Reinforcing the myth of the crazed rapist: A feminist critique of recent rape legislation

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 127-198

  Wells, Christina E ^a   Motley, Erin Elliott ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035585618     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (367)

1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West 1995). ("[T]he purpose of this part [is] to protect. . . civil rights . . . by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender." Id. § 13981(a)). The civil rights remedy is but one of a multitude of statutory provisions included in the Violence Against Women Act. See generally id. at §§ 13931-14040. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 is codified in Titles 18 and 42 of the United States Code. The referenced portion in Title 42 contains six Parts that legislate Safe Streets for Women, Safe Homes for Women, Civil Rights for Women, Equal Justice for Women in the Courts, Violence Against Women Act Improvements, and National Stalker and Domestic Violence Reduction. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
2. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2136-37 (1994) (enacting Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415) (permitting the admission of evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases (FRE 413) and child molestation cases (FRE 414), and of similar acts in civil cases concerning sexual assault or child molestation (FRE 415)).
3. See infra notes 13, 22 for citations to the federal registration statute and the registration statutes of 47 states.
4. See infra note 34 for citations to 16 state statutes requiring indefinite civil commitment for sexual predators.
5. The laws described apply to a variety of sexual offenses, ranging from forcible rape to statutory rape to child molestation. Virtually all such laws, however, cover at least the crime of forcible rape. This article is concerned with the laws as they primarily relate to that crime. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209, infra note 73, for a definition of forcible rape.
6. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103RD CONG., 1ST SESS., THE RESPONSE TO RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL JUSTICE iii (Comm. Print 1993).
7. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1099, 1135, 1138 (1986) [hereinafter Estrich, Rape] (discussing the legal requirement that the female victim prove nonconsent by "utmost resistance" or "reasonable physical resistance," and a common cautionary jury instruction regarding possible false accusations); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1041-46 (1991) [hereinafter Torrey, Rape Myths] (discussing prompt complaint requirement, also known at common law as "immediate outcry," and the historical origins of the "false accusation" jury instruction in rape trials); Dawn M. Dubois, Note, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1087, 1087-91, 1098-99 (1988) (discussing the prompt complaint and corroboration requirements); Karla Fischer, Note, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695-96 (discussing the prompt complaint and corroboration requirements).
8. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1099, 1135, 1138 (1986) [hereinafter Estrich, Rape] (discussing the legal requirement that the female victim prove nonconsent by "utmost resistance" or "reasonable physical resistance," and a common cautionary jury instruction regarding possible false accusations); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1041-46 (1991) [hereinafter Torrey, Rape Myths] (discussing prompt complaint requirement, also known at common law as "immediate outcry," and the historical origins of the "false accusation" jury instruction in rape trials); Dawn M. Dubois, Note, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1087, 1087-91, 1098-99 (1988) (discussing the prompt complaint and corroboration requirements); Karla Fischer, Note, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695-96 (discussing the prompt complaint and corroboration requirements).
9. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1099, 1135, 1138 (1986) [hereinafter Estrich, Rape] (discussing the legal requirement that the female victim prove nonconsent by "utmost resistance" or "reasonable physical resistance," and a common cautionary jury instruction regarding possible false accusations); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1041-46 (1991) [hereinafter Torrey, Rape Myths] (discussing prompt complaint requirement, also known at common law as "immediate outcry," and the historical origins of the "false accusation" jury instruction in rape trials); Dawn M. Dubois, Note, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1087, 1087-91, 1098-99 (1988) (discussing the prompt complaint and corroboration requirements); Karla Fischer, Note, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695-96 (discussing the prompt complaint and corroboration requirements).
10. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1099, 1135, 1138 (1986) [hereinafter Estrich, Rape] (discussing the legal requirement that the female victim prove nonconsent by "utmost resistance" or "reasonable physical resistance," and a common cautionary jury instruction regarding possible false accusations); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1041-46 (1991) [hereinafter Torrey, Rape Myths] (discussing prompt complaint requirement, also known at common law as "immediate outcry," and the historical origins of the "false accusation" jury instruction in rape trials); Dawn M. Dubois, Note, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1087, 1087-91, 1098-99 (1988) (discussing the prompt complaint and corroboration requirements); Karla Fischer, Note, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695-96 (discussing the prompt complaint and corroboration requirements).
11. Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1017-37 (discussing four categories of rape myths, their acceptance by society, and the media's role in fostering these stereotypes); Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 404 (1985) (discussing the persistence of rape mythology that "insidiously infect[s] the minds of jurors, judges, and others").
12. Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1017-37 (discussing four categories of rape myths, their acceptance by society, and the media's role in fostering these stereotypes); Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 404 (1985) (discussing the persistence of rape mythology that "insidiously infect[s] the minds of jurors, judges, and others").
13. Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 677-78 (1998); see also JOYCE E. WILLIAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES 118 (1981) (discussing study finding that most people believe rapists are "crazy").
14. Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 677-78 (1998); see also JOYCE E. WILLIAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES 118 (1981) (discussing study finding that most people believe rapists are "crazy").
15. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy In Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 576-78 (1997) (reviewing social science data regarding the "normality" of rapists).
16. NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER AND CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT CENTER, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 4 (1992) [hereinafter RAPE IN AMERICA] (summarizing results of the National Women's Survey); see also infra notes 129, 143, 144.
17. DIANE E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE 82-86 (1974) (discussing rape by lovers); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1092-93 (citing feminist writers who assert "that most of what passes for 'sex' in our capitalist society is coerced").
18. DIANE E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE 82-86 (1974) (discussing rape by lovers); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1092-93 (citing feminist writers who assert "that most of what passes for 'sex' in our capitalist society is coerced").
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(a)(1) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring sexually violent offenders to register their current addresses after release from incarceration). States failing to initiate sexual offender registration programs are denied ten percent of the funds they would otherwise have received as federal grants for assistance with law enforcement. Those funds are then reallocated to other States that do comply with the law. See id. § 14071(g)(2).
20. Id. § 14071(b)(6) (ranging from ten years to life according to the offense).
21. The federal act requires states to inform an offender, upon release from incarceration, that he must provide certain information to local law enforcement personnel, including fingerprints, photographs, addresses, and future changes of residence. The act also requires the state to provide the registration information to the local law enforcement agency that has jurisdiction over the released offender's residence. See id. §§ 14071(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2), (b)(4).
22. See id. § 14071(d) (enacting criminal penalties for offenders who fail to register or do not keep their registrations current).
23. See id. § 14071(d)(3) (permitting the state to release information to the public about registered offenders).
24. See id. § 14071(e)(2) (requiring that the State "release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public").
25. See id. § 14071(a)(1)(A) (requiring registration of persons convicted of a sexually violent offense against anyone). Sexually violent offenses includes the crime of rape as defined by state law or §§ 2241 and 2242 of Title 18 of the U.S.C.A. See id. § 14071(a)(3)(B). For example, the federal registration act covers an offender who knowingly "causes another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that other person in fear . . . or [who] engages in a sexual act with another person . . . [who] is . . . incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct . . . or . . . physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2242(1)-(2) (West 2000).
26. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring registration of persons convicted of a criminal offense against a minor). While the statute is targeted toward individuals who have committed sexual offenses, an offender can be deemed to have committed a criminal offense against a child not only through sexual conduct with a child, but also through kidnapping, false imprisonment of a minor or other sexually oriented conduct towards a minor. See id. § 14071(a)(3)(A) (listing the stated crimes and excepting perpetrators no older than eighteen years).
27. See id. § 14071(a)(1)(B). A sexually violent predator is an individual "convicted of a violent sexual offense who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses." Id. § 14071(a)(3)(C). The main point of the sexually violent predator designation is to signal that the offender is subject to stricter registration and notification requirements. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14071(b)(1)(B), 14071(b)(6)(B) (West 2000) (including documentation of treatment for the psychiatric disorder and prolonging the registration requirement until the person "no longer suffers" from the psychiatric disorder that made "the person likely to engage in a predatory sexually violent offense").
28. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.835 to 11.56.840, 12.63.010 to 12.63.100, 18.65.087, 28.05.048, 33.30.035 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to 13-3824 (West 1989 & West Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to 12-12-920 (Michie 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1999 & West Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-252 to 54-260 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 775.21 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E-2 (1999); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8301 to 18-8326 (1997 & Supp. 1999); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/1 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1 to 5-2-12-5 (West Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692A.1 to 692A.16 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to 22-4910 (West 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.500 to 17.540 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:540 to 15:549 (West Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11001 to 11005, tit. 16, § 612 (West Supp.1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6 §§ 178C-178P (West Supp. 2000); MD. ANN. CODE of 1957 art. 27, § 792 (Michie 1996 & Lexis Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.721 to 28.732 (West Supp. 2000); MINN: STAT. § 243.166 (1992 & Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-1 to 45-33-21 (West Supp. 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 589.400 to 589.425 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to 46-23-512 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 179B.010 to 179B.260, 179D.010 to 179D.220 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651-B:1 to 651-B:9 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11A-1 to 29-11A-8 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2000); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168 to 168-v (Lexis Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.7 to 14-208.25 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01 to 2950.14, 2950.99 (Anderson Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, §§ 581 to 587 1991 & West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.585 to 181.606 (1999); 42 PA. C. S. A. §§ 9791-99.6 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1-1 to 11-37.1-19 (1994 & Lexis Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-31 to 22-22-40 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-101 (1997 & Supp. 1999); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.01 to 62.12 (West Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to 19.2-298.4 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.550 to 4.24.552 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000); W.VA. CODE §§ 15-12-1 to 15-12-10 (Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. §§ 301.45 to 301.46 (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to 7-19-305, 7-19-307 (Michie 1999).
29. Some states broaden the registration requirement far beyond the federal statute. Thus, in Alabama and Arizona anyone convicted of the crime of indecent exposure must register. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (requiring the registration of any adult convicted, inter alia, of indecent exposure); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821 (requiring the registration of any person convicted either of three or more violations of indecent exposure, or of two or more such violations if the victim is less than fifteen years old). In California those convicted of "lewd or dissolute conduct" are required to register. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290, 647(a) (West 1999). Kansas includes in its definition of "sexually violent offense" the highly interpretive "indecent liberties with a child." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(e)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999) (defining "sexually violent offense" to include "indecent liberties with a child" under § 21-3503, which proscribes certain specific activities "with a child who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age"). Missouri law requires registration of persons convicted of kidnapping or promoting prostitution. See Mo REV. STAT. § 589.400.1(2). Washington singles out a variety of felony offenses, such as murder, assault, and kidnapping, if such crimes were sexually motivated. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 71.09.020(6) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (defining a number of crimes, including residential burglary, as "sexually violent offense[s]" upon determination that they were sexually motivated "beyond a reasonable doubt"). While almost all state laws include a forcible rape conviction as grounds for registration, some statutes are specific to the rape of a child. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to 12-12-909 (Michie 1999). For an in-depth review of offenses meeting various state registration requirements, see Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 788, 799-802 (1996) (reviewing the range of offenses cited by statute in over two dozen states).
30. Some states require such things as social security numbers and places of employment. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-8306 (requiring a signed form summarizing all relevant information, including social security number and residential address); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542 (West Supp. 2000) (requiring the offender to notify "[a]t least one person in every residence or business within a one-mile radius in a rural area and a three square block area in an urban or suburban area" of the offender's address); MO. REV. STAT. § 589.407(1) (requiring a written statement by the offender concerning all aspects of the crime, punishment, current residence, and employment, including social security and telephone numbers); see also Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, at 802-14 (providing an overview of the registration requirements in various states).
31. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.730(2)-(3) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring that certain information be "available for public inspection," and permitting that information to be "available to the public through electronic [or] computerized . . . means"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:542(B)(1)(a), (B)(3) (permitting the sentencing court to require a notification via "signs, handbills, bumper stickers, or clothing labeled to that effect"); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 589.417(1)-(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (making available a complete list of all registered offenders, including their names, addresses, and crimes, to anyone upon request, but restricting all other registry information, including photographs, "to courts, prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies"); see also Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1175 n.41 (1999) (reviewing states with single-tier notification statutes).
32. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178E (West 1999) (promulgating rules for registration and notification that reflect the relative risk of reoffense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c) (West 1997) (describing "three levels of notification depending upon the risk of re-offense"); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-6 (McKinney Supp. 1998) (describing the criteria for determining the type of notification based upon a low, moderate, or high risk of recidivism); see also Logan, supra note 25, at 1175 n.40 (discussing three-tiered notification statutes).
33. Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 452, 461 (1998) [hereinafter Jonathan Simon, Monstrous] (describing the "Registrant Risk Assessment Scale" developed in New Jersey).
34. The New Jersey statute, for example, classifies notification obligations as follows: (1) If risk of re-offense is low, law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the person registered shall be notified; (2) If risk of re-offense is moderate, organizations in the community including schools, religious and youth organizations shall be notified; (3) If risk of re-offense is high, the public shall be notified through means . . . designed to reach members of the public likely to encounter the person registered, in addition to the notice required [elsewhere in the statute]. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(1)-(3).
35. In 1989, a seven-year-old Washington boy was found wandering in the woods after a convicted sex offender lured him there, raped him and attempted to kill him. See Hal Spencer, Victim's Mother Glad Predators Locked Up, SEATTLE TIMES, May 15, 1994, at B1. In 1990, Jacob Wetterling, an eleven-year-old Minnesota boy, disappeared after he was abducted from his home by an armed man. See 139 CONG. REC. H10,320-322 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statements of Reps. Ramstad, Sensenbrenner, and Grams). In 1993, ten-year-old Zachary Snider was raped and murdered by a local resident whom the young boy thought was romantically involved with his mother. See Susan Schramm, Tape Played in Molester's Slaving Trial, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb, 7, 1995, at E1. Finally, in 1994, Megan Kanka's neighbor lured her "into his home with the promise of seeing his new puppy." He used a belt to choke her, placed plastic bags over her head, raped her and left her body in the park where it was later discovered. See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, at 789.
36. H.R. REP. No. 392, at 4 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
37. The New Jersey Legislature justified its sex offender registration statute as follows: The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who commit other predatory acts against children, and the dangers posed by persons who prey on others as a result of mental illness, require a system of registration that will permit law enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the public safety. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000). While criticizing this justification, one commentator has noted that proponents of such laws have effectively used it to gain support for them: [I]t is simply not true that sex offenders have unusually high recidivism rates . . . Despite studies indicating low recidivism rates, the public continues to perceive . . . that the threat from sex offenders is greater than it actually is . . . . Advocates of sex offender registration laws continue to fuel this public misconception by touting high recidivism rates as the reason why registration laws are necessary. Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 897-98 (1995).
38. Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 92 (1996). State sex offender laws are thus assuming an identity shaped largely by the public's desire for punishment and retaliation. "The new penology is generally agnostic toward treatment. The goal is waste management . . . . Sex offenders are our modern-day monsters . . . ." See Jonathan Simon, Monstrous, supra note 27, at 456.
39. For example, the Washington statute, the prototype for most others, was enacted after a convicted sex offender, recently released from prison, raped and sexually mutilated a young boy. Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional Implications of the Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators - A Due Process Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 594, 611 (1997) (reviewing the 1989 case that prompted the Washington legislature to enact the Sexually Violent Predator Act).
40. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to 36-3707 (West Supp. 1999) (providing for the commitment of sexually violent persons after their release from incarceration); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600 to 6609.3 (West 1989 and Supp. 1999) (governing trial, custody, diagnosis, treatment, and indefinite commitment of sexually violent predators); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13-201 to 16-13-216 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (providing for an indeterminate term of commitment under the Colorado Sex Offender Act of 1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.1 (West Supp. 2000) (finding "that a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of the sexually violent predator is necessary"); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a15 (West 1999) (enacting the statutes for the "Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1 to 8 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000) (providing for the treatment of sexually dangerous persons); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West 1998) (defining sexual psychopaths and sexually dangerous persons who are subject to civil commitment); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480 to 632.513 (West 2000) (defining sexual predators and enumerating the associated crimes and penalties); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2922 to 29-2936 (1995) (enacting the "Convicted Sex Offender Act" which defines the associated crimes and specifies the sentencing, treatment, and possible commitment of convicted offenders); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1 to 2C:47-10 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (providing for the civil commitment of convicted sex offenders); id. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11 (requiring the registration of sexual offenders, including sexual predators); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.510 to 426.680 (1999) (defining a sexually dangerous person and the conditions for his commitment); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-301 to 33-6-306 (1984 & Supp. 1999) (defining the conditions for commitment of a sexual offender); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16-1 to 77-16-5 (Supp. 1999) (providing for commitment after conviction of a sex offender); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-300 to 19.2-311 (Michie 2000) (providing for the commitment of anyone convicted of a "criminal offense which indicates sexual abnormality"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (defining a sexually violent predator); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01 to 980.06 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999) (defining sexually violent offenses and the requirements for commitment).
41. Missouri law goes even further, allowing the attorney general to institute proceedings against an individual not in the custody of the state if that person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense in the past and a law enforcement agency notifies the attorney general that the individual has committed a "recent overt act" or "has been in the custody of an agency with jurisdiction within the preceding ten years and may meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator." MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.484.1(1)-(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
42. In Missouri, for example, "sexually violent offense" includes forcible rape, rape, first degree statutory rape, sodomy, first degree statutory sodomy, sexual abuse, sexual assault, deviate sexual assault, and certain forms of sexual child abuse. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(4) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (specifying the crimes qualifying as "sexually violent offenses"); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(6) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (listing a variety of "sexually violent offenses").
43. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to 36-3716 (West 1989 & West Supp. 1999) (providing for the commitment of sexually violent persons during and after incarceration); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(a)(1) (West 1999 & West Supp. 2000) (granting authority to the Director of Corrections to refer prisoners for evaluation regarding commitment); COLO REV. STAT. § 16-13-205 (2000) (granting authority to initiate commitment proceedings to the district attorney and to the court); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-566 (1998 & Supp 2000) (authorizing the court and the state's attorney to initiate commitment proceedings); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a04 (West 1999) (providing for the commitment of sexually violent predators); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § 12(b) (West 2000) (authorizing the District Attorney and the Attorney General to initiate commitment proceedings); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 2538.185(1) (West 1999) (authorizing the county attorney to initiate commitment proceedings); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2925 (1999) (authorizing the Department of Public Institutions to initiate commitment proceedings); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.510 to 426.680 (1999) (permitting the court to initiate commitment proceedings); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16-1 (Supp. 1999) (authorizing the court to initiate commitment proceedings); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-300 (Michie 2000) (authorizing the trial judge or the attorney for the Commonwealth to initiate commitment proceedings after incarceration); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (authorizing the prosecuting attorney to initiate commitment proceedings); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.02 (West 1999) (authorizing the initiation of commitment proceedings by the state department of justice or by the district attorney). At least one state allows a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other mental health professional to make the initial determination. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-305 (1997 & Supp. 1999) ("Not more than one (1) year nor less than six (6) months prior to the non-parole release of any person convicted of a sex crime, an examination of such person shall be made by a psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist or psychological examiner from the department of correction.").
44. Missouri and Washington have representative commitment schemes. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.483 632.486, 632.489, 632.492, 632.495 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.030, 71.09.050, 71.09.060(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000). For more in-depth discussion of commitment procedures, see Morris, supra note 33, at 611-15 (reviewing the actions taken to close "gaps" in the pre-existing system after determining that "the potential for curing sexually violent offenders was unlikely," including the hearing process and the statutory procedures for commitment of sexually violent predators).
45. "If the court or jury so determines, that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed . . . until such time as the person's mental abnormality has so changed that the person is safe to be at large." MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.495 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000). For statutes using identical or similar language, see FLA. STAT. ch. 394.917(2) (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a)(West 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (Law Co-op. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000).
46. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (finding "that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist[s]" who require long-term commitment).
47. The term "mental abnormality" is generally defined as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others." MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000). For similar definitions, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (West 1999).
48. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (defining a sexually violent predator as a "person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (defining a sexually violent predator as "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility"). Predatory acts of sexual violence are often defined as "acts directed towards strangers or individuals with whom relationships have been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization." MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(3) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000). Kansas originally used a similar definition of sexual predator but recently amended its statutes so that commitment can occur if the detained individual has a "mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 1999).
49. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (finding that certain "sex offenders' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (West 1999) (finding "that there exists an extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators who have a mental abnormality or personality disorder and who are likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence").
50. The new sexual predator laws are closely related to earlier sexual psychopath laws that were popular in the mid-twentieth century. Between 1937 and 1960, at least halt of the states enacted laws allowing involuntary civil commitment of sexual psychopaths. See Raquel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the "Sexual Psychopath" Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 897-903 (1995) (discussing the "sexual psychopath" statutes enacted by twenty-six states and the District of Columbia during this period). Such laws viewed sexual psychopaths as mentally ill and permitted commitment as an alternative to criminal punishment. See Stephen R. McAllister, "Punishing" Sex Offenders, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 27, 45 (1997) ("The original sexual psychopath statutes operated on the premise that a sex offender was either 'bad' or 'mad,' but not both."). Due to reforms in the 1970s, many states repealed such laws and replaced them with laws imposing criminal punishment on sex offenders. See Joelle Anne Moreno, "Whoever Fights Monsters Should See to It that in the Process He Does Not Become a Monster": Hunting the Sexual Predator with Silver Bullets - Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 - and a Stake Through the Heart - Kansas v. Hendricks, 49 FLA. L. REV. 505, 530-31 (1997) ("By 1990, half the states had repealed their sexual psychopath statutes and, of the remaining states, only five have actively enforced their laws."). The 1990s saw a resurgence of such statutes, although their purpose now is to use civil commitment as a way of prolonging detention rather than an alternative to criminal punishment See McAllister, supra, at 45 (discussing the newer sexual predator acts that provide for involuntary commitment after completion of the term of criminal confinement).
51. FED. R. EVID. 413(a) and 414(a). The new rules became law in 1995 and technically created an offense-specific exception to the bar on admissibility of character evidence for sexual assault. For an in-depth discussion of enactment and effect of FRE 413, see Baker, supra note 10, at 563-624 (reviewing the legislative history, intent, and potential effects of FRE 413).
52. FED. R. EVID. 415(a) ("In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that party's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as provided in FRE 413 and FRE 414 of these rules.").
53. FED. R. EVID. 413(a), 414(a). FRE 415 notes that such evidence in civil cases "may be considered as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules." FED. R. EVID. 415(a). There was early controversy regarding whether FRE 413-415 were exempt from FRE 403, which allows a court to exclude evidence determined to be more prejudicial than probative. Courts have since ruled that FRE 413-415 are subject to FRE 403 balancing test. See, e.g., United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Under both [FRE 413 and 414] the court must conduct a Rule 403 balancing test prior to admitting the evidence."); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing the House and Senate legislative histories of FRE 413 as support for applying the FRE 403 balancing test to evidence that is otherwise admissible under FRE 413); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying FRE 403 balancing test to evidence submitted under FRE 414); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding "Rule 403 analysis in connection with evidence offered under Rule 414 to be consistent with Congress's intent." Id.); Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D.N.J. 1996) ("[T]his Court determines that evidence proffered under [FRE 415] must still be shown to be relevant, probative and 'legally relevant' under FRE 403."); see also cases cited in Erik D. Ojala, Note, Propensity Evidence Under Rule 413: The Need for Balance, 77 WASH. U.L.Q. 947, 968-69 nn.105, 113 (1999).
54. United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977).
55. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
56. 1A HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 (1983).
57. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (exceptions to ban on evidence of prior acts includes evidence to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident).
58. 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
59. 140 CONG. REC. H5438 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl); see also 140 CONG. REC. S12, 263 (daily ed. Aug 22, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Why should we not let the juries know . . . that these people have a pattern and series of acts that they have done that have amounted to rape."); 140 CONG. REC. S10, 276 (daily ed. Aug 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("[W]hen someone is out there committing sex crime after sex crime . . . this [propensity] evidence should be admitted."); 140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) ("The past conduct of a person with a history of rape or child molestation provides evidence that he or she has the combination of aggressive and sexual impulses that motivates the commission of such crimes and lacks the inhibitions against acting on these impulses. A charge of rape or child molestation has a greater plausibility against such a person."); 140 CONG. REC. H2434 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (commenting "given what we know about the recidivist nature of sex offenders you might think that the criminal justice system does all that it can to keep them in prison").
60. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (discussing concern about false accusation and consent defenses at sexual assault trials); see also 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) ("If the defendant has committed similar acts in the past, the claims of the victim are more likely to be considered truthful if there is substantiation of other assaults.").
61. See 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) ("Victims who [might be reluctant to pursue charges] are often willing to bear the burden of testifying when they know that the person who marred their lives has also victimized others and that these revelations will come out at trial.").
62. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
63. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes) ("If the primary evidence in a prosecution's case in chief is evidence of prior acts - which would be possible under the changes - we would be sinking into the star chamber procedures that have long been rejected by civilized societies everywhere").
64. See 139 CONG. REC. S15072 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Biden) (noting that evidence of past acts "tends to . . . blind people to looking at the real facts before them and making an independent judgment").
65. The Judicial Conference Committee argued that the rules would "diminish significantly the protections that have safeguarded persons accused in criminal cases . . . against undue prejudice." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted in 159 F.R.D. 51, 52-53 (1995). Certain public interest groups, such as the National Organization for Women and the American Civil Liberties Union echoed these sentiments, as did many legal scholars. See 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (expressing shared concern regarding due process, evidence, and the American system of freedom); see also Michael S. Ellis, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961, 978 (1998) ("[J]udges consistently found the probative value of [character] evidence to be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect."); James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 107-08 (1994) (asserting that propensity evidence carries an inherent risk of convicting the innocent and may violate due process and the presumption of innocence); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 296 (1995) (noting that in offenses such as sexual misconduct character evidence "carr[ies] great potential for unfair prejudice and ha[s] little probative value"); Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Sigall, "Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 12 (1996) ("[A]dmission of propensity evidence prevents a fair trial and thus violates the due process clauses of the Constitution."); Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rules of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 71 (1995) ("Rule 413 continues the disturbing dilution of the legal protection that historically prevented the admission of prejudicial or otherwise disfavored evidence."); Joseph A. Aluise, Note, Evidence of Prior Sexual Misconduct in Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Proceedings: Did Congress Err in Passing Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415?, 14 J.L. & POL. 153, 193-94 (1998).
66. While FRE 413-415 were enacted during the Clinton Administration, which did not oppose the rules, the considerable push for their passage occurred during the Bush Administration. Prior to their enactment, David Karp, a senior counsel in the Bush Justice Department publicly spoke about the need for FRE 413-415. See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 19-26 (1994) (supporting the admission of evidence to aid the jury in foreclosing reasonable doubt in inconclusive cases and resolving claims between plaintiff and defendant). The House and Senate sponsors of the rules explicitly relied upon Karp's reasoning in justifying them. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) (quoting Karp's speech regarding the benefits of admitting evidence "on any matter to which it is relevant" rather than the stricter rules of 404(b)); see also Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Robert Dole, Minority Leader, reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S4927 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991) ("These new rules are responsive to deficiencies in the existing rules of evidence . . . . [It is an] entirely sound perception that evidence of this type is frequently of critical importance in establishing the guilt of a rapist or child molester, and that concealing it from the jury often carries a grave risk that such criminal will be turned loose to claim other victims.").
67. See, e.g., State v. Lachtermann, 812 S.W.2d 759, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) ("Evidence of repeated acts of sexual abuse of children demonstrates, per se, a propensity for sexual aberration and a depraved sexual instinct and should be recognized as an additional, distinct exception to the rule against the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes."); State v. Raye, 326 S.E.2d 333, 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (older sister allowed to offer corroborating evidence of incest "for the purpose of showing intent as well as the unnatural lust of the defendant"); State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 531 (R.I. 1992) (evidence of prior acts previously allowed to demonstrate motive, design, plan, and scheme now admissible to demonstrate defendant's "lewd disposition"); see also Maynard v. State, 513 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind. 1987) (testimony concerning prior sexual acts was admissible to "show a continuing plan on [defendant's] part to exploit and sexually abuse [plaintiff]"), overruled by Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1339 (Ind. 1992) (prior sexual misconduct admitted only to demonstrate proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake and not to demonstrate "bad character"); State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 131 (W.Va. 1990) (evidence admissible so long as prior acts were used to establish defendant's identity, absence of mistake or accident, and intent); State v. Tarrell, 247 N.W.2d 696, 702 (Wis. 1976) (determining that a consideration of all sexual incidents might establish a general plan and therefore a motive or intent to commit the alleged act).
68. See Taylor, 735 S.W.2d at 415 ("[T]he commission of a sex crime has an inherent significance as evidence the perpetrator has previously committed . . . [similar acts]."); see also Lannan, 600 N.E.2d at 1335-37 (noting that high rates of recidivism in child molestation cases and difficulties of proof form the basis for this exception). For an excellent description of the lustful disposition exception, see Baker, supra note 10, at 582 ("Not all courts accept [the lustful disposition] exception, but those that do rest the exception on the previously discussed misconceptions that rapists are rare and particularly recidivistic, and on a belief that the private nature of the act justifies letting in prior act evidence due to the absence of corroborating witnesses."). See also David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 559 (1994) (asserting that these exceptions "do[] not justify the admission of uncharged misconduct to show a 'depraved sexual instinct'").
69. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 13931 (West 1995) (grants for capital improvements to prevent crime in public transportation); id. § 13971 (grants to government entities to assist in rural domestic violence and child abuse enforcement assistance).
70. See id. § 13941 (training programs for parole officers and other personnel working with sex offenders); id. § 13961 (encouraging National Research Council to develop research agenda regarding increased understanding of violence against women); id. § 13963 (requiring Secretary of Health and Human Services to study the nationwide incidence and cost of injuries resulting from domestic violence).
71. The Supreme Court recently struck down VAWA as beyond Congress' regulatory powers. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2000) (neither the Commerce Clause nor the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with the authority to enact a civil remedy). Despite the Supreme Court's action, examination of that provision and its relationship to the crazed rapist myth is nevertheless useful. First, it provides an example of how otherwise laudable legislation may still reinforce stereotypes. Second, the civil rights action presents issues similar to bias-crime statutes including gender that are increasingly popular in many states. See Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 139 (1999) (noting that by 1998, 40 states and the District of Columbia carried a bias crime law on their books with 19 of those states specifically addressing gender-based bias crimes).
72. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(c) (West 1995) (victim of a crime of violence motivated by gender may recover damages and any other relief the court deems appropriate). Although the statute is gender-neutral, this Article refers to victims of gender-bias as "she," reflecting that Congress was primarily concerned with violence against women.
73. See id. § 13981(c) (providing a cause of action against any person "who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right [to be free from crimes of violence]"). The civil rights remedy provides that a "crime of violence" is "an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another" and comes within the meaning of state and federal offenses described in section 16 of Title 18. Id. § 13981(d)(2)(A). Section 16 of Title 18 states that a "crime of violence" includes "an offense that is a felony and that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C.A. § 16(b)(West 1995).
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(d)(1) (West 1995).
75. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 37 (1991).
76. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
77. See id. at 48 (past legislature has not filled the "gender gap" left by traditional anti-bias crime law). Congress noted that: Whether the attack is motivated by racial bias, ethnic bias, or gender bias, the results are often the same. The victims of such violence are reduced to symbols of hatred; they are chosen not because of who they are as individuals but because of their class status. The violence not only wounds physically, it degrades and terrorizes, instilling fear and inhibiting the lives of all those similarly situated. Id. at 49.
78. Id. at 49.
79. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209 (1803). Although states have built upon and altered current definitions of rape, it is still conceived to be remarkably similar to Blackstone's definition - forcible and non-consensual sex. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.030 (West 1999) ("A person commits the crime of forcible rape if such person has sexual intercourse with another person by the use of forcible compulsion."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 39 (1992) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy] (noting that most laws "[i]n one form or another. . . preserve[] as essential requirements both force and non-consent").
80. In fact, the punishment of rape goes back to ancient and Roman law. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1781-82 (1992) (noting that the rape of a virgin was a serious crime that ancient code, roman law, and early English law punished severely).
81. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *210 (noting that rapists were punished by death under early Saxon, old Gothic and Scandinavian law).
82. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (noting that as of 1971, 16 states and the federal government authorized capital punishment for forcible rape).
83. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 584 (striking down Georgia law authorizing death penalty for rape of an adult woman as "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment and . . . therefore forbidden by the 8th Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment"). Relying on a narrow reading of Coker, Louisiana recently enacted a law authorizing the death penalty for rape of a child under 12 years of age. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.42(A)(4), (D)(2) (West Supp. 1999). The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1063 (La. 1996) (upholding death sentence for a man convicted of raping three girls under ten on grounds that the punishment is not out of proportion with the severity of the crime). Other states are also considering such legislation. See Meryl P. Diamond, Assessing the Constitutionality of Capital Child Rape Statutes, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1159, 1160 n.6 (1999) (discussing pending legislation in Georgia and Pennsylvania).
84. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.030 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (potential sentence of life imprisonment for forcible rape); see also Kim Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095, 1095 (1987) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987)) ("Convictions for rape often have brought the most severe sentences the law can impose.").
85. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: THE SEVERITY OF CRIME 2 (1984) (survey of 60,000 people revealed that the they put rape and child abuse second only to murder in terms of their seriousness); see
86. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: THE SEVERITY OF CRIME 2 (1984) (survey of 60,000 people revealed that the they put rape and child abuse second only to murder in terms of their seriousness); see also GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 62 (1989) ("[P]eople regard rape as a heinous offense worthy of the most serious punishment."). See Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 41 (1993) ("[S]uccessful prosecution of cases not meeting the stereotype of real rape, while no longer impossible, remains improbable."); Scheppele, supra note 78, at 1098 ("One study . . . indicated that men who raped had about a 13% chance of being convicted, assuming the victim reported the crime to the police. Another study revealed the chances were closer to 2%."); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws, Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919, 927 (1973) (commenting on the relatively few apprehended rapists charged and convicted, and noting that in California there is a higher acquittal rate for rape than for any other felony).
87. See Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 41 (1993) ("[S]uccessful prosecution of cases not meeting the stereotype of real rape, while no longer impossible, remains improbable."); Scheppele, supra note 78, at 1098 ("One study . . . indicated that men who raped had about a 13% chance of being convicted, assuming the victim reported the crime to the police. Another study revealed the chances were closer to 2%."); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws, Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919, 927 (1973) (commenting on the relatively few apprehended rapists charged and convicted, and noting that in California there is a higher acquittal rate for rape than for any other felony).
88. See generally Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1105-25 (discussing that this requirement defines rape in terms of a woman's resistance rather than male force used to overcome female nonconsent). "Utmost resistance" amounts to physical struggle, short of putting oneself at significant risk of death, necessary to prevent the rape from occurring - i.e., the kind of struggle that leaves visible marks as proof of the victim's defense of virtue. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906) ("Not only must there be entire absence of mental consent or assent, but there must be the most vehement exercise of every physical means of faculty within the woman's power to resist the penetration of her person, and this must be shown to persist until the offense is consummated."). Courts viewed the victim's failure to resist as evidence of her consent to sex. See Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1105-25 (noting that failure to resist may result in a determination that the woman victim, rather than the man, was the party acting unreasonably).
