How tame will Leviathan become in institutional competition? Competition among governments in the provision of public goods

Public Choice

Volumn 107, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 359-381

  Apolte, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MÜNSTER   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035607935     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010320505547     Document Type: Article

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