Legal persuasion, political realism, and legitimacy: The European court's recent treatment of the effect of WTO agreements in the EC legal order

Journal of International Economic Law

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 411-440

  Van Den Broek, Naboth ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0035592993     PISSN: 13693034     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/4.2.411     Document Type: Article

References (221)

1. ECJ Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, (1963) ECR 003, at 12; see on direct effect in the EC in general, also B. De Witte, 'Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of Legal Order' in P. Craig and G. De Bùrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999) 177-214.
2. ECJ Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, (1963) ECR 003, at 12; see on direct effect in the EC in general, also B. De Witte, 'Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of Legal Order' in P. Craig and G. De Bùrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999) 177-214.
3. Van Gend & Loos, above, at 13.
4. ECJ Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL, (1964) ECR 585, at 593.
5. ECJ Case 181/73, Haegeman v Belgium, (1974) ECR 449, at 472.
6. ECJ Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg, (1982) ECR 3641, at 3662, para 13.
7. J. Rideau, 'Les accords internationaux dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes', Revue Générale de Droit International Publique (1990), at 370ff; the tests are also summarized very clearly by Advocate General Darmon, Opinion to ECJ Case 12/86, Demirel, (1987) ECR 3719.
8. J. Rideau, 'Les accords internationaux dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes', Revue Générale de Droit International Publique (1990), at 370ff; the tests are also summarized very clearly by Advocate General Darmon, Opinion to ECJ Case 12/86, Demirel, (1987) ECR 3719.
9. See P. J. Kuijper, 'The Court and the Tribunal of the EC and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969', 25(1) Legal Issues of European Integration (1998) 4.
10. Idem, at 5-6.
11. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
12. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
13. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
14. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
15. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
16. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
17. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
18. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
19. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
20. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
21. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
22. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
23. ECJ Joined cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groente en Fruit; (1972) ECR 1219; ECJ Case 9/73, Schlüter, (1973) ECR 1135. See also ECJ Case 266/81, SIOT, (1983) ECR 0731; ECJ Joined cases 267-269/81, SPI and SAMI, (1983) ECR 801; ECJ Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v Council, (1994) ECR I-4737; ECJ Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, (1995) ECR I-4533; see for an overview of the Court's case law on the status of GATT and WTO agreements: C.-D. Ehlermann, 'Application of GATT Rules in the European Community', in M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), The European Communities and GATT (Deventer: Kluwer 1986); C. W. A Timmermans, 'L'Uruguay Round: sa mise en oeuvre par la Communauté européenne', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 177-82; M. Maresceau, 'The GATT in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice' in M. Hilf et al., above.; P. Eeckhout, 'The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems', 34 Common Mkt L Rev (1997) 11-58; E.-U. Petersmann, 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; C. W. Timmermans, 'The Implementation of the Uruguay Round by the EC', in J. H. J. Bourgeois, F. Berrod, and E. Gippini Fournier (eds), The Uruguay Round Results, A European Lawyer's Perspective (Bruges: European Interuniversity Press 1995); P. Lee and B. Kennedy, 'The Potential Direct Effect of the GATT 1994 in European Community Law', 30 Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1996) 67.
24. See for an analysis of the changes for example J. H. J. Bourgeois et al. (eds.), above.
25. See in general the numerous works by E.-U. Petersmann on the topic.
26. ECJ Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council, (1999) ECR I-8377; confirmed in ECJ Joined Cases C-300/ 98 and C-392/98, Dior v Tuk, not yet reported. This conclusion was also confirmed by the Court of First Instance in the context of an argument claiming compensation for losses as a result of misuse of power by the Community in not correctly implementing WTO panel and Appellate Body reports in the Bananas cases: CFI Joined Cases T-18/99, T-30/99, T-52/99, Cordis et al. v Comm., 20 March 2001, not yet reported.
27. See for analyses of the judgment: A. Desmedt, 'ECJ Restricts Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order', 27(1) Legal Issues of European Integration (2000) 93; F. Berrod, 'La Cour de justice refuse l'invocabilité des accords OMC', 36(3) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit européen (2000) 419; Stefan Griller, 'Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union, Annotation to Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council', 3(3) J Int'l Econ L (2000) 441-72; P. Mengozzi, 'La Cour de justice et l'applicabilité des règles de l'OMC en droit communautaire à la lumière de l'affaire C-89/ 96 'Portugal c. Conseil' arrêt du 23 novembre 1999', Revue du Droit de l'Union Européenne (3- 2000) 509-22; Alan Rosas, 'CJEC Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council: Judgment of the Full Court of 23 November 1999, nyr (annotation)', 37(3) Common Mkt L Rev (2000) 797-816.
28. See for analyses of the judgment: A. Desmedt, 'ECJ Restricts Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order', 27(1) Legal Issues of European Integration (2000) 93; F. Berrod, 'La Cour de justice refuse l'invocabilité des accords OMC', 36(3) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit européen (2000) 419; Stefan Griller, 'Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union, Annotation to Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council', 3(3) J Int'l Econ L (2000) 441-72; P. Mengozzi, 'La Cour de justice et l'applicabilité des règles de l'OMC en droit communautaire à la lumière de l'affaire C-89/ 96 'Portugal c. Conseil' arrêt du 23 novembre 1999', Revue du Droit de l'Union Européenne (3- 2000) 509-22; Alan Rosas, 'CJEC Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council: Judgment of the Full Court of 23 November 1999, nyr (annotation)', 37(3) Common Mkt L Rev (2000) 797-816.
