olson's idea that unless the community is small, or coerced into acting in the best interest of the group, "rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests").
69. See William D. Hamilton, The Genetic Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 7-52 (1964); see also ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 361 (1985) (defining reciprocal altruism as the trading of altruistic acts where the benefit outweighs the cost and thus produces a long-term net gain for both parties); Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE 1390-91 (1981) (using the notion of the prisoner's dilemma to explain biological and evolutionary cooperation); Robert Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. OF BIOLOGY 35-56 (1871).
70. See William D. Hamilton, The Genetic Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 7-52 (1964); see also ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 361 (1985) (defining reciprocal altruism as the trading of altruistic acts where the benefit outweighs the cost and thus produces a long-term net gain for both parties); Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE 1390-91 (1981) (using the notion of the prisoner's dilemma to explain biological and evolutionary cooperation); Robert Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. OF BIOLOGY 35-56 (1871).
71. See William D. Hamilton, The Genetic Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 7-52 (1964); see also ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 361 (1985) (defining reciprocal altruism as the trading of altruistic acts where the benefit outweighs the cost and thus produces a long-term net gain for both parties); Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE 1390-91 (1981) (using the notion of the prisoner's dilemma to explain biological and evolutionary cooperation); Robert Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. OF BIOLOGY 35-56 (1871).
72. See William D. Hamilton, The Genetic Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 7-52 (1964); see also ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 361 (1985) (defining reciprocal altruism as the trading of altruistic acts where the benefit outweighs the cost and thus produces a long-term net gain for both parties); Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE 1390-91 (1981) (using the notion of the prisoner's dilemma to explain biological and evolutionary cooperation); Robert Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. OF BIOLOGY 35-56 (1871).
73. See generally DAVID SLOAN WILSON & ELLIOT SOBER, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998) (offering an overview of the efforts to seriously analyze the group-selection hypothesis).
74. The Wason test was devised in the 1960s to determine whether subjects could correctly falsify conditional if-then propositions by turning over a series of cards containing several possible answers. In Wason's original test, this kind of logical reasoning proved very difficult for most people when it concerned abstract propositions; only 25% of the subjects tested were able to provide correct answers. See THE ADAPTED MIND: COGNITIVE ADAPTATIONS FOR SOCIAL EXCHANGE 181, 182 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992).
75. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 165-68 (1994).
76. See id. at 173-75.
77. See Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. no. 4, at 1096, 1101, 1109 (1986) (explaining a metanorm as the treatment of non-punishment as a method of defection by citing the use of lynching to promote White supremacy in the South).
78. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 45, 46 (1997) (differentiating between ordinary norms, which govern everyday life and metanorms, which provide specific mechanisms for the enforcement of ordinary norms).
79. See TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION, supra note 55, at 388 (arguing that altruistic behavior is coupled with a strong fairness standard, which is used by the altruist as a measurement standard for others - infringement of this fairness standard results in punishment of the "cheater" known as moralistic aggression).
80. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000) (arguing that the bulk of existing social norms can be explicated using a game-theoretic approach).