Faking it: Hobbes's thinking-bodies and the ethics of dissimulation

Political Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 30-57

  Frost, Samantha ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0035586195     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591701029001003     Document Type: Article

References (106)

1. Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore, vol. 1 of The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1839), chap. 1, p. 2. Future references will be made in the text as DCP, followed by chapter and page numbers.
2. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (New York: Penguin, 1968), chap. 46, p. 689. Future references will be made in the text as L, followed by chapter and page numbers. For John Aubrey's account of Hobbes's ebullient engagement with interlocutors, see "The Brief Life, John Aubrey: An Abstract of Aubrey's Notes," in Thomas Hobbes: The Elements of Law Natural and Politic: Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994).
3. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (New York: Penguin, 1968), chap. 46, p. 689. Future references will be made in the text as L, followed by chapter and page numbers. For John Aubrey's account of Hobbes's ebullient engagement with interlocutors, see "The Brief Life, John Aubrey: An Abstract of Aubrey's Notes," in Thomas Hobbes: The Elements of Law Natural and Politic: Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994).
4. In De Corpore, Hobbes states, "Seeing that, for the knowledge of the properties of a commonwealth, it is necessary first to know the dispositions, affections, and manners of men, civil philosophy is ... commonly divided into two parts, whereof one, which treats of men's dispositions and manners, is called ethics; and the other, which takes cognizance of their civil duties, is called politics, or simply civil philosophy. In the first place, therefore ... I will discourse of bodies natural; in the second, of the dispositions and manners of men; and in the third, of the civil duties of subjects" (DCP, 1, 11-12). He later restates the dimensions of his project, explaining, "The principles of the politics consist in the knowledge of the motions of the mind, and the knowledge of these motions from the knowledge of sense and imagination," which in turn require knowledge of "the first part of philosophy, namely, geometry and physics" (DCP, 6, 74).
5. See, for example, Samuel Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1962). See also Alan Ryan, "A More Tolerant Hobbes?" in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. Susan Mendus (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
6. See, for example, Samuel Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1962). See also Alan Ryan, "A More Tolerant Hobbes?" in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. Susan Mendus (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
7. Leo Strauss suggests and then rejects the possibility that we might think of Hobbes as a "metaphysical materialist" in his essay "The Spirit of Hobbes's Political Philosophy," in Hobbes Studies, ed. K. C. Brown (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 7. Sheldon Wolin gives eloquent voice to the concerns held by political theorists in the face of disciplinary departmental politics in his seminal essay, "Political Theory as a Vocation," American Political Science Review 63, no. 4 (1969).
8. Leo Strauss suggests and then rejects the possibility that we might think of Hobbes as a "metaphysical materialist" in his essay "The Spirit of Hobbes's Political Philosophy," in Hobbes Studies, ed. K. C. Brown (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 7. Sheldon Wolin gives eloquent voice to the concerns held by political theorists in the face of disciplinary departmental politics in his seminal essay, "Political Theory as a Vocation," American Political Science Review 63, no. 4 (1969).
9. J.W.N. Watkins states his objection to Hobbes's materialism quite clearly when he declares that "psychological conclusions about thought, feelings, and wants cannot be deduced from materialistic premises about bodily movements." See Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," in Brown, Hobbes Studies, 251. For his part, Bernard Gert complains that Hobbes "makes deliberation sound more like a succession of emotional states than a consideration of the consequences of various courses of action." See Gert, "Hobbes's Psychology," in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorrel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 162. Elsewhere, he contends that Hobbes's claim that the subjects he describes can imagine or have thoughts is tantamount to "illegitimately" attributing beliefs to a machine. See Gert, "Hobbes, Mechanism, and Egoism," Philosophical Quarterly 5, no. 4 (1965): 347.
10. J.W.N. Watkins states his objection to Hobbes's materialism quite clearly when he declares that "psychological conclusions about thought, feelings, and wants cannot be deduced from materialistic premises about bodily movements." See Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," in Brown, Hobbes Studies, 251. For his part, Bernard Gert complains that Hobbes "makes deliberation sound more like a succession of emotional states than a consideration of the consequences of various courses of action." See Gert, "Hobbes's Psychology," in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorrel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 162. Elsewhere, he contends that Hobbes's claim that the subjects he describes can imagine or have thoughts is tantamount to "illegitimately" attributing beliefs to a machine. See Gert, "Hobbes, Mechanism, and Egoism," Philosophical Quarterly 5, no. 4 (1965): 347.
11. J.W.N. Watkins states his objection to Hobbes's materialism quite clearly when he declares that "psychological conclusions about thought, feelings, and wants cannot be deduced from materialistic premises about bodily movements." See Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," in Brown, Hobbes Studies, 251. For his part, Bernard Gert complains that Hobbes "makes deliberation sound more like a succession of emotional states than a consideration of the consequences of various courses of action." See Gert, "Hobbes's Psychology," in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorrel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 162. Elsewhere, he contends that Hobbes's claim that the subjects he describes can imagine or have thoughts is tantamount to "illegitimately" attributing beliefs to a machine. See Gert, "Hobbes, Mechanism, and Egoism," Philosophical Quarterly 5, no. 4 (1965): 347.
12. J.W.N. Watkins states his objection to Hobbes's materialism quite clearly when he declares that "psychological conclusions about thought, feelings, and wants cannot be deduced from materialistic premises about bodily movements." See Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," in Brown, Hobbes Studies, 251. For his part, Bernard Gert complains that Hobbes "makes deliberation sound more like a succession of emotional states than a consideration of the consequences of various courses of action." See Gert, "Hobbes's Psychology," in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorrel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 162. Elsewhere, he contends that Hobbes's claim that the subjects he describes can imagine or have thoughts is tantamount to "illegitimately" attributing beliefs to a machine. See Gert, "Hobbes, Mechanism, and Egoism," Philosophical Quarterly 5, no. 4 (1965): 347.
