Sino 301: How Congress Can Effectively Review Relations with China after WTO Accession

Cornell International Law Journal

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 55-93

  Tiefer, Charles ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035608343     PISSN: 00108812     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (244)

1. The accession agreement is entitled Agreement on Market Access, Nov. 15, 1999, P.R.C.-U.S. (copy released by United States Trade Representative on file with author) [hereinafter China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement or WTO Accession Agreement]; see also White House National Economic Council, Summary of the U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement (Nov. 15, 1999), reprinted in 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1888 (Nov. 17, 1999).
2. For a review of the ending of the annual review and the Congressional enactment of permanent normal trade relations with China in October 2000 (that is, by House vote in May 2000, Senate vote in September 2000, and Presidential signature in October 2000), see China's Trade Status, 57 CONG. Q. 2926, 2927 (Dec. 16, 2000). For views on the annual MFN reviews, see, e.g., David M. Lampton, China Policy in Clinton's First Year, in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS (James R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie II eds., 1994); L. Jay Kuo, Comment, Farewell to Jackson-Vanik: The Case for Unconditional MFN Status for the People's Republic of China, 1 ASIAN L.J. 85 (1994);
3. For a review of the ending of the annual review and the Congressional enactment of permanent normal trade relations with China in October 2000 (that is, by House vote in May 2000, Senate vote in September 2000, and Presidential signature in October 2000), see China's Trade Status, 57 CONG. Q. 2926, 2927 (Dec. 16, 2000). For views on the annual MFN reviews, see, e.g., David M. Lampton, China Policy in Clinton's First Year, in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS (James R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie II eds., 1994); L. Jay Kuo, Comment, Farewell to Jackson-Vanik: The Case for Unconditional MFN Status for the People's Republic of China, 1 ASIAN L.J. 85 (1994);
4. For a review of the ending of the annual review and the Congressional enactment of permanent normal trade relations with China in October 2000 (that is, by House vote in May 2000, Senate vote in September 2000, and Presidential signature in October 2000), see China's Trade Status, 57 CONG. Q. 2926, 2927 (Dec. 16, 2000). For views on the annual MFN reviews, see, e.g., David M. Lampton, China Policy in Clinton's First Year, in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS (James R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie II eds., 1994); L. Jay Kuo, Comment, Farewell to Jackson-Vanik: The Case for Unconditional MFN Status for the People's Republic of China, 1 ASIAN L.J. 85 (1994);
5. Daniel C. Turack, The Clinton Administration's Response to China's Human Rights Record: At the Half-Way Point, 3 TULSA. J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (1995). The text of the bill, H.R. 4444, 106th Cong. (2d Sess., 2000), the enactment of which ended the annual MFN review by granting China permanent "normal trade relations" (NTR) treatment, was first printed in the Congressional Record in 146 CONG. REC. H3662 (daily ed., May 24, 2000).
6. For previous analyses, see Jacques DeLisle, Of Chinese Walls, Battering Rams, and Building Permits: Five Lessons About International Economic Law from Sino-U.S. Trade and Investment Relations, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 513 (1996).
7. See generally Paul Lansing & Eric Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most-Favored-Nation Status for Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 329 (1984) (describing the system by which MFN status could be granted, or suspended, for nonmarket economy states, particularly Communist ones).
8. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1155-59 (3d ed. 1995); Xiao-Lin Zhou, U.S.-China Trade Dispute and China's Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1115 (1992); Robert M. Dow, Linking Trade Policy to Free Emigration: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 4 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 128 (1991); Lansing & Rose, supra note 4.
9. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1155-59 (3d ed. 1995); Xiao-Lin Zhou, U.S.-China Trade Dispute and China's Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1115 (1992); Robert M. Dow, Linking Trade Policy to Free Emigration: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 4 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 128 (1991); Lansing & Rose, supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1155-59 (3d ed. 1995); Xiao-Lin Zhou, U.S.-China Trade Dispute and China's Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1115 (1992); Robert M. Dow, Linking Trade Policy to Free Emigration: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 4 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 128 (1991); Lansing & Rose, supra note 4.