89. See Fischer, supra note 7, at 696 ("Rape prosecutions have also included evidentiary requirements not imposed in other criminal trials."); see also Dubois, supra note 7, at 1098 ("In New York, a woman's charge of rape was subject to the strictest corroboration requirements in the country . . . [a] woman's complaint of rape standing alone was 'incredible as a matter of law.'"). 83 Many courts, for example, adhered to the "prompt complaint" and "corroboration" requirements. See Dubois, supra note 7, at 1088 ("The prompt complaint doctrine is a specific exception to the rule against prior consistent statements founded upon a distrust of rape complainants and a fear of false accusations."); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1139 (the MPC adopted the "prompt complaint" requirement and required some corroborating proof due to fear of blackmail); Fischer, supra note 7, at 696 ("Until recently, the state could only prove rape where some piece of independent evidence corroborated the victim's story."). The prompt complaint requirement stems as far back as Blackstone who noted that "in order to prevent malicious accusations, [Anglo law] . . . required that the woman should immediately after . . . go to the next town, and there make discovery to some credible persons of the she injury she has suffered." BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *211. In rape trials, evidence of failure to complain promptly was presented to the jury and created a strong presumption against the victim's credibility. See, e.g., Baccio v. People, 41 N.Y. 265, 268 (1869) (noting that it is natural for a woman to immediately complain of crime to a close friend/relative and failure to do so "would be strong evidence that her affirmation on the subject . . . was false"). The corroboration requirement similarly stemmed from the notion that women lie about sex, as reflected in Lord Hale's statement that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho[ugh] never so innocent." 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (1778); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 428 (1980) ("In no other context is felony liability premised on conduct that under other circumstances may be welcomed by the 'victim.'").
90. See Fischer, supra note 7, at 696 ("Rape prosecutions have also included evidentiary requirements not imposed in other criminal trials."); see also Dubois, supra note 7, at 1098 ("In New York, a woman's charge of rape was subject to the strictest corroboration requirements in the country . . . [a] woman's complaint of rape standing alone was 'incredible as a matter of law.'"). 83 Many courts, for example, adhered to the "prompt complaint" and "corroboration" requirements. See Dubois, supra note 7, at 1088 ("The prompt complaint doctrine is a specific exception to the rule against prior consistent statements founded upon a distrust of rape complainants and a fear of false accusations."); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1139 (the MPC adopted the "prompt complaint" requirement and required some corroborating proof due to fear of blackmail); Fischer, supra note 7, at 696 ("Until recently, the state could only prove rape where some piece of independent evidence corroborated the victim's story."). The prompt complaint requirement stems as far back as Blackstone who noted that "in order to prevent malicious accusations, [Anglo law] . . . required that the woman should immediately after . . . go to the next town, and there make discovery to some credible persons of the she injury she has suffered." BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *211. In rape trials, evidence of failure to complain promptly was presented to the jury and created a strong presumption against the victim's credibility. See, e.g., Baccio v. People, 41 N.Y. 265, 268 (1869) (noting that it is natural for a woman to immediately complain of crime to a close friend/relative and failure to do so "would be strong evidence that her affirmation on the subject . . . was false"). The corroboration requirement similarly stemmed from the notion that women lie about sex, as reflected in Lord Hale's statement that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho[ugh] never so innocent." 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (1778); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 428 (1980) ("In no other context is felony liability premised on conduct that under other circumstances may be welcomed by the 'victim.'").
91. See Fischer, supra note 7, at 696 ("Rape prosecutions have also included evidentiary requirements not imposed in other criminal trials."); see also Dubois, supra note 7, at 1098 ("In New York, a woman's charge of rape was subject to the strictest corroboration requirements in the country . . . [a] woman's complaint of rape standing alone was 'incredible as a matter of law.'"). 83 Many courts, for example, adhered to the "prompt complaint" and "corroboration" requirements. See Dubois, supra note 7, at 1088 ("The prompt complaint doctrine is a specific exception to the rule against prior consistent statements founded upon a distrust of rape complainants and a fear of false accusations."); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1139 (the MPC adopted the "prompt complaint" requirement and required some corroborating proof due to fear of blackmail); Fischer, supra note 7, at 696 ("Until recently, the state could only prove rape where some piece of independent evidence corroborated the victim's story."). The prompt complaint requirement stems as far back as Blackstone who noted that "in order to prevent malicious accusations, [Anglo law] . . . required that the woman should immediately after . . . go to the next town, and there make discovery to some credible persons of the she injury she has suffered." BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *211. In rape trials, evidence of failure to complain promptly was presented to the jury and created a strong presumption against the victim's credibility. See, e.g., Baccio v. People, 41 N.Y. 265, 268 (1869) (noting that it is natural for a woman to immediately complain of crime to a close friend/relative and failure to do so "would be strong evidence that her affirmation on the subject . . . was false"). The corroboration requirement similarly stemmed from the notion that women lie about sex, as reflected in Lord Hale's statement that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho[ugh] never so innocent." 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (1778); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 428 (1980) ("In no other context is felony liability premised on conduct that under other circumstances may be welcomed by the 'victim.'").
92. See Fischer, supra note 7, at 696 ("Rape prosecutions have also included evidentiary requirements not imposed in other criminal trials."); see also Dubois, supra note 7, at 1098 ("In New York, a woman's charge of rape was subject to the strictest corroboration requirements in the country . . . [a] woman's complaint of rape standing alone was 'incredible as a matter of law.'"). 83 Many courts, for example, adhered to the "prompt complaint" and "corroboration" requirements. See Dubois, supra note 7, at 1088 ("The prompt complaint doctrine is a specific exception to the rule against prior consistent statements founded upon a distrust of rape complainants and a fear of false accusations."); Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1139 (the MPC adopted the "prompt complaint" requirement and required some corroborating proof due to fear of blackmail); Fischer, supra note 7, at 696 ("Until recently, the state could only prove rape where some piece of independent evidence corroborated the victim's story."). The prompt complaint requirement stems as far back as Blackstone who noted that "in order to prevent malicious accusations, [Anglo law] . . . required that the woman should immediately after . . . go to the next town, and there make discovery to some credible persons of the she injury she has suffered." BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *211. In rape trials, evidence of failure to complain promptly was presented to the jury and created a strong presumption against the victim's credibility. See, e.g., Baccio v. People, 41 N.Y. 265, 268 (1869) (noting that it is natural for a woman to immediately complain of crime to a close friend/relative and failure to do so "would be strong evidence that her affirmation on the subject . . . was false"). The corroboration requirement similarly stemmed from the notion that women lie about sex, as reflected in Lord Hale's statement that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho[ugh] never so innocent." 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (1778); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 428 (1980) ("In no other context is felony liability premised on conduct that under other circumstances may be welcomed by the 'victim.'").
93. See Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1046 (commenting on MPC advice that "the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private"). A typical instruction based upon Lord Hale's concerns, see supra note 83, the mandate that "[t]he law requires that you examine the testimony of the female person named in the information with caution." Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1045.
94. See ZSUZSANNA ADLER, RAPE ON TRIAL 17 (1987) (maintaining that it has become "increasingly clear that rape victims were systematically subjected to institutionalized sexism, which began with their treatment by police, continued through the legal system . . . and ended with the acquittal of many de facto rapists"); Shirley Feldman-Summers & Karen Lindner, Perceptions of Victims and Defendants in Criminal Assault Cases, 3 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 135, 135-36 (1976) (noting that a "major factor" in the failure of rape prosecutions "is related to the judgmental policies of the police, the prosecuting attorneys, and the juries"); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1047 (discussing the reflection of rape myths in juror and judicial misconceptions about rape).
95. Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1025; see Mary I. Combs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 282 (1993) ("The assumption inherent in some myths is that the woman is consciously lying to hide her sexual complicity or to harm the man."). The drafters of the Model Penal Code, for example, argued that the prompt complaint doctrine was necessary to protect against the possibility that "unwanted pregnancy or bitterness at a relationship gone sour might convert a willing participant in sexual relations to a vindictive complainant." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 421 (1980). Others similarly used women's vindictiveness to support the corroboration requirement. See MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 187-90 (1951) (false rape charges might be brought for blackmail, pure fantasy, revenge, spitefulness, or psychopathic reasons); Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1967) (women accuse men falsely because of mental illness, delusions, shame, bitterness, pregnancy, hatred, or preference for a false explanation to a true one).
96. See Martha R. Burt, Rape Myths and Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 31 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991) [hereinafter ACQUAINTANCE RAPE] (commenting the continuing belief that some women like to be "treated violently and that force is sexually stimulating to women"); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1026 (despite the past prevalence of the theory that women fantasized about rape, the theory has been widely discredited). In Rusk v. State, for example, several justices of the Maryland Supreme Court argued that the victim, who verbally resisted but did not physically resist, was not a rape victim because her verbal requests to desist did "not transform a seducer into a rapist." Rusk v. State, 424 A.2d 730, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting).
97. See Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1025 ("A study of rape done in the District of Columbia found that in 82% of the rapes studied, the rape victims had a 'good reputation.'"). The prompt complaint doctrine reflects this myth in operation. Courts reasoned that a "good" girl reports the damage to her person promptly because she has nothing to hide. In contrast, failure to report promptly reflects either a victim's nefarious motive or her "badness." See Dubois, supra note 7, at 1094 ("Evidence of a prompt complaint is necessary because the courts decided that rape is an attack that no 'honest' woman could keep to herself.").
98. See JOYCE E. WILLIAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES 118(1981) (recounting study results in which "most respondents . . . saw women's behavior and/or appearance as the second most frequent cause of rape"). The behavior sufficient to doom a woman's rape claim is quite varied, see STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 28 (1998) (jury acquitted on grounds of questionable occupations, past consensual sex, and unconventional family values), including such things as her manner of dress, see Jury: Woman in Rape Case "Asked for It," CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1989 (jury acquitted a rape suspect on grounds that the woman wore a lace mini-skirt without underwear), her past employment, see Susan Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, RAMPARTS 56 (1971) (upon cross-examination woman "admitted" to working as a cocktail waitress on occasion), her appearance unescorted in a bar, especially if she voluntarily consumed alcohol, see Karen Kramer, Note, Rule By Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115, 121 (1994) (women who drink are perceived as more sexually available by both men and women), and her past sexual activity, whether during the encounter at issue or a different one. See Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) (defense attorneys were permitted to "delve into issues like the victim's use of birth control, her attendance (unescorted) at bars, the existence of any illegitimate children, and the number of her prior sexual experiences").
99. See Laurie Bechhofer and Andrea Parrot, What is Acquaintance Rape?, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 87, at 9-12 (the fact that an acquaintance rape victim knows her assailant seems to make her appear partially to blame for the incident); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 829-32 (1991) [hereinafter Estrich. Sex at Work] (contending that the court holds women responsible for their "own torment" by basing the determination of harassment of women on their behavior); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1058 ("The female victim must prove her innocence, while the male defendant is treated as if he has been defamed.")
100. See Laurie Bechhofer and Andrea Parrot, What is Acquaintance Rape?, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 87, at 9-12 (the fact that an acquaintance rape victim knows her assailant seems to make her appear partially to blame for the incident); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 829-32 (1991) [hereinafter Estrich. Sex at Work] (contending that the court holds women responsible for their "own torment" by basing the determination of harassment of women on their behavior); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1058 ("The female victim must prove her innocence, while the male defendant is treated as if he has been defamed.")
101. See Laurie Bechhofer and Andrea Parrot, What is Acquaintance Rape?, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 87, at 9-12 (the fact that an acquaintance rape victim knows her assailant seems to make her appear partially to blame for the incident); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 829-32 (1991) [hereinafter Estrich. Sex at Work] (contending that the court holds women responsible for their "own torment" by basing the determination of harassment of women on their behavior); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1058 ("The female victim must prove her innocence, while the male defendant is treated as if he has been defamed.")
102. see also SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 29-30 (1975) (tracing the modern concept of rape as a personal injury and corresponding suspicions of female motivations dating back to the 13th Century).
103. See Lynne Henderson, Rape & Responsibility, 11 L. & PHIL. 127, 128 (1992) (noting that the meaning of "nonconsensual" and "forcible" are bitterly contested in all but the most stereotypical case of rape); see also Beverly J. Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make a Difference?: A Look at the Law of Rape, 100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 821-22 (1996) (in cases lacking physical evidence of rape the focus often turns to the woman's state of mind to the exclusion of the man's).
104. See Lynne Henderson, Rape & Responsibility, 11 L. & PHIL. 127, 128 (1992) (noting that the meaning of "nonconsensual" and "forcible" are bitterly contested in all but the most stereotypical case of rape); see also Beverly J. Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make a Difference?: A Look at the Law of Rape, 100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 821-22 (1996) (in cases lacking physical evidence of rape the focus often turns to the woman's state of mind to the exclusion of the man's).
105. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1204 (1997).
106. Henderson, supra note 91, at 130-31; see also CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 1 81-83 (1989) (condemning focus on the male rapist's lack of perception in realizing that the woman did not want him, rather than what the female victim felt); Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 90, at 815 ("[Rape] is the only crime whose victims are almost exclusively female. And it is the only crime which is defined more by the actions, reactions, motives, and inadequacies of the victim than by those of the defendant."); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1014 ("The legal treatment of rape seems to be structured to make it as difficult as possible to establish that any given man has raped any given woman."). This story of male innocence/female guilt is so prevalent that many acquaintance rape victims either do not realize they were raped, see generally ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 11-26 (1988) (discussing how acquaintance rape victims are perceived as responsible, or more responsible, than their assailant based on the cultural perception that "bad things" do not happen to "good girls"), or refuse to report the rape and subject themselves to often scalding attacks on their character at trial. See sources cited in Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1224 nn.187, 188 (listing scholars attributing victim reluctance to report the rape to the legal system's treatment of acquaintance rape victims). 94 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198-99 (discussing goals behind rape law reforms).
107. Henderson, supra note 91, at 130-31; see also CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 1 81-83 (1989) (condemning focus on the male rapist's lack of perception in realizing that the woman did not want him, rather than what the female victim felt); Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 90, at 815 ("[Rape] is the only crime whose victims are almost exclusively female. And it is the only crime which is defined more by the actions, reactions, motives, and inadequacies of the victim than by those of the defendant."); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1014 ("The legal treatment of rape seems to be structured to make it as difficult as possible to establish that any given man has raped any given woman."). This story of male innocence/female guilt is so prevalent that many acquaintance rape victims either do not realize they were raped, see generally ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 11-26 (1988) (discussing how acquaintance rape victims are perceived as responsible, or more responsible, than their assailant based on the cultural perception that "bad things" do not happen to "good girls"), or refuse to report the rape and subject themselves to often scalding attacks on their character at trial. See sources cited in Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1224 nn.187, 188 (listing scholars attributing victim reluctance to report the rape to the legal system's treatment of acquaintance rape victims). 94 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198-99 (discussing goals behind rape law reforms).
108. Henderson, supra note 91, at 130-31; see also CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 1 81-83 (1989) (condemning focus on the male rapist's lack of perception in realizing that the woman did not want him, rather than what the female victim felt); Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 90, at 815 ("[Rape] is the only crime whose victims are almost exclusively female. And it is the only crime which is defined more by the actions, reactions, motives, and inadequacies of the victim than by those of the defendant."); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1014 ("The legal treatment of rape seems to be structured to make it as difficult as possible to establish that any given man has raped any given woman."). This story of male innocence/female guilt is so prevalent that many acquaintance rape victims either do not realize they were raped, see generally ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 11-26 (1988) (discussing how acquaintance rape victims are perceived as responsible, or more responsible, than their assailant based on the cultural perception that "bad things" do not happen to "good girls"), or refuse to report the rape and subject themselves to often scalding attacks on their character at trial. See sources cited in Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1224 nn.187, 188 (listing scholars attributing victim reluctance to report the rape to the legal system's treatment of acquaintance rape victims). 94 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198-99 (discussing goals behind rape law reforms).
109. Henderson, supra note 91, at 130-31; see also CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 1 81-83 (1989) (condemning focus on the male rapist's lack of perception in realizing that the woman did not want him, rather than what the female victim felt); Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 90, at 815 ("[Rape] is the only crime whose victims are almost exclusively female. And it is the only crime which is defined more by the actions, reactions, motives, and inadequacies of the victim than by those of the defendant."); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1014 ("The legal treatment of rape seems to be structured to make it as difficult as possible to establish that any given man has raped any given woman."). This story of male innocence/female guilt is so prevalent that many acquaintance rape victims either do not realize they were raped, see generally ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 11-26 (1988) (discussing how acquaintance rape victims are perceived as responsible, or more responsible, than their assailant based on the cultural perception that "bad things" do not happen to "good girls"), or refuse to report the rape and subject themselves to often scalding attacks on their character at trial. See sources cited in Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1224 nn.187, 188 (listing scholars attributing victim reluctance to report the rape to the legal system's treatment of acquaintance rape victims). 94 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198-99 (discussing goals behind rape law reforms).
110. Henderson, supra note 91, at 130-31; see also CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 1 81-83 (1989) (condemning focus on the male rapist's lack of perception in realizing that the woman did not want him, rather than what the female victim felt); Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 90, at 815 ("[Rape] is the only crime whose victims are almost exclusively female. And it is the only crime which is defined more by the actions, reactions, motives, and inadequacies of the victim than by those of the defendant."); Torrey, Rape Myths, supra note 7, at 1014 ("The legal treatment of rape seems to be structured to make it as difficult as possible to establish that any given man has raped any given woman."). This story of male innocence/female guilt is so prevalent that many acquaintance rape victims either do not realize they were raped, see generally ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 11-26 (1988) (discussing how acquaintance rape victims are perceived as responsible, or more responsible, than their assailant based on the cultural perception that "bad things" do not happen to "good girls"), or refuse to report the rape and subject themselves to often scalding attacks on their character at trial. See sources cited in Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1224 nn.187, 188 (listing scholars attributing victim reluctance to report the rape to the legal system's treatment of acquaintance rape victims). 94 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198-99 (discussing goals behind rape law reforms).