13. As Thomas Spragens puts his objection to Hobbes's materialism, "Structural features of one realm of reality cannot be derived by deducing them from the characteristic features of another realm." See Spragens, The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), 165. Richard Peters decries Hobbes's "logical mistakes" in trying to formulate a materialist account of the subject and charges him with failing "to see what later generations have called 'philosophical problems' in moving from physiology to psychology." See Peters, Hobbes, 2d ed. (New York: Penguin, 1967), 159, 94-95.
14. As Thomas Spragens puts his objection to Hobbes's materialism, "Structural features of one realm of reality cannot be derived by deducing them from the characteristic features of another realm." See Spragens, The Politics of Motion: The World of Thomas Hobbes (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), 165. Richard Peters decries Hobbes's "logical mistakes" in trying to formulate a materialist account of the subject and charges him with failing "to see what later generations have called 'philosophical problems' in moving from physiology to psychology." See Peters, Hobbes, 2d ed. (New York: Penguin, 1967), 159, 94-95.
15. Sheldon Wolin, "Hobbes and the Culture of Despotism," in Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, ed. Mary Dietz (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), 25.
16. For example, in their dismissal of what they deem his "monstrous piece of metaphysics," Richard Peters and Henri Tajfel claim that "there is something almost incredibly hard-headed and naive about Hobbes' gross materialism." See Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull: Metaphysicians of Behaviour," in Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard Peters (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972), 180. According to other attacks leveled at his materialist metaphysics, it is not that Hobbes was simply "curiously" unaware of the "logical mistakes" he committed in his materialism (Peters, Hobbes, 159). He did not merely make a mistake, nor was he simply afflicted with "self-deception" (Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Hobbes is also accused of deliberately using a "twilight kind of language" to confound and trick his readers: he relied on ambiguous terms, open to "twofold interpretation," in order to "obscure ... the jumps he was in fact making" (Peters, 78, 93; see also Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Such a theoretical sleight of hand serves to veil Hobbes's "reckless" leaps in logic and allows him duplicitously to forward his arbitrary and rationally indefensible preference for absolute monarchy (Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull," 180).
17. For example, in their dismissal of what they deem his "monstrous piece of metaphysics," Richard Peters and Henri Tajfel claim that "there is something almost incredibly hard-headed and naive about Hobbes' gross materialism." See Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull: Metaphysicians of Behaviour," in Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard Peters (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972), 180. According to other attacks leveled at his materialist metaphysics, it is not that Hobbes was simply "curiously" unaware of the "logical mistakes" he committed in his materialism (Peters, Hobbes, 159). He did not merely make a mistake, nor was he simply afflicted with "self-deception" (Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Hobbes is also accused of deliberately using a "twilight kind of language" to confound and trick his readers: he relied on ambiguous terms, open to "twofold interpretation," in order to "obscure ... the jumps he was in fact making" (Peters, 78, 93; see also Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Such a theoretical sleight of hand serves to veil Hobbes's "reckless" leaps in logic and allows him duplicitously to forward his arbitrary and rationally indefensible preference for absolute monarchy (Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull," 180).
18. For example, in their dismissal of what they deem his "monstrous piece of metaphysics," Richard Peters and Henri Tajfel claim that "there is something almost incredibly hard-headed and naive about Hobbes' gross materialism." See Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull: Metaphysicians of Behaviour," in Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard Peters (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972), 180. According to other attacks leveled at his materialist metaphysics, it is not that Hobbes was simply "curiously" unaware of the "logical mistakes" he committed in his materialism (Peters, Hobbes, 159). He did not merely make a mistake, nor was he simply afflicted with "self-deception" (Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Hobbes is also accused of deliberately using a "twilight kind of language" to confound and trick his readers: he relied on ambiguous terms, open to "twofold interpretation," in order to "obscure ... the jumps he was in fact making" (Peters, 78, 93; see also Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Such a theoretical sleight of hand serves to veil Hobbes's "reckless" leaps in logic and allows him duplicitously to forward his arbitrary and rationally indefensible preference for absolute monarchy (Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull," 180).
19. For example, in their dismissal of what they deem his "monstrous piece of metaphysics," Richard Peters and Henri Tajfel claim that "there is something almost incredibly hard-headed and naive about Hobbes' gross materialism." See Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull: Metaphysicians of Behaviour," in Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard Peters (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972), 180. According to other attacks leveled at his materialist metaphysics, it is not that Hobbes was simply "curiously" unaware of the "logical mistakes" he committed in his materialism (Peters, Hobbes, 159). He did not merely make a mistake, nor was he simply afflicted with "self-deception" (Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Hobbes is also accused of deliberately using a "twilight kind of language" to confound and trick his readers: he relied on ambiguous terms, open to "twofold interpretation," in order to "obscure ... the jumps he was in fact making" (Peters, 78, 93; see also Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Such a theoretical sleight of hand serves to veil Hobbes's "reckless" leaps in logic and allows him duplicitously to forward his arbitrary and rationally indefensible preference for absolute monarchy (Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull," 180).
20. For example, in their dismissal of what they deem his "monstrous piece of metaphysics," Richard Peters and Henri Tajfel claim that "there is something almost incredibly hard-headed and naive about Hobbes' gross materialism." See Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull: Metaphysicians of Behaviour," in Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard Peters (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972), 180. According to other attacks leveled at his materialist metaphysics, it is not that Hobbes was simply "curiously" unaware of the "logical mistakes" he committed in his materialism (Peters, Hobbes, 159). He did not merely make a mistake, nor was he simply afflicted with "self-deception" (Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Hobbes is also accused of deliberately using a "twilight kind of language" to confound and trick his readers: he relied on ambiguous terms, open to "twofold interpretation," in order to "obscure ... the jumps he was in fact making" (Peters, 78, 93; see also Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Such a theoretical sleight of hand serves to veil Hobbes's "reckless" leaps in logic and allows him duplicitously to forward his arbitrary and rationally indefensible preference for absolute monarchy (Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull," 180).
