Which historical sociology? A response to Stephen Hobden's 'Theorising the International System'

Review of International Studies

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 273-280

  Nexon, Daniel ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035592461     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210500002734     Document Type: Article

References (85)

1. S. Hobden, 'Theorising the International System: Perspectives from Historical Sociology', Review of International Studies, 25:2 (1999), pp. 257-71.
2. M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). Hobden also discusses work before Tilly's relational turn (and thus not relevant to my argument). See C. Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European State Making', in C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
3. M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). Hobden also discusses work before Tilly's relational turn (and thus not relevant to my argument). See C. Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European State Making', in C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
4. M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). Hobden also discusses work before Tilly's relational turn (and thus not relevant to my argument). See C. Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European State Making', in C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
5. M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992). Hobden also discusses work before Tilly's relational turn (and thus not relevant to my argument). See C. Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European State Making', in C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
6. For an example of the high profile of relationalism in historical sociology, see the symposium on the utility of rational choice approaches to historical sociology which recently appeared in the American Journal of Sociology. In particular, see M. Sommers, '"We're No Angels": Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in Social Science', American Journal of Sociology, 104:3 (1998), pp. 722-85.
7. For an example of the high profile of relationalism in historical sociology, see the symposium on the utility of rational choice approaches to historical sociology which recently appeared in the American Journal of Sociology. In particular, see M. Sommers, '"We're No Angels": Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in Social Science', American Journal of Sociology, 104:3 (1998), pp. 722-85.
8. Hobden, 'Theorising', p. 271.
9. See, for example, B. Buzan, C. Jones, and R. Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), and F. Kratochwil, 'The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitik Without Politics', Review of International Studies, 19:1 (1993), pp. 63-80.
10. See, for example, B. Buzan, C. Jones, and R. Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), and F. Kratochwil, 'The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitik Without Politics', Review of International Studies, 19:1 (1993), pp. 63-80.
11. Ibid., p. 269.
12. Many relationalists dispute the proposition that action is necessarily coherent - an assumption central to, for example, rational choice theory. See H. White, Identity and Control: A Structural Theory of Social Action (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 1992), p. 303.
13. See A. Abott, 'Things of Boundaries', Social Research 62 (1996), pp. 857-62. For a philosophical defense of this proposition, see N. Rescher, Process Metaphysics (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 64-7.
14. See A. Abott, 'Things of Boundaries', Social Research 62 (1996), pp. 857-62. For a philosophical defense of this proposition, see N. Rescher, Process Metaphysics (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 64-7.
15. M. Emirbayer, 'Manifesto for a Relational Sociology', American Journal of Sociology, 103:2 (1997), pp. 281-317. For an application to IR theory, see P. Jackson and D. Nexon, 'Relations Before the States: Substance, Process, and the Study of World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 5:3 (1999), pp. 291-332 and Y. Lapid, 'Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory', in Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1997), pp. 5-11.
16. M. Emirbayer, 'Manifesto for a Relational Sociology', American Journal of Sociology, 103:2 (1997), pp. 281-317. For an application to IR theory, see P. Jackson and D. Nexon, 'Relations Before the States: Substance, Process, and the Study of World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 5:3 (1999), pp. 291-332 and Y. Lapid, 'Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory', in Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1997), pp. 5-11.
17. M. Emirbayer, 'Manifesto for a Relational Sociology', American Journal of Sociology, 103:2 (1997), pp. 281-317. For an application to IR theory, see P. Jackson and D. Nexon, 'Relations Before the States: Substance, Process, and the Study of World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 5:3 (1999), pp. 291-332 and Y. Lapid, 'Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory', in Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1997), pp. 5-11.
18. White, pp. 8-9.
19. Emirbayer, 'Manifesto', p. 287.
20. Mann, Sources: vol. 1, pp. 1-2. See also, C. Tilly, 'Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology', Comparative Social Research, 16 (1997), p. 50; C. Tilly, 'International Communities, Secure or Otherwise', in E. Adler and M. Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 398-402. For a similar argument, see P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, An Introduction to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1992).
21. Mann, Sources: vol. 1, pp. 1-2. See also, C. Tilly, 'Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology', Comparative Social Research, 16 (1997), p. 50; C. Tilly, 'International Communities, Secure or Otherwise', in E. Adler and M. Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 398-402. For a similar argument, see P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, An Introduction to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1992).
22. Mann, Sources: vol. 1, pp. 1-2. See also, C. Tilly, 'Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology', Comparative Social Research, 16 (1997), p. 50; C. Tilly, 'International Communities, Secure or Otherwise', in E. Adler and M. Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 398-402. For a similar argument, see P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, An Introduction to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1992).
23. Mann, Sources: vol. 1, pp. 1-2. See also, C. Tilly, 'Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology', Comparative Social Research, 16 (1997), p. 50; C. Tilly, 'International Communities, Secure or Otherwise', in E. Adler and M. Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 398-402. For a similar argument, see P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, An Introduction to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1992).
24. Hobden, 'Theorising,' p. 258.
25. Mann, Sources: vol. 1, p. 1.
26. Ibid., p. 1.
27. Thus, cities are nodes of capital. C. Tilly, Coercion, p. 17.
28. Hobden, 'Theorising,' p. 260. See, for example, Tilly, Coercion, pp. 65, 70; and C. Tilly, 'Entanglements of European Cities and States', in C. Tilly and W. Blockmans (eds.), Cities and the Rise of States in Europe: A.D. 1000 to 1800 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), pp. 1-27.
29. Hobden, 'Theorising,' p. 260. See, for example, Tilly, Coercion, pp. 65, 70; and C. Tilly, 'Entanglements of European Cities and States', in C. Tilly and W. Blockmans (eds.), Cities and the Rise of States in Europe: A.D. 1000 to 1800 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), pp. 1-27.
30. Hobden, 'Theorising,' p. 260. See, for example, Tilly, Coercion, pp. 65, 70; and C. Tilly, 'Entanglements of European Cities and States', in C. Tilly and W. Blockmans (eds.), Cities and the Rise of States in Europe: A.D. 1000 to 1800 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), pp. 1-27.
31. Which is not to say that they sometimes cannot be analytically separated.
32. Neopositivist variable analysis is an approach to theory building which stresses causal relationships based upon independent (explanatory) variables and dependent (outcome) variables. See G. King, R. Keohane, and S. Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Tilly does, of course, speak of 'variables' in Coercion, but he does not mean them in the neopositivist sense, just as he does not use the term 'system' in the systems theoretic sense of the term. See Tilly, Coercion, pp. 33-7, ch. 6.
33. Neopositivist variable analysis is an approach to theory building which stresses causal relationships based upon independent (explanatory) variables and dependent (outcome) variables. See G. King, R. Keohane, and S. Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Tilly does, of course, speak of 'variables' in Coercion, but he does not mean them in the neopositivist sense, just as he does not use the term 'system' in the systems theoretic sense of the term. See Tilly, Coercion, pp. 33-7, ch. 6.
34. A. Abbott, 'Transcending General Linear Reality,' Sociological Theory, 6 (1988), p. 181.
35. M. Emirbayer, 'Manifesto,' p. 286.
36. C. Tilly, 'To Explain Political Processes', American Journal of Sociology, 100: 6 (1995), pp. 1594-1610.
37. This distinction emerged from conversations with Stacie E. Goddard.
38. For a similar line of criticism, see M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1972). For an example of retrospective path dependency analysis, see R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
39. For a similar line of criticism, see M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1972). For an example of retrospective path dependency analysis, see R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
40. For example, the very fact that a peasant rebellion (hypothetically) occurred in 1352 becomes causally relevant to the peasant rebellion which happened in 1394 (and to the one which did not occur in 1367); each instance of major events in state transformation, likewise, takes place against the backdrop of earlier processes of state transformation and in the context of simultaneous processes of state transformation.
41. For a sustained treatment of processes analysis in historical sociology, see C. Tilly, 'Historical Sociology', manuscript prepared for the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.
42. For a discussion of causality under open systems, and why variable analysis (i.e. causal reasoning of the constant conjunction sort) fails under these conditions, see R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Verso, 1975); R. Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality (London: Verso, 1989); P. Jackson and D. Nexon, 'Relations'; and H. Patomäki, 'How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 2 (1996), pp. 105-33.
43. For a discussion of causality under open systems, and why variable analysis (i.e. causal reasoning of the constant conjunction sort) fails under these conditions, see R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Verso, 1975); R. Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality (London: Verso, 1989); P. Jackson and D. Nexon, 'Relations'; and H. Patomäki, 'How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 2 (1996), pp. 105-33.
44. For a discussion of causality under open systems, and why variable analysis (i.e. causal reasoning of the constant conjunction sort) fails under these conditions, see R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Verso, 1975); R. Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality (London: Verso, 1989); P. Jackson and D. Nexon, 'Relations'; and H. Patomäki, 'How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 2 (1996), pp. 105-33.
45. For a discussion of causality under open systems, and why variable analysis (i.e. causal reasoning of the constant conjunction sort) fails under these conditions, see R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (London: Verso, 1975); R. Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality (London: Verso, 1989); P. Jackson and D. Nexon, 'Relations'; and H. Patomäki, 'How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 2 (1996), pp. 105-33.
