Big fish eat small fish: On merger in Stackelberg markets

Economics Letters

Volumn 73, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 213-217

  Huck, Steffen ^a   Konrad, Kai A ^b   Müller, Wieland ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^c HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

D43; L11; L13; Market power; Market structure; Merger

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035610539     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00490-6     Document Type: Article

References (6)

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2. Farrell J., Shapiro C. Horizontal mergers: an equilibrium analysis. American Economic Review. 80:1990;107-126.
3. Hamilton J.H., Slutsky S.M. Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior. 2:1990;29-46.
4. Lommerud, K.E., Straume, O.R., Sorgard, L., 2000. Merger profitability in unionized monopoly, mimeo, University of Bergen, Norway.
5. Perry M.K., Porter R.H. Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger. American Economic Review. 75:1985;219-227.
6. Salant S.W., Switzer S., Reynolds R.J. Losses from horizontal merger: the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 98:1983;185-199.