Does Russia have a "market economy"?

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 291-319

  Ericson, Richard E ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035565925     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/088832501766276416     Document Type: Article

References (108)

1. One of the earliest assertions of success in building a market economy is in A. Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995). For a more nuanced if less systematic discussion, see P. Sutela, The Road to the Russian Market Economy (Helsinki: Kikimora, 1998).
2. One of the earliest assertions of success in building a market economy is in A. Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995). For a more nuanced if less systematic discussion, see P. Sutela, The Road to the Russian Market Economy (Helsinki: Kikimora, 1998).
3. See J. Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); and R. E. Ericson, "The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implications for Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:4 (Fall 1991): 11-27, for analysis of the Soviet-type economic system.
4. See J. Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); and R. E. Ericson, "The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implications for Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:4 (Fall 1991): 11-27, for analysis of the Soviet-type economic system.
5. These achievements are chronicled in many places, including Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995); OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1995 (Paris: OECD, 1995); and J. R. Blasi, M. Kroumova, and D. Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Shlapentokh emphasizes the negative aspects of all-encompassing "privatization," including the public sphere and governmental functions (see V. Shlapentokh, "Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 48:3 [1996]: 393-411).
6. These achievements are chronicled in many places, including Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995); OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1995 (Paris: OECD, 1995); and J. R. Blasi, M. Kroumova, and D. Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Shlapentokh emphasizes the negative aspects of all-encompassing "privatization," including the public sphere and governmental functions (see V. Shlapentokh, "Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 48:3 [1996]: 393-411).
7. These achievements are chronicled in many places, including Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995); OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1995 (Paris: OECD, 1995); and J. R. Blasi, M. Kroumova, and D. Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Shlapentokh emphasizes the negative aspects of all-encompassing "privatization," including the public sphere and governmental functions (see V. Shlapentokh, "Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 48:3 [1996]: 393-411).
8. These achievements are chronicled in many places, including Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995); OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1995 (Paris: OECD, 1995); and J. R. Blasi, M. Kroumova, and D. Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Shlapentokh emphasizes the negative aspects of all-encompassing "privatization," including the public sphere and governmental functions (see V. Shlapentokh, "Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 48:3 [1996]: 393-411).
9. These achievements are chronicled in many places, including Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995); OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1995 (Paris: OECD, 1995); and J. R. Blasi, M. Kroumova, and D. Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Shlapentokh emphasizes the negative aspects of all-encompassing "privatization," including the public sphere and governmental functions (see V. Shlapentokh, "Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 48:3 [1996]: 393-411).
10. The many "business success stories" are at the heart of the optimism of economists like Peter Boone and Simon Johnson (see P. Boone and S. Johnson, "Russia after Yeltsin: Economic Alternatives - Boom or Bust or Both?" (paper presented at "Russia Post-Yeltsin" conference, Wye River Center, 19-20 August 1999). See Harley Balzer for an analysis of the new Russian bourgeoisie ("A Shadow Middle Class for a Shadow Economy," Post-Soviet Affairs 14:2 [April-June 1998]: 165-86).
11. The many "business success stories" are at the heart of the optimism of economists like Peter Boone and Simon Johnson (see P. Boone and S. Johnson, "Russia after Yeltsin: Economic Alternatives - Boom or Bust or Both?" (paper presented at "Russia Post-Yeltsin" conference, Wye River Center, 19-20 August 1999). See Harley Balzer for an analysis of the new Russian bourgeoisie ("A Shadow Middle Class for a Shadow Economy," Post-Soviet Affairs 14:2 [April-June 1998]: 165-86).
12. Among these new regulatory bodies were a new Securities and Exchange Commission, a Commission for Real Estate Validation, a State Anti-Monopoly Committee, and a State Committee for the Development and Support of Small Business (see OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation, annex 4 (Paris: OECD, 1997), 200-23.
13. th ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1998); and in OECD, ibid. It is worth noting that new Land and Tax Codes, both critical to defining the powers of, and limitations on, governmental and administrative organs, have yet to be enacted, and are indeed the subject of deep political struggle between the executive and legislative branches at the center and between regions and the center.
14. th ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1998); and in OECD, ibid. It is worth noting that new Land and Tax Codes, both critical to defining the powers of, and limitations on, governmental and administrative organs, have yet to be enacted, and are indeed the subject of deep political struggle between the executive and legislative branches at the center and between regions and the center.