111. See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 37; Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1137 n.155; Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198-99.
112. See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 37; Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1137 n.155; Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198-99.
113. See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 37; Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1137 n.155; Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198-99.
114. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198.
115. The common law definition of rape specifically excluded the possibility that a wife could claim rape by her husband. See Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 352-53 (1995). Many states have repealed the exemption entirely although several retain a partial exemption in some circumstances. See id.
116. See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 36-38: Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1123-24 (noting the elimination of the "utmost resistance" requirement). To some extent, the elimination of the utmost resistance requirement began before the feminist movement. During the 1950s, the drafters of the Model Penal Code advocated abolition of the standard. See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 36-38.
117. See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 36-38: Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1123-24 (noting the elimination of the "utmost resistance" requirement). To some extent, the elimination of the utmost resistance requirement began before the feminist movement. During the 1950s, the drafters of the Model Penal Code advocated abolition of the standard. See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 36-38.
118. See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 36-38: Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1123-24 (noting the elimination of the "utmost resistance" requirement). To some extent, the elimination of the utmost resistance requirement began before the feminist movement. During the 1950s, the drafters of the Model Penal Code advocated abolition of the standard. See Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73, at 36-38.
119. See KATHERINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER & LAW 832 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing rape shield laws enacted in response to feminist critique). Every state currently has a statutory or common law rape shield doctrine. See id. (noting that by 1997 only Utah and Arizona, states which had common law rape shield doctrines, had not passed rape shield laws). The Federal Rules of Evidence also contain a rape shield provision. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
120. See Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger, The Current Status of Rape Reform Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 25, 25-26 (1987) (noting the feminist redefinition of rape as "sexual assault").
121. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198; see also Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship On Rape: A Maturing Look At One Form of Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 38-39 (1995) [hereinafter Torrey, Feminist Scholarship] (discussing the liberal feminists' characterization of rape as "violence" as opposed to "sex").
122. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1198; see also Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship On Rape: A Maturing Look At One Form of Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 38-39 (1995) [hereinafter Torrey, Feminist Scholarship] (discussing the liberal feminists' characterization of rape as "violence" as opposed to "sex").
123. See, e.g., Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1263 (citing to noted New York City prosecutor Linda Fairstein's assessment that juries currently are more sympathetic to the notion of acquaintance rape than in the past).
124. See generally CASIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 157-75 (1992) (containing a survey of rape law reform demonstrating the limited improvement of the legal system's response to rape); Ronald J. Berger, et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 329, at 334-36 (1988) (pointing out the limitations of rape reform laws); Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1283-94 (asserting that rape law reforms have had a low impact on conviction rates and rates of reported rape); Kenneth Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Processing, 31 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 191 (1985) (asserting that rape reform laws have had a limited effect).
125. See generally CASIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 157-75 (1992) (containing a survey of rape law reform demonstrating the limited improvement of the legal system's response to rape); Ronald J. Berger, et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 329, at 334-36 (1988) (pointing out the limitations of rape reform laws); Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1283-94 (asserting that rape law reforms have had a low impact on conviction rates and rates of reported rape); Kenneth Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Processing, 31 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 191 (1985) (asserting that rape reform laws have had a limited effect).
126. See generally CASIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 157-75 (1992) (containing a survey of rape law reform demonstrating the limited improvement of the legal system's response to rape); Ronald J. Berger, et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 329, at 334-36 (1988) (pointing out the limitations of rape reform laws); Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1283-94 (asserting that rape law reforms have had a low impact on conviction rates and rates of reported rape); Kenneth Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Processing, 31 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 191 (1985) (asserting that rape reform laws have had a limited effect).
127. See generally CASIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 157-75 (1992) (containing a survey of rape law reform demonstrating the limited improvement of the legal system's response to rape); Ronald J. Berger, et al., The Dimensions of Rape Reform Legislation, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 329, at 334-36 (1988) (pointing out the limitations of rape reform laws); Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1283-94 (asserting that rape law reforms have had a low impact on conviction rates and rates of reported rape); Kenneth Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Processing, 31 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 191 (1985) (asserting that rape reform laws have had a limited effect).
128. See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 103, at 160 (noting that rape reforms "did not produce an increase in the likelihood of conviction, and they produced an increase in reports and the likelihood of indictment in only one of the six [studied] jurisdictions").
129. Anne M. Coughlin, Sex & Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1998); see also Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73 (discussing continuing problems with the traditional view of consent as well as efforts to expand the conception of force).
130. Anne M. Coughlin, Sex & Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1998); see also Schulhofer, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 73 (discussing continuing problems with the traditional view of consent as well as efforts to expand the conception of force).
131. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 103, at 159.
132. Id. at 164-71 (criticizing rape shield laws as failing to exclude evidence of the victim's sexual history, particularly the history of sexual relations between the victim and the defendant).
133. See Torrey, Feminist Scholarship, supra note 101, at 38 (noting that liberal feminism's emphasis on issues of "privacy, autonomy, and individual choice shaped emerging rape reform").
134. See Kristin Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Symbol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 76 (1987).
135. Id. at 77 (footnote omitted).
136. See Jo Dixon, Feminist Reforms and Sexual Coercion Laws, in SEXUAL COERCION: A SOURCEBOOK ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 161, 170 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary Koralewski eds., 1991) (criticizing liberal feminist characterization of rape as "violence" rather than "sex" as making more difficult the prosecution of acquaintance rape, which often lacks physical violence); Dorothy Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 362 (1993) ("If rape is violence as the law defines it (weapons, bruises, blood) then what most men do when they disregard women's sexual autonomy is not rape."); Henderson, supra note 91, at 157 ("In calling rape 'violence,' feminists have enabled many men to distinguish what they have done from what the rapists do, because they haven't caused external physical damage that they can understand as violence.").
137. See Jo Dixon, Feminist Reforms and Sexual Coercion Laws, in SEXUAL COERCION: A SOURCEBOOK ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 161, 170 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary Koralewski eds., 1991) (criticizing liberal feminist characterization of rape as "violence" rather than "sex" as making more difficult the prosecution of acquaintance rape, which often lacks physical violence); Dorothy Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 362 (1993) ("If rape is violence as the law defines it (weapons, bruises, blood) then what most men do when they disregard women's sexual autonomy is not rape."); Henderson, supra note 91, at 157 ("In calling rape 'violence,' feminists have enabled many men to distinguish what they have done from what the rapists do, because they haven't caused external physical damage that they can understand as violence.").
138. See Jo Dixon, Feminist Reforms and Sexual Coercion Laws, in SEXUAL COERCION: A SOURCEBOOK ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 161, 170 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary Koralewski eds., 1991) (criticizing liberal feminist characterization of rape as "violence" rather than "sex" as making more difficult the prosecution of acquaintance rape, which often lacks physical violence); Dorothy Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 362 (1993) ("If rape is violence as the law defines it (weapons, bruises, blood) then what most men do when they disregard women's sexual autonomy is not rape."); Henderson, supra note 91, at 157 ("In calling rape 'violence,' feminists have enabled many men to distinguish what they have done from what the rapists do, because they haven't caused external physical damage that they can understand as violence.").
139. See MACKINNON, supra note 93, at 171-83 (discussing, inter alia, the relationship between sex and violence and the roots of the subject's jurisprudence in social, political, and economic male dominance); see also BROWNMILLER, supra note 90, at 16-30 (describing the history of the law of rape as rooted in male predations of women); Roberts, supra note 111, at 369-81 (discussing the relationship between sex, power, and violence in the context of the eroticisation of dominance).
140. See MACKINNON, supra note 93, at 171-83 (discussing, inter alia, the relationship between sex and violence and the roots of the subject's jurisprudence in social, political, and economic male dominance); see also BROWNMILLER, supra note 90, at 16-30 (describing the history of the law of rape as rooted in male predations of women); Roberts, supra note 111, at 369-81 (discussing the relationship between sex, power, and violence in the context of the eroticisation of dominance).
141. See MACKINNON, supra note 93, at 171-83 (discussing, inter alia, the relationship between sex and violence and the roots of the subject's jurisprudence in social, political, and economic male dominance); see also BROWNMILLER, supra note 90, at 16-30 (describing the history of the law of rape as rooted in male predations of women); Roberts, supra note 111, at 369-81 (discussing the relationship between sex, power, and violence in the context of the eroticisation of dominance).
142. See Torrey, Feminist Scholarship, supra note 101, at 46 (observing that feminists have recently begun to focus their attention on the "myths of male innocence and female guilt" and have emphasized men's responsibility for their own conduct).
143. Lynne Henderson, Criminal Law Symposium: Commentary: Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victims' Rights Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 584 (noting that "the image of the criminal is the ominous, if undifferentiated, poor, angry, violent, black or Latino male" and that the "popular image of the 'criminal' certainly does not include a white fraternity member who participates in the gang-rape of a young woman he knows").
144. See generally Estelle Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires:" The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960, in PASSION & POWER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY (Kathy Peiss & Christina Simmons eds., 1989). See also Aluise, supra note 59, at 167-68 (discussing psychological theories of mid-twentieth century).
145. See Freedman, supra note 115, at 199 (discussing the media's obsession with violent sexual murders during that period); PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 144 (1996) (discussing the preoccupation with the notion of the "sex psychopath" brought on by a "wave of brutal, seemingly sexually motivated child murders" during the 1930s). These murders set off nationwide "sex panics" regarding a perceived increase in such crimes. J. Edgar Hoover, for example, claimed that "the most rapidly increasing type of crime is that perpetrated by sex offenders." Freedman, supra note 115, at 205-06. Statistics, however, did not support his claim. See id. at 206 (noting the "lack of evidence that the incidence of rape, child murder, or minor sex offenses has increased").
146. See Freedman, supra note 115, at 199 (discussing the media's obsession with violent sexual murders during that period); PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 144 (1996) (discussing the preoccupation with the notion of the "sex psychopath" brought on by a "wave of brutal, seemingly sexually motivated child murders" during the 1930s). These murders set off nationwide "sex panics" regarding a perceived increase in such crimes. J. Edgar Hoover, for example, claimed that "the most rapidly increasing type of crime is that perpetrated by sex offenders." Freedman, supra note 115, at 205-06. Statistics, however, did not support his claim. See id. at 206 (noting the "lack of evidence that the incidence of rape, child murder, or minor sex offenses has increased").
147. SANDAY, supra note 116, at 144.
148. Id. 119 PLOSCOWE, supra note 86, at 165.
149. WILLIAMS & HOLMES, supra note 9, at 118-19 (indicating that a large proportion of the subjects participating in the authors' study believed rapists to be "crazy," "mentally ill," or "emotionally disturbed"). According to Williams & Holmes, 91% of white men and 92% of white women, 83% of black men and 98% of black women, and 87% of Mexican-American men and 63% of Mexican-American women believe that rapists are "sick." See id. at 136.
150. The myth of the crazed rapist has had a particular impact on black men. See, e.g., ESTRICH, REAL RAPE, supra note 78, at 32 (noting that "one is hard pressed to find a conviction of a stranger, let alone a black stranger, who jumped from the bushes and attacked a virtuous white woman, reversed for lack of resistance"); BROWNMILLER, supra note 90, at 216 (noting that in a study of rape convictions in Baltimore, "blacks received the stiffest sentences for raping white women and the mildest sentences for raping black women"); id. at 210-55 (chronicling "the mythified spectre of the black man as rapist");
151. The myth of the crazed rapist has had a particular impact on black men. See, e.g., ESTRICH, REAL RAPE, supra note 78, at 32 (noting that "one is hard pressed to find a conviction of a stranger, let alone a black stranger, who jumped from the bushes and attacked a virtuous white woman, reversed for lack of resistance"); BROWNMILLER, supra note 90, at 216 (noting that in a study of rape convictions in Baltimore, "blacks received the stiffest sentences for raping white women and the mildest sentences for raping black women"); id. at 210-55 (chronicling "the mythified spectre of the black man as rapist");
152. Bumiller, supra note 109, at 86-88 (detailing the "pattern of excessive punishment for interracial sexual assault [that] continued into the twentieth century") (footnote omitted).
153. This is not to say that the public believes that black men are mentally ill but that it is willing to believe accusations against black men because of racist beliefs about their uncontrollable and "animalistic" sexuality. See, e.g., Andrew Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUDIES 387, 453-57 (1996) (noting the widely held myth of black men "as in a 'state of savage promiscuity'") (citations omitted).
154. See HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 55 (1980) (noting the historical depiction of men as subject to uncontrollable sexual desires when stimulated by women).
155. See WILLIAMS & HOLMES, supra note 9, at 187; see also LAFREE, supra note 79, at 31 (noting the predominance of narrow perceptions of rape as a sudden, violent attack by a stranger in a deserted public place).
156. See WILLIAMS & HOLMES, supra note 9, at 187; see also LAFREE, supra
157. Stevi Jackson, The Social Context of Rape, in RAPE & SOCIETY 16 (Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger eds., 1995).
158. See Hubert S. Feild, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapists, Crisis Counselors, and Citizens, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 156, 169 (1978) (discussing police attitudes towards rapists including their belief, similar to that of rapists themselves, that they are not mentally normal); Duncan Chappell & Susan Singer, Rape in New York City: A Study of the Material in the Police Files and Its Meaning, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM & THE OFFENDER 245 (Duncan Chappell et al., eds. 1977) (noting that New York police found 24% of acquaintance rape cases to be without merit as opposed to only 5% of stranger rape cases); see also Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1087-88 (describing police officers' response to her rape by a stranger with a weapon as legitimate because of circumstances).
159. See Hubert S. Feild, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapists, Crisis Counselors, and Citizens, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 156, 169 (1978) (discussing police attitudes towards rapists including their belief, similar to that of rapists themselves, that they are not mentally normal); Duncan Chappell & Susan Singer, Rape in New York City: A Study of the Material in the Police Files and Its Meaning, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM & THE OFFENDER 245 (Duncan Chappell et al., eds. 1977) (noting that New York police found 24% of acquaintance rape cases to be without merit as opposed to only 5% of stranger rape cases); see also Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1087-88 (describing police officers' response to her rape by a stranger with a weapon as legitimate because of circumstances).
160. See Hubert S. Feild, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapists, Crisis Counselors, and Citizens, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 156, 169 (1978) (discussing police attitudes towards rapists including their belief, similar to that of rapists themselves, that they are not mentally normal); Duncan Chappell & Susan Singer, Rape in New York City: A Study of the Material in the Police Files and Its Meaning, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM & THE OFFENDER 245 (Duncan Chappell et al., eds. 1977) (noting that New York police found 24% of acquaintance rape cases to be without merit as opposed to only 5% of stranger rape cases); see also Estrich, Rape, supra note 7, at 1087-88 (describing police officers' response to her rape by a stranger with a weapon as legitimate because of circumstances).
161. Many prosecutors, like police, consider stranger rape to be more serious than acquaintance rape and more vigorously pursue those cases. See, e.g., Robert A . Weninger, Factors Affecting the Prosecution of Rape: A Case Study of Travis County, 64 VA. L. REV. 357, 380 (1978) (noting that "the probability of an indictment was highest in cases of strangers and lower, not in cases of friends, but in those cases of acquaintances"); id. at 385 (suggesting that juries may demand greater evidence of nonconsent in acquaintance rape, and "[t]hese expectations of jury reaction seem likely to have influenced prosecutors' perceptions of their chances for success at trial and, therefore, their decisions to indict"). To be sure prosecutors' reluctance to pursue acquaintance rape cases could be related to their belief in their likelihood of success at trial rather than to a firmly held belief regarding the "crazed" nature of rapists. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1246-54 (discussing prosecutorial disinclination to pursue "unwinnable" cases and noting that acquaintance rape cases are more difficult to win than stranger rape cases). Even so, the decision to prosecute is directly related to what a prosecutor thinks the public will believe. Given the public's firmly held belief in the crazed rapist, prosecutors at least partly utilize the myth in their decision-making. Moreover, prosecutors frequently use the image of rapist as "crazed beast" in their arguments in stranger rape cases, thus solidifying the myth. See Lisa A. Binder, "With More Than Admiration He Admired": Images of Beauty and Defilement in Judicial Narratives of Rape, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 265, 274 (1995) (discussing and citing instances of prosecutorial use of the image of rapists as beasts).
162. See WILLIAMS & HOLMES, supra note 9, at 19 (citing a study of judicial attitudes classifying "genuine" rape as those involving women attacked by "a stranger leaping out of the shadows of a dark alley"). 127 In a comprehensive jury study. Professors Kalven and Zeisel revealed that juries were far less likely to convict an accused man of rape when the rape was not stereotypical - i.e., where there was no extrinsic violence or multiple assailants and where the victim and assailant knew one another. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 252-3 (1966);
163. see also Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1263 n.442 (citing later studies tending to confirm Kalven & Zeisel's conclusions); FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 121, at 56 (study of potential jurors revealed that 85% viewed rapists as "not normal" and 57% viewed them as mentally ill); Wenniger, supra note 125, at 370 (noting that the rape victim often carried a greater burden because "grand jurors were especially inquisitive if a prior relationship existed or if there was any question concerning consent to intercourse").
164. see also Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1263 n.442 (citing later studies tending to confirm Kalven & Zeisel's conclusions); FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 121, at 56 (study of potential jurors revealed that 85% viewed rapists as "not normal" and 57% viewed them as mentally ill); Wenniger, supra note 125, at 370 (noting that the rape victim often carried a greater burden because "grand jurors were especially inquisitive if a prior relationship existed or if there was any question concerning consent to intercourse").