11. For that reaction, see CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 11, 196 n.19 (1994).
12. For that quest, see Monica Hsiao, China and the GATT: Two Theories of Political Economy Explaining China's Desire for Membership in the GATT, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 431 (1994).
13. In other Section 301 contexts, the views of the free-trade enthusiasts have been extensively elaborated. See, e.g., Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233 (1996); A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section 301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1996). For the analysis of such an enthusiast's view written on the eve of Congress's vote to end the annual MFN review, see Brad L. Bacon, The People's Republic of China and the World Trade Organization: Anticipating a United States Congressional Dilemma, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 369 (2000).
14. In other Section 301 contexts, the views of the free-trade enthusiasts have been extensively elaborated. See, e.g., Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233 (1996); A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section 301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1996). For the analysis of such an enthusiast's view written on the eve of Congress's vote to end the annual MFN review, see Brad L. Bacon, The People's Republic of China and the World Trade Organization: Anticipating a United States Congressional Dilemma, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 369 (2000).
15. In other Section 301 contexts, the views of the free-trade enthusiasts have been extensively elaborated. See, e.g., Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233 (1996); A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section 301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1996). For the analysis of such an enthusiast's view written on the eve of Congress's vote to end the annual MFN review, see Brad L. Bacon, The People's Republic of China and the World Trade Organization: Anticipating a United States Congressional Dilemma, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 369 (2000).
16. Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361 (1995); Andrew J. Nathan, Influencing Human Rights in China, in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS, supra note 2, at 77.
17. Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361 (1995); Andrew J. Nathan, Influencing Human Rights in China, in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS, supra note 2, at 77.
18. For how that balance has worked generally regarding American trade unilateralism, see, for instance, THOMAS O. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994); AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick eds., 1990). For the author's recent study of that balance in American trade relations, see Charles Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-Executive Interactions About International Organizations, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 239 (2000) [hereinafter Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty].
19. For how that balance has worked generally regarding American trade unilateralism, see, for instance, THOMAS O. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994); AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick eds., 1990). For the author's recent study of that balance in American trade relations, see Charles Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-Executive Interactions About International Organizations, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 239 (2000) [hereinafter Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty].
20. For how that balance has worked generally regarding American trade unilateralism, see, for instance, THOMAS O. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994); AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick eds., 1990). For the author's recent study of that balance in American trade relations, see Charles Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-Executive Interactions About International Organizations, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 239 (2000) [hereinafter Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty].
21. For how that balance has worked generally regarding American trade unilateralism, see, for instance, THOMAS O. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994); AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick eds., 1990). For the author's recent study of that balance in American trade relations, see Charles Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-Executive Interactions About International Organizations, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 239 (2000) [hereinafter Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty].
22. See Warren Maruyama, Section 301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 394 (1990); Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988); Patricia I. Hansen, Note, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122 (1987); Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1975).
23. See Warren Maruyama, Section 301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 394 (1990); Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988); Patricia I. Hansen, Note, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122 (1987); Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1975).
24. See Warren Maruyama, Section 301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 394 (1990); Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988); Patricia I. Hansen, Note, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122 (1987); Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1975).
25. See Warren Maruyama, Section 301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 394 (1990); Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988); Patricia I. Hansen, Note, Defining Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122 (1987); Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1975).
26. See RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 146-48 (1995) (discussing antidumping law for nonmarket economies); William P. Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other "Nonmarket Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1987); see generally PAUL B. STEPHAN III, DON WALLACH, JR., & JULIE A. ROIN, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 845-46 (1996) (addressing nonmarket economies).
27. See RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 146-48 (1995) (discussing antidumping law for nonmarket economies); William P. Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other "Nonmarket Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1987); see generally PAUL B. STEPHAN III, DON WALLACH, JR., & JULIE A. ROIN, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 845-46 (1996) (addressing nonmarket economies).
28. See RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 146-48 (1995) (discussing antidumping law for nonmarket economies); William P. Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other "Nonmarket Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1987); see generally PAUL B. STEPHAN III, DON WALLACH, JR., & JULIE A. ROIN, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 845-46 (1996) (addressing nonmarket economies).