21. For example, in their dismissal of what they deem his "monstrous piece of metaphysics," Richard Peters and Henri Tajfel claim that "there is something almost incredibly hard-headed and naive about Hobbes' gross materialism." See Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull: Metaphysicians of Behaviour," in Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard Peters (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972), 180. According to other attacks leveled at his materialist metaphysics, it is not that Hobbes was simply "curiously" unaware of the "logical mistakes" he committed in his materialism (Peters, Hobbes, 159). He did not merely make a mistake, nor was he simply afflicted with "self-deception" (Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Hobbes is also accused of deliberately using a "twilight kind of language" to confound and trick his readers: he relied on ambiguous terms, open to "twofold interpretation," in order to "obscure ... the jumps he was in fact making" (Peters, 78, 93; see also Watkins, "Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes," 251). Such a theoretical sleight of hand serves to veil Hobbes's "reckless" leaps in logic and allows him duplicitously to forward his arbitrary and rationally indefensible preference for absolute monarchy (Peters and Tajfel, "Hobbes and Hull," 180).
22. Even in his fairly generous attempt to grant Hobbes his materialism, Tom Sorell protests that it "seems wrong but in a way that is hard to capture." However, despite his professed difficulty in articulating the dilemma, what is wrong yet "hard to capture" is intimated in his subsequent complaint that Hobbes's adherence to a metaphysical materialism in his philosophical reconstruction of subjectivity entails that "the idea of an agent's being the source of his actions is incompletely recovered." Indeed, in an explanation that underscores the underlying presumption of a self-sovereign, self-transparent rational actor, Sorell follows up his complaint by observing that Hobbes's subject "is more the medium than the controller of the process of deliberation, and not so much like the deliberation we are apt to conceive pre-theoretically." See Tom Sorell, Hobbes (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1986), 94-95.
23. As F. S. McNeilly has put it, "All that is postulated" in Hobbes's state of nature "is a reasoning being having a number of objectives and in a context with similar beings." See McNeilly, "Egoism in Hobbes," in Ethics, vol. 2 of Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. Preston King (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993), 165. See also Francois Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature from 1640-1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988). Recently, however, Stephen Holmes has gone so far as to suggest that rationality may not be such a definitive characteristic of Hobbes's subject after all. See Holmes, introduction to Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), also published as "Political Psychology in Hobbes's Behemoth," in Dietz, Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory. give a more extended analysis of the production of the figure of the "Hobbesian subject qua rational actor" in "Reading the Body: Hobbes, Body Politics, and the Vocation of Political Theory," in Vocations of Political Theory, ed. Jason A. Frank and John Tambornino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
24. As F. S. McNeilly has put it, "All that is postulated" in Hobbes's state of nature "is a reasoning being having a number of objectives and in a context with similar beings." See McNeilly, "Egoism in Hobbes," in Ethics, vol. 2 of Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. Preston King (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993), 165. See also Francois Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature from 1640-1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988). Recently, however, Stephen Holmes has gone so far as to suggest that rationality may not be such a definitive characteristic of Hobbes's subject after all. See Holmes, introduction to Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), also published as "Political Psychology in Hobbes's Behemoth," in Dietz, Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory. give a more extended analysis of the production of the figure of the "Hobbesian subject qua rational actor" in "Reading the Body: Hobbes, Body Politics, and the Vocation of Political Theory," in Vocations of Political Theory, ed. Jason A. Frank and John Tambornino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
25. As F. S. McNeilly has put it, "All that is postulated" in Hobbes's state of nature "is a reasoning being having a number of objectives and in a context with similar beings." See McNeilly, "Egoism in Hobbes," in Ethics, vol. 2 of Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. Preston King (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993), 165. See also Francois Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature from 1640-1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988). Recently, however, Stephen Holmes has gone so far as to suggest that rationality may not be such a definitive characteristic of Hobbes's subject after all. See Holmes, introduction to Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), also published as "Political Psychology in Hobbes's Behemoth," in Dietz, Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory. give a more extended analysis of the production of the figure of the "Hobbesian subject qua rational actor" in "Reading the Body: Hobbes, Body Politics, and the Vocation of Political Theory," in Vocations of Political Theory, ed. Jason A. Frank and John Tambornino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
26. As F. S. McNeilly has put it, "All that is postulated" in Hobbes's state of nature "is a reasoning being having a number of objectives and in a context with similar beings." See McNeilly, "Egoism in Hobbes," in Ethics, vol. 2 of Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. Preston King (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993), 165. See also Francois Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature from 1640-1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988). Recently, however, Stephen Holmes has gone so far as to suggest that rationality may not be such a definitive characteristic of Hobbes's subject after all. See Holmes, introduction to Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), also published as "Political Psychology in Hobbes's Behemoth," in Dietz, Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory. give a more extended analysis of the production of the figure of the "Hobbesian subject qua rational actor" in "Reading the Body: Hobbes, Body Politics, and the Vocation of Political Theory," in Vocations of Political Theory, ed. Jason A. Frank and John Tambornino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
27. As F. S. McNeilly has put it, "All that is postulated" in Hobbes's state of nature "is a reasoning being having a number of objectives and in a context with similar beings." See McNeilly, "Egoism in Hobbes," in Ethics, vol. 2 of Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. Preston King (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993), 165. See also Francois Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature from 1640-1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988). Recently, however, Stephen Holmes has gone so far as to suggest that rationality may not be such a definitive characteristic of Hobbes's subject after all. See Holmes, introduction to Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), also published as "Political Psychology in Hobbes's Behemoth," in Dietz, Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory. give a more extended analysis of the production of the figure of the "Hobbesian subject qua rational actor" in "Reading the Body: Hobbes, Body Politics, and the Vocation of Political Theory," in Vocations of Political Theory, ed. Jason A. Frank and John Tambornino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
28. As F. S. McNeilly has put it, "All that is postulated" in Hobbes's state of nature "is a reasoning being having a number of objectives and in a context with similar beings." See McNeilly, "Egoism in Hobbes," in Ethics, vol. 2 of Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. Preston King (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993), 165. See also Francois Tricaud, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature from 1640-1651: Evolution and Ambiguities," in Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Alan Ryan (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1988). Recently, however, Stephen Holmes has gone so far as to suggest that rationality may not be such a definitive characteristic of Hobbes's subject after all. See Holmes, introduction to Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), also published as "Political Psychology in Hobbes's Behemoth," in Dietz, Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory. give a more extended analysis of the production of the figure of the "Hobbesian subject qua rational actor" in "Reading the Body: Hobbes, Body Politics, and the Vocation of Political Theory," in Vocations of Political Theory, ed. Jason A. Frank and John Tambornino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
29. See, for example, T. F. Ackerman, "Two Concepts of Moral Goodness in Hobbes's Ethics," Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (1976), and M. A. Bertman, "Hobbes on 'Good,'" Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6 (1975), both reproduced in King, Ethics. See also John Deigh, "Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan," Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (January 1996).