165. see also Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 92, at 1263 n.442 (citing later studies tending to confirm Kalven & Zeisel's conclusions); FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 121, at 56 (study of potential jurors revealed that 85% viewed rapists as "not normal" and 57% viewed them as mentally ill); Wenniger, supra note 125, at 370 (noting that the rape victim often carried a greater burden because "grand jurors were especially inquisitive if a prior relationship existed or if there was any question concerning consent to intercourse").
166. See Mary P. Koss et al., Stranger and Acquaintance Rape, 12 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 1, 4 (1988) (57% of women surveyed who were raped did not realize that the sex in which they were forced to engage was rape); WARSHAW, supra note 93. at 26 (only 26% of women surveyed whose sexual assault met the legal definition of rape thought of themselves as rape victims).
167. See RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 ("The National Women's Survey clearly dispels the common myth that most women are raped by strangers."). The offender statistics break down as follows: husbands or ex-husbands (9%), fathers or step-fathers (11%), boyfriends or ex-boyfriends (10%), other relatives (16%), and non-relative acquaintances (29%). See id. 130 G.G. Abel, J.V. Becker, & L.J. Skinner, Aggressive Behavior and Sex, 3 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 133, 140 (1980).
168. Steven J. Morse, Fear or Danger, Flight From Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 250, 263 (1998) ("Most arguments that facilely suggest that sexual impulses or desires, or any other kind, are necessarily uncontrollable are conceptually and empirically unsupported."). Many scholars note that while sexual offenders often claim to feel unable to control their desires, there is "a considerable difference between a desire not resisted and an irresistible desire." Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505, 521 (1998).
169. Baker, supra note 10, at 577. For studies regarding the "normality" of men who rape, see James V. Check & Neil Malamuth, An Empirical Assessment of Some Feminist Hypotheses About Rape, 8 INT'L J. WOMEN'S STUD. 414, 415 (1985).
170. See Paul Schewe & William O'Donohue, Rape Prevention: Methodological Problems and New Directions, 13 CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY REV. 667, 668 (1972) ("At this point . . . it appears that deviant arousal may not be a necessary or sufficient cause of rape, as some researchers have failed to find significant differences between rapist and nonrapist populations."). Studies reporting that a substantial portion of college males indicate a likelihood of committing rape if there were no negative consequences also support the proposition that rapists are relatively normal. Check & Malamuth, supra note 132, at 416 (study found that 35% of men questioned would rape if they were assured of not getting caught);
171. Neil M. Malamuth, Rape Proclivity Among Males, 37 J. SOC. ISSUES 138, 140 (describing the results of the previously cited study). Moreover, a number of "normal" college men have admitted to committing rape. See Mary P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Students in Higher Education, in 2 RAPE & SEXUAL ASSAULT 1, 11 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988) (nationwide survey of over 6100 college males revealed that 1 in 12 admitted to committing rape);
172. Karen Rapaport & C. Dale Posey, Sexually Coercive College Males, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 87, at 217, 219-20 (43% of college males surveyed admitted to engaging in coercive sex);
173. see also sources cited in Baker, supra note 10, at 576 n.61 (describing the results of the Rapaport & Posey study and surveying the results of several other studies that "found lower, but nonetheless startling percentages of men who admit to engaging in coercive sex").
174. See Check & Malamuth, supra note 132, at 415 (describing studies linking sexual aggressivity to "socially acquired attitudes about rape, women, and sexual relations" and a self-reported likelihood of committing rape to "acceptance of rape myths. . . violence against women, and sex-role stereotyping");
175. Mary P. Koss et al., Nonstranger Sexual Aggression: A Discriminant Analysis of the Psychological Characteristics of Undetected Offenders, 12 SEX ROLES 981, 989 (1985) (noting that sexually aggressive men are more likely to "attribute adversarial qualities to interpersonal relationships, to accept sex-role stereotypes, to believe myths about rape, to feel that rape prevention is the woman's responsibility, and to view as normal an intermingling of aggression and sexuality").
176. See, e.g., PATRICK J. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF FELONS ON PROBATION, 1986-1989, 6 (1992) (noting that while there exists "a tendency for offenders to repeat the crime they were previously convicted of," the recidivism of rapists (3%) was no greater than for those convicted of murder (5%), robbery (17%), or assault (9%));
177. ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989);
178. Joseph J. Romero & Linda Meyer Williams, Recidivism Among Convicted Sex Offenders: A 10-Year Follow-up Study, 49 FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1985, at 58 (noting that most early studies did not reveal sex offenders to be "serious recidivists"). Several articles thoroughly survey the numerous studies on recidivism rates. See Baker, supra note 10, at 578-80 (comparing Bureau of Justice statistics for rape recidivism with statistics of recidivism for other crimes);
179. Aluise, supra note 59, at 173-84;
180. Moreno, supra note 44, at 554-57 (citing various studies and articles in support of the proposition that recidivism rates for sexual offenders are no greater than those for other sorts of offenders).
181. See BECK, supra note 135, at 6 (finding that rapists are 10.5 times more likely to be arrested for another rape than were criminals who had committed different crimes).
182. Beck found that 7.7% of convicted rapists were later rearrested for rape within three years of their earlier conviction, as compared to 33.5% of larcenists who were rearrested for larceny, 31.9% of burglars rearrested for burglary, 19.6% of robbers rearrested for robbery, and 21.9% of aggressors rearrested for assault. See id.; see also LANGAN, supra note 135, at 6 (2.9% of rapists rearrested for rape, 12.2% of larcenists rearrested for larceny, 17.2% of burglars rearrested for burglary, 17.3% of robbers rearrested for robbery, 9.4% of aggressors rearrested for assault).
183. The feminist claim that most rapes go unreported casts some doubt on the relevance of arrest statistics as a measure of recidivism. Self-reported data from sex offenders seems to indicate a much higher rate of recidivism than found in the Beck and Langan studies, which relied on arrest and conviction rates. See Aluise, supra note 59, at 181-83 (surveying studies). However, this fact does not distinguish rapists from other criminals, many of whom also committed unreported crimes prior to their first arrest or conviction. See Baker, supra note 10, at 579.
184. Most studies of rape recidivism are based on re-arrest rates or self-reported subsequent offenses of convicted sex offenders. The focus on men who have already been convicted excludes most men who have committed acquaintance rape but who, for reasons entirely unrelated to their guilt, are never arrested much less convicted. It is thus difficult to determine whether they rape with more or less frequency than do men who sexually assault strangers.
185. Mary P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Students in Higher Education, in RAPE & SOCIETY, supra note 123, at 45.
186. See WARSHAW, supra note 93, at 63 (stating the results of the cited survey).
187. See PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE 46-47, 56-59 (1990) (describing the manner in which the accused men's sexual exploits are used as tools for gaining status within their fraternity).
188. BERNARD LEFKOWITZ, OUR GUYS: THE GLEN RIDGE RAPE AND THE SECRET LIFE OF THE PERFECT SUBURB 146-48 (1997) (chronicling how several high school students who were later accused of sexually assaulting a mentally retarded classmate frequently physically and emotionally abused other female students).
189. See RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (reporting that "[a]nother common misconception about rape is that most victims sustain serious physical injuries").
190. CAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMES 12 (1991).
191. We recognize that the term "non-violent" rape is an oxymoron. See generally Lynne Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth of the Non-Violent Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 439 (1993) (discussing the relationship between the terming of rapes as violent or non-violent and the resulting sentences imposed). However, we use it to distinguish between rapes accompanied by overt extrinsic violence or weapons and those which are not.
192. See RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4 (reporting that 49% of rape victims surveyed "described being tearful of serious injury during the rape").
193. Lynne Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 990-91 (1993) (discussing reasons why some rape victims do not physically resist).
194. Id. at 990 (emphasis omitted).
195. Koss, Stranger and Acquaintance Rape, supra note 128, at 13 (noting that victims of acquaintance and stranger rape did not differ markedly in their psychological symptoms, which included depression, anxiety, and a decrease in relationship and sexual satisfaction). Koss and her colleagues concluded that there existed a "lingering, potentially clinically significant [psychological] impact of rape which did not vary in severity according to the victim-offender relationship." Id. at 22.
196. Massaro, supra note 8, at 429;
197. Schafran, supra note 145, at 1018-20 (analyzing statistical data on the impact of the different types of rape on the victims).
198. Bechhofer & Parrot, supra note 90, at 10 (noting that, contrary to the common understanding of the stereotypical rape, date rape or acquaintance rape is much more common); id. at 27 (noting the difference between date rape and so-called "real" rape).
199. WILLIAMS & HOLMES, supra note 9, at 118 (noting that mental illness ranked first as a reason for rape among whites, blacks, and victims of rape, and second behind the woman's appearance and behavior among Mexican-Americans). 153 See Orenstein, supra note 9, at 687-90 (canvassing feminist arguments in support of FRE 413); Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing "The Credibility Quotient," 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 107, 124-27 (1995) (arguing that FRE 413 is necessary to eradicate the myth of the lying woman).
200. WILLIAMS & HOLMES, supra note 9, at 118 (noting that mental illness ranked first as a reason for rape among whites, blacks, and victims of rape, and second behind the woman's appearance and behavior among Mexican-Americans). 153 See Orenstein, supra note 9, at 687-90 (canvassing feminist arguments in support of FRE 413); Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing "The Credibility Quotient," 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 107, 124-27 (1995) (arguing that FRE 413 is necessary to eradicate the myth of the lying woman).
201. See Goldscheid, supra note 65, at 124 (noting that "[e]nactment of the Civil Rights Remedy reflects increased acceptance of the feminist position that crimes such as rape and sexual assault are bias crimes that violate women's civil rights").
202. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1994).
203. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney Supp. 1998) (statement of Legislative Findings and Intent).
204. See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, at 794-95 (discussing incidents spurring laws). Indeed, many such laws are named after especially well-known victims. The shorthand term for them - "Megan's laws" - is highly recognizable as referring to Megan Kanka, a young, New Jersey girl raped and killed by a new neighbor with two previous convictions for sexual assault of minors. See Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & POL'Y, 569, 569-71 (1995) (describing the crime and the perpetrator and how the law became named after the victim). The incident was highly publicized in national newspapers. See, e.g., Man Charged in 7-Year-Old Neighbor's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at B5; Suspect Confessed in the Murder of a 7-Year-Old, Prosecutors Say, N.Y, TIMES, Aug. 2 1994, at B2: Jan Huffman, New Law is Urged on Freed Sex Offenders; N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1994, at B1, B7. Within three months the New Jersey legislator enacted a law requiring registration of sex offenders. See Ryan A. Boldan, Note, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Protection, Not Punishment, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 183, 183-84 (1995). The federal law, named the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program, is similarly named after a child victim. Lewis, supra note 32, at 91.
205. The Jacob Wetterling Act encourages states to enact registration and notification laws applicable to, among others, persons convicted of a "sexually violent offense." See Lewis, supra note 32, at 94 (noting that failure to enact registration laws results in the state losing 10% of its funding from the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act). The federal guidelines further make clear that the purpose of the latter phrase is "to require registration of persons convicted of rape or rape-like offenses." Megan's Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 577 (1999).
206. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 373-77 (N.J. 1995) (finding that laws are designed to protect society from sexual predators by informing the public of their presence); Simeon Schopf, "Megan's Law:" Community Notification and the Constitution, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 131 (1995) ("[T]he purpose of 'Megan's law' is to facilitate the protection of the community and its children.").
207. See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1193-94 (1999) (noting that "notification entails a more acute and sustained harm . . . . and, depending on applicable law, [the offender] can suffer this public ignominy well past the end of their prison sentence, and, indeed, for the rest of their lives"); Mel L. Greenberg, Just Deserts in an Unjust Society: Limitations on Law as a Method of Social Control, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 333, 338-39 (1997) (noting that constitutional questions arising from the Massachusetts registration statute have yet to be addressed by the courts); Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, 813-14 (noting that the California Supreme Court has found that questioning of those registered when a similar crime occurs constitutes an "affirmative disability").
208. See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1193-94 (1999) (noting that "notification entails a more acute and sustained harm . . . . and, depending on applicable law, [the offender] can suffer this public ignominy well past the end of their prison sentence, and, indeed, for the rest of their lives"); Mel L. Greenberg, Just Deserts in an Unjust Society: Limitations on Law as a Method of Social Control, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 333, 338-39 (1997) (noting that constitutional questions arising from the Massachusetts registration statute have yet to be addressed by the courts); Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, 813-14 (noting that the California Supreme Court has found that questioning of those registered when a similar crime occurs constitutes an "affirmative disability").
209. See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1193-94 (1999) (noting that "notification entails a more acute and sustained harm . . . . and, depending on applicable law, [the offender] can suffer this public ignominy well past the end of their prison sentence, and, indeed, for the rest of their lives"); Mel L. Greenberg, Just Deserts in an Unjust Society: Limitations on Law as a Method of Social Control, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 333, 338-39 (1997) (noting that constitutional questions arising from the Massachusetts registration statute have yet to be addressed by the courts); Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, 813-14 (noting that the California Supreme Court has found that questioning of those registered when a similar crime occurs constitutes an "affirmative disability").
210. See cases cited infra note 164.
211. See, e.g., Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting the "stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the 'sex offender' label"); Poritz, 662 A.2d at 419 (noting that public notification "would expose plaintiff to public opprobrium, not only by identifying him as a sex offender but also by labeling him as potentially currently dangerous, and thereby undermining his reputation and standing in the community").
212. See Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are The People In Your Neighborhood? Due Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1451, 1467-69 (detailing accounts of vigilantism against sex offenders or alleged sex offenders as a result of notification programs); Mark E. Rath, Comment, Michigan's Scarlet Letter Laws: Are Changes In Order?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 291, 291 (1998) (describing attacks on registered sex offenders by members of the community in which they have moved); Elizabeth Kelley Cierzniak, Note, There Goes the Neighborhood: Notifying the Public When a Convicted Child Molester is Released Into the Community, 28 IND. L. REV. 715, 715 (1995) (detailing the burning of a registered offender's home in Washington less than a day before his scheduled release).
213. See Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are The People In Your Neighborhood? Due Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1451, 1467-69 (detailing accounts of vigilantism against sex offenders or alleged sex offenders as a result of notification programs); Mark E. Rath, Comment, Michigan's Scarlet Letter Laws: Are Changes In Order?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 291, 291 (1998) (describing attacks on registered sex offenders by members of the community in which they have moved); Elizabeth Kelley Cierzniak, Note, There Goes the Neighborhood: Notifying the Public When a Convicted Child Molester is Released Into the Community, 28 IND. L. REV. 715, 715 (1995) (detailing the burning of a registered offender's home in Washington less than a day before his scheduled release).
214. See Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are The People In Your Neighborhood? Due Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1451, 1467-69 (detailing accounts of vigilantism against sex offenders or alleged sex offenders as a result of notification programs); Mark E. Rath, Comment, Michigan's Scarlet Letter Laws: Are Changes In Order?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 291, 291 (1998) (describing attacks on registered sex offenders by members of the community in which they have moved); Elizabeth Kelley Cierzniak, Note, There Goes the Neighborhood: Notifying the Public When a Convicted Child Molester is Released Into the Community, 28 IND. L. REV. 715, 715 (1995) (detailing the burning of a registered offender's home in Washington less than a day before his scheduled release).
215. Courts have rejected claims that notification statutes violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, see, e.g., Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 193 (D. Mass. 1998); Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Poritz, 662 A.2d at 405, the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy clauses, see, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997) (Ex Post Facto only); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997) (Ex Post Facto only); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1105 (3d, Cir. 1997); Spencer v. O'Connor, 707 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Poritz, 662 A.2d at 404-05, the equal protection clause, see, e.g., Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1267-68 (3d Cir. 1996); Farwell, 999 F. Supp. at 195, Poritz, 662 A.2d at 413, and the Fourth Amendment, see, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1558 (9th Cir. 1995); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Alaska 1994). Courts have had more difficulty resolving claims that notification statutes provide insufficient due process protection. Compare Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 480-82 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that defendant did not have a protectible liberty interest implicating due process rights), Femedeer v. Haun, 35 F. Supp.2d. 852, 859 (D. Utah 1999) (same) and Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 848, 855 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (same) with Shimoda, 131 F.3d at 830 (holding that notification implicated liberty interests for due process purposes), Poritz, 662 A.2d at 411 (same), Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (same) and Doe v. Attorney General, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1014 (Mass. 1997) (same).
216. Despite court rulings, numerous commentators question the constitutionality of registration and notification laws. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 160, at 1197-1212 (discussing the degree to which notification laws impact registrants' lives in comparison with laws that created lesser stigmas that nevertheless received procedural due process safeguards); Stephen R. McAllister, Megan's Laws: Wise Public Policy or Ill-Considered Public Folly, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 19-20 (1998) (discussing potential ex post facto violations); Small, supra note 163, at 1486-92 (discussing potential procedural due process violation); Rath, supra note 163, at 304-14 (discussing ex post facto violations resulting from community notification); Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, at 815-49 (discussing cruel and unusual punishment and due process violations); Bedarf, supra note 31, at 924-39 (discussing cruel and unusual punishment problems).
217. This is not to say that we should use different standards for such defendants. As Stephen Schulhofer notes, however, society is more willing to heap harsh sentences on criminal defendants it can describe as "someone hostile to civilized values, devoid of human sensibilities, utterly 'other.'" Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials: The Trouble With Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825, 852 (1995) (reviewing GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIM'S RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995)).
218. 947 P.2d 466 (Kan Ct. App. 1997), rev'd 961 P.2d 667 (Kan. 1998).