29. See generally Robert L. Harris, Note, Goin' Down the Road Feeling Bad: U.S. Trade Laws' Discriminatory Treatment of the East European Economies in Transition to Capitalism, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403 (1993).
30. See generally Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escpe Clause"with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991).
31. For the various Uruguay Round agreements, collectively (and loosely) referred to in this article as "the WTO," see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). For discussions generally of Uruguay Round agreements, see Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45 (1998) [hereinafter Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements]; Charles Tiefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 31 (1997).
32. For the various Uruguay Round agreements, collectively (and loosely) referred to in this article as "the WTO," see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). For discussions generally of Uruguay Round agreements, see Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45 (1998) [hereinafter Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements]; Charles Tiefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 31 (1997).
33. For a recent review of the law and policies from their origins to almost the final negotiations for the accession agreement, see MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE & CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, TIGER BY THE TAIL: CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 8-60 (1999).
34. Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (1998); John Maggs, Can China Deliver on the Trade Deal?, NAT'L J., Dec. 4, 1999, at 3464, 3465.
35. Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (1998); John Maggs, Can China Deliver on the Trade Deal?, NAT'L J., Dec. 4, 1999, at 3464, 3465.
36. For the significance of a transition mechanism generally and of benchmarks specifically, see Alan S. Alexandroff, Concluding China's Accession to the WTO: The U.S. Congress and Permanent Most Favored Nation Status for China, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 23, 39-42 (1998).
37. For the balance in this context of the roles of the President and Congress, see Charles Tiefer, Alongside the Fast Track: Environment and Labor Issues in the FTAA, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329 (1998) [hereinafter Tiefer, Alongside the Fast Track]; Lawrence M. Reich, Note, Foreign Policy or Foreign Commerce?: WTO Accessions and the U.S. Separation of Powers, 86 GEO. L.J. 751 (1998).
38. For the balance in this context of the roles of the President and Congress, see Charles Tiefer, Alongside the Fast Track: Environment and Labor Issues in the FTAA, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329 (1998) [hereinafter Tiefer, Alongside the Fast Track]; Lawrence M. Reich, Note, Foreign Policy or Foreign Commerce?: WTO Accessions and the U.S. Separation of Powers, 86 GEO. L.J. 751 (1998).
39. United States-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999), 1999 WL 127266 [hereinafter WTO 301 Panel Decision].
40. ROBERT A. PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1929-1976 (1980); Kuo, supra note 2, at 95-96.
41. M.M. KOSTECKI, EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM (1979); Kuo, supra note 2, at 97-101.
42. See generally id.
43. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 1411; JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 818.
44. Section 401 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432.
45. Congress specifically aimed in the Jackson-Vanik provision to condition trade with the Soviet Union on that nation's allowing Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. PAULA STERN, WATER'S EDGE: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 28-30 (1979).
46. Di Jiang-Schuerger, The Most Favored Nation Trade Status and China: The Debate Should Stop Here, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1321, 1342-43 (1998)
47. Id. at 1329.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1334.
50. Id. at 1334-38.
51. Randall Green, Human Rights and Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Rates for Products from the People's Republic of China, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 611, 616 (1994); JiangSchuerger, supra note 27.
52. Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 27, at 1321-24.
53. Lampton, supra note 2, at 9.
54. Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 27, at 1334.
55. Id.
56. Lori Nitschke, Trade Measure Won't Clear Until Fall; House Backers See a Risky Delay, Stave Off Annual Move Against China, 57 CONG. Q. 1823 (July 22, 2000) (noting House vote against ending China's MFN status); Lori Nitschke, China's Human Rights Record Dominates Debate as House Votes to Keep Trade Doors Open, 57 CONG. Q. 1887 (July 31, 1999) (noting House vote against ending China's MFN status); Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 27, at 1322 n.7 (noting House vote against ending China's MFN status).
57. Lori Nitschke, Trade Measure Won't Clear Until Fall; House Backers See a Risky Delay, Stave Off Annual Move Against China, 57 CONG. Q. 1823 (July 22, 2000) (noting House vote against ending China's MFN status); Lori Nitschke, China's Human Rights Record Dominates Debate as House Votes to Keep Trade Doors Open, 57 CONG. Q. 1887 (July 31, 1999) (noting House vote against ending China's MFN status); Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 27, at 1322 n.7 (noting House vote against ending China's MFN status).