29. See for analyses of the judgment: A. Desmedt, 'ECJ Restricts Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order', 27(1) Legal Issues of European Integration (2000) 93; F. Berrod, 'La Cour de justice refuse l'invocabilité des accords OMC', 36(3) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit européen (2000) 419; Stefan Griller, 'Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union, Annotation to Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council', 3(3) J Int'l Econ L (2000) 441-72; P. Mengozzi, 'La Cour de justice et l'applicabilité des règles de l'OMC en droit communautaire à la lumière de l'affaire C-89/ 96 'Portugal c. Conseil' arrêt du 23 novembre 1999', Revue du Droit de l'Union Européenne (3- 2000) 509-22; Alan Rosas, 'CJEC Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council: Judgment of the Full Court of 23 November 1999, nyr (annotation)', 37(3) Common Mkt L Rev (2000) 797-816.
30. See for analyses of the judgment: A. Desmedt, 'ECJ Restricts Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order', 27(1) Legal Issues of European Integration (2000) 93; F. Berrod, 'La Cour de justice refuse l'invocabilité des accords OMC', 36(3) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit européen (2000) 419; Stefan Griller, 'Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union, Annotation to Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council', 3(3) J Int'l Econ L (2000) 441-72; P. Mengozzi, 'La Cour de justice et l'applicabilité des règles de l'OMC en droit communautaire à la lumière de l'affaire C-89/ 96 'Portugal c. Conseil' arrêt du 23 novembre 1999', Revue du Droit de l'Union Européenne (3-2000) 509-22; Alan Rosas, 'CJEC Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council: Judgment of the Full Court of 23 November 1999, nyr (annotation)', 37(3) Common Mkt L Rev (2000) 797-816.
31. See for analyses of the judgment: A. Desmedt, 'ECJ Restricts Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order', 27(1) Legal Issues of European Integration (2000) 93; F. Berrod, 'La Cour de justice refuse l'invocabilité des accords OMC', 36(3) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit européen (2000) 419; Stefan Griller, 'Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union, Annotation to Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council', 3(3) J Int'l Econ L (2000) 441-72; P. Mengozzi, 'La Cour de justice et l'applicabilité des règles de l'OMC en droit communautaire à la lumière de l'affaire C-89/ 96 'Portugal c. Conseil' arrêt du 23 novembre 1999', Revue du Droit de l'Union Européenne (3- 2000) 509-22; Alan Rosas, 'CJEC Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council: Judgment of the Full Court of 23 November 1999, nyr (annotation)', 37(3) Common Mkt L Rev (2000) 797-816.
32. Decision 96/386/CE of the Council of 26 February 1996, OJ 1996, L 153, at 47.
33. The complaint was also based on certain rules and principles of EC law, this, however, falls outside the scope of this paper. Furthermore, it should be noted that the term 'WTO agreements' was consistently used in the case, apparently indicating the entire system of WTO treaties and possibly panel reports and the system of the organization as such.
34. ECJ Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision v Council, 7 May 1991, (1991) ECR I-2069.
35. AG Saggio, Opinion in Case 149/96, above, para 18.
36. Idem, para 21-22.
37. ECJ Case 104/81, above, para 44.
38. Preamble to the WTO agreement.
39. See on the absence of direct effect in the US for example R. E. Hudec, 'The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic Law of the US', in Hilf et al., fn 9.
40. See for this line of reasoning also M. Montañá i Mora, 'Equilibrium: A Rediscovered Basis for the Court of Justice of the European Communities to Refuse Direct Effect to the Uruguay Round Agreements?', JWT (1996), at 43.
41. Council Decision 94/800, (1994) OJ L 336, at 1; see for an analysis of the policy reasons underlying this decision also P. Mengozzi, 'Les droits des citoyens de l'Union européenne et l'applicabilité directe des accords de Marrakech', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 165-74.
42. Council Decision 94/800, (1994) OJ L 336, at 1; see for an analysis of the policy reasons underlying this decision also P. Mengozzi, 'Les droits des citoyens de l'Union européenne et l'applicabilité directe des accords de Marrakech', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 165-74.
43. In this respect, he points at Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and the ICJ case concerning the Territorial Dispute between Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Chad, ICJ Reports 1994, at 6.
44. Para 20 of the opinion, where Saggio also refers to AG Tesauro's opinion in Hermès (para 24).
45. ECJ Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98, Dior v Tuk, 14 December 2000, para 44n not yet reported.
46. These 'mixed agreements' are concluded by the Member States and the Community jointly. See for the WTO agreements ECJ Opinion 1/94, 15 November 1994, ECR, I-50267; Jean-Victor Louis, 'Some Reflections on the Implementation of WTO Rules in the European Community Legal Order', in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, New Directions in International Economic Law, Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (The Hague: Kluwer 2000) 494-98. See also in general D. O'Keeffe and H. G. Schermers (eds), Mixed Agreements (Deventer: Kluwer 1983); Jean-Victor Louis, 'Some Reflections on the Implementation of WTO Rules in the European Community Legal Order', in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, New Directions in International Economic Law, Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (The Hague: Kluwer 2000) 494-98.
47. These 'mixed agreements' are concluded by the Member States and the Community jointly. See for the WTO agreements ECJ Opinion 1/94, 15 November 1994, ECR, I-50267; Jean-Victor Louis, 'Some Reflections on the Implementation of WTO Rules in the European Community Legal Order', in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, New Directions in International Economic Law, Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (The Hague: Kluwer 2000) 494-98. See also in general D. O'Keeffe and H. G. Schermers (eds), Mixed Agreements (Deventer: Kluwer 1983); Jean-Victor Louis, 'Some Reflections on the Implementation of WTO Rules in the European Community Legal Order', in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, New Directions in International Economic Law, Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (The Hague: Kluwer 2000) 494-98.
48. These 'mixed agreements' are concluded by the Member States and the Community jointly. See for the WTO agreements ECJ Opinion 1/94, 15 November 1994, ECR, I-50267; Jean-Victor Louis, 'Some Reflections on the Implementation of WTO Rules in the European Community Legal Order', in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, New Directions in International Economic Law, Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (The Hague: Kluwer 2000) 494-98. See also in general D. O'Keeffe and H. G. Schermers (eds), Mixed Agreements (Deventer: Kluwer 1983); Jean-Victor Louis, 'Some Reflections on the Implementation of WTO Rules in the European Community Legal Order', in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, New Directions in International Economic Law, Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (The Hague: Kluwer 2000) 494-98.