219. Scott, 947 P.2d at 468.
220. Id. at 468.
221. See id. 171 See id.; State v. Scott, 961 P.2d 667, 668 (Kan. 1998) (noting that the victim had a bloody nose and several bruises on her face, arms and legs in addition to broken ribs). 172 Scott, 947 P.2d at 470.
222. Id. at 470-71.
223. Eventually, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, noting that "Scott committed a very violent crime after an acquaintance refused to have sex with him", Scott, 961 P.2d at 673, and that the statute's "punitive effect. . . resulting from an interest in public safety [were] not so disproportionate to Scott's violent, sexually motivated crime" that it violated the prohibition against cruel and inhumane punishment. Id. at 673-76.
224. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
225. In states such as New Jersey, New York and Massachusetts, all sex offenders must register but their period of registration and the entities to whom their status is disclosed differ. Thus, Tier 1, or non-egregious sex offenders, are known only to the police and other law enforcement officials, while Tier 3, the most egregious sex offenders, are subject to widespread public disclosure regarding their status. See supra note 26.
226. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c) (West 1994).
227. N.J. ANN. STAT. § 2C:7-8(b) (West 1994); see also N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 1681(5) (McKinney 1995) (listing factors similar to New Jersey Law). Unlike the New Jersey requirements, the New York law merely lists some, but not necessarily all, of the factors to be used by the board directed to establish guidelines for tier assessment. See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir. 1997). Elaborating on the New York law, the board created a multi-factor assessment guide with factors similar to the New Jersey statute, including, among others the defendant's use of violence, number of victims, age of the victim, relationship between offender and victim, and the number and nature of prior crimes. See id. at 1268 n.6.
228. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of recidivism in acquaintance rapists).
229. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (discussing the common misconception that the absence of extrinsic violence means women do not suffer severe psychological harm as the result of rape).
230. For example, if the Scott court had been considering defendant's challenge to his classification as an egregious sex offender rather than a constitutional challenge to the notification statute generally, its reasoning is unlikely to have changed.
231. In hearings before the Minnesota legislature regarding the commitment of sexual predators, for example, the state attorney general characterized the issue as how to "protect the public from some of the most dangerous criminals in society." Eric Janus, Sex Offender Commitments: Debunking the Official Narrative and Revealing the Rules-in-Use, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 71, 80 (1997) [hereinafter Janus, Sex Offender Commitments] (quoting Minnesota Attorney General Hubert Humphrey, III). Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court characterized its sexually violent predator statute as applying to "distinctively dangerous" and "only the most dangerous of sex offenders." State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 124, 130 (Wis. 1995). The preambles of various statutes also refer to the "extremely dangerous" group of criminals subject to the statute. See supra note 40.
232. There is controversy, however, regarding whether the State may use civil commitment procedures to protect against dangerousness in the absence of mental illness. The Court has indicated the State could not do so. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (overturning a Louisiana rule requiring commitment of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity until the defendant can show he or she is not dangerous to society, even if they are no longer insane). However, in upholding Kansas's sexual predator statute - which allows commitment based upon dangerousness and something less than mental illness, the Supreme Court cast some doubt on whether serious mental illness is necessary to support civil commitment proceedings. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359-60 (1997) (holding that states could set their own criteria for defining who should be civilly confined). Many scholars disagree with Hendricks, characterizing sexual predator statutes as penalogical or punitive in nature and, thus, deserving of criminal procedural protections. See, e.g, Cynthia A. King, Fighting the Devil We Don't Know: Kansas v. Hendricks, A Case Study Exploring the Civilization of Criminal Punishment and Its Ineffectiveness in Prevent Child Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1427, 1440-51 (1999) (criticizing the Supreme Court's analysis in Hendricks); Moreno, supra note 44, at 544-47 (noting that Justice Thomas' opinion upheld the statute in Hendricks while refuting the only possible bases for its legitimacy); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 94-96 (1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Two Systems] (disagreeing with the Court's allowance of civil confinement absent mental illness). The civil/criminal debate regarding sexual predator statutes is beyond the scope of this article, although we generally concur with the scholars listed above.
233. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a), (e) (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(3) (West 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(4) (West 1998).
234. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (noting that there is significant evidence that acquaintance rapists recidivate as often as stranger rapists).
235. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
236. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 82 (1987) (noting that injuries particular to women, such as rape and sexual harassment, are often conceived of as private issues rather than legal injuries capable of redress).
237. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West Supp. 1999); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. eh. 123A § 1 (West Supp. 2000) (defining "sexually dangerous person" to include juvenile delinquents, people charged with sexual offenses who suffer from mental abnormalities, and people previously adjudicated as "sexually dangerous" and whose behavior indicates inability to control their sexual impulses).
238. Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 161, 170 (1995). Although courts have never settled on a single definition of mental illness, the definition in the text generally tracks the description of legal insanity. Physicians and psychologists define serious mental illness in a similar manner. See Brief for the National Mental Health Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-1649) ("The term mental illness is reserved for psychological conditions that impair virtually every aspect of the lives of people it affects. It does not apply to those who merely cannot resist deviant sexual urges whose origin, in any case, is unrelated to medical illness."); Eric Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 187 (1996) [hereinafter Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence] (serious mental illness for typical civil commitment proceedings is that illness which "renders the individual substantially disconnected with reality").
239. See Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 70 (commenting that all states allow civil commitment of persons who are "mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or others").
240. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 71.09.090 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (West 1999) ("Because the existing civil commitment procedures . . . are inadequate to address the special needs of sexually violent predators and the risks they present to society . . . a separate involuntary civil commitment process . . . is necessary.").
241. MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); see also, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (West 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 2000). The term "personality disorder" is rarely defined at all. To the extent the term is defined, it is usually so circular as to be meaningless. See MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 § 1 (West Supp. 2000) (defining "personality disorder" as a "congenital or acquired physical or mental condition that results in a general lack of power to control sexual impulses").
242. Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 95; Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 78 (2000) (arguing that the scope of the statutes is not limited to the mentally ill). In fact, a large portion of committed sex offenders are diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder which has been extremely controversial in the mental health field because it does little more than indicate "that an individual is predisposed to committing unlawful, irresponsible acts." Andrew Hammel, Comment, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator Civil Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 HOUSTON L. REV. 775, 808-09 (1995); see also Janus, Sex Offender Commitments, supra note 182, at 74 n.74 (citing sources questioning the diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder).
243. Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 95; Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 78 (2000) (arguing that the scope of the statutes is not limited to the mentally ill). In fact, a large portion of committed sex offenders are diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder which has been extremely controversial in the mental health field because it does little more than indicate "that an individual is predisposed to committing unlawful, irresponsible acts." Andrew Hammel, Comment, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator Civil Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 HOUSTON L. REV. 775, 808-09 (1995); see also Janus, Sex Offender Commitments, supra note 182, at 74 n.74 (citing sources questioning the diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder).
244. Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 95; Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 78 (2000) (arguing that the scope of the statutes is not limited to the mentally ill). In fact, a large portion of committed sex offenders are diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder which has been extremely controversial in the mental health field because it does little more than indicate "that an individual is predisposed to committing unlawful, irresponsible acts." Andrew Hammel, Comment, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator Civil Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 HOUSTON L. REV. 775, 808-09 (1995); see also Janus, Sex Offender Commitments, supra note 182, at 74 n.74 (citing sources questioning the diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder).
245. See Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 95 ("In effect, the predictive component of the definition is not only necessary but in practice sufficient; the mental disorder component imposes no limitation at all."); see also Jonathan Simon, Monstrous, supra note 27, at 460 ("The logic of [sexual predator laws] is one based on statistical evidence about recidivism rather than on clinical judgments about individual proclivities.").
246. See Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 95 ("In effect, the predictive component of the definition is not only necessary but in practice sufficient; the mental disorder component imposes no limitation at all."); see also Jonathan Simon, Monstrous, supra note 27, at 460 ("The logic of [sexual predator laws] is one based on statistical evidence about recidivism rather than on clinical judgments about individual proclivities.").
247. Some states explicitly make this declaration. Tennessee, for example, declares that "[s]ex offenders constitute a species of mentally ill persons in the eyes of the general assembly," some of whom are appropriate for civil commitment. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-302 (1984). States acknowledging that their sexual predator statutes apply only to "a small but extremely dangerous group" of offenders, see supra note 40 (quoting Washington statute), send a more conflicting message. Their open acknowledgment regarding the small population to which they apply arguably belies the concept of sex offenses as their own psychopathology. However, the emptiness of the mental health definitions in such statutes and their reliance on recidivism as the only predictor for mental abnormality indicates an underlying vision of all sex offenders as mentally ill, although only some might be appropriate for commitment.
248. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 735 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("Common sense dictates that most sex crimes are the result of a mental or an emotional state not often terminated by one act.").
249. This proposition is not without controversy. Many mental health officials argue that predicting future criminal behavior from past acts is difficult and often inaccurate. See Winick, supra note 131, at 559 (arguing that the accuracy of clinical predictions has been "seriously questioned"). Others, however, argue that carefully constructed models assessing risk in light of an offender's particular characteristics and on-going behavior may adequately predict the potential for future violence. See id. at 560-61 (suggesting that information concerning an individual developed over time can predict the risk of violent behavior and perhaps reduce that risk).
250. In Kansas, for example, the agency with custody of the offender initially identifies him as potentially sexually violent predator. The agency then refers the case to the prosecutor's review committee (a multi-disciplinary team composed of unidentified state agency representatives), who, upon determination that the individual is a sexually violent predator, refers it to the Attorney General who may file a petition requesting that a court find probable cause to make a determination regarding the offender's status. If the court finds probable cause to believe the offender is a sexually violent predator, it will refer the offender to a professionally qualified evaluator to determine the offender's status. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a03-05 (West Supp. 1999). In Colorado, the procedure is less complex. After a defendant is convicted of a sex offense, the court, district attorney, or defendant can request that commitment proceedings begin. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-13-205 (1996 & Supp. 1998) (commitment proceeding can being within twenty days after conviction). After those proceedings begin, the defendant is subject to a mental health evaluation. See id. § 16-13-207 ("The examining psychiatrists shall make independent written reports to the court which shall contain the opinion of the psychiatrist as to whether the defendant, if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public."). For a review of statutes operating similarly to those in Colorado and Kansas, see supra note 37.
251. In surveying recent commitment cases, Samuel Brakel and James Cavanaugh found that the first step in the assessment process is: [I]n effect a rough screen to determine if there is enough in the offender's background and character to warrant that he will reoffend. The emphasis at this stage is on actuarial rather than clinical methods and the inquiries may be performed by evaluators with only modest, or no, clinical training. A review of the offender's file alone may suffice to weed him out. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 193, at 79.
252. See id. at 79 (asserting that referral rates of sex offenders for civil commitment hearings ranged from approximately 7% to 5% of all offenders and that rates of actual commitments of those referred were even lower); see also Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 189, at 192 n.74 (noting that only 6% of sex offenders in Minnesota were committed).
253. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 193, at 91 (noting that the "laws will miss committing many who will reoffend and they will commit an undiscernible number who would not have reoffended if left free").
254. See Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 189, at 202-03 (arguing that several factors, such as fear of liability from a false prediction of safety and hindsight bias, induce officials to find an offender dangerous).
255. A study in Minnesota, for example, revealed that in "seventeen of fifty-five cases resulting in commitment, the trial court ordered the individual indeterminately committed despite testimony from the evaluating hospital staff that either recommended against commitment, or was neutral on the subject of commitment." Id. at 205.
256. See Jonathan Simon, Monstrous, supra note 27, at 458 (arguing that although the trial includes examination by mental health professionals, the "underlying inquiry" is left to the jury).
257. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (discussing rape myths and reliance on the victim's character as evidence of consent).
258. Karp, supra note 60, at 24.
259. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing supporters' arguments in favor of FRE 413-415).
260. We use the term "misconduct" to signify that the rules apply not only to sexual assaults of adults and children but also to sexual harassment lawsuits.
261. See, e.g., Natali & Stigall, supra note 59, at 13-14 ("Th[e] ban on propensity evidence has been firmly and historically established since at least the seventeenth century. . . . It is a fundamental conception of how defendants should be tried in American courtrooms."); Sheft, supra note 59, at 73 (describing ban on character evidence as an essential component of American jurisprudence).
262. See, e.g., Natali & Stigall, supra note 59, at 13-14 ("Th[e] ban on propensity evidence has been firmly and historically established since at least the seventeenth century. . . . It is a fundamental conception of how defendants should be tried in American courtrooms."); Sheft, supra note 59, at 73 (describing ban on character evidence as an essential component of American jurisprudence).
263. See Natali & Stigall, supra note 59, at 23-34 (arguing that FRE 413-415's admission of propensity evidence violates the presumption of innocence protected by the due process clause); Sheft, supra note 59, at 77-82 (declaring that the admission of propensity evidence additionally violates the equal protection clause). The Judicial Conference Committee also raised questions regarding the constitutionality of FRE 413-415. See 159 F.R.D. at 54 (arguing that the opposing party should have the right to offer rebuttal character evidence in order to negate constitutional concerns).
264. See Natali & Stigall, supra note 59, at 23-34 (arguing that FRE 413-415's admission of propensity evidence violates the presumption of innocence protected by the due process clause); Sheft, supra note 59, at 77-82 (declaring that the admission of propensity evidence additionally violates the equal protection clause). The Judicial Conference Committee also raised questions regarding the constitutionality of FRE 413-415. See 159 F.R.D. at 54 (arguing that the opposing party should have the right to offer rebuttal character evidence in order to negate constitutional concerns).
265. See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1430-31 (10th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging "serious constitutional due process issue" raised by rules but holding due process satisfied by application of FRE 403 balancing); see also sources cited supra note 47 (identifying cases that have applied the balancing test).
266. See Jane Harris Aiken, Sexual Character Evidence in Civil Actions: Refining the Propensity Rule, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1221, 1244. For cases in which courts sustained FRE 403 objections, see United States v. Guardia, 955 F. Supp. 115, 119-20 (D.N.M. 1997), aff'd 135 F.3d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998) (past accusations of sexual fondlings by physician excluded under FRE 403 in pending case alleging similar fondling); Cleveland v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (evidence of sexual misconduct arising after plaintiffs employment excluded under FRE 403 in pending sexual harassment case); Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 627 (D.N.J. 1996) (past allegation of sexual assault excluded under FRE 403 in pending sexual harassment case); United States v. Jackson, CR 95-388-FR, 1996 WL 444968, at *4 (D. Or. July 22, 1996) (past allegations of sexual assault excluded under FRE 403 as being insufficiently similar in pending sexual assault case). For cases in which the court allowed admission of FRE 413-415 evidence after a FRE 403 balancing, see United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1997) (allowing evidence of child molestation occurring 16-20 years prior in pending molestation case); United States v. Akram, No. 97 CR 78, 1997 WL 392220, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1997) (acts of past sexual misconduct admissible in pending case alleging sexual contact with minors).
267. Courts in cases involving child molestation and stranger rape almost uniformly allow propensity evidence after a FRE 403 balancing. See United States v. Sumner, 204 F.3d 1182, 1187 (8th Cir. 2000) (allowing evidence of past molestation of children in pending child molestation case); United States v. Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 796 (8th Cir. 2000) (allowing evidence of past forcible, child molestation in pending forcible child molestation case); United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 899 (10th Cir. 1999) (allowing evidence of past molestation in pending molestation case); United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) (allowing prior evidence of 10-year-old conviction for carnal knowledge of a child in pending molestation case); United States v. Peters, 133 F.3d 933 (table of unpublished opinions), No. 96-2286, 1998 WL 17750, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 20, 1998) (allowing evidence of past convictions for forcible rape of a stranger in pending rape case). Courts also remain unwilling to allow propensity evidence when the issue involved is sexual misconduct with an acquaintance. See United States v. Acevedo, 117 F.3d 1429 (table of unpublished decisions), No. 96-2149, 1997 WL 392253, at *5 (10th Cir. July 14, 1997) (discussing district court's exclusion of evidence offered under FRE 413 of 18-year-old conviction for attempted sexual assault in pending forcible sexual assault case of acquaintance but allowing it as impeachment evidence on rebuttal); but see United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1435 (10th Cir. 1998) (allowing evidence of prior rape of an acquaintance in pending acquaintance rape case).
268. See Acevedo, 1997 WL 392253, at *1 (discussing the district court's assertion that the conviction was too remote in time to be admissible).
269. See Guardia, 955 F. Supp. at 118-19 (arguing that the necessity of expert testimony to determine the propriety of the defendant's past conduct, would lead to jury confusion); Frank, 924 F. Supp. at 625-27 (arguing that the different factual scenario of the past act decreased the probative value of the propensity evidence).
270. See Baker, supra note 10, at 573-74 (raising question of whether different types of rape are probative of one another); id. at 590-97 (noting the potentially prejudicial and racist effect of FRE 413-415).
271. See Guardia, 955 F. Supp. at 117 (woman described defendant's behavior as "sexual and inappropriate").
272. See id. at 119 (quoting government's response to defendant's motion to preclude propensity evidence). 219 See id. at 118-20 (assessing the evidence and concluding that admitting it would result injury confusion, which would be unfair to the defendant). 220 Id. at 118.
273. See id. at 119 (arguing that the necessity of expert testimony for each incident would confuse the jury); see also Aiken, supra note 212. at 1246-47 (discussing similarities in allegations and implications of court's refusal to see them).
274. See United States v. Jackson, CR 95-388-FR, 1996 WL 444968, at *1 (D. Or. July 22, 1996) (victim alleged that when she awoke, defendant was having sexual intercourse with her).