58. See, e.g., supra note 37; Christine Button, Book Review, Democracy Behind Bars: Forced Labor in the Chinese Prison System: Past, Present, and Perspectives on the Future, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 181 (1996); Andrew F. Upton, The Big Green Stick: Reducing International Environmental Degradation Through U.S. Trade Sanctions, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. Rev. 671 (1995); Green, supra note 32.
59. See, e.g., supra note 37; Christine Button, Book Review, Democracy Behind Bars: Forced Labor in the Chinese Prison System: Past, Present, and Perspectives on the Future, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 181 (1996); Andrew F. Upton, The Big Green Stick: Reducing International Environmental Degradation Through U.S. Trade Sanctions, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. Rev. 671 (1995); Green, supra note 32.
60. "Fast track" is the statutory authority that allows the President to negotiate trade agreements, which Congress approves on a strictly up-or-down basis, without amendments. Tiefer, Alongside the Fast Track, supra note 19, at 329.
61. For a discussion of the 1999 Seattle demonstrations and their effect on WTO negotiations and China, see John Maggs, Trade Winds Swirling over China Vote, NAT'L J., Dec. 18, 1999, at 3618.
62. See generally China's Trade Status, supra note 2.
63. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 294-95.
64. Id. at 140
65. Hudec, supra note 11, at 510-13.
66. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 141, 817-18 (discussing developments, including the Kennedy Round agreement that reduced international trade barriers and strengthened the GATT).
67. 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
68. Politically, this expansion reflected the Democratic gains in the 1986 election (including majority control of the Senate), the eclipse of the Reagan Administration's stature in foreign affairs following the Iran-contra scandal, and growing trade problems, particularly vis-à-vis Japan. See Steven R. Phillips, The New Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Trade Wars or Open Markets, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 491 (1989).
69. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418.
70. 19 U.S.C. § 2242; Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301": Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (1989).
71. Id.
72. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(A)-(B); see also § 2416(b).
73. 19 U.S.C. § 2420.
74. James M. Cooper, Spirits in the Material World: A Post-Modern Approach to United States Trade Policy, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 957, 1003-06 (1999).
75. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Market Access, Oct. 10, 1992, U.S.-P.R.C., reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1275; Patrick H. Hu, The China 301 on Market Access: A Prelude to GATT Membership?, MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 131 (1994).
76. RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1056-58 (1996).
77. Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property (1992), U.S.-P.R.C., reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 676 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 MOU].
78. BHALA, supra note 55, at 1059-72.
79. Id. at 1060.
80. Id. at 1062.
81. Zhou, supra note 5.
82. See, e.g., Thomas Yunlong Man, Note, National Legal Restructuring in Accordance with International Norms: GATT/WTO and China's Foreign Trade Regime, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 471 (1997).
83. BHALA, supra note 55, at 1063.
84. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS ON MARKET ACCESS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995).
85. BHALA, supra note 55, at 1072.
86. Determination of Action Concerning the People's Republic of China's Protection of Intellectual Property, 60 Fed. Reg. 7230 (Feb. 7, 1995).
87. See BHALA, supra note 55, at 1072-74.
88. Id.
89. Robert S. Ross, China, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 22-23 (Richard N. Haass ed., 1998).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 24.
93. Keshia B. Haskins, Note, Special 301 in China and Mexico: A Policy Which Fails to Consider How Politics, Economics, and Culture Affect Legal Change Under Civil Law Systems of Developing Countries, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1125 (1999).
94. Ross, supra note 68, at 22-24.
95. A Congressional enactment, Section 307 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, bars export of products produced by convicts or forced labor to the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1307.
96. BHALA, supra note 55, at 1333-36; Turack, supra note 2, at 12-15.
97. The United States presented an ultimatum to China in 1993: either improve your human rights record in seven specific areas, number one being the export of prison-made goods, or we will revoke MFN Status. Unfortunately, this ultimatum proved futile . . . . [I]t seems more likely that the advantages provided by the cheap and skilled work force of prisoners in China's labor reform system will cause China to continue on its present course . . . . Button, supra note 38, at 191-92 (footnotes omitted).