15. The legacies of the military-industrial complex are nicely discussed in C. Gaddy, The Price of the Past (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1996); and K. M. Zisk, Weapons, Culture, and Self-Interest: Soviet Defense Managers in the New Russia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
16. The legacies of the military-industrial complex are nicely discussed in C. Gaddy, The Price of the Past (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1996); and K. M. Zisk, Weapons, Culture, and Self-Interest: Soviet Defense Managers in the New Russia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
17. These include the infamous oligarchs, such as Berezovsky, Potanin, and Gusinsky, with their new financial/media structures. See V. Aleksandrov, "The Magic Seven: Who are They, The Saviors of Russia?" Argumenty I fakty, no. 1-2 (December 1996); O. Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia," ibid., no. 21 (May 1997); M. Goldman, "Leading Russian Industrialists," Economic Newsletter 23:10 (June 1998), Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University; and D. Aikman, "The Men Who Run Russia," Weekly Standard, 20 July 1998, for partial listings and discussion. For a recent update, see G. Winestock and L. Bershidsky, "The Oligarchs: Who's Up, Who's Down," Moscow Times, 12 January 1999. The new elite arose from academic, criminal, and party circles by boldly exploiting opportunities, not always legal, that arose in the chaos created by perestroika and the collapse of central authority and then of the Soviet empire. These were largely opportunities for asset stripping and rent extraction through arbitrage against the irrational price system and the exploitation of special favors/licenses and subsidies from the marcescing state. Among the many sources telling these stories are I. Bunin, Biznesmeny Rossii (Moscow: AO OKA, 1994); Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; P. Kranz, "Russia's Most Powerful Man," Business Week (international ed.), 24 November 1997; and S. L. Solnik, Stealing the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1998).
18. These include the infamous oligarchs, such as Berezovsky, Potanin, and Gusinsky, with their new financial/media structures. See V. Aleksandrov, "The Magic Seven: Who are They, The Saviors of Russia?" Argumenty I fakty, no. 1-2 (December 1996); O. Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia," ibid., no. 21 (May 1997); M. Goldman, "Leading Russian Industrialists," Economic Newsletter 23:10 (June 1998), Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University; and D. Aikman, "The Men Who Run Russia," Weekly Standard, 20 July 1998, for partial listings and discussion. For a recent update, see G. Winestock and L. Bershidsky, "The Oligarchs: Who's Up, Who's Down," Moscow Times, 12 January 1999. The new elite arose from academic, criminal, and party circles by boldly exploiting opportunities, not always legal, that arose in the chaos created by perestroika and the collapse of central authority and then of the Soviet empire. These were largely opportunities for asset stripping and rent extraction through arbitrage against the irrational price system and the exploitation of special favors/licenses and subsidies from the marcescing state. Among the many sources telling these stories are I. Bunin, Biznesmeny Rossii (Moscow: AO OKA, 1994); Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; P. Kranz, "Russia's Most Powerful Man," Business Week (international ed.), 24 November 1997; and S. L. Solnik, Stealing the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1998).
19. These include the infamous oligarchs, such as Berezovsky, Potanin, and Gusinsky, with their new financial/media structures. See V. Aleksandrov, "The Magic Seven: Who are They, The Saviors of Russia?" Argumenty I fakty, no. 1-2 (December 1996); O. Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia," ibid., no. 21 (May 1997); M. Goldman, "Leading Russian Industrialists," Economic Newsletter 23:10 (June 1998), Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University; and D. Aikman, "The Men Who Run Russia," Weekly Standard, 20 July 1998, for partial listings and discussion. For a recent update, see G. Winestock and L. Bershidsky, "The Oligarchs: Who's Up, Who's Down," Moscow Times, 12 January 1999. The new elite arose from academic, criminal, and party circles by boldly exploiting opportunities, not always legal, that arose in the chaos created by perestroika and the collapse of central authority and then of the Soviet empire. These were largely opportunities for asset stripping and rent extraction through arbitrage against the irrational price system and the exploitation of special favors/licenses and subsidies from the marcescing state. Among the many sources telling these stories are I. Bunin, Biznesmeny Rossii (Moscow: AO OKA, 1994); Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; P. Kranz, "Russia's Most Powerful Man," Business Week (international ed.), 24 November 1997; and S. L. Solnik, Stealing the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1998).