49. These 'mixed agreements' are concluded by the Member States and the Community jointly. See for the WTO agreements ECJ Opinion 1/94, 15 November 1994, ECR, I-50267; Jean-Victor Louis, 'Some Reflections on the Implementation of WTO Rules in the European Community Legal Order', in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, New Directions in International Economic Law, Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (The Hague: Kluwer 2000) 494-98. See also in general D. O'Keeffe and H. G. Schermers (eds), Mixed Agreements (Deventer: Kluwer 1983); Jean-Victor Louis, 'Some Reflections on the Implementation of WTO Rules in the European Community Legal Order', in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, New Directions in International Economic Law, Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (The Hague: Kluwer 2000) 494-98.
50. The Court does add, however, that it follows from Hermès, 'that the judicial authorities of the Member States are required by virtue of Community law, when called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for the protection of rights falling within such a field, to do so as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of TRIPs', and thus clarifies that Hermès also applies to non-trademark issues.
51. Dior v Tuk, para 48.
52. Idem.
53. See ECJ Opinion 1/94, above.
54. Dior v Tuk, Conclusion AG Cosmas, para 71.
55. Idem, para 69, 56-69.
56. Idem, para 75.
57. Idem.
58. Idem para 82.
59. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) reprint (London: Penguin 1985).
60. Wils, 'The Concept of Reciprocity in EEC Law: An Exploration into these Realms', 28 Common Mkt L Rev (1991) 245-74, at 247.
61. See for example the distinctions made by E.-U. Petersmann in 'Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 397-437; and Wils, above.
62. Wils, above, 255-56.
63. Wils, above, at 261; see also Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, and Article 42 of the ILC Draft on State Responsibility, in Third Report on State Responsibility, by James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN GA Doc. A/CN.4/507 of 15 March 2000; see further part II(B) of this submission.
64. ECJ Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v Harlequin, (1982) ECR 329.
65. ECJ Case 104/81, above, at 3674.
66. Idem, paras 17-18.
67. P. Mengozzi, 'The Marrakesh DSU and its Implications on the International and European Level', in J. H. J. Bourgeois et al., fn 9, 125-27.
68. G. Wils, fn 38, 251; K. J. Kuijlwijk, The European Court of Justice and the GATT Dilemma (Nexed 1996) 125.
69. G. Wils, fn 38, 251; K. J. Kuijlwijk, The European Court of Justice and the GATT Dilemma (Nexed 1996) 125.
70. Idem, 247-48.
71. Case 87/75, above.
72. Convention de Yaoundé, l'Association des Pays et Territoires d'Outre-Mer a la CEE, du 20 Juillet 1963; The Convention de Yaoundé II, of 29 July 1969, has not substantially changed in this respect; compare for example also the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989, OJ L229, of 17 October 1991, at 0003.
73. Idem, Article 1.
74. Idem, Article 3(2). 'However, each associated State can maintain or establish, under the conditions laid down in protocol 2 to the present agreement, customs duties and charges of equivalent effect necessary for its development or to to support its budget'. (author's own translation)
75. An exact economic calculation, if possible, of the consequences of the treaty falls outside the scope of this paper. Here it is enough to observe that it is not as clear as the Court may think it is that the Convention is asymmetric and that the African countries are on the receiving end, for such a judgment would indeed require an extensive economic calculation.
76. See also Wils, fn 38, 248 and further.
77. M. Brühlhardt and D. McAleese, 'The External Trade Policy of the European Union' in A. El-Agraa (ed), The Economics of the European Union (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1997) 15. They give three causes: 'First, as tariffs have been reduced under the GATT Rounds, the practical usefulness of tariff preferences has diminished. . . . Second, NTBs in the form of VERs, quotas and antidumping measures remain an important barrier to export from LDCs to the EU market. . . . Third, the EU's system of preferences is complex and uncertain in its application'.
78. Para 23.
79. AG Rozes, Opinion to ECJ Case 104/81, above; own italics.
80. ECJ Case C-18/90, Onem v Kziber, (1991) ECR 199; Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, of 17 April 1976, OJ No. L264, p 2 of 27 September 1978.
81. See once again the Wils article in which the possibility of an eventual equilibrium as an objective of an asymmetric treaty is mentioned.
82. Own italics.
83. K. J. Kuijlwijk, above, fn 46, ch 4.
84. Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Portuguese Republic, 22 July 1972, OJ No. L301, of 31 November 1972, p 165 and the implementing Council regulation No. 2844/72 of 19 December 1972.
85. Kuilwijk, above, 112-13.
86. Kuilwijk, above, 112-13.
87. ECJ Case 17/81, above.
88. Idem, para 26; see also Kuilwijk, above, 114.
89. D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 985; Interestingly, even within the EU, Member States have hardly ever brought a judicial complaint against another Member State for violations of the EU treaties, and the Commission has to give a Member State a reasonable period to comply before it can bring a case to the European Court.
90. See Articles 36(1) and (2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice; see also M. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997) 749-62.
91. See for example the Corfu Channel Case, UK v Albania, preliminary objection, ICJ Reports 1948, p 15.
92. Harris, above, 759-60.
93. See on the procedure Articles 2(5), 3(3), 5(2) and 6(5) of the Convention.
94. Articles 40 and 43 of the Convention.
95. Article 51 of the Convention.
96. See for example the United Kingdom Declaration Accepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Court, Misc. No. 4 (1969), Cmnd. 3872; also mentioned by Harris, above, 1002-03, in which the UK accepts the Court's jurisdiction on condition of reciprocity and limited to a certain number of concretely defined situations and facts.