98. Ehrenberg, supra note 9, at 417; Button, supra note 38, at 191.
99. BHALA, supra note 55, at 225-45, 261-95 (discussing tariff concessions and restrictions on non-tariff barriers); id. at 192 (discussing "most favored nation" treatment); id. at 245 (discussing "national" treatment).
100. Id. at 192.
101. Id. at 245.
102. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 72-81 (1998).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Bacon, supra note 8, at 387-95 (describing China's current noncompliance with the general WTO regime and the new, detailed commitments in the accession agreement).
106. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
107. Id. The agreement regarding investment measures as part of the Uruguay Round, entitled the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures, is discussed in BHALA, supra note 55, at 1384; Robert H. Edwards, Jr., & Simon N. Lester, Towards a More Comprehensive World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 169, 171 (1997).
108. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1 (section on "Protocol Language," subsection on "Price Comparability in Determining Dumping and Subsidization").
109. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1 ("Summary of U.S. China Bilateral WTO Agreement," at 6 (itself describing the safeguard arrangement as a "special mechanism") and section on "Protocol Language," subsection on "Product-Specific Safeguard" (describing the mechanism that will operate for twelve years)).
110. Id.
111. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1 (section on "Protocol Language," subsection on "Price Comparability in Determining Dumping and Subsidization").
112. Irish Saywell, China's City Limits, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 14, 1999, at 58 (illustrating the reality of local protectionism).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements, supra note 15 (contrasting general absence of local protectionism with the particular protectionism possible in local government procurement).
116. Id.
117. DALI L. YANG, BEYOND BEIJING: LIBERALIZATION AND THE REGIONS IN CHINA 19 (1997).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 72.
120. "[I]nternal trade barriers between provinces or even towns have been a problem throughout China since reform began, and in many instances they persist." DANIEL H. ROSEN, BEHIND THE OPEN DOOR: FOREIGN ENTERPRISES IN THE CHINESE MARKETPLACE 136 (1999).
121. Tiefer, Free Trade Agreements, supra note 15, at 66 (discussing, in connection with the Agreement on Government Procurement, how American state governments cannot have in-state preferences vis-à-vis foreign suppliers). The problem exists for China under other agreements even without its committing to the government procurement agreement. Id.
122. NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA'S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 5 (1998).
123. Id.
124. China has been hoping to raise the center's share of state revenue (vis-à-vis the share kept for local expenditure) to sixty percent. Even then, only about forty percent would be centrally expended and twenty percent still would be in the form of transfer grants to local governments. Id. at 105.
125. Richard H. Holton & Xia Yuan Lin, China and the World Trade Organization: Can the Assimilation Problems Be Overcome?, Asian Survey, Aug. 1, 1998, 1998 WL 13064625.
126. Id.
127. LARDY, supra note 101, at 26-29.
128. Id.
129. Xinquiang Sun, Reform of China's State-Owned Enterprises: A Legal Perspective, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 19, 46 (1999).
130. The Real Leap Forward, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1999, available at LEXIS, News database, Econ file.
131. See generally Mark E. Monfort, Reform of the State-Owned Enterprises and the Bankruptcy Law in the People's Republic of China, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1067 (1977).
132. "[I]t is well recognized that SOEs in China function as the social safety net for much of the citizenry." GROOMBRIDGE & BARFIELD, supra note 16, at 27.
133. "Beijing has ordered state-owned enterprises to shed another 10 million employees this year, in addition to the 30 million already axed since 1998." Clay Chandler, WTO Membership Imperils China's Industrial Dinosaurs, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2000, at A1, A17.
134. Sun, supra note 108, at 24.
135. Problems Left Over from History, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999, available at LEXIS, News database, Econ file.
136. Id.
137. CHINA-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
138. Id.
139. "Beyond three years or so, however, only fundamental reform can avert a systemic banking crisis." Problems Left Over from History, supra note 114.
