Clubs and the cost of agency

Public Choice

Volumn 107, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 383-393

  Siqueira, Kevin ^a  

^a CLARKSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035598483     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010360531607     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. Buchanan, J.M. (1965). An economic theory of clubs. Economica 32: 1-14.
2. Cornes, R. and Sandler, T. (1996). The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods. New York: Cambridge University Press.
3. Grossman, S.J. and Hart, O.D. (1983). An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 51: 7-45.
4. Helsley, R.W. and Strange, W.C. (1991). Exclusion and the theory of clubs. Canadian Journal of Economics 24: 888-899.
5. Kreps, D. (1990). A course in microeconomic theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
6. Lee, K. (1991). Transaction costs and equilibrium pricing of congested public goods with imperfect information. Journal of Public Economics 45: 337-362.
7. Mackie-Mason, J.K. and Varian, H.R. (1995). Pricing congestible network resources. IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communications 13: 1141-1149.
8. McGuire, M.C. (1972). Private good clubs and public good clubs: Economic models of group formation. Swedish Journal of Economics 74: 84-99.
9. McGuire, M.C. (1974). Group segregation and optimal jurisdictions. Journal of Political Economy 82: 112-182.
10. Pauly, M.V. (1970). Cores and clubs. Public Choice 9: 53-65.
11. Salanié, B. (1997). The economics of contracts: A primer. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
12. Sandler, T. and Tschirhart, J. (1997). Club theory: Thirty years later. Public Choice 93: 335-355.
13. Silva, E.C.D. and Kahn, C.M. (1993). Exclusion and moral hazard: The case of identical demand. Journal of Public Economy 52: 217-235.
14. Tiebout, C.M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-424.