97. Article 45(1) and (3) of the EC-Morocco Agreement, above; see also Article 33 of the EC-Portugal Free Trade Agreement, above, providing a comparable system.
98. Idem, Article 52(2); the Joint Committee charged with negotiating the settlement of disputes in the system of the EC-Portugal Free Trade Agreement too is a purely diplomatic organ, consisting of 'representatives of the Community on the one hand, and representatives of Portugal on the other' and acting by 'mutual agreement'. The Committee will adopt its own rules of procedure and negotiation between parties to bring settlement. No judicial procedure is provided for within the framework of the treaty.
99. Unless one counts their possibility to agree to arbitration after failed negotiations as such. In fact, appeal possibilities are generally very limited in international law: G. Sacerdoti, 'Appeal and Judicial Review in International Arbitration and Adjudication: The Case of the WTO Appellate Review' in E.-U. Petersmann (ed), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (London: Kluwer 1997) ch 6.
100. Article 51(2) of the EC-Morocco Agreement, above.
101. EC-Portugal Free Trade Agreement, Article 30(3)a; in particular an eventual withdrawal of tariff concessions is possible.
102. Idem, Article 30(3)b.
103. ICJ Nicaragua v United States, ICJ Reports, 1986, p 1.
104. Shaw, above, fh 67, 667;
105. see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 60(2);
106. Tacna-Arica arbitration between Chile and Peru, 2 RIAA, p 921 (1925);
107. Rainbow Warrior case, 82 ILR, p 499.
108. ILC Draft on State Responsibility in Third Report on State Responsibility by James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN GA Doc. A/CN.4/507 of 15 March 2000.
109. These provisions can probably be seen as customary international law: cf Shaw, above, at 578.
110. See on the historical development J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999) 289-318; J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, 1-6; E.-U. Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization', http://www.ejil.org/journal/vol6/no2/art1.html; N. Weinrichter, 'Perspectives on the Changing Nature of the GATT', European Online Papers, http://eiop.or.at/aiop/texte/1999-01a.htm, 1-2.
111. See on the historical development J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999) 289-318; J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, 1-6; E.-U. Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization', http://www.ejil.org/journal/vol6/no2/art1.html; N. Weinrichter, 'Perspectives on the Changing Nature of the GATT', European Online Papers, http://eiop.or.at/aiop/texte/1999-01a.htm, 1-2.
112. See on the historical development J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999) 289-318; J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, 1-6; E.-U. Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization', http://www.ejil.org/journal/vol6/no2/art1.html; N. Weinrichter, 'Perspectives on the Changing Nature of the GATT', European Online Papers, http://eiop.or.at/aiop/texte/1999-01a.htm, 1-2.
113. See on the historical development J. H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999) 289-318; J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, 1-6; E.-U. Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization', http://www.ejil.org/journal/vol6/no2/art1.html; N. Weinrichter, 'Perspectives on the Changing Nature of the GATT', European Online Papers, http://eiop.or.at/aiop/texte/1999-01a.htm, 1-2.
114. See for introductions to this classical trade theory for example, P. Krugman and M. Obstfeld, International Economics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1997) 13-120.
115. See on this in general Krugman and Obstfeld, above, 121-58.
116. Krugman and Obstfeld, above, 219-42; or for an application to the GATT and WTO, Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.A.
117. See for an introduction to the economic analysis Krugman and Obstfeld, above, at 187 and further; see also Wils, fn 38, at 248.
118. See for example OECD, Annuaire des Statistiques d'Investissement Direct International, 1998, 11-35; think also of present discussions about European retaliation in the US-FSC case.
119. J. E. Garten, 'Business and Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs (May/June 1997) 69-70; think also of the recent concerns regarding retaliation in the FSC case.
120. See for example J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, above, 12-22.
121. R. Blackhurst, 'Reciprocity in Trade Negotiations under Flexible Exchange Rates', in J. P. Martin and A. Smith, Trade and Payments under Flexible Exchange Rates, Trade Policy Research Center (London: Macmillan 1979); and in general: Krugman and Obstfeld, above, chs 18 and 19.
122. Krugman and Obstfeld, above, fn 85, 219-42.
123. Wils, above fn 38, 247-48.
124. See on this in general Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.B; and Krugman and Obstfeld, above, 230-42.
125. Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.B.
126. Petersmann, idem, ch II.C.
127. Citing John Rawls.
128. Now citing Buchanan.
129. B. Hoekman and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995) 58; Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.C.
130. B. Hoekman and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995) 58; Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.C.
131. R. Keohane, above, 10, 78; see in this respect also R. H. Steinberg, 'Great Power Management of the World Trading System: A Transatlantic Strategy for Liberal Multilateralism', Law and Policy in International Business (1998) 205-55.
132. R. Keohane, above, 10, 78; see in this respect also R. H. Steinberg, 'Great Power Management of the World Trading System: A Transatlantic Strategy for Liberal Multilateralism', Law and Policy in International Business (1998) 205-55.
133. R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984) at 89.
134. Z. Finlayson, 'The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions', International Organization (1981) 273-314; Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.C.
135. Z. Finlayson, 'The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions', International Organization (1981) 273-314; Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.C.
136. R. H. Steinberg, above.
137. A. Krueger, above, at 911.
138. See generally Keohane, above, 10, 78; For many developing countries this was probably a reason to support a rule-based WTO system (see A. Krueger, above, 911; Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.C) , but for large trading nations and blocks too it reduces the costs of trade disputes and trade wars (J. H. Jackson, W. J. Davey, and A. O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (3rd ed, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing 1995) 27- 30) and legitimizes their dealings with barriers abroad (see for a discussion on norms as ends or means of foreign policy: H. J. Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1995), 315 and further.