140. Gary Hufbauer, China as an Economic Actor on the World Stage: An Overview, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 47, 49 (Frederick M. Abbott ed., 1998).
141. Problems Left Over from History, supra note 114.
142. GREG MASTEL, THE RISE OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY 80-81 (1997).
143. See GROOMBRIDGE & BARFIELD, supra note 16, at 20-23.
144. David Biederman, Slow Boat to China, TRAFFIC WORLD, Apr. 19, 1999, at 29 (quoting "the European Union's Trade Barriers Database").
145. Id. (quoting "the European Union's Trade Barriers Database").
146. Holten & Lin, supra note 104, at 746-51.
147. Rossella Brevetti, Trade Policy: USTR Report Cites Significant Foreign Trade Barriers in 1999, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 583 (Apr. 7, 1999).
148. Holton & Lin, supra note 104, at 746.
149. Id.
150. Thomas Cottier, Emerging Doctrines of Good Governance: The Impact of the WTO and China's Accession, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 119, at 119, 126.
151. Biederman, supra note 123.
152. ROSEN, supra note 99, at 111.
153. Id. at 147.
154. Id. at 220.
155. Id.
156. From the post-World War II Marshall plan that spurred European economic recovery to the Brady-bond reorganization that lightened the 1980s debt burden of Latin America, the United States has supported the efforts of other nations to lift themselves out of economic problems.
157. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-72.
158. Joseph A. Laroski, Jr., NMES: A Love Story- Nonmarket and Market Economy Status Under U.S. Antidumping Law, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 369, 372-73 (1999).
159. BHALA, supra note 55, at 603.
160. Id.
161. Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies in Transition Under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 993, 1002-07 (1995).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (c).
165. Alford, supra note 12, at 90-95.
166. John H. Jackson, State Trading and Nonmarket Economies, 23 INT'L LAW. 891, 906-07 (1989).
167. Luke P. Bellocchi, The Effects of and Trends in Executive Policy and Court of International Trade (CIT) Decisions Concerning Antidumping and the Non-Market Economy (NME) of the People's Republic of China, 10 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 177 (1997).
168. See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978) (interpreting CVD under § 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930).
169. Sanghan Wang, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies Revisited for Fairness and Consistency, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 593, 594-97 (1996).
170. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
171. For a fuller description of the MOI approach, see Lantz, supra note 140, at 1042-48. The Uruguay Round produced a change in the international subsidy law, recognized by Congress in replacing section 303 in the prior CVD statute with section 262 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which requires an injury test along with the previous criteria. Id. at 1019, 1029.
172. Laroski, supra note 137, at 378-79.
173. John Pomfret, Trade Deal Brings Renewed Light to a Chinese Candlemaker, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1999, at A23, A25.
174. Tang Xiaobing, China's Economic System and Its New Role in the World Economy, in CHINA IN THH WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 119, at 53, 59.
175. GREG MASTEL, ANTIDUMPING LAWS AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 58 (1998).
176. Id. at 118.
177. Pomfret, supra note 152, at A25.
178. Id.
179. Id. at A23.
180. See Lantz, supra note 140.
181. See generally id. at 1049-57 (reviewing a diverse array of potential approaches for the application of CVD law to nonmarket economies in transition such as China).
182. See Pomfret, supra note 152 (noting that Chinese exports to the United States have grown despite U.S. law such as antidumping remedies); MASTEL, supra note 154 (same).
183. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
184. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53; BHALA, supra note 55, at 905 (providing a description of, and synonyms for, section 201).
185. BHALA, supra note 55, at 883-84.
186. For the 1940s history leading up to Article XIX of GATT 1947, see id.
187. Id. at 884; Paul C. Rosenthal & Robin H. Gilbert, The 1988 Amendments to Section 201: It Isn't Just for Import Relief Anymore, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 403 (1989).
188. Thus, for running counter to trade liberalization, Section 201 had both economic and political justifications. In economics terms, import surge relief allows domestic industries to either adjust to regain competitiveness or to adjust to a shrinking market share in an orderly manner. Politically, import surge relief both allows the United States, like other cautious countries, to enter into otherwise worrisomely rigid trade liberalization undertakings. If such undertakings produce a protectionist backlash, section 201 provides a unilateral safety valve. Sykes, supra note 14, at 273 (proposing the "Safety Valve Hypothesis").