275. See id. (defendant contended that victim responded to him and made no effort to rebuff him).
276. See id. 225 Id. at *4.
277. See id. at *4 (concluding that the evidence was not relevant to the case).
278. See id. at *2.
279. See id. at *3 (victim did not remember the assault).
280. See id. (victim stated that she told defendant that she did not want to have sex with him).
281. See United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 899 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence).
282. See id. at 894 (indictment alleged that defendant engaged in sexual acts with all three victims).
283. See id. at 895 (victim stated that defendant made her touch him on the outside of his clothing).
284. See id. at 898 (stating that the defendant's alleged conduct towards the victims "closely resemble[d]" the conduct the propensity evidence described).
285. See United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming the defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual abuse of a child, the court upheld the admission of evidence of a past statutory rape conviction noting that the testimony of the statutory rape victim, now the defendant's common-law wife, would provide the jury an opportunity to discount the prejudice caused by the admission of the evidence); see also United States v. Koruh, 210 F.3d 390 (table of unpublished decisions), No. 99-2138, 2000 WL 342252, at **1 (10th Cir. Apr. 3, 2000) (allowing admission of past forcible rape allegation in pending case involving allegations of sexual fondling). In Koruh, the evidence admitted was based on testimony of the defendant's daughter, from a previous marriage, involving sexual abuse occurring more than 16 years before the present trial. See id. at **1. Upholding the district court's decision to admit the evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, the Tenth Circuit noted that the prosecutor had argued that the alleged molestations were similar: both victims and the defendant's daughter were female and related to the defendant; the girls were under the age of 12 years old when the alleged abuse occurred; and the molestation allegedly occurred in or near the defendant's homes. See id. at **4.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Withorn, 204 F.3d 790, 794 (2000) (upholding the admission of testimony, in a forcible rape case, that defendant had forcibly raped his cousin several years earlier). In Withron, there were similarities between the conduct on trial and the past conduct - both cases involved forcible rape, the victims' ages were similar, and in both cases the defendant claimed the victims had consented. See id. The court did not address the similarities, but upheld admission of the evidence noting that there was a "'strong legislative judgment that evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible.'" Id. (quoting United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997)); see also United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997) (in affirming a conviction of transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent that the minor engage in sexual activity for which defendant could be charged with a crime, the court upheld admission of evidence that defendant had abused his stepdaughters, more than thirty years earlier, as evidence of defendant's intent to go on the trip to sexually molest the victim).
287. More than one court in child molestation cases has mentioned that past molestation acts show defendant's aberrant sexual "taste" for children. See, e.g., United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1260 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that propensity evidence in child molestation cases is "exceptionally probative because it shows an unusual disposition of defendant - a sexual or sado-sexual interest in children - that simply does not exist in ordinary people"); United States v. Akram, No. 97 CR 78, 1997 WL 392220, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 8, 1997) (admitting evidence of other, contemporaneous but uncharged sexual assaults under FRE 413, the court commented on defendant's "taste" for young girls, which it argued tended to establish motive); United States v. Castillo, 188 F.3d 519 (table of unpublished decisions), No. 98-2191, 1999 WL 569054, at **1 (10th Cir. Aug. 4, 1999) (in upholding admission of uncharged conduct under FRE 414 and 403, the court found testimony relating to the uncharged conduct highly probative of the defendant's aberrant "sexual proclivities" towards his daughters).
288. See infra notes 299-307 and accompanying text for further discussion.
289. Lehiy v. State, 501 N.E.2d 451 455 (Ind. App. 1986) ) (citing State v. Robbins, 46 N.E.2d 691 (Ind. 1943)); see also Reichard v. State, 510 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. 1987) (holding that the depraved sexual act exception, allowing evidence of past sexual criminal conduct in cases involving sodomy, sexual conduct against children, and incest, was not applicable to rape of adult woman); State v. McFarlin, 517 P.2d 87, 90 (Ariz. 1973) (upholding the admission of other acts of child molestation committed shortly before and after the charged offense of child molesting, but noting that the lustful disposition exception applied to cases of abnormal sexual conduct - such as sodomy, child molestation, and lewd and lascivious conduct - and not to adult rape cases).
290. See Bryden & Park, supra note 62, at 557-59 (finding that a survey of past acts evidence in sex offense cases reveals that courts retaining the "lustful disposition" exception increasingly limit it to child molestation cases); Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 188 n.340 (1993) (noting that a survey of 29 states retaining the lustful disposition exception reveals that a majority of cases where the exception was used involved child molestation).
291. See Bryden & Park, supra note 62, at 557-59 (finding that a survey of past acts evidence in sex offense cases reveals that courts retaining the "lustful disposition" exception increasingly limit it to child molestation cases); Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 188 n.340 (1993) (noting that a survey of 29 states retaining the lustful disposition exception reveals that a majority of cases where the exception was used involved child molestation).
292. See Reichard, 510 N.E.2d at 165 (holding, in a case involving violent rape of woman by her boyfriend, that evidence of prior rapes was inadmissible because they "did not involve depraved sexual conduct") (citing Lehiy v. State, 501 N.E.2d 451 (Ind. App. 1986)); see also Lehiy, 501 N.E.2d at 451, 456 (holding that "evidence of prior criminal sexual conduct was not admissible to show depraved sexual instinct in a case where only rape was being prosecuted").
293. McFarlin, 517 P.2d at 90 (citing Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (1948)); accord State v. Valdez, 534 P.2d 449, 451-52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). In Valdez, the court noted that the two crimes had many similarities, including defendant's casual acquaintance with the victims, the use of similar pretense for gaining access to the victims' homes, and both rapes occurred in early morning hours and involved "a sexual tour-de-force including a request for oral copulation." Id. at 452. Nevertheless, it held the prior act evidence inadmissible under the common design, plan, scheme, and modus operandi exception, noting that "[m]ere similarity between the crime charged and the prior bad act is not sufficient." Id. at 451-52; see also Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390-91 (9th Cir. 1948). In reversing the defendant's conviction in Lovely, the court refused to find that similarities between the two acts - apparent casual acquaintance with the victim, taking the victim in defendant's car to a remote location on a military installation, committing the rape in the defendant's car, and claiming that the intercourse was consensual - established a plan or scheme, concluding that "[t]he fact that one woman was raped, however, has no tendency to prove that another woman did not consent." Id. at 390.
294. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (detailing supporters' arguments in favor of VAWA); see also Joseph R. Biden Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEG. 1, 4-5 (2000) (noting that Congress had determined that state legal systems had "institutionalized" historic barriers against women and had prevented equal protection of the law and further noting that state officials had asked Congress to pass VAWA).
295. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39, 44-49 (1991) (discussing traditional rape myths and related legal barriers to prosecution of rape); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38, 41-42, 44-47 (1993) (discussing the traditionally low prosecution rates for many crimes against women).
296. Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 29 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Justice Department under President Bush opposed the civil rights remedy arguing that "'whenever a woman is a victim of any crime, a case can be made that the criminal preyed on her thinking she would be an easier target than a man.'" Nourse, supra, at 30 n.164 (quoting the Department of Justice's letter to Senator Biden, Chairman Senate Judiciary Committee, 14 (Apr. 9, 1991) (on file with the Senate Judiciary Committee)).
297. Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 80 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 House Hearing] (statement by the Conference of Chief Justices on S.15, Violence Against Women Act of 1991).
298. The Supreme Court recently agreed, striking down the Civil Rights provision as beyond Congress's power to regulate. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1754-55, 1759 (2000) (striking down the VAWA's civil remedy provision as beyond Congress's Commerce Clause regulatory powers and not within Congress's power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment). While an examination of the gendered aspects of this particular objection to VAWA is beyond the scope of this article, Professor Reva Siegel has thoroughly set forth the relevant arguments. See Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2196-2206 (1996) [hereinafter Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love] (tracing the influence of traditional common law reasoning with respect to gender and domestic relations on the federalism arguments about regulation of domestic relations as raised by critics of VAWA's civil rights remedy).
299. See Nourse, supra note 244, at 28. In the original Act's version, the civil rights remedy referred to a federal law that covered both felonies and misdemeanors. See id. The compromise made clear that only felonies that potentially posed a threat of physical injury could be the basis of such a claim. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 13981(d)(2)(A) (West 1995) (identifying a "crime or violence" as an act that would constitute a felony if it presents serious risk of injury, whether or not the act resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction). The compromise also extended coverage of the bill to those crimes that would be felonies but for the relationship of the parties. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(d)(2)(B) (West 1995) This second provision was inserted in recognition of those "cases in which state and local laws effectively 'downgraded' a crime (to a misdemeanor) because of the relationship of the parties." Nourse, supra note 244, at 28.
300. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 28 (1991) (Section 3.01(c) and (d)(1) of proposed civil rights claim).
301. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(d)(1) (West 1995).
302. This compromise reflected an "intermediate position" between those previously advocated: At one end of the spectrum was a "malice" or "animosity" standard. Such a standard could have required proof that the defendant . . . hated all members of the opposite sex or consciously intended to use violence as a message of gender hatred . . . . On the other side of the spectrum was a "disparate impact" standard!,] under [which] statistical evidence demonstrating the disparate impact of a particular kind of violence would have been sufficient to make out a cause of action without regard to the particular motivation or purpose of the defendant. Nourse, supra note 244, at 29-30 (footnotes omitted).
303. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 64 (1993). The Senate Report accompanying the final version of VAWA indicated that the "new language elucidates the committee's intent that a victim alleging a violation under this section must have been targeted on the basis of his or her gender The defendant must have had a specific intent or purpose, based on the victim's gender to injure the victim." Id.; see also Nourse, supra note 244, at 30-32 (discussing facts supporting an interpretation of "animus" as "purpose" or "intent"); Goldscheid, supra note 65, at 150 (discussing legislative history and noting that Congress used the terms "animus," "purpose," and "motivation" interchangeably, thus dispelling any notion that disparate impact would be sufficient for recovery).
304. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994) (creating a civil remedy for victims of conspiracies to deprive them of equal protection of the laws). The Supreme Court, however, has noted that § 1985(3)'s animus requirement does not require "maliciously motivated, as opposed to assertedly benign (though objectively invidious), discrimination against women." Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1993) (holding that § 1985(3) does not create a federal cause of action against people who obstruct women's access to abortion clinics and rejecting the argument that the abortion opponent's opposition to abortion reflects an animus against women).
305. Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1993, at 12, 14 (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch).
306. Nourse, supra note 244, at 32 n.173. Some courts applying VAWA have commented upon the ambiguity of the term "animus." See Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1406 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (commenting that the term "animus" was ambiguous but concluding, upon reviewing VAWA's legislative history, that allegations of unwanted or unwelcomed sexual advances are sufficient to meet the requirement that the victim allege that the defendant targeted the victim due to his or her gender), rev'd in part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1340 (8th Cir. 1998); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 474 (D.R.I. 1999) (analyzing the ambiguity of the term "animus," the court reviewed VAWA's legislative history and concluded that the existence of gender-motivated animus was determined by a totality of the circumstances).
307. 935 F. Supp. 779, 784 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that VAWA was within Congress's Commerce Clause powers), vacated en banc 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that VAWA could not be upheld under Congress's Commerce Clause powers and was not a legitimate exercise of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
308. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
309. See id. (noting that at the university's disciplinary hearing, the defendant, Morrison, admitted that the victim said "no" twice in response to his requests for sexual intercourse). 257 See id. at 784. Although the Brzonkala court found that the particular facts of the rape indicated gender animus, it discussed two statements by defendant Morrison that reinforced the court's finding of gender animus. First, after having intercourse with the victim, Morrison had stated, "You better not have any fucking diseases," which the court said evidenced Morrison's disrespect for the victim. See id. The court said that more relevant to gender animus was Morrison's statement at a later date, and made in the presence of at least one woman, that he "like[d] to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them." Id. The court found that this later statement indicated a disrespect for women in general and connected this gender disrespect to sexual intercourse. See id. 258 Id. at 784-85.
310. See, e.g., Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 540-41 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (rejecting Brzonkala's "broad characterizations" of rape and noting that "[a]lthough Congress clearly did not intend to designate rape as a per se 'crime of violence motived by gender,' the cases where it is not would appear to this Court to be few and far between"); McCann v. Rosquist, 998 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (D. Utah 1998) ("The notion that nonconsensual sexually oriented conduct is actually amorous and therefore not invidiously discriminatory toward the victimized class is clearly wrong."); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1408 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (finding allegations of unwanted or unwelcome sexual advances sufficient to satisfy VAWA's "gender-motivated" requirement while rejecting notion that an "unwanted kiss [was] merely a 'signal of affection'").
311. Although no court has expressed its views on rape hierarchies as graphically as in Brzonkala, some courts' discussions of the gender animus requirement further suggest that it might lend itself to stereotypes. See Mattison v. Click Corp. of Amer., Inc., No 97-CV-2736, 1998 WL 32597, at *1-*2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998). Mattison involved allegations by a female plaintiff that her male supervisor made repeated requests for sexual favors, verbally abused her by calling her degrading names, coerced her into a sexual relationship, and ultimately forcibly raped her. See id. The court dismissed the defendant's claim that his actions and remarks "demonstrate[d] an affinity, not animosity towards women," including plaintiff. Id. at *7. The court did not rule, however, that the defense of "amorousness" was never available. Instead, it ruled simply that the detailed allegations of humiliating and degrading behavior in this case "overshadowed" defendant's claims and "connect[ed his] gender disrespect to sexual intercourse." Id. (citation omitted). The court in Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999), similarly relied upon extrinsic evidence, such as lewd comments, threats of deportation and the lack of any other apparent motive, to bolster the conclusion that defendant's conduct toward a female victim, which included forcible rape, was gender-motivated. See id. at 475-76. While neither court necessarily meant to distinguish between types of rape, their desire to bolster what were obviously forcible acquaintance rapes with additional allegations of behavior showing a hostile or demeaning attitude toward women suggests that rape stereotypes operate even in these cases.
312. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 49 (1991).
313. See id. at 50 (discussing the similarities between proof of gender motivation and the proscribed motivation in other civil rights laws).
314. Id. at 50 n.72.
315. The Anti-Defamation League's model hate crime law, which many states have followed, defines a hate crime as a crime committed "'by reason of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another individual or group of individuals.'" Katherine Chen, Note, Including Gender in Bias Crime Statutes: Feminist and Evolutionary Perspectives, Note, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 277, 287-88 (1997) (quoting Anti-Defamation League of the B'Nai B'Rith, ADL Hate Crime Statutes: A Response to Anti-Semitism, Vandalism, and Violent Bigotry at A-1 (Supp. 1990)). Similarly, the federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act defines a bias crime as one which "manifest[s] evidence of prejudice based on" various classifications. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 534 note (West 1993) (Hate Crime Statistics). Like § 1985(3), see supra note 234, neither of these requires animosity in order to manifest bias. A defendant could, for example, act against a victim not because of overt animosity so much as complete indifference to the humanity of that person or group.
316. Most working definitions of bias crimes, for example, recognize that such crimes actually are committed out of animosity toward an individual because of their membership in a particular class. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, Recognizing Violence Against Women: Gender & the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 157, 159 (1994) ("The term 'hate crime' generally refers to a crime committed . . . out of hostility toward the group to which the victim belongs."); Kristin L. Taylor, Note, Treating Male Violence Against Women As a Bias Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 575, 577 (1996) ("Bias crime offenders typically act against individuals they perceive to be members of a particular group toward which the offenders feel animosity.").
317. Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 245, at 2205.
318. See Baker, supra note 10, at 599 (motivated by desire for sex); id. at 602 (ignoring women's boundaries); id. at 603 (treating women as sexual commodities); id. at 606 (bonding with other men).
319. A number of authors argue in favor of the bias crimes paradigm, either through VAWA or state bias crime laws. See Marguerite Angelari, Hate Crime Statutes: A Promising Tool For Fighting Violence Against Women, 2 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 63, 100-03 (1994) (arguing that the potential benefits of treating violence against woman as hate crimes include: providing remedies that are not traditionally available to women; increasing public awareness of the seriousness and prevalence of violence against women; and directing the emphasis away from the sexual nature of certain biased-motivated violent crimes against woman, such as rape, which perpetuate the existing "rape myths"); Steven Bennett Weisbrud & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex": Recognizing Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 21, 33-40 (1994) (articulating reasons why gender-related crimes fit the bias crime mold); Taylor, supra note 265, at 594-604 (concluding that male violence against women is gender-motivated and is similar, in many respects, to bias crimes motivated by race, religion, or sexual orientation); Chen, supra note 264, at 288-324 (arguing that both feminist and evolutionary theories support inclusion of gender in bias crime statutes); W.H. Hallock, Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Civil Rights For Sexual Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577, 603-15 (1993) (arguing that much violence against women contains the bias factors common to other bias crimes). Some authors even argue that acquaintance rape should be included within the confines of bias crimes and mount feminist arguments regarding the bias aspects of acquaintance rape. See, e.g., Weisbrud & Levin, supra at 40-41 ("No matter what the particular facts of a given case, there is no escaping the fact that rapes are committed against women as women."); Chen, supra note 264, at 320 (arguing that there is no significant difference between stranger and non stranger rape, that both types of rape have the same underlying motivation, and that "all males benefit from the rape of females because it strongly discourages females from deviating from male control, thereby ensuring paternity"); Hallock, supra, at 609-10 (arguing that rape should be seen as a "per se act of gender violence" and that once rape is proven, a "rebuttable presumption of gender bias should arise"). We agree that courts should interpret bias crimes as including acquaintance rape. Our fear, however, is that they will not do so because their focus on hate conjures up images of the crazed rapist that detract from feminist arguments regarding acquaintance rape.