139. See generally Keohane, above, 10, 78; For many developing countries this was probably a reason to support a rule-based WTO system (see A. Krueger, above, 911; Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.C) , but for large trading nations and blocks too it reduces the costs of trade disputes and trade wars (J. H. Jackson, W. J. Davey, and A. O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (3rd ed, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing 1995) 27- 30) and legitimizes their dealings with barriers abroad (see for a discussion on norms as ends or means of foreign policy: H. J. Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1995), 315 and further.
140. See generally Keohane, above, 10, 78; For many developing countries this was probably a reason to support a rule-based WTO system (see A. Krueger, above, 911; Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.C) , but for large trading nations and blocks too it reduces the costs of trade disputes and trade wars (J. H. Jackson, W. J. Davey, and A. O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (3rd ed, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing 1995) 27-30) and legitimizes their dealings with barriers abroad (see for a discussion on norms as ends or means of foreign policy: H. J. Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1995), 315 and further.
141. See generally Keohane, above, 10, 78; For many developing countries this was probably a reason to support a rule-based WTO system (see A. Krueger, above, 911; Petersmann, 'The Transformation of the World Trading System', above, ch II.C) , but for large trading nations and blocks too it reduces the costs of trade disputes and trade wars (J. H. Jackson, W. J. Davey, and A. O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (3rd ed, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing 1995) 27- 30) and legitimizes their dealings with barriers abroad (see for a discussion on norms as ends or means of foreign policy: H. J. Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1995), 315 and further.
142. Preambles of both the GATT 1947 and the WTO agreement.
143. See further: A. Krueger, 'The Developing Countries and the Next Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations', 22(7) The World Economy (1999) 911; see also in general J. Whalley, 'Special and Differential Treatment in the Millennium Round', 22(8) The World Economy (1999) 1065-93.
144. See further: A. Krueger, 'The Developing Countries and the Next Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations', 22(7) The World Economy (1999) 911; see also in general J. Whalley, 'Special and Differential Treatment in the Millennium Round', 22(8) The World Economy (1999) 1065-93.
145. It is of course interesting that we would come to the exact same conclusion through an anti-liberal line of argument supporting the view that developing countries or, for that matter, small French farmers, are worse off than others. After all, this too leads to the conclusion that apparently no direct reciprocity in obligations exists.
146. E.-U. Petersmann, 'How to Promote the International Rule of Law? Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System', 1(1) J Int'l Econ L (1998) 25-48; T. Cottier, 'Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Characteristics and Structural Implications for the European Union', 35 Common Mkt L Rev (1998) 339 . The legalization actually causes fear with some commentators: H. Rasmussen, 'L'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce et ses Instruments Législatifs et Juridictionnels', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 186.
147. E.-U. Petersmann, 'How to Promote the International Rule of Law? Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System', 1(1) J Int'l Econ L (1998) 25-48; T. Cottier, 'Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Characteristics and Structural Implications for the European Union', 35 Common Mkt L Rev (1998) 339 . The legalization actually causes fear with some commentators: H. Rasmussen, 'L'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce et ses Instruments Législatifs et Juridictionnels', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 186.
148. E.-U. Petersmann, 'How to Promote the International Rule of Law? Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System', 1(1) J Int'l Econ L (1998) 25-48; T. Cottier, 'Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Characteristics and Structural Implications for the European Union', 35 Common Mkt L Rev (1998) 339 . The legalization actually causes fear with some commentators: H. Rasmussen, 'L'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce et ses Instruments Législatifs et Juridictionnels', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 186.
149. See concerning objectives for the Seattle Round for example P. Jacquet, P. Messerlin, and L. Tubiana, Le Cycle du Millénaire (Paris: La Documentation française 1999); see concerning the rule- based approach of panels: E.-U. Petersmann, 'From the Hobbesian International Law of Coexistence to Modern Integration Law: The WTO Dispute Settlement System', 1(2) J Int'l Econ L (1998): a somewhat opposite view regarding the arbitration in the Bananas case is defended by P. Mengozzi, 'Structure et principes de l'OMC à la lumière de la mise en oeuvre des recommandations de l'ORD dans l'affaire Bananes III', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1999) 11-23; the rule-based nature of dispute settlement will be dealt with further in the next chapter. See also P. Lamy, 'La Conférence Ministérielle de l'OMC à Seattle: bilan et perspectives', 3 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1999) 5-7; P. VanDoren and A. Schomaker, 'Les Relations Economiques entre l'Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis après la conclusion de l'Uruguay Round', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 51-65.
150. See concerning objectives for the Seattle Round for example P. Jacquet, P. Messerlin, and L. Tubiana, Le Cycle du Millénaire (Paris: La Documentation française 1999); see concerning the rule-based approach of panels: E.-U. Petersmann, 'From the Hobbesian International Law of Coexistence to Modern Integration Law: The WTO Dispute Settlement System', 1(2) J Int'l Econ L (1998): a somewhat opposite view regarding the arbitration in the Bananas case is defended by P. Mengozzi, 'Structure et principes de l'OMC à la lumière de la mise en oeuvre des recommandations de l'ORD dans l'affaire Bananes III', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1999) 11-23; the rule-based nature of dispute settlement will be dealt with further in the next chapter. See also P. Lamy, 'La Conférence Ministérielle de l'OMC à Seattle: bilan et perspectives', 3 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1999) 5-7; P. VanDoren and A. Schomaker, 'Les Relations
151. See concerning objectives for the Seattle Round for example P. Jacquet, P. Messerlin, and L. Tubiana, Le Cycle du Millénaire (Paris: La Documentation française 1999); see concerning the rule- based approach of panels: E.-U. Petersmann, 'From the Hobbesian International Law of Coexistence to Modern Integration Law: The WTO Dispute Settlement System', 1(2) J Int'l Econ L (1998): a somewhat opposite view regarding the arbitration in the Bananas case is defended by P. Mengozzi, 'Structure et principes de l'OMC à la lumière de la mise en oeuvre des recommandations de l'ORD dans l'affaire Bananes III', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1999) 11-23; the rule-based nature of dispute settlement will be dealt with further in the next chapter. See also P. Lamy, 'La Conférence Ministérielle de l'OMC à Seattle: bilan et perspectives', 3 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1999) 5-7; P. VanDoren and A. Schomaker, 'Les Relations Economiques entre l'Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis après la conclusion de l'Uruguay Round', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 51-65.