189. During the period from the Tokyo Round (1979) to the Uruguay Round (1994), the United States used safeguards only four times, while the European Communities used them eighteen times (of which thirteen involved processed foodstuffs, clearly a sensitive point for the EC). BHALA, supra note 55, at 890.
190. Notably, the Uruguay Round "Agreement on Safeguards" provides that safeguard actions must be applied against imports of the particular product from all sources, meaning that safeguards affect imports on a nonselective or "most favored nation" basis, rather than being directed only against selected countries as are antidumping remedies. See sources cited supra note 15 (particularly Article 2(2) of the Agreement on Safeguards).
191. Ernesto M. Hizon, The Safeguard Measure/VER Dilemma: The Jekyll and Hyde of Trade Protection, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 105, 162-67 (1994).
192. MASTEL, supra note 121, at 182-85 (1997).
193. Id.
194. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2436, 2251.
195. Jeffrey S. Neeley, Nonmarket Economy Import Regulation: From Bad to Worse, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 529, 536 (1989). For a discussion of the differences in standards, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576-100, at 690-91 (1988).
196. Besides the just-described issue of the product-specific safeguard, the negotiations included the companion issue of a possible "general" safeguard, which would have allowed the United States to exit the accession agreement on a general basis if unsatisfied with its operation. Frederic M. Abbott, Reflection Paper on China in the World Trading System: Defining the Principles of Engagement, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 119, at 1, 21. China adamantly opposed both types of safeguard. Jeffrey L. Gertler, The Process of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 119, at 65, 71. In the final negotiations, China apparently avoided a general safeguard provision, but at the price of giving the United States a powerful product-specific safeguard. See China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
197. Besides the just-described issue of the product-specific safeguard, the negotiations included the companion issue of a possible "general" safeguard, which would have allowed the United States to exit the accession agreement on a general basis if unsatisfied with its operation. Frederic M. Abbott, Reflection Paper on China in the World Trading System: Defining the Principles of Engagement, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 119, at 1, 21. China adamantly opposed both types of safeguard. Jeffrey L. Gertler, The Process of China's Accession to the World Trade Organization, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 119, at 65, 71. In the final negotiations, China apparently avoided a general safeguard provision, but at the price of giving the United States a powerful product-specific safeguard. See China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
198. GROOMBRIDGE & BARFIELD, supra note 16, at 46.
199. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1 (section on "Protocol Language, Product-Specific Safeguard").
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See generally Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999) (describing how the WTO dispute settlement rules have been working in practice).
203. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing enactments of 1974, 1984, 1988, and 1994).
204. GROOMBRIDGE & BARFIELD, supra note 16, at 55-56.
205. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(D); Cooper, supra note 53, at 1005.
206. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
207. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 1184-90.
208. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
209. See supra notes 91-135 and accompanying text.
210. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1 (section entitled "Insurance"). For a discussion of the subject of benchmarking for China's accession to the WTO, see Alexandroff, supra note 18.
211. China-U.S. WTO Accession Agreement, supra note 1.
212. Shai Oster, Insurance Industry Experts View China's Market Opening Plans with Skepticism, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 136 (Jan. 17, 2000).
213. The Clinton Administration had already asked for funding to assign trade compliance personnel to China. Gary G. Yerkey & Rossella Brevetti, Administration Asks for $21.2 Million for New Trade Compliance Initiative, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 229 (Feb. 10, 2000). In fact, something of a network might develop of American-employed China-based consultants, much as large-scale regulatory initiatives of the past, for example, the devising of air and water pollution standards, have depended upon rapid assembly of economy-wide information by such networks domestically.
214. At one end of the spectrum, the ultimate goal could consist of the degree of transparency found in European Union trade regulation; at the other end of the spectrum, China has itself made limited progress in some spheres, such as in the promulgation of codes; and in the middle, Hong Kong and the nearby regions it influences represent a valuable yardstick, since trade between them has flourished-albeit with some nontransparency, arbitrariness, and corruption on the Chinese side in matters such as customs valuation. See generally OsUy, supra note 17 (analyzing the transparency issue with regard to China).