30. See, for example, T. F. Ackerman, "Two Concepts of Moral Goodness in Hobbes's Ethics," Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (1976), and M. A. Bertman, "Hobbes on 'Good,'" Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6 (1975), both reproduced in King, Ethics. See also John Deigh, "Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan," Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (January 1996).
31. See, for example, T. F. Ackerman, "Two Concepts of Moral Goodness in Hobbes's Ethics," Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (1976), and M. A. Bertman, "Hobbes on 'Good,'" Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6 (1975), both reproduced in King, Ethics. See also John Deigh, "Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan," Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (January 1996).
32. See, for example, T. F. Ackerman, "Two Concepts of Moral Goodness in Hobbes's Ethics," Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (1976), and M. A. Bertman, "Hobbes on 'Good,'" Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6 (1975), both reproduced in King, Ethics. See also John Deigh, "Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan," Journal of the History of Philosophy 34 (January 1996).
33. See A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," Philosophy 13 (October 1938), reproduced in King, Ethics. See also Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1957).
34. See A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," Philosophy 13 (October 1938), reproduced in King, Ethics. See also Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1957).
35. See A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," Philosophy 13 (October 1938), reproduced in King, Ethics. See also Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, His Theory of Obligation (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1957).
36. See Thomas Nagel, "Hobbes's Conception of Obligation," Philosophical Review 68 (1959), reproduced in King, Ethics. See also Norberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, trans. Daniela Gobetti (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
37. See Thomas Nagel, "Hobbes's Conception of Obligation," Philosophical Review 68 (1959), reproduced in King, Ethics. See also Norberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, trans. Daniela Gobetti (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
38. See Thomas Nagel, "Hobbes's Conception of Obligation," Philosophical Review 68 (1959), reproduced in King, Ethics. See also Norberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, trans. Daniela Gobetti (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
39. Recent exchanges in both game theory and communicative ethics debate whether such presumptions are empirically justifiable or unjustifiable, imperialist or universally fair. See, for example, Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994) and Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). See also, Seyla Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). Nevertheless, to point out the difficulties and dangers of attributing certain kinds of values - and thus certain kinds of rationalities - to our interlocutors is not the same as to deny that it may be necessary for us to do so to engage in collective political activity.
40. Recent exchanges in both game theory and communicative ethics debate whether such presumptions are empirically justifiable or unjustifiable, imperialist or universally fair. See, for example, Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994) and Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). See also, Seyla Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). Nevertheless, to point out the difficulties and dangers of attributing certain kinds of values - and thus certain kinds of rationalities - to our interlocutors is not the same as to deny that it may be necessary for us to do so to engage in collective political activity.
41. Recent exchanges in both game theory and communicative ethics debate whether such presumptions are empirically justifiable or unjustifiable, imperialist or universally fair. See, for example, Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994) and Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). See also, Seyla Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). Nevertheless, to point out the difficulties and dangers of attributing certain kinds of values - and thus certain kinds of rationalities - to our interlocutors is not the same as to deny that it may be necessary for us to do so to engage in collective political activity.
42. Richard Tuck situates Hobbes in a history of thinkers whose skepticism entails that peace be a guiding concern in ethics and politics. See Richard Tuck, "Scepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century," in Mendus, Justifying Toleration. See also Tuck, "Optics and Sceptics: The Philosophical Foundations of Hobbes's Political Thought," in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. Edmund Leites (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Richard Flathman, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality, and Chastened Politics (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993).
43. Richard Tuck situates Hobbes in a history of thinkers whose skepticism entails that peace be a guiding concern in ethics and politics. See Richard Tuck, "Scepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century," in Mendus, Justifying Toleration. See also Tuck, "Optics and Sceptics: The Philosophical Foundations of Hobbes's Political Thought," in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. Edmund Leites (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Richard Flathman, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality, and Chastened Politics (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993).
44. Richard Tuck situates Hobbes in a history of thinkers whose skepticism entails that peace be a guiding concern in ethics and politics. See Richard Tuck, "Scepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century," in Mendus, Justifying Toleration. See also Tuck, "Optics and Sceptics: The Philosophical Foundations of Hobbes's Political Thought," in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. Edmund Leites (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Richard Flathman, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality, and Chastened Politics (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993).
45. Richard Tuck situates Hobbes in a history of thinkers whose skepticism entails that peace be a guiding concern in ethics and politics. See Richard Tuck, "Scepticism and Toleration in the Seventeenth Century," in Mendus, Justifying Toleration. See also Tuck, "Optics and Sceptics: The Philosophical Foundations of Hobbes's Political Thought," in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. Edmund Leites (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Richard Flathman, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality, and Chastened Politics (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993).
46. For Hobbes, "True and False are attributes of Speech," and truth is a matter of "the right ordering of names in our affirmations" (L, 4, 105).
47. Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1979), 265.
48. Hobbes makes similar arguments in Leviathan. In chapter 46, for example, he argues that while it is wrong for metaphysicians to promote belief in "Abstract Essences, and Substantiall Formes," it does not follow that "Spirits are nothing: for they have dimensions, and are therefore really Bodies; though that name in common Speech be given to such Bodies onely, as are visible, or palpable" (L, 46, 689).