20. These include the infamous oligarchs, such as Berezovsky, Potanin, and Gusinsky, with their new financial/media structures. See V. Aleksandrov, "The Magic Seven: Who are They, The Saviors of Russia?" Argumenty I fakty, no. 1-2 (December 1996); O. Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia," ibid., no. 21 (May 1997); M. Goldman, "Leading Russian Industrialists," Economic Newsletter 23:10 (June 1998), Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University; and D. Aikman, "The Men Who Run Russia," Weekly Standard, 20 July 1998, for partial listings and discussion. For a recent update, see G. Winestock and L. Bershidsky, "The Oligarchs: Who's Up, Who's Down," Moscow Times, 12 January 1999. The new elite arose from academic, criminal, and party circles by boldly exploiting opportunities, not always legal, that arose in the chaos created by perestroika and the collapse of central authority and then of the Soviet empire. These were largely opportunities for asset stripping and rent extraction through arbitrage against the irrational price system and the exploitation of special favors/licenses and subsidies from the marcescing state. Among the many sources telling these stories are I. Bunin, Biznesmeny Rossii (Moscow: AO OKA, 1994); Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; P. Kranz, "Russia's Most Powerful Man," Business Week (international ed.), 24 November 1997; and S. L. Solnik, Stealing the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1998).
21. These include the infamous oligarchs, such as Berezovsky, Potanin, and Gusinsky, with their new financial/media structures. See V. Aleksandrov, "The Magic Seven: Who are They, The Saviors of Russia?" Argumenty I fakty, no. 1-2 (December 1996); O. Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia," ibid., no. 21 (May 1997); M. Goldman, "Leading Russian Industrialists," Economic Newsletter 23:10 (June 1998), Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University; and D. Aikman, "The Men Who Run Russia," Weekly Standard, 20 July 1998, for partial listings and discussion. For a recent update, see G. Winestock and L. Bershidsky, "The Oligarchs: Who's Up, Who's Down," Moscow Times, 12 January 1999. The new elite arose from academic, criminal, and party circles by boldly exploiting opportunities, not always legal, that arose in the chaos created by perestroika and the collapse of central authority and then of the Soviet empire. These were largely opportunities for asset stripping and rent extraction through arbitrage against the irrational price system and the exploitation of special favors/licenses and subsidies from the marcescing state. Among the many sources telling these stories are I. Bunin, Biznesmeny Rossii (Moscow: AO OKA, 1994); Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; P. Kranz, "Russia's Most Powerful Man," Business Week (international ed.), 24 November 1997; and S. L. Solnik, Stealing the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1998).
22. These include the infamous oligarchs, such as Berezovsky, Potanin, and Gusinsky, with their new financial/media structures. See V. Aleksandrov, "The Magic Seven: Who are They, The Saviors of Russia?" Argumenty I fakty, no. 1-2 (December 1996); O. Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia," ibid., no. 21 (May 1997); M. Goldman, "Leading Russian Industrialists," Economic Newsletter 23:10 (June 1998), Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University; and D. Aikman, "The Men Who Run Russia," Weekly Standard, 20 July 1998, for partial listings and discussion. For a recent update, see G. Winestock and L. Bershidsky, "The Oligarchs: Who's Up, Who's Down," Moscow Times, 12 January 1999. The new elite arose from academic, criminal, and party circles by boldly exploiting opportunities, not always legal, that arose in the chaos created by perestroika and the collapse of central authority and then of the Soviet empire. These were largely opportunities for asset stripping and rent extraction through arbitrage against the irrational price system and the exploitation of special favors/licenses and subsidies from the marcescing state. Among the many sources telling these stories are I. Bunin, Biznesmeny Rossii (Moscow: AO OKA, 1994); Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; P. Kranz, "Russia's Most Powerful Man," Business Week (international ed.), 24 November 1997; and S. L. Solnik, Stealing the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1998).