215. For such indicators, comparisons of available Chinese and American data, with data from suitable third countries, should allow an assessment of whether Chinese export prices are reasonable, the significance of lingering subsidies such as the state-owned industry system, and its commercially unjustified bank loans, and the impact on domestic American production. See generally Lantz, supra note 140, at 1038-59 (discussing the comparisons of available data that allow an assessment of Chinese progress in each sector in the current processes regarding antidumping and countervailing duty laws).
216. WTO 301 Panel Decision, supra note 20, at 4.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. Of course, the argument includes much more than this one sentence conveys. For the panel's outline of the EC's arguments and the United States' counterarguments, see id. at 9-223.
220. Id. at 292.
221. Id. at 311.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 318.
225. Id. at 314-18.
226. Id. at 330.
227. "[I]n the event the United States wins a panel decision and the loser refuses to comply, the United States could use Section 301 as authorized retaliation." William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United States' Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1225, 1256 (1998).
228. See sources cited supra note 15 (particularly Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. 22.4). Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding puts down a few principles and procedures, but little more that matters than that "[t]he level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations [i.e., the level of retaliation] authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment." Id.
229. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
230. As a commentator analyzed the 1999 prospect of suspension agreements on steel: "suspension agreements replace duties . . . with negotiated quotas . . . . . . . If tariffs are imposed, the U.S. treasury captures those [economic] rents. If, however, quotas are used, the foreign companies that raise their prices capture them." Greg Mastel, Foreign Aid in the Guise of Steel Pacts, J. COM., July 23, 1999, at 6.
231. MASTEL, supra note 121, at 156-59.
232. See generally W. Gary Vause, Tibet to Tienanmen: Chinese Human Rights and the United States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1575 (1989).
233. Greg Mastel, Clinton Made the Right Call on China and WTO, J. COM., Oct. 15, 1999, at 6.
234. For a particularly strong treatment of this side, see generally RICHARD BERNSTEIN, THE COMING CONFEICT WITH CHINA (1997).
235. For two of the many surveys in recent years, see CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS (Elizabeth Economy & Michael Oksenberg eds., 1999); LIVING WITH CHINA: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997).
236. For two of the many surveys in recent years, see CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS (Elizabeth Economy & Michael Oksenberg eds., 1999); LIVING WITH CHINA: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997).
237. Steven Mufson & Robert G. Kaiser, Missed U.S.-China Deal Looms Large: Near-Agreement in April May Prove Pivotal in WTO Talks, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1999, at A1; see generally William V. Roth, Jr., Let China Join the WTO, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1999, at A19 (chair of Senate Finance Committee disputing his party's criticisms of an accession agreement with China even at the moment they proved temporarily decisive).
238. Steven Mufson & Robert G. Kaiser, Missed U.S.-China Deal Looms Large: Near- Agreement in April May Prove Pivotal in WTO Talks, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1999, at A1; see generally William V. Roth, Jr., Let China Join the WTO, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1999, at A19 (chair of Senate Finance Committee disputing his
239. Bacon, supra note 8, at 370-73 (describing in retrospect the friction in 1999 in Sino-U.S. trade relations and why the accession agreement at 1999's end was a positive development).
240. See generally Jonathan Mirsky, Democratic Vistas?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 13, 1998, at 26.
241. See generally Kevin M. McDonald, The Unilateral Undermining of Conventional International Trade Law Via Section 301, 7 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 395 (1998).
242. Tiefer, Adjusting Sovereignty, supra note 10.
243. Rufus H. Yerxa & Demetrios J. Marantis, Assessing the New WTO Dispute System: A U.S. Perspective, 32 INT'L LAW. 795, 806 (1998).
244. For a reconceptualization and defense of such unilateralism in international economic law, see Alan C. Swan, "Fairness" and "Reciprocity" in International Trade Section 301 and the Rule of Law, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 37 (1999).