49. Michael Oakeshott states that there is a notion that "there is something called 'the mind' ... that it causes bodily activities, and that it works best when it is unencumbered by an acquired disposition of any sort. Now, this mind I believe to be a fiction; it is nothing more than an hypostatized activity.... The whole notion of the mind as an apparatus for thinking is, I believe, an error." See Oakeshott, "Rational Conduct," in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1991), 109. For a thoughtful consideration of Hobbes's notion of the "thinking-body," see Tom Foster Digby, "Bodies and More Bodies: Hobbes's Ascriptive Individualism," Metaphilosophy 22 (October 1991).
50. Michael Oakeshott states that there is a notion that "there is something called 'the mind' ... that it causes bodily activities, and that it works best when it is unencumbered by an acquired disposition of any sort. Now, this mind I believe to be a fiction; it is nothing more than an hypostatized activity.... The whole notion of the mind as an apparatus for thinking is, I believe, an error." See Oakeshott, "Rational Conduct," in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1991), 109. For a thoughtful consideration of Hobbes's notion of the "thinking-body," see Tom Foster Digby, "Bodies and More Bodies: Hobbes's Ascriptive Individualism," Metaphilosophy 22 (October 1991).
51. Hobbes argues that "every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which is no part of it, is Nothing; and consequently no where" (L, 46, 689).
52. Oakeshott, "Rational Conduct," 124-25.
53. In many of his works, Hobbes gives a fairly elaborate account of thinking-bodies' sense perception, imagination, memory, and thinking processes. Although tempted by Tom Sorell's concern that Hobbes's metaphysical materialism may reduce us to no more than stones, I cannot explain Hobbes's account of thinking in full here. Just briefly, though, Hobbes contends that "the cause of Sense, is the External Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediately ... or mediately" (L, 1, 85). He illustrates the effect of such impressions by pointing out that "as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eyes, makes us fancy a light, and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action" upon the organs of sense (86). In a later chapter in Leviathan in which he aims to explain and dispel "daemonology," Hobbes reiterates that "the impression made on the organs of Sight, by lucide Bodies, either in one direct line, or in many lines, reflected from Opaque, or refracted in the passage through Diaphanous Bodies, produceth in living Creatures, in whom God hath placed such Organs, an Imagination of the Object, from when the Impression proceedeth; which Imagination is called Sight.... And the motion made by this pressure, continuing after the object which caused it is removed, is that we call Imagination, and Memory" (L, 45, 658). Curiously, philosophers of mind are not as perplexed as political theorists appear to be about the possibility of conceiving of mind as "material" or "matter." See, for example, Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
54. William Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), particularly pp. 25-29.
55. Hobbes explains that "when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it, he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing else but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or, which is the same thing, alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth." In other words, deliberation consists of the "alternate succession of contrary appetites." See Hobbes, "Of Liberty and Necessity," in Molesworth, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. 4, p. 273. Cited hereafter in text as LN.
56. Hobbes explains that "when a man deliberates whether he shall do a thing or not do it, he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing else but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or, which is the same thing, alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth." In other words, deliberation consists of the "alternate succession of contrary appetites." See Hobbes, "Of Liberty and Necessity," in Molesworth, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. 4, p. 273. Cited hereafter in text as LN.
57. Thomas Wilson, The Arte of Rhetorique, for the Use of All Soche as Are Studious of Eloquence (London, 1553); John Bulwer, Chirologie (London, 1644), cited in Anna Bryson, "The Rhetoric of Status: Gesture, Demeanour and the Image of the Gentleman in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England," in Renaissance Bodies: The Human Figure in English Culture c. 1540-1660, ed. Lucy Gent and Nigel Llewellyn (London: Reaktion Books, 1990), 148. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, rhetoricians, mathematicians exploring the possibility of a universal language, and scholars working on sign language for the deaf paid increasing attention to the task of reducing "the apparent diversity of gesture" to "general principles." See Dilwyn Knox, "Ideas on Gesture and Universal Languages, c. 1550-1650," in New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought: Essays in the History of Science, Education and Philosophy: In Memory of Charles B. Schmitt, ed. John Henry and Sarah Mutton (London: Duckworth, 1990), 121. See also James Knowlson, "Appendix A: Gesture as a Form of Universal Language," in Universal Language Schemes in England and France 1600-1800 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
58. Thomas Wilson, The Arte of Rhetorique, for the Use of All Soche as Are Studious of Eloquence (London, 1553); John Bulwer, Chirologie (London, 1644), cited in Anna Bryson, "The Rhetoric of Status: Gesture, Demeanour and the Image of the Gentleman in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England," in Renaissance Bodies: The Human Figure in English Culture c. 1540-1660, ed. Lucy Gent and Nigel Llewellyn (London: Reaktion Books, 1990), 148. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, rhetoricians, mathematicians exploring the possibility of a universal language, and scholars working on sign language for the deaf paid increasing attention to the task of reducing "the apparent diversity of gesture" to "general principles." See Dilwyn Knox, "Ideas on Gesture and Universal Languages, c. 1550-1650," in New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought: Essays in the History of Science, Education and Philosophy: In Memory of Charles B. Schmitt, ed. John Henry and Sarah Mutton (London: Duckworth, 1990), 121. See also James Knowlson, "Appendix A: Gesture as a Form of Universal Language," in Universal Language Schemes in England and France 1600-1800 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
