Devaluing the vote in Latin America

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 146-159

  Snyder, Richard ^a   Samuels, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035586791     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2001.0016     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Dahl writes that the "unimpaired opportunit[y]" of all full citizens to "have their preferences weighed equally" is a necessary condition for democracy. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 2. Dahl also includes "voting equality" as one of his "five criteria for a democratic process." Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 109-11.
2. Dahl writes that the "unimpaired opportunit[y]" of all full citizens to "have their preferences weighed equally" is a necessary condition for democracy. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 2. Dahl also includes "voting equality" as one of his "five criteria for a democratic process." Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 109-11.
3. The Table on p. 148 is based on David Samuels and Richard Snyder, "The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Political Science 31 (forthcoming). To calculate malapportionment, we used a modified version of the Loosemore-Hanby index of electoral disproportionality, taking the absolute value of the difference between each district's seat and population shares, adding them, and then dividing by two. Wherever available, we used population rather than registered voters per district, as most countries apportion seats on the basis of population.
4. In fact, the only way to avoid malapportionment completely is to elect representatives in a single nationwide district, as a few countries do (such as Israel, Namibia, the Netherlands, Peru, and Sierra Leone).
5. Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries," World Development 21 (August 1993): 1355-70; Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," World Politics 46 (January 1994): 151-84.
6. Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries," World Development 21 (August 1993): 1355-70; Jonathan Fox, "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," World Politics 46 (January 1994): 151-84.
7. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions About Consolidation," Journal of Democracy 7 (April 1996): 34-52, 41.
8. In terms of comparative research on democracy, recognizing this formal flaw offers important advantages. Precisely because it is a formal component of electoral systems, malapportionment is amenable to systematic measurement and statistical analysis. By contrast, informal flaws, like "brown areas" and the (un)rule of law, while critical, often frustrate scholars because of the difficulty of gathering systematic data that go beyond fertile anecdotal evidence.
9. Alfred Stepan, "Brazil's Decentralized Federalism: Bringing Government Closer to the Citizens?" Daedelus 129 (Spring 2000): 145-69, 163. Part of the explanation for this omission surely involves the fact that solving the problem of malapportionment would require a constitutional amendment, and such an amendment would require the unlikely support of a supermajority of senators and deputies from the overrepresented states. For an insightful analysis of malapportionment in Brazil, see Jairo Nicolau, "As Distorções na Representação dos Estados na Câmara dos Deputados Brasileira," Dados 40:3 (1997): 441-64.
10. Alfred Stepan, "Brazil's Decentralized Federalism: Bringing Government Closer to the Citizens?" Daedelus 129 (Spring 2000): 145-69, 163. Part of the explanation for this omission surely involves the fact that solving the problem of malapportionment would require a constitutional amendment, and such an amendment would require the unlikely support of a supermajority of senators and deputies from the overrepresented states. For an insightful analysis of malapportionment in Brazil, see Jairo Nicolau, "As Distorções na Representação dos Estados na Câmara dos Deputados Brasileira," Dados 40:3 (1997): 441-64.
11. By contrast, informal practices such as clientelism and particularism may be less compatible with these rules and institutions.
12. Here, we follow Dahl's threefold distinction between the formulating, signifying, and weighing of citizens' preferences as necessary conditions for democracy. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, 1-3.
13. See Richard Snyder and David Samuels, "Legislative Malapportionment in Latin America: Comparative and Historical Perspectives," in Edward L. Gibson, ed., Representing Regions: Federalism and Territorial Politics in Latin America (forthcoming).
14. See Edward L. Gibson, "The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina," World Politics 49 (April 1997): 339-70; and Edward L. Gibson and Ernesto Calvo, "Federalism and Low-Maintenance Constituencies: Territorial Dimensions of Economic Reform in Argentina," Studies in Comparative International Development (forthcoming).
15. See Edward L. Gibson, "The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina," World Politics 49 (April 1997): 339-70; and Edward L. Gibson and Ernesto Calvo, "Federalism and Low-Maintenance Constituencies: Territorial Dimensions of Economic Reform in Argentina," Studies in Comparative International Development (forthcoming).
16. Matthew Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 286.
17. David V. Fleischer, "Manipulações Casuísticas do Sistema Eleitoral Durante o Período Militar, ou Como Usualmente o Fetiço Voltava contra o Feitiçeiro," Cadernos de Ciência Político 10 (1994).
18. Peter Pyne, "The Politics of Instability in Ecuador: The Overthrow of the President, 1961," Journal of Latin American Studies 7:1 (1975): 109-33.
19. Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
20. Edward L. Gibson, Ernesto Calvo, and Túlia Falleti, "Reallocative Federalism in the Western Hemisphere," paper presented at the Conference on Federalism, Democracy, and Public Policy, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica (CIDE), Mexico City, 14-15 June 1999.
21. Alfred Stepan, "Brazil's Decentralized Federalism," 165. Contemporary Mexico provides additional examples of persistent subnational authoritarian enclaves. See Richard Snyder, "After the State Withdraws: Neoliberalism and Subnational Authoritarian Regimes in Mexico," in Wayne A. Cornelius, Todd A. Eisenstadt, and Jane Hindley, eds., Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico (La Jolla, Calif.: The Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1999), 295-341.
22. Alfred Stepan, "Brazil's Decentralized Federalism," 165. Contemporary Mexico provides additional examples of persistent subnational authoritarian enclaves. See Richard Snyder, "After the State Withdraws: Neoliberalism and Subnational Authoritarian Regimes in Mexico," in Wayne A. Cornelius, Todd A. Eisenstadt, and Jane Hindley, eds., Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico (La Jolla, Calif.: The Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1999), 295-341.
23. Juan E. Méndez, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, eds., The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999).
24. Alonso Lujambio and Horacio Vives, "Nota Sobre la Redistritación," unpubl. ms., September 2000. On IFE's important role in Mexico's transition to democracy, see Andreas Schedler, "Mexico's Victory: The Democratic Revelation," Journal of Democracy 11 (October 2000).
25. Alonso Lujambio and Horacio Vives, "Nota Sobre la Redistritación," unpubl. ms., September 2000. On IFE's important role in Mexico's transition to democracy, see Andreas Schedler, "Mexico's Victory: The Democratic Revelation," Journal of Democracy 11 (October 2000).
26. Jorge Domínguez and James McCann, Democratizing Mexico (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 118-19.
27. It should be noted, however, that in Venezuela, as in Germany, "extra" seats can be allocated to different states to make the party results more proportional.
28. One such instance is the automatic granting of a Senate seat to ex-presidents in some Latin American countries (Chile and Venezuela, for example).