320. The Senate Report's unfortunate example of a gender-motivated rape stated: Consider the case of a serial rapist who violates his victims as he hurls misogynist slurs. The victim's lawyers would prove exactly the same type of "circumstances" that the lawyer in the "race" case proved: that the victim was of one sex (female) and the attacker a different sex (male); that the attacker did not kidnap and rape men, but had a long history of attacking women; and that the attacker shouted anti-woman epithets during the assault. Again, the jury might not be convinced by any one of these circumstances individually - but all together show gender bias. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 50 (1991).
321. See supra notes 254-58, 260.
322. Lynne Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193, 226 (1987) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987)). Catharine MacKinnon makes a stronger version of this argument: Women are sexually assaulted because they are women: not individually or at random, but on the basis of sex, because of their membership in a group defined by gender . . . . Rape is an act of dominance over women that works systematically to maintain a gender-stratified society in which women occupy a disadvantaged status as the appropriate victims and targets of sexual aggression. Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301-02 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
323. Orenstein, supra note 9, at 691; see also Baker, supra note 10, at 589 (noting that "Rule 413 and its supporting rationale fail to acknowledge, much less incorporate, most of what scholars have learned about rape in the past twenty-five years").
324. See Jennifer Gafney, Note, Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creating a Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 247, 256-57 (1997) (arguing that the bias crime model might preclude actions for marital rape under VAWA's civil rights action because of refusal to see marital rape as motivated by hate); see also Wendy Rae Willis, Note, The Gun Is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, Note, 80 GEO L.J. 2197, 2212 (1992) (suggesting that requiring proof of improper motivation - i.e. hate or animus toward women-as required in racial violence cases, ignores the unique nature of the sexual violence injury and arguing that the rape itself should raise a credible presumption that the assault was gender motivated).
325. See Jennifer Gafney, Note, Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creating a Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 247, 256-57 (1997) (arguing that the bias crime model might preclude actions for marital rape under VAWA's civil rights action because of refusal to see marital rape as motivated by hate); see also Wendy Rae Willis, Note, The Gun Is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, Note, 80 GEO L.J. 2197, 2212 (1992) (suggesting that requiring proof of improper motivation - i.e. hate or animus toward women-as required in racial violence cases, ignores the unique nature of the sexual violence injury and arguing that the rape itself should raise a credible presumption that the assault was gender motivated).
326. Stephen Schulhofer and Lenore Simon note that civil commitment and notification statutes presume that the defendant was a stranger to his victim. Neither, however, discusses the issue primarily from a feminist perspective. The former merely mentions the issue in passing while writing from a constitutional perspective and the latter writes from a therapeutic jurisprudence rationale. See Schulhofer, Two Systems, supra note 183, at 76 (noting that sexually violent predator laws are targeted at acts committed by strangers, thus ignoring other crimes that constitute a large part of the sexual violence problem - domestic violence, child abuse by family members, and other acquaintance abuse); Lenore M.J. Simon, Sex Offender Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 485, 490, 496 (1999) (arguing that the fact that fear of stranger-committed violence fuels most criminal legislation, including sex offender laws, creates a misperception of the magnitude of sexually violent crimes, and promotes inadequate solutions for the majority of sexually violent crimes against children and women, which are carried out by acquaintances).
327. See Christina E. Wells, Hypocrites and Barking Harlots, The Clinton-Lewinsky Affair and the Attack on Women, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 151, 153-54 & n.10 (1998) (countering the hypocrisy charges made by anti-feminist commentators against women's continued support of President Clinton following revelations of his affair with Monica Lewinsky and the subsequent investigation and impeachment).
328. See id. at 153-54.
329. See supra notes 69-72, 243 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 65, at 124 (characterizing the civil rights action as embodying a feminist position that rape is a bias crime); Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 245, at 2206 (arguing that the "very struggle over the interpretation of VAWA's civil rights remedy will, of necessity, modernize gender status discourse").
331. See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 65, at 124 (characterizing the civil rights action as embodying a feminist position that rape is a bias crime); Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 245, at 2206 (arguing that the "very struggle over the interpretation of VAWA's civil rights remedy will, of necessity, modernize gender status discourse").
332. Many feminists responded with protests to the Supreme Court's decision striking down VAWA. See Sarah Cagle, Tech Protest Targets High Court Ruling, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, May 26, 2000, available in 2000 WL 5267991 (discussing organized protest of Court's decision in Virginia and Washington D.C.).
333. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which rape myths decreased successful prosecution of rape).
334. See Berger, et al., supra note 103, at 335-36.
335. We recognize that in the case of the existing legislation our argument can be characterized as shutting the barn door after the animals have escaped. Ideally, feminists should speak out against such legislation before the legislature expends time and energy enacting it. However, educating legislatures regarding the flaws in the new laws still performs a useful function because it may make them less complacent and more willing to listen to future proposals. Moreover, some feminists did oppose the new laws prior to their enactment which suggests that an on-going educational effort is still necessary.
336. The U.S. House of Representatives recently passed a bill requiring that colleges enact policies regarding registration and notification of sexually violent predators (as defined in the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program) who are enrolled at or employed by that institution. See H.R. 4504, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2(i)(7)(A) (2000) (discussing how the institution "shall make available to the campus community . . . all such information [provided to the institution by the State, pursuant to § 170101 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 14071)] concerning" any such person enrolled or employed at the institution, how to access the information, the frequency of updates of the information, and the type of information available.).
337. See supra notes 160-65 (discussing constitutional issues raised by registration/notification statutes); see also supra note 183 (discussing constitutional issues raised by civil commitment statutes).
338. Some scholars already imply such blame. One commentator, while never explicitly blaming feminists for the Federal Rules of Evidence, nevertheless strongly intimates that they are at fault for what he perceives to be fundamentally unfair treatment of rape defendants. He thus argues that FRE 413-415 reflect the political trends of the time, rather than careful and proper legislative efforts and claims that the trends reflect women's growing political influence as a result of increased debates regarding women in the military/workplace, and dramatically increasing rape statistics. See Ellis, supra note 59, at 973-74.
339. See Linda J. Lacey, We Have Nothing to Fear But Gender Stereotypes: Of Katie and Amy and "Babe Feminism," 80 CORNELL L. REV. 612, 640 (1995) (reviewing KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993)) (commenting on feminists' pervasive stereotype being that of a feminazi, as compared to the view of women generally as passive and cowering Victorian victim). Some of this criticism comes not only from right wing critics such as Rush Limbaugh, but from neo-feminists who argue that feminists focusing on date rape "'betray[] feminism' by portraying women as fragile, vulnerable, and unable to negotiate the 'libidinous jostle,' of contemporary life without paternalistic rules and restrictions." Kathryn Abrams, Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University, 103 YALE L.J. 1533, 1534 (1994) (quoting Katie Roiphe, Date Rape's Other Victim, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 13, 1993, at 26, and discussing Camille Paglia's and Roiphe's criticism of feminists who they believe exaggerate date rape claims).
340. See, e.g., RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION 84 (2000) ("[T]he proximate causes of human rape lie in the different adaptations of male and female sexuality that were formed by selection in human evolutionary history."); see also Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 827, 831-32 (1999) (asserting that rape discourse should involve both biological and social theories and perspectives); id. at 899 (suggesting that "a partnership between life sciences and social sciences is necessary to construct an adequate model of rape behavior").
341. See, e.g., RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION 84 (2000) ("[T]he proximate causes of human rape lie in the different adaptations of male and female sexuality that were formed by selection in human evolutionary history."); see also Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 827, 831-32 (1999) (asserting that rape discourse should involve both biological and social theories and perspectives); id. at 899 (suggesting that "a partnership between life sciences and social sciences is necessary to construct an adequate model of rape behavior").
342. Evolutionary biologists do not all believe that rape is inevitable and thus beyond the reach of the law because of its biological bases. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 287, at 909-17 (discussing how, although biological influences contribute to rape patterns and incidence, it "does not automatically follow" that rape is inevitable or that rape should be tolerated). Rather, they simply seek to give rape biological origins. See id. at 838-53 (discussing theories of biological influences on rape, including natural selection theory, sexual selection theory, and the evolution of species-typical human behavior). Some scholars do argue that rape's potential biological origin excuses much of that behavior. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 107, 384-85 (1992) (generally discussing rape as "primarily a substitute for consensual sexual intercourse" rather than as misogyny or attempts to subordinate women). The danger in allowing the evolutionary biology debate to occur without feminist input regarding why men rape on a social level is that the "biology as inevitability" areument will take hold, much like the crazed rapist stereotype did, to excuse men's actions rather than to try to understand them. See Katharine K. Baker, What Rape Is and What It Ought Not to Be, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 233, 240 (1999) (noting that "[i]f law is to combat rape effectively, it must attempt to change the social meaning of rape," and that the goal should be to understand how rape exists and operates on both biological and sociological levels); id. at 238-39 (noting that social constructions encourage rape); see also Robin West, Sex, Reason and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413, 2438-40 (1993) (reviewing POSNER, supra) (discussing how Posner's arguments suggest that patriarchy has biological roots, that it is rooted in human nature and that the theory of sociobiology favors the sexual status quo); id. at 2444-46 (under Posner's analysis, patriarchy, rape, and other acts which subordinate women, are not practices of subordination per se, but rather efficient practices, "successful adaptations to biological market conditions for efficient evolutionary strategies").
343. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 44, at 20-22 (noting that notification is often too vague to be useful and causes needless paranoia among the public); Jessica R. Ball, Comment Public Disclosure of "America's Secret Shame:" Child Sex Offender Community Notification in Illinois, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 439 (1996) (noting that 40% of offenders in Washington and 75% in California have failed to register); id. at 440 ("Rather than furthering a state's goal of preventing future sex offenses, community notification serves only as a reactive measure reflecting the community's outrage over the proliferation of sex crimes against children."); Montana, supra note 157, at 584-85 (discussing generally the difficulty criminal offenders have in reassimilating to the community, and that notification laws reinforce the stigmas they face and interfere with reassimilation attempts).
344. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 44, at 20-22 (noting that notification is often too vague to be useful and causes needless paranoia among the public); Jessica R. Ball, Comment Public Disclosure of "America's Secret Shame:" Child Sex Offender Community Notification in Illinois, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 439 (1996) (noting that 40% of offenders in Washington and 75% in California have failed to register); id. at 440 ("Rather than furthering a state's goal of preventing future sex offenses, community notification serves only as a reactive measure reflecting the community's outrage over the proliferation of sex crimes against children."); Montana, supra note 157, at 584-85 (discussing generally the difficulty criminal offenders have in reassimilating to the community, and that notification laws reinforce the stigmas they face and interfere with reassimilation attempts).
345. See sources cited supra notes 160, 163.
346. See sources cited supra note 162.
347. Deborah Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1736 (1991). In the specific context of rape, Aviva Orenstein has noted: Sometimes, particularly in . . . rape cases . . . there will be a conflict between empathy for the accused (particularly when he comes from an oppressed minority) and practical concern for what is good for women. Often, however, . . . this is a false dilemma. Once the problem is analyzed enlightened concern for women's safety recognizes that women are not safer or better off in a world that treats those accused of crimes - even the crime of rape - unfairly. Orenstein, supra note 9, at 690-91 n.113.
348. Legislatures likely would need to rely more heavily on psychological and mental health literature in order to identify which aspects of crime and the offender are adequate predictors of recidivism.
349. Sentiments seem to be mixed regarding this proposition. Some studies suggest a compulsive-like form of recidivism and that child molestors are particularly difficult to rehabilitate. See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 23, at 795 (discussing studies by legislators when "Megan's Law" and "Zachary's Law" were being considered including one finding 74% of imprisoned child sex offenders had a previous conviction for a similar offense and that they were the most difficult class of criminals to rehabilitate and another claiming that the average child sex offender molested 117 children during his lifetime). Others indicate that child molesters do not specialize or recidivate at higher rates than other criminals. See Lenore M.J. Simon, The Myth Of Sex Offender Specialization: An Empirical Analysis, 23 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 387 (1997) (noting that "[f]ew 'rapists' or 'child molesters' specialize in rape and child molestation"); id. at 401 (stating that "there is no evidence that child molesters . . . have higher recidivism rates or are in fact more dangerous than other types of offenders" and claiming that "it is impossible to predict which [convicted child molesters] will remolest" a child victim). We do not advocate that legislatures enact laws limited to child molestation but use this information only as an example of a possible way to limit notification statutes.
350. See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
351. See, e.g., Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 189, at 191-92 (noting that "[sjince sex offender commitments are held out as being applicable only to the 'most dangerous criminals,' the stigma from sex offender commitments is arguably much worse than that of a criminal prosecution") (footnotes omitted); id. at 192 (noting that the language of sex offender discourse is "objectifying and demeaning"). Other commentators note that labeling sex offenders as mentally abnormal, and as "violent sexual predators," may "reinforce their antisocial sexual behavior" and ultimately "get in the way of change and provide [sex offenders] with an excuse for giving in to their sexual urges." Winick, supra note 131, at 539.
352. Sexual predator laws do not enjoy the popularity of registration and notification laws which exist in every state. In fact, twenty-one states have rejected bills proposing such statutes. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 193, at 87-88 (noting that although sexual predator laws have been rejected or withdrawn in 21 states, and that there has always been opposition to the laws, for example, from civil liberties lawyers and some psychiatrists, they have generally proved easy to pass). However, the statutes are politically popular in the states that have them, suggesting that they will not soon be repealed.
353. Some states already require an initial evaluation by a mental health professional. See supra note 37.
354. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 10, at 594-97 (noting that black men receive more severe penalties for rape than white men and that the legal system also discriminates against black women).
355. Orenstein, supra note 9, at 693.
356. See id. 302 See sources cited supra notes 209-10.
357. See Baker, supra note 10, at 612 (noting that various "motivational typologies" allow courts to admit evidence of prior acts of rape under FRE 404(b), without needing 413); id. at 613 (discussing the motive exception at length, and arguing that courts should also rely on the absence of mistake exception in 404(b)).
358. See Orenstein, supra note 9, at 696 ("Although Baker's solution avoids some of the anti-feminist assumptions of Rule 413, it still replicates many of its evils in demonizing defendants and in magnifying unfair prejudice.").
359. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 10, at 612-14 (proposing that judges be required to include different motive typologies, and reasons for admitting prior bad acts evidence in rape cases, in written opinions, thus enabling appellate "supervision" and effective review).
360. Professor Park has urged that states adopt rules similar to FRE 413-415 but only in those cases where consent is a defense - essentially, in acquaintance rape cases. See Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271 (1995). Park makes this argument because in consent defense cases, the accused does not dispute that he had a sexual encounter with the complainant. There is thus no danger that the character evidence will convict an otherwise innocent defendant, or that the person "who actually committed the crime will go free." Id. at 273; see also id. at 275-76.
361. Professor Park's proposal is obviously feminist in that it aims to increase our understanding and prosecution of acquaintance rape. It also cures some of the problems with "rounding up the usual suspects" because the prosecution will not center around trying to identify a stranger who has raped before - the kind of case most likely to impact disparately men already familiar with the criminal justice system. See id. at 273-74. Furthermore, by focusing only on acquaintance rape, Park's proposed rule emphasizes the seriousness of that crime and arguably avoids court attempts to treat acquaintance rapists more leniently after comparison with paradigmatic stranger rapists. However, the existence of a rule aimed only at the crime of rape reinforces the myth that men who rape are more mentally deviant than other criminals and could detract from the benefits of Park's proposed rule or the feminist agenda generally. Because evidence of past convictions could be admissible under the "absence of mistake" exception in FRE 404(b), a neutral rule which does not reinforce sex offender stereotypes, we prefer it to Park's proposal. His proposal is, however, preferable to the existing rules.
362. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
363. For a feminist critique of the federalism arguments raised in opposition to VAWA's civil rights action, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998) (discussing federalism and "localism" as they related to family law specifically). See also Reva Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note 245.
364. The decision's close nature suggests that future courts may be willing to re-examine it. Four justices, Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, argued that VAWA was an acceptable exercise of congressional powers. See 120 S. Ct. at 1774 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
365. As the Anisimov court noted, there are likely to be few instances where a rape is not gender-motivated. See supra note 259. One scholar has suggested a few possible examples, including that the offender "did not care if his victim was a man or a woman, that he had a history of assaulting people of either gender, or that he is psychologically predisposed to sexually assault people of either gender." Willis, supra note 273, at 2221-22. We agree that an offender who rapes men and women interchangeably may not show the requisite gender motivation. However, we note that men often are harassed or sexually assaulted by other men in ways that reflect evidence of gender hierarchies which greatly resemble male-female relationships. Cf. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998) (holding that male workers' sexual harassment of male co-worker was actionable under Title VII). Such rapes may be motivated by gender even if the rapist has male and female victims.
366. See Gaffney, supra note 273, at 286 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court advocates that the concept of a rebuttable presumption is useful in discrimination cases," and that because VAWA provides a discrimination remedy (the civil rights remedy), "a rebuttable presumption . . . would similarly be useful"); Willis, supra note 273, at 2221-22 (arguing that "[o]nce a plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a sexual assault occurred, a rebuttable presumption should arise that the assault was motivated by gender," and that "[i]n the few cases where the sexual assault is not based on gender, the defendant should be allowed to rebut the presumption of gender motivation").
367. See Gaffney, supra note 273, at 286 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court advocates that the concept of a rebuttable presumption is useful in discrimination cases," and that because VAWA provides a discrimination remedy (the civil rights remedy), "a rebuttable presumption . . . would similarly be useful"); Willis, supra note 273, at 2221-22 (arguing that "[o]nce a plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a sexual assault occurred, a rebuttable presumption should arise that the assault was motivated by gender," and that "[i]n the few cases where the sexual assault is not based on gender, the defendant should be allowed to rebut the presumption of gender motivation").