152. See concerning objectives for the Seattle Round for example P. Jacquet, P. Messerlin, and L. Tubiana, Le Cycle du Millénaire (Paris: La Documentation française 1999); see concerning the rule- based approach of panels: E.-U. Petersmann, 'From the Hobbesian International Law of Coexistence to Modern Integration Law: The WTO Dispute Settlement System', 1(2) J Int'l Econ L (1998): a somewhat opposite view regarding the arbitration in the Bananas case is defended by P. Mengozzi, 'Structure et principes de l'OMC à la lumière de la mise en oeuvre des recommandations de l'ORD dans l'affaire Bananes III', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1999) 11-23; the rule-based nature of dispute settlement will be dealt with further in the next chapter. See also P. Lamy, 'La Conférence Ministérielle de l'OMC à Seattle: bilan et perspectives', 3 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1999) 5-7; P. VanDoren and A. Schomaker, 'Les Relations Economiques entre l'Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis après la conclusion de l'Uruguay Round', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 51-65.
153. See concerning objectives for the Seattle Round for example P. Jacquet, P. Messerlin, and L. Tubiana, Le Cycle du Millénaire (Paris: La Documentation française 1999); see concerning the rule- based approach of panels: E.-U. Petersmann, 'From the Hobbesian International Law of Coexistence to Modern Integration Law: The WTO Dispute Settlement System', 1(2) J Int'l Econ L (1998): a somewhat opposite view regarding the arbitration in the Bananas case is defended by P. Mengozzi, 'Structure et principes de l'OMC à la lumière de la mise en oeuvre des recommandations de l'ORD dans l'affaire Bananes III', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1999) 11-23; the rule-based nature of dispute settlement will be dealt with further in the next chapter. See also P. Lamy, 'La Conférence Ministérielle de l'OMC à Seattle: bilan et perspectives', 3 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1999) 5-7; P. VanDoren and A. Schomaker, 'Les Relations Economiques entre l'Union Européenne et les Etats-Unis après la conclusion de l'Uruguay Round', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 51-65.
154. See, on the development of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system in general, J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, above, 59-71; M. Montañá i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Columbia J of Transnat'l L (1993) 103-80; E.-U. Petersmann, 'The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948', 31 Common Mkt L Rev (1994) 1157-1244; T. Cottier, above; P. Pescatore, 'The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism, its Present Situation and its Prospects', 5(1) Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1993); R. E. Hudec, 'The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure', 8(1) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (1999).
155. See, on the development of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system in general, J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, above, 59-71; M. Montañá i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Columbia J of Transnat'l L (1993) 103-80; E.-U. Petersmann, 'The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948', 31 Common Mkt L Rev (1994) 1157-1244; T. Cottier, above; P. Pescatore, 'The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism, its Present Situation and its Prospects', 5(1) Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1993); R. E. Hudec, 'The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure', 8(1) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (1999).
156. See, on the development of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system in general, J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, above, 59-71; M. Montañá i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Columbia J of Transnat'l L (1993) 103-80; E.-U. Petersmann, 'The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948', 31 Common Mkt L Rev (1994) 1157-1244; T. Cottier, above; P. Pescatore, 'The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism, its Present Situation and its Prospects', 5(1) Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1993); R. E. Hudec, 'The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure', 8(1) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (1999).
157. See, on the development of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system in general, J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, above, 59-71; M. Montañá i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Columbia J of Transnat'l L (1993) 103-80; E.-U. Petersmann, 'The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948', 31 Common Mkt L Rev (1994) 1157-1244; T. Cottier, above; P. Pescatore, 'The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism, its Present Situation and its Prospects', 5(1) Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1993); R. E. Hudec, 'The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure', 8(1) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (1999).
158. See, on the development of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system in general, J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, above, 59-71; M. Montañá i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Columbia J of Transnat'l L (1993) 103-80; E.-U. Petersmann, 'The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948', 31 Common Mkt L Rev (1994) 1157-1244; T. Cottier, above; P. Pescatore, 'The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism, its Present Situation and its Prospects', 5(1) Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1993); R. E. Hudec, 'The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure', 8(1) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (1999).
159. See, on the development of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system in general, J. H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, above, 59-71; M. Montañá i Mora, 'A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes', 31 Columbia J of Transnat'l L (1993) 103-80; E.-U. Petersmann, 'The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948', 31 Common Mkt L Rev (1994) 1157-1244; T. Cottier, above; P. Pescatore, 'The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism, its Present Situation and its Prospects', 5(1) Journal of World Trade (JWT) (1993); R. E. Hudec, 'The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure', 8(1) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (1999).
160. Cottier, above, 342.
161. Article 11 DSU; Cottier, above.
162. Cottier, above, 347.
163. Cottier, above, 347.
164. Cottier, above, 345.
165. Only realistically conceivable, I would argue, when he has reached a negotiated solution.
166. J. H. Bello, 'Editorial Comment: The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More', 90 AJIL (1996) 416.
167. Idem, 418.
168. J. H. Jackson, 'The WTO Dispute Settlement: Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation', 91 AJIL (1996) 60.
169. Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil - Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/ARB, circulated on 28 August 2000, para 3.44; the arbitrators also refer to Article 47 of the ILC Draft on State Responsibility in Third Report on State Responsibility by James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN GA Doc. A/CN.4/507 of 15 March 2000; see also Marco Bronckers, 'More Power to the WTO?' 4(1) J Int'l Econ L (2001) 59, who also states that '(l)egally', he sees 'insufficient evidence that the drafters of the DSU wanted to deviate from general principles of public international law, or even general contracts law: following a breach, the injured party can ask performance to begin with; if performance is somehow objectively impossible, then the injured party can claim damages as a second best remedy'.
170. At 40.
171. Article 22(2) DSU.
172. Stefan Griller, above, 453.
173. See also, somewhat in line with this, Cottier, above, 347, who argues that the fact that a negotiated solution can be found outside the panel process should not be taken into account when assessing 'the legal quality of the panel process proper'.
174. See about the wisdom of this policy option or 'efficient breach', Alan O. Sykes, 'The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?' in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick (eds), New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (The Hague: Kluwer 2000) 352.
175. Think for example of contract law, where parties usually have the possibility to prefer an out-of-court settlement, before, during and even after having referred their case to a court.
176. See also P. J. Kuijper, 'The New WTO Dispute Settlement System: The Impact on the Community', in Bourgeois et al. fn 9, 104. It even goes so far that some actually fear too great a 'juridictionalization': H. Rasmussen, 'L'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce et ses Instruments Législatifs et Juridictionnels', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 186.
177. See also P. J. Kuijper, 'The New WTO Dispute Settlement System: The Impact on the Community', in Bourgeois et al. fn 9, 104. It even goes so far that some actually fear too great a 'juridictionalization': H. Rasmussen, 'L'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce et ses Instruments Législatifs et Juridictionnels', 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen (1994) 186.
178. See in general J. Osterhoudt Berkey, 'The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect for the GATT: A Question Worth Revisiting', http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/JeanMonnet/papers/ 98/98-3-.html;
179. See further for the arguments pro direct effect, in general the works of E.-U. Petersmann; K. J. Kuilwijk, above; see also for a very brief summary of the international political economy argument H. G. Schermers, 'Editorial Comment, Strengthening the GATT', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 393-96.
180. See further for the arguments pro direct effect, in general the works of E.-U. Petersmann; K. J. Kuilwijk, above; see also for a very brief summary of the international political economy argument H. G. Schermers, 'Editorial Comment, Strengthening the GATT', 20 Common Mkt L Rev (1983) 393-96.
181. E.g. A. Amin et al., 'Editorial: Forum for Heterodox International Political Economy', 1(1) Review of International Political Economy (1994) 1-4.
182. See for example B. Badie, Le Retournement du Monde (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po et Dalloz 1999), 144-49; B. Badie, Un Monde Sans Souveraineté: Les Etats entre Ruse et Responsabilité (Paris: Fayard 1999).
183. See for example B. Badie, Le Retournement du Monde (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po et Dalloz 1999), 144-49; B. Badie, Un Monde Sans Souveraineté: Les Etats entre Ruse et Responsabilité (Paris: Fayard 1999).
184. See for introductory explanations of these theories further for example P. Krugman and M. Obstfeld, International Economics (4th edn, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1997) 1-120; M. Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997); D. Begg, S. Fischer, and R. Dornbusch, Macroeconomie, trans B. Bernier (Paris: Ediscience 1999) 337-59.
185. See for introductory explanations of these theories further for example P. Krugman and M. Obstfeld, International Economics (4th edn, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1997) 1-120; M. Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997); D. Begg, S. Fischer, and R. Dornbusch, Macroeconomie, trans B. Bernier (Paris: Ediscience 1999) 337-59.
186. See for introductory explanations of these theories further for example P. Krugman and M. Obstfeld, International Economics (4th edn, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1997) 1-120; M. Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997); D. Begg, S. Fischer, and R. Dornbusch, Macroeconomie, trans B. Bernier (Paris: Ediscience 1999) 337-59.
187. Think for example of the concept of structural state power as advanced by S. Strange, a power based on power structures of production, finance, technology or knowledge and security. S. Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter 1988).
188. See for example M. Malia, The Soviet Tragedy (New York: Free Press 1996).
189. B. Badie, Un Monde sans Souveraineté (Paris: Fayard 1999); S. Strange, States and Markets, above.
190. B. Badie, Un Monde sans Souveraineté (Paris: Fayard 1999); S. Strange, States and Markets, above.
191. An allusion that may need some clarification: according to some, among whom is Francis Fukuyama, the specific characteristics of liberal democratic individualism bring individuals peace, prosperity and, most importantly, individual recognition and thus explain the victory of liberal democracy over communism. Communism, in its turn, is based on the Hegelian idea of die 'cunning of history', reason and extreme rationality, and the collapse of the communist ideology is referred to by Martin Malia as the result of its own 'perverse logic', the cunning of its own rationality. F. Fukuyama, The End of History (New York: Avon 199?); M. Malia, above.
192. B. Badie and M.-C. Smouts, Le Retournement du Monde, above.
193. T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651 (reprint London: Penguin 1985); see for the modern theory of realism based on Hobbes: H. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (6th edn, New York: Knopf 1985).
194. T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651 (reprint London: Penguin 1985); see for the modern theory of realism based on Hobbes: H. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (6th edn, New York: Knopf 1985).
195. See for example R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books 1984).
196. N. Macchiavelli, De Heerser, trans from Italian by F. van Dooren (Amsterdam: Atheneum 1997); D. Gianotti, Republica Fiorentina (1530), A Critical Edition and Introduction by Giovanni Silvano (1990).
197. N. Macchiavelli, De Heerser, trans from Italian by F. van Dooren (Amsterdam: Atheneum 1997); D. Gianotti, Republica Fiorentina (1530), A Critical Edition and Introduction by Giovanni Silvano (1990).