59. Thomas Wilson, The Arte of Rhetorique, for the Use of All Soche as Are Studious of Eloquence (London, 1553); John Bulwer, Chirologie (London, 1644), cited in Anna Bryson, "The Rhetoric of Status: Gesture, Demeanour and the Image of the Gentleman in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England," in Renaissance Bodies: The Human Figure in English Culture c. 1540-1660, ed. Lucy Gent and Nigel Llewellyn (London: Reaktion Books, 1990), 148. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, rhetoricians, mathematicians exploring the possibility of a universal language, and scholars working on sign language for the deaf paid increasing attention to the task of reducing "the apparent diversity of gesture" to "general principles." See Dilwyn Knox, "Ideas on Gesture and Universal Languages, c. 1550-1650," in New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought: Essays in the History of Science, Education and Philosophy: In Memory of Charles B. Schmitt, ed. John Henry and Sarah Mutton (London: Duckworth, 1990), 121. See also James Knowlson, "Appendix A: Gesture as a Form of Universal Language," in Universal Language Schemes in England and France 1600-1800 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
60. Thomas Wilson, The Arte of Rhetorique, for the Use of All Soche as Are Studious of Eloquence (London, 1553); John Bulwer, Chirologie (London, 1644), cited in Anna Bryson, "The Rhetoric of Status: Gesture, Demeanour and the Image of the Gentleman in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England," in Renaissance Bodies: The Human Figure in English Culture c. 1540-1660, ed. Lucy Gent and Nigel Llewellyn (London: Reaktion Books, 1990), 148. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, rhetoricians, mathematicians exploring the possibility of a universal language, and scholars working on sign language for the deaf paid increasing attention to the task of reducing "the apparent diversity of gesture" to "general principles." See Dilwyn Knox, "Ideas on Gesture and Universal Languages, c. 1550-1650," in New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought: Essays in the History of Science, Education and Philosophy: In Memory of Charles B. Schmitt, ed. John Henry and Sarah Mutton (London: Duckworth, 1990), 121. See also James Knowlson, "Appendix A: Gesture as a Form of Universal Language," in Universal Language Schemes in England and France 1600-1800 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
61. Thomas Wilson, The Arte of Rhetorique, for the Use of All Soche as Are Studious of Eloquence (London, 1553); John Bulwer, Chirologie (London, 1644), cited in Anna Bryson, "The Rhetoric of Status: Gesture, Demeanour and the Image of the Gentleman in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England," in Renaissance Bodies: The Human Figure in English Culture c. 1540-1660, ed. Lucy Gent and Nigel Llewellyn (London: Reaktion Books, 1990), 148. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, rhetoricians, mathematicians exploring the possibility of a universal language, and scholars working on sign language for the deaf paid increasing attention to the task of reducing "the apparent diversity of gesture" to "general principles." See Dilwyn Knox, "Ideas on Gesture and Universal Languages, c. 1550-1650," in New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought: Essays in the History of Science, Education and Philosophy: In Memory of Charles B. Schmitt, ed. John Henry and Sarah Mutton (London: Duckworth, 1990), 121. See also James Knowlson, "Appendix A: Gesture as a Form of Universal Language," in Universal Language Schemes in England and France 1600-1800 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
62. Thomas Hobbes, De Homine in Thomas Hobbes: Man and Citizen, ed. Bernard Gert (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991), chap. 13, p. 63.
63. Richard Kroll argues that the rising popularity of neo-epicureanism in England in the mid-seventeenth century provided a context in which Hobbes's assertions about the legibility of the passions were hardly out of the ordinary. See Kroll, "Introduction: Atoms, Bodies, and Words," in The Material Word: Literate Culture in the Restoration and Early Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 14.
64. As Hobbes details in his rich discussions of power and honor, individuals' countenance, gestures, and manners are evidence of their perceptions and opinions of those with whom they keep company. See, in particular, Leviathan, chaps. 10 and 11.
65. Richard Flathman points out, however, that in De Homine as in a couple of other places, Hobbes does allow that when "the pains of life" are unbearable, people may commit suicide. See Flathman, Thomas Hobbes, 77.
66. He acknowledges, of course, that what he describes as natural laws are not "properly called Lawes" since a law is "the word of him, that by right have command over others" (L, 15, 216). But he suggests that if we imagine that God's word created the world, these theorems can rightly be seen as commands and thus as natural laws.
67. In an argument that is consonant with the one I develop here, Kinch Hoekstra claims that Hobbes's rebuttal to such contentions is leveled not so much at those "Silent Fooles" whose plots are secret and whose connivance is slight and discrete but rather at those "Explicit Fooles" whose actions and words serve to "incite others to contravene contracts and (therefore) laws, or at least will have the effect of eroding respect for contracts and laws." See Kinch Hoekstra, "Hobbes and the Foole," Political Theory 25 (October 1997): 623-24. Hoekstra contends that for Hobbes, "Occasional low-risk, low-publicity, silent infringements are for a commonwealth survivable, if not always innocuous; the incitement of infringement, however, is deadly to the commonwealth" (628).
68. In various of his discussions of power and honor, Hobbes explains that in the effort to secure his power, the sovereign awards titles to people whom he trusts, a designation that wins him their fealty (L, 18, 238). The granting of such titles has a broader socially cementing effect, for "to honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of approbation of his judgement" (L, 10, 154).
69. Thomas Hobbes, De Cive in Gert, Thomas Hobbes: Man and Citizen, chap. 3, p. 140. Cited hereafter in the text as DC with chapter and page numbers.
70. Thomas Hobbes, De Cive in Gert, Thomas Hobbes: Man and Citizen, chap. 3, p. 140. Cited hereafter in the text as DC with chapter and page numbers.
71. On the political uses made of slander in Hobbes's contemporary England, see M. Lindsay Kaplan, The Culture of Slander in Early Modern England (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
72. For Flathman's discussion of adverbial virtues, see his "Ruling, Rules, and Rule Following," in Reflections of a Would-Be Anarchist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 72-75 and passim.
73. In De Cive, Hobbes explains this distinction thus: "As the justice or the injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man, is one thing, that of an action or omission is another" (DC, 3, 138).
74. Hobbes declares that "in this [third] law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of Justice" (L, 15, 201).
75. Hobbes argues that "where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in the keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep them" (L, 15, 202-3).
76. See Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The Development of Manners: Changes in the Code of Conduct and Feeling in Early Modern Times, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 1978).