46. Tilly, 'Means', p. 49.
47. Hobden, 'Theorising', pp. 260-3. Frankly, I am perplexed by Hobden's contrast between 'structure' and norms. He associates the first with the bellocentric nature of Mann's and Tilly's theories of state formation; I assume he means material structures here because that is the standard sociological contrast with culture. See, for example, M. Archer, Culture and Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The third dichotomy draws on the game theorists' method of taking structurally patterned preferences as exogenous, in opposition to constructivist claims that structures are produced and reproduced by the action of agents.
48. Hobden, 'Theorising', pp. 260-3. Frankly, I am perplexed by Hobden's contrast between 'structure' and norms. He associates the first with the bellocentric nature of Mann's and Tilly's theories of state formation; I assume he means material structures here because that is the standard sociological contrast with culture. See, for example, M. Archer, Culture and Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The third dichotomy draws on the game theorists' method of taking structurally patterned preferences as exogenous, in opposition to constructivist claims that structures are produced and reproduced by the action of agents.
49. Ibid., p. 263.
50. Ibid., p. 264. Hobden draws this distinction from M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). While a potentially useful heuristic, this distinction would surprise, for example, symbolic interactionists who sought to produce explanatory accounts of action by focusing on strategic actors oriented towards meanings. See, for example, H. Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969).
51. Ibid., p. 264. Hobden draws this distinction from M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). While a potentially useful heuristic, this distinction would surprise, for example, symbolic interactionists who sought to produce explanatory accounts of action by focusing on strategic actors oriented towards meanings. See, for example, H. Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969).
52. Ibid., p. 264. Hobden draws this distinction from M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). While a potentially useful heuristic, this distinction would surprise, for example, symbolic interactionists who sought to produce explanatory accounts of action by focusing on strategic actors oriented towards meanings. See, for example, H. Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969).
53. See, for example, A. Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 335-70; A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It', International Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 391-425. Anthony Giddens, an important intellectual figure in the development of mainstream constructivism, rejects the material/ideal dichotomy and yet sees structures as basically rules. He furthermore understands structures as simultaneously enabling and constraining and suggests that theorists should analytically bracket each in turn to see their effects upon one another. See, for example, A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984).
54. See, for example, A. Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 335-70; A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It', International Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 391-425. Anthony Giddens, an important intellectual figure in the development of mainstream constructivism, rejects the material/ideal dichotomy and yet sees structures as basically rules. He furthermore understands structures as simultaneously enabling and constraining and suggests that theorists should analytically bracket each in turn to see their effects upon one another. See, for example, A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984).
55. See, for example, A. Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 335-70; A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It', International Organization, 46 (1992), pp. 391-425. Anthony Giddens, an important intellectual figure in the development of mainstream constructivism, rejects the material/ideal dichotomy and yet sees structures as basically rules. He furthermore understands structures as simultaneously enabling and constraining and suggests that theorists should analytically bracket each in turn to see their effects upon one another. See, for example, A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984).
56. See T. Parsons, 'The present position and prospects of systematic theory in sociology,' in Essays in Sociological Theory, rev. edn. (New York: Free Press, 1954); also, T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, vol. II (New York: Free Press, 1949), pp. 727-75; T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: Free Press, 1954). For an overview, see J. Alexander, Action and its Environments (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988): ch. 9.
57. See T. Parsons, 'The present position and prospects of systematic theory in sociology,' in Essays in Sociological Theory, rev. edn. (New York: Free Press, 1954); also, T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, vol. II (New York: Free Press, 1949), pp. 727-75; T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: Free Press, 1954). For an overview, see J. Alexander, Action and its Environments (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988): ch. 9.
58. See T. Parsons, 'The present position and prospects of systematic theory in sociology,' in Essays in Sociological Theory, rev. edn. (New York: Free Press, 1954); also, T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, vol. II (New York: Free Press, 1949), pp. 727-75; T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: Free Press, 1954). For an overview, see J. Alexander, Action and its Environments (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988): ch. 9.
59. See T. Parsons, 'The present position and prospects of systematic theory in sociology,' in Essays in Sociological Theory, rev. edn. (New York: Free Press, 1954); also, T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, vol. II (New York: Free Press, 1949), pp. 727-75; T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: Free Press, 1954). For an overview, see J. Alexander, Action and its Environments (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988): ch. 9.
60. Hobden, 'Theories', p. 264.
61. Mann, Sources: vol. 1, p. 1.
62. See, for example, Mann, Sources: vol. 1, pp. 27, 376.
63. The dichotomy between 'war' and 'norms' is mostly found in a handful of contemporary realists. Neither classical realists nor contemporary constructivists accept it, and certainly no relationalist would. For an excellent discussion of this point, see M. Finnemore, National Interest in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 128. See, also R. Bruce Hall and F. Kratochwil, 'Medieval Tales: Neorealist "Science" and the Abuse of History', International Organization, 47 (1993), pp. 479-91.