198. See for an introduction in these issues for example B. Russet and H. Starr, World Politics, The Menu for Choice (New York: Freeman and Co. 1995) 161-218.
199. See in general D. Curtin, 'Directives: The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individual Rights', Common Mkt L Rev (1990) 709-737; S. Prechal, 'Remedies after Marshall', Common Mkt L Rev (1990) 451-73.
200. See in general D. Curtin, 'Directives: The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individual Rights', Common Mkt L Rev (1990) 709-737; S. Prechal, 'Remedies after Marshall', Common Mkt L Rev (1990) 451-73.
201. P. J. G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, Inleiding tot het recht van de Europese Gemeenschappen (Deventer 1995) 202; P. Craig, G. De Búrca, EU Law (Oxford 1998), 186. Compare this especially with the international legal obligation of pacta sunt servanda that leaves the measures chosen by a state of compliance up to the state's sovereign decision.
202. P. J. G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, Inleiding tot het recht van de Europese Gemeenschappen (Deventer 1995) 202; P. Craig, G. De Búrca, EU Law (Oxford 1998), 186. Compare this especially with the international legal obligation of pacta sunt servanda that leaves the measures chosen by a state of compliance up to the state's sovereign decision.
203. ECJ Case 41/74, Van Duyn, (1974) ECR, 1337, para 12;
204. ECJ Case 148/78, Ratti, (1979) ECR 1629, para 22;
205. Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, above, 323, 325;
206. S. Weatherill and P. Beaumont, EC Law (London: 1995) 345-50.
207. ECJ Case 152/84, Marshall, (1986) ECR 723, para 48; ECJ Case 91/92, Faccini Dori, (1994) ECR I-3325; Kapteyn, VerLoren van Themaat, above, 331; Weatherill and Beaumont, above, 347-348.
208. ECJ Case 152/84, Marshall, (1986) ECR 723, para 48; ECJ Case 91/92, Faccini Dori, (1994) ECR I-3325; Kapteyn, VerLoren van Themaat, above, 331; Weatherill and Beaumont, above, 347-348.
209. ECJ Case 152/84, Marshall, (1986) ECR 723, para 48; ECJ Case 91/92, Faccini Dori, (1994) ECR I-3325; Kapteyn, VerLoren van Themaat, above, 331; Weatherill and Beaumont, above, 347-348.
210. ECJ Case 152/84, above; ECJ Case C-188/89, Foster, (1990) ECR I-3313.
211. ECJ Case C-106/89, Marleasing, (1990) ECR I-4135;
212. ECJ Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann, (1984) ECR 1891. The national court will have to try to interpret national provision in line with the directive. It is up to the national court to decide whether such an interpretation is possible and does not conflict with principles of legal certainty.
213. ECJ Case 78/87, Fediol v Commission, (1989) ECR 731.
214. ECJ Case C-69/89, Nakajima, above.
215. ECJ Case C-53/96, Hermés, (1998) ECR I-3603.
216. Dworkin describes law as 'the best moral interpretation of existing social practices'. It is a court's role to interpret the consensually developed system, combining 'backward and forward looking elements; they interpret temporary legal practice as an unfolding narrative'. (R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1986) 225).
217. The Court uses both terms without clearly making a distinction, and furthermore, has consistently avoided answering the question as to the applicability of other international agreements in cases for annulment brought by Member States (see e.g. Case C-197/97, Spain v Commission, (1999) ECR 1251; Case 114/86, United Kingdom v Commission, (1988) ECR 5289; Case 204/86, (1988) ECR 5323). See for the distinction between applicability and invocability generally, J. H. Jackson, 'Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems', above. It is noteworthy for example that Kuilwijk deals with the Court's denial of direct effect as a denial of invocability (Kuilwijk, above), whereas Macleod, Hendry, and Hyatt deal with it as a denial of direct applicability (I. MacLeod, I. D. Hendry, and S. Hyatt, The External Relations of the European Communities (Oxford: Clarendon 1996) 133-41).
218. The Court uses both terms without clearly making a distinction, and furthermore, has consistently avoided answering the question as to the applicability of other international agreements in cases for annulment brought by Member States (see e.g. Case C-197/97, Spain v Commission, (1999) ECR 1251; Case 114/86, United Kingdom v Commission, (1988) ECR 5289; Case 204/86, (1988) ECR 5323). See for the distinction between applicability and invocability generally, J. H. Jackson, 'Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems', above. It is noteworthy for example that Kuilwijk deals with the Court's denial of direct effect as a denial of invocability (Kuilwijk, above), whereas Macleod, Hendry, and Hyatt deal with it as a denial of direct applicability (I. MacLeod, I. D. Hendry, and S. Hyatt, The External Relations of the European Communities (Oxford: Clarendon 1996) 133-41).
219. The Court uses both terms without clearly making a distinction, and furthermore, has consistently avoided answering the question as to the applicability of other international agreements in cases for annulment brought by Member States (see e.g. Case C-197/97, Spain v Commission, (1999) ECR 1251; Case 114/86, United Kingdom v Commission, (1988) ECR 5289; Case 204/86, (1988) ECR 5323). See for the distinction between applicability and invocability generally, J. H. Jackson, 'Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems', above. It is noteworthy for example that Kuilwijk deals with the Court's denial of direct effect as a denial of invocability (Kuilwijk, above), whereas Macleod, Hendry, and Hyatt deal with it as a denial of direct applicability (I. MacLeod, I. D. Hendry, and S. Hyatt, The External Relations of the European Communities (Oxford: Clarendon 1996) 133-41).
220. As the reader will have noticed, this seems to be in line with what Advocate General Saggio said in his Opinion in Portugal/Council, above, para 18.
221. Recourse to the European Court is the only option Member States realistically have, because the principle of Community loyalty, formulated in Article 10 EC would probably prevent them from bringing a case against the EC or against another Member State to the WTO dispute settlement system