77. As Hobbes maintains in De Cive, "Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the same reason, that all necessary means to peace be good also; and therefore that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy ... are good manners or habits, that is virtues. The law therefore, in the means to peace, commands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore it is called moral" (DC, 3, 151).
78. See Mary Dietz, "Hobbes's Subject as Citizen," in Dietz, Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, 96, 100.
79. See Mary Dietz, "Hobbes's Subject as Citizen," in Dietz, Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory, 96, 100.
80. M. Hawke argues that "every one hath sufficient power to rein and moderate his outward demeanour, that he commit no outward or civil act repugnant to the law of nature. And in this sense is Mr Hobbes's saying true, that the law of nature is easily kept." See M. Hawke, The Right of Dominion (London, 1655), 25, cited in Quentin Skinner, "The Ideological Context of Hobbes's Political Thought," The Historical Journal 9, no. 3 (1966): 307.
81. M. Hawke argues that "every one hath sufficient power to rein and moderate his outward demeanour, that he commit no outward or civil act repugnant to the law of nature. And in this sense is Mr Hobbes's saying true, that the law of nature is easily kept." See M. Hawke, The Right of Dominion (London, 1655), 25, cited in Quentin Skinner, "The Ideological Context of Hobbes's Political Thought," The Historical Journal 9, no. 3 (1966): 307.
82. In what may be a legal codification of this aspect of his ethics, Hobbes argues that while an individual cannot be compelled "to think any otherwise then my reason perswades me," the sovereign may oblige a subject "to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I beleeve him not" (L, 32, 411). In an analysis that picks up on themes similar to those I develop here, Alan Ryan claims that Hobbes's argument for religious uniformity is "about manners in public rather than about anything deeper." See Ryan, "A More Tolerant Hobbes?" 50.
83. The fact that there is this dimension of pretense in Hobbes's ethics and that this pretense mirrors his argument for religious conformity in a commonwealth suggests to me that he is doing something other than seeking to replace an ethic of aristocratic military virtue with an ethic of aristocratic gentlemanly virtue, as Keith Thomas argues. See Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought," in Brown, Hobbes Studies. In my reading, Hobbes draws on more than the traditions of the aristocracy in formulating his ethics. For an account of Jacobean and early Stuart debates about whether the particulars of religious ceremonial conformity were adiaphoric matters, see Lori Anne Ferrell, Government by Polemic: James I, the King's Preachers, and the Rhetorics of Conformity, 1603-1625 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). For an analysis of the ferocious debates about the moral status of the Jesuitical practice of "mental reservation" or the mental addition of clauses to verbal confessions to avoid telling lies before God, see Johann P. Sommerville, "The 'New Art of Lying': Equivocation, Mental Reservation, and Casuistry," in Leites, Conscience and Casuistry.
84. The fact that there is this dimension of pretense in Hobbes's ethics and that this pretense mirrors his argument for religious conformity in a commonwealth suggests to me that he is doing something other than seeking to replace an ethic of aristocratic military virtue with an ethic of aristocratic gentlemanly virtue, as Keith Thomas argues. See Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought," in Brown, Hobbes Studies. In my reading, Hobbes draws on more than the traditions of the aristocracy in formulating his ethics. For an account of Jacobean and early Stuart debates about whether the particulars of religious ceremonial conformity were adiaphoric matters, see Lori Anne Ferrell, Government by Polemic: James I, the King's Preachers, and the Rhetorics of Conformity, 1603-1625 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). For an analysis of the ferocious debates about the moral status of the Jesuitical practice of "mental reservation" or the mental addition of clauses to verbal confessions to avoid telling lies before God, see Johann P. Sommerville, "The 'New Art of Lying': Equivocation, Mental Reservation, and Casuistry," in Leites, Conscience and Casuistry.
85. The fact that there is this dimension of pretense in Hobbes's ethics and that this pretense mirrors his argument for religious conformity in a commonwealth suggests to me that he is doing something other than seeking to replace an ethic of aristocratic military virtue with an ethic of aristocratic gentlemanly virtue, as Keith Thomas argues. See Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought," in Brown, Hobbes Studies. In my reading, Hobbes draws on more than the traditions of the aristocracy in formulating his ethics. For an account of Jacobean and early Stuart debates about whether the particulars of religious ceremonial conformity were adiaphoric matters, see Lori Anne Ferrell, Government by Polemic: James I, the King's Preachers, and the Rhetorics of Conformity, 1603-1625 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). For an analysis of the ferocious debates about the moral status of the Jesuitical practice of "mental reservation" or the mental addition of clauses to verbal confessions to avoid telling lies before God, see Johann P. Sommerville, "The 'New Art of Lying': Equivocation, Mental Reservation, and Casuistry," in Leites, Conscience and Casuistry.
86. The fact that there is this dimension of pretense in Hobbes's ethics and that this pretense mirrors his argument for religious conformity in a commonwealth suggests to me that he is doing something other than seeking to replace an ethic of aristocratic military virtue with an ethic of aristocratic gentlemanly virtue, as Keith Thomas argues. See Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought," in Brown, Hobbes Studies. In my
87. The fact that there is this dimension of pretense in Hobbes's ethics and that this pretense mirrors his argument for religious conformity in a commonwealth suggests to me that he is doing something other than seeking to replace an ethic of aristocratic military virtue with an ethic of aristocratic gentlemanly virtue, as Keith Thomas argues. See Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought," in Brown, Hobbes Studies. In my reading, Hobbes draws on more than the traditions of the aristocracy in formulating his ethics. For an account of Jacobean and early Stuart debates about whether the particulars of religious ceremonial conformity were adiaphoric matters, see Lori Anne Ferrell, Government by Polemic: James I, the King's Preachers, and the Rhetorics of Conformity, 1603-1625 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). For an analysis of the ferocious debates about the moral status of the Jesuitical practice of "mental reservation" or the mental addition of clauses to verbal confessions to avoid telling lies before God, see Johann P. Sommerville, "The 'New Art of Lying': Equivocation, Mental Reservation, and Casuistry," in Leites, Conscience and Casuistry.