64. The dichotomy between 'war' and 'norms' is mostly found in a handful of contemporary realists. Neither classical realists nor contemporary constructivists accept it, and certainly no relationalist would. For an excellent discussion of this point, see M. Finnemore, National Interest in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 128. See, also R. Bruce Hall and F. Kratochwil, 'Medieval Tales: Neorealist "Science" and the Abuse of History', International Organization, 47 (1993), pp. 479-91.
65. Tilly does not spend much time examining or elucidating these developing rules and norms as autonomous causal factors. While this may be an important lacuna, it does not rise to level of theoretical difficulty posited by Hobden.
66. Tilly, Coercion, p. 163. Hobden quotes this passage but adds emphasis which I believe to be misleading. S. Hobden, 'Theorising', p. 260.
67. Tilly, Coercion, p. 163. Hobden quotes this passage but adds emphasis which I believe to be misleading. S. Hobden, 'Theorising', p. 260.
68. Hobden, 'Theories', p. 271.
69. Hobden, 'Theories', p. 266. Hobden bases a good part of his argument on (sometimes sympathetic) references Mann and Tilly make to realists.
70. Mann, Sources: vol. 1, pp. 2-32; M. Mann, Sources: vol. 2 is concerned with how states came to dominate social and political life. See, also, C. Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage, 1994); C. Tilly, 'Means'.
71. Mann, Sources: vol. 1, pp. 2-32; M. Mann, Sources: vol. 2 is concerned with how states came to dominate social and political life. See, also, C. Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage, 1994); C. Tilly, 'Means'.
72. Mann, Sources: vol. 1, pp. 2-32; M. Mann, Sources: vol. 2 is concerned with how states came to dominate social and political life. See, also, C. Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage, 1994); C. Tilly, 'Means'.
73. Mann, Sources: vol. 1, pp. 2-32; M. Mann, Sources: vol. 2 is concerned with how states came to dominate social and political life. See, also, C. Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage, 1994); C. Tilly, 'Means'.
74. Tilly, 'Means', p. 50. Tilly explicitly includes non-state actors in his account of the social networks which constitute international politics. See, C. Tilly, 'International Communities', p. 406.
75. Tilly, 'Means', p. 50. Tilly explicitly includes non-state actors in his account of the social networks which constitute international politics. See, C. Tilly, 'International Communities', p. 406.
76. For a powerful version of the argument that non-military forces are of primary importance in the development of modern states, see H. Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
77. Hobden, 'Theories', pp. 268-9. As I have argued, relationalism accomplishes this goal rather effectively.
78. Ibid., p. 270.
79. While few of these theorists call themselves 'neofunctionalists,' their arguments and research agendas clearly place them in the neofunctionalist tradition. For examples, see E. Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivists in World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 3 (1997), pp. 319-63; J. Checkel, 'Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe', International Studies Quarterly, 43 (1999), pp. 83-114; and A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
80. While few of these theorists call themselves 'neofunctionalists,' their arguments and research agendas clearly place them in the neofunctionalist tradition. For examples, see E. Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivists in World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 3 (1997), pp. 319-63; J. Checkel, 'Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe', International Studies Quarterly, 43 (1999), pp. 83-114; and A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
81. While few of these theorists call themselves 'neofunctionalists,' their arguments and research agendas clearly place them in the neofunctionalist tradition. For examples, see E. Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivists in World Politics', European Journal of International Relations, 3 (1997), pp. 319-63; J. Checkel, 'Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe', International Studies Quarterly, 43 (1999), pp. 83-114; and A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
82. See Alexander, Action and Neofunctionalism, and Archer, Culture.
83. See Alexander, Action and Neofunctionalism, and Archer, Culture.
84. However, one can go too far in stressing the opposing programmes of the two schools; both neofunctionalists and relationalists share many ontological assumptions, and have similar critiques of individualist and structuralist social theories. In fact, they have even claimed some of the same theorists as their own, most notably Pierre Bourdieu. See Alexander, Neofunctionalism, and Emirbayer, 'Manifesto'.
85. However, one can go too far in stressing the opposing programmes of the two schools; both neofunctionalists and relationalists share many ontological assumptions, and have similar critiques of individualist and structuralist social theories. In fact, they have even claimed some of the same theorists as their own, most notably Pierre Bourdieu. See Alexander, Neofunctionalism, and Emirbayer, 'Manifesto'.