Choice as the focus of antitrust: A marketing perspective

University of Pittsburgh Law Review

Volumn 62, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 527-532

  Gundlach, Gregory T ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035612765     PISSN: 00419915     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44-50 (2000) (discussing the deleterious effects of Microsoft conduct on choice); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1984) (suggesting that consumer choice is to be the guiding principle in American antitrust); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) ("an agreement limiting consumer choice . . . cannot be sustained"); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.5 (1988) (quoting 7 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1503, at 373 (1986)) (determining that the challenged activity "might deprive some consumers of a desired product"); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 369 n.20 (1977) ("[t]he public is entitled to know . . . useful information that will enable people to make a more informed choice") (quoting 235 JAMA 2328 (1976)); United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 455 (1964) ("price is only one factor in a user's choice"); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 677 (3d Cir. 1993) (labeling the crucial issue as whether the challenged practice "actually enhances consumer choice"); Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979) (labeling a crucial issue as whether "the free choice of consumers is preserved"); Butler Aviation Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 389 F.2d 517, 520 (2d Cir. 1968) (analyzing effect of corporate acquisition on consumer choice).
2. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Practical Reason]; Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty]; see also Louis B. Schwanz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern for Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283 (1996); Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Introduction: The Economics of the Antitrust Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 1-15 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996); see generally Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice, Not Price or Efficiency, as the Focus of Antitrust, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust as Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000).
3. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Practical Reason]; Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty]; see also Louis B. Schwanz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern for Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283 (1996); Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Introduction: The Economics of the Antitrust Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 1-15 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996); see generally Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice, Not Price or Efficiency, as the Focus of Antitrust, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust as Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000).
4. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Practical Reason]; Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty]; see also Louis B. Schwanz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern for Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283 (1996); Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Introduction: The Economics of the Antitrust Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 1-15 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996); see generally Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice, Not Price or Efficiency, as the Focus of Antitrust, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust as Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000).
5. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Practical Reason]; Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty]; see also Louis B. Schwanz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern for Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283 (1996); Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Introduction: The Economics of the Antitrust Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 1-15 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996); see generally Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice, Not Price or Efficiency, as the Focus of Antitrust, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust as Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000).
6. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Practical Reason]; Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty]; see also Louis B. Schwanz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern for Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283 (1996); Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Introduction: The Economics of the Antitrust Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 1-15 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996); see generally Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice, Not Price or Efficiency, as the Focus of Antitrust, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust as Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000).
7. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Practical Reason]; Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty]; see also Louis B. Schwanz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern for Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283 (1996); Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Introduction: The Economics of the Antitrust Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 1-15 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996); see generally Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice, Not Price or Efficiency, as the Focus of Antitrust, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust as Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000).
8. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Practical Reason]; Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty]; see also Louis B. Schwanz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern for Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283 (1996); Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Introduction: The Economics of the Antitrust Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 1-15 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996); see generally Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice, Not Price or Efficiency, as the Focus of Antitrust, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust as Consumer Choice: Comments on the New Paradigm, An Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century, American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000).
9. FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary, Freedom as the Core Value of Antitrust in the New Millennium, ABA Antitrust Section, 48th Annual Meeting Chair's showcase Program (Apr. 6, 2000) ". . . seller freedom implies the ability to have access to needed inputs or channels of distribution, and recognizes that sellers must be free to make efficient choices. Similarly, consumer freedom implies the right to buy in open markets from seller who can be trusted."
10. See Shelby D. Hunt, General Theories and the Fundamental Explanda of Marketing, J. MARKETING, Fall 1983, at 9, 13 (characterizing the discipline as the "behavioral science that seeks to explain exchange relationships"). See also WROE ALDERSON, MARKETING BEHAVIOR AND EXECUTIVE ACTION: A FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO MARKETING THEORY (1957); Richard P. Bagozzi, Toward a Formal Theory of Marketing Exchanges, in MARKETING THEORY: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 791 (1979); Franklin S. Houston & Jule B. Gassenheimer, Marketing and Exchange, 51 J. MARKETING 3 (1987); Philip Kotler, A General Concept of Marketing, 36 J. MARKETING 48 (1972).
11. See Shelby D. Hunt, General Theories and the Fundamental Explanda of Marketing, J. MARKETING, Fall 1983, at 9, 13 (characterizing the discipline as the "behavioral science that seeks to explain exchange relationships"). See also WROE ALDERSON, MARKETING BEHAVIOR AND EXECUTIVE ACTION: A FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO MARKETING THEORY (1957); Richard P. Bagozzi, Toward a Formal Theory of Marketing Exchanges, in MARKETING THEORY: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 791 (1979); Franklin S. Houston & Jule B. Gassenheimer, Marketing and Exchange, 51 J. MARKETING 3 (1987); Philip Kotler, A General Concept of Marketing, 36 J. MARKETING 48 (1972).
12. See Shelby D. Hunt, General Theories and the Fundamental Explanda of Marketing, J. MARKETING, Fall 1983, at 9, 13 (characterizing the discipline as the "behavioral science that seeks to explain exchange relationships"). See also WROE ALDERSON, MARKETING BEHAVIOR AND EXECUTIVE ACTION: A FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO MARKETING THEORY (1957); Richard P. Bagozzi, Toward a Formal Theory of Marketing Exchanges, in MARKETING THEORY: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 791 (1979); Franklin S. Houston & Jule B. Gassenheimer, Marketing and Exchange, 51 J. MARKETING 3 (1987); Philip Kotler, A General Concept of Marketing, 36 J. MARKETING 48 (1972).
13. See Shelby D. Hunt, General Theories and the Fundamental Explanda of Marketing, J. MARKETING, Fall 1983, at 9, 13 (characterizing the discipline as the "behavioral science that seeks to explain exchange relationships"). See also WROE ALDERSON, MARKETING BEHAVIOR AND EXECUTIVE ACTION: A FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO MARKETING THEORY (1957); Richard P. Bagozzi, Toward a Formal Theory of Marketing Exchanges, in MARKETING THEORY: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 791 (1979); Franklin S. Houston & Jule B. Gassenheimer, Marketing and Exchange, 51 J. MARKETING 3 (1987); Philip Kotler, A General Concept of Marketing, 36 J. MARKETING 48 (1972).
14. See Shelby D. Hunt, General Theories and the Fundamental Explanda of Marketing, J. MARKETING, Fall 1983, at 9, 13 (characterizing the discipline as the "behavioral science that seeks to explain exchange relationships"). See also WROE ALDERSON, MARKETING BEHAVIOR AND EXECUTIVE ACTION: A FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO MARKETING THEORY (1957); Richard P. Bagozzi, Toward a Formal Theory of Marketing Exchanges, in MARKETING THEORY: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 791 (1979); Franklin S. Houston & Jule B. Gassenheimer, Marketing and Exchange, 51 J. MARKETING 3 (1987); Philip Kotler, A General Concept of Marketing, 36 J. MARKETING 48 (1972).
15. Leary, supra note 3.
16. Id.
17. Averitt & Lande, Practical Reason, supra note 2; Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty, supra note 2.
18. Averitt & Lande, Practical Reason, supra note 2; Averitt & Lande, Consumer Sovereignty, supra note 2.
19. Id. at 44-47.
20. See generally EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY & APPLICATIONS (5th ed. 1985); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990).
21. See generally EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY & APPLICATIONS (5th ed. 1985); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1990).
22. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (5th ed. 1937) (1776).
23. In this regard, the objective of antitrust as maximizing consumer welfare is generally interpreted to tip the balance of weighting toward consumers.
24. Averitt & Lande, Practical Reason, supra note 2, at 44 ("The antitrust laws are intended to ensure that the marketplace remains competitive, so that a meaningful range of options is made available to consumers . . . . The consumer protection laws are intended to ensure that consumers can select effectively from among those options with their critical faculties unimpaired . . . .").
25. By welfare analysis I refer to considerations of allocative efficiency.
26. Lande, supra note 2.