88. As Michel Ter Hark explains in his reading of Wittgenstein, "The very need for feigned behaviour can only arise if I know that I am not always a mystery for others.... 'If I can never know what he feels, then he cannot pretend either.'" See Ter Hark, Beyond the Inner and the Outer: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology (Boston: Kluwer, 1990), 134. In other words, a feigned performance is only successful to the extent that the pretender is aware that his or her audience presumes the possibility of transparent or authentic self-expression.
89. Hobbes explains that "the only way to erect ... a Common Power ... is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will, which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person" (L, 17, 227).
90. As Tracy Strong explains, being a person "is simply what happens when judgments are made about the ownership of actions and words." Strong, "How to Write Scripture: Words, Authority, and Politics in Thomas Hobbes," Critical Inquiry 20 (1993): 156.
91. For Hanna Pitkin's analysis of Hobbes's theory of representation, see her chapter on Hobbes in The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), and also her "Hobbes's Concept of Representation - Part I" and "Hobbes's Concept of Representation - Part II," American Political Science Review 58 (1964), both reproduced in Politics and Law, vol. 3 of Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. Preston King (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993).
92. For Hanna Pitkin's analysis of Hobbes's theory of representation, see her chapter on Hobbes in The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), and also her "Hobbes's Concept of Representation - Part I" and "Hobbes's Concept of Representation - Part II," American Political Science Review 58 (1964), both reproduced in Politics and Law, vol. 3 of Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. Preston King (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993).
93. For Hanna Pitkin's analysis of Hobbes's theory of representation, see her chapter on Hobbes in The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), and also her "Hobbes's Concept of Representation - Part I" and "Hobbes's Concept of Representation - Part II," American Political Science Review 58 (1964), both reproduced in Politics and Law, vol. 3 of Thomas Hobbes: Critical Assessments, ed. Preston King (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993).
94. Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), chap. 1, p. 16. Hobbes makes a similar argument in Leviathan, contending that "the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions, and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the wel governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord" (L, 18, 233).
95. Likewise, in Human Nature, Hobbes argues that "the signs by which we know our own power are those actions which proceed from the same, and the signs by which other men know it, are such actions, gesture, countenance and speech, as usually such power produce. " See Hobbes, Human Nature, in Gaskin, Thomas Hobbes, chap. 8, p. 95.
96. Likewise, in Human Nature, Hobbes argues that "the signs by which we know our own power are those actions which proceed from the same, and the signs by which other men know it, are such actions, gesture, countenance and speech, as usually such power produce. " See Hobbes, Human Nature, in Gaskin, Thomas Hobbes, chap. 8, p. 95.
97. Likewise, in Human Nature, Hobbes argues that "the signs by which we know our own power are those actions which proceed from the same, and the signs by which other men know it, are such actions, gesture, countenance and speech, as usually such power produce. " See Hobbes, Human Nature, in Gaskin, Thomas Hobbes, chap. 8, p. 95.
98. For a thorough analysis of Hobbes's understanding of the political nature of knowledge, see Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
99. Melissa Orlie makes a similar argument in her analysis of the fate of the Quakers in seventeenth-century England. See Orlie, "The Politics of Conscience," in Living Ethically, Acting Politically (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). Judith Butler argues that the gender identities that are requisite for being recognized as a bona fide person are the effect of a forced coherence or continuity between biology, affect, and sexual desire and practice as per the requirements of heterosexuality. See Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1990). Similarly, Charles Mills claims that to adopt and sustain the norms of political intelligibility is to participate in practices that effect the racialization of political space and identity. See Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). For each of these authors, individuals' failure to correspond to the norms of intelligibility positions them as unintelligible nonpersons, political outsiders whose presence affirms the very norms they are supposed to contravene.
100. Melissa Orlie makes a similar argument in her analysis of the fate of the Quakers in seventeenth-century England. See Orlie, "The Politics of Conscience," in Living Ethically, Acting Politically (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). Judith Butler argues that the gender identities that are requisite for being recognized as a bona fide person are the effect of a forced coherence or continuity between biology, affect, and sexual desire and practice as per the requirements of heterosexuality. See Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1990). Similarly, Charles Mills claims that to adopt and sustain the norms of political intelligibility is to participate in practices that effect the racialization of political space and identity. See Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). For each of these authors, individuals' failure to correspond to the norms of intelligibility positions them as unintelligible nonpersons, political outsiders whose presence affirms the very norms they are supposed to contravene.
101. Melissa Orlie makes a similar argument in her analysis of the fate of the Quakers in seventeenth-century England. See Orlie, "The Politics of Conscience," in Living Ethically, Acting Politically (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). Judith Butler argues that the gender identities that are requisite for being recognized as a bona fide person are the effect of a forced coherence or continuity between biology, affect, and sexual desire and practice as per the requirements of heterosexuality. See Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1990). Similarly, Charles Mills claims that to adopt and sustain the norms of political intelligibility is to participate in practices that effect the racialization of political space and identity. See Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). For each of these authors, individuals' failure to correspond to the norms of intelligibility positions them as unintelligible nonpersons, political outsiders whose presence affirms the very norms they are supposed to contravene.
102. For example, Hobbes challenges Aristotle's claim that by nature, some people are "more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;) others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he)" (L, 15, 211). In his view, Aristotle fell prey to a "vain conceipt" of his own wisdom and formulated his theory of politics accordingly (L, 13, 183). In contrast, Hobbes declares that if we consider and compare the strength of body and quickness of mind among individuals, we find that "the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he" (183). In other words, when considering people in their "natural state," that is, outside the social, cultural, and political practices that make us who we are, the "question who is the better man, has no place" (L, 15, 211).
103. See, for example, Linda Zerilli, Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993); Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
104. See, for example, Linda Zerilli, Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993); Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
105. See, for example, Linda Zerilli, Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993); Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
106. See, for example, Linda Zerilli, Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1993); Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).