23. These include the infamous oligarchs, such as Berezovsky, Potanin, and Gusinsky, with their new financial/media structures. See V. Aleksandrov, "The Magic Seven: Who are They, The Saviors of Russia?" Argumenty I fakty, no. 1-2 (December 1996); O. Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia," ibid., no. 21 (May 1997); M. Goldman, "Leading Russian Industrialists," Economic Newsletter 23:10 (June 1998), Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University; and D. Aikman, "The Men Who Run Russia," Weekly Standard, 20 July 1998, for partial listings and discussion. For a recent update, see G. Winestock and L. Bershidsky, "The Oligarchs: Who's Up, Who's Down," Moscow Times, 12 January 1999. The new elite arose from academic, criminal, and party circles by boldly exploiting opportunities, not always legal, that arose in the chaos created by perestroika and the collapse of central authority and then of the Soviet empire. These were largely opportunities for asset stripping and rent extraction through arbitrage against the irrational price system and the exploitation of special favors/licenses and subsidies from the marcescing state. Among the many sources telling these stories are I. Bunin, Biznesmeny Rossii (Moscow: AO OKA, 1994); Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; P. Kranz, "Russia's Most Powerful Man," Business Week (international ed.), 24 November 1997; and S. L. Solnik, Stealing the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1998).
24. These include the infamous oligarchs, such as Berezovsky, Potanin, and Gusinsky, with their new financial/media structures. See V. Aleksandrov, "The Magic Seven: Who are They, The Saviors of Russia?" Argumenty I fakty, no. 1-2 (December 1996); O. Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia," ibid., no. 21 (May 1997); M. Goldman, "Leading Russian Industrialists," Economic Newsletter 23:10 (June 1998), Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University; and D. Aikman, "The Men Who Run Russia," Weekly Standard, 20 July 1998, for partial listings and discussion. For a recent update, see G. Winestock and L. Bershidsky, "The Oligarchs: Who's Up, Who's Down," Moscow Times, 12 January 1999. The new elite arose from academic, criminal, and party circles by boldly exploiting opportunities, not always legal, that arose in the chaos created by perestroika and the collapse of central authority and then of the Soviet empire. These were largely opportunities for asset stripping and rent extraction through arbitrage against the irrational price system and the exploitation of special favors/licenses and subsidies from the marcescing state. Among the many sources telling these stories are I. Bunin, Biznesmeny Rossii (Moscow: AO OKA, 1994); Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; P. Kranz, "Russia's Most Powerful Man," Business Week (international ed.), 24 November 1997; and S. L. Solnik, Stealing the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1998).
25. These include the infamous oligarchs, such as Berezovsky, Potanin, and Gusinsky, with their new financial/media structures. See V. Aleksandrov, "The Magic Seven: Who are They, The Saviors of Russia?" Argumenty I fakty, no. 1-2 (December 1996); O. Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia," ibid., no. 21 (May 1997); M. Goldman, "Leading Russian Industrialists," Economic Newsletter 23:10 (June 1998), Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University; and D. Aikman, "The Men Who Run Russia," Weekly Standard, 20 July 1998, for partial listings and discussion. For a recent update, see G. Winestock and L. Bershidsky, "The Oligarchs: Who's Up, Who's Down," Moscow Times, 12 January 1999. The new elite arose from academic, criminal, and party circles by boldly exploiting opportunities, not always legal, that arose in the chaos created by perestroika and the collapse of central authority and then of the Soviet empire. These were largely opportunities for asset stripping and rent extraction through arbitrage against the irrational price system and the exploitation of special favors/licenses and subsidies from the marcescing state. Among the many sources telling these stories are I. Bunin, Biznesmeny Rossii (Moscow: AO OKA, 1994); Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; P. Kranz, "Russia's Most Powerful Man," Business Week (international ed.), 24 November 1997; and S. L. Solnik, Stealing the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1998).
26. This is the foundation of the "virtual economy" indicated in P. A. Karpov, "On the Causes of Low Tax Collection (Arrears in the Fiscal System), General Causes of the 'Arrears Crisis' and Opportunities for the Restoration of Solvency of Russian Enterprises," Report of Interdepartmental Balance; B. W Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1998): 53-67; and id., "An Accounting Model of the Virtual Economy in Russia," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 40:2 (1999): 79-97. For an earlier analysis of this situation, see IET, "Russian Enterprises in 1996-7," The Russian Economy: Tendencies and Prospects (Moscow: Institute of Economic Transtion, 1997).
27. This is the foundation of the "virtual economy" indicated in P. A. Karpov, "On the Causes of Low Tax Collection (Arrears in the Fiscal System), General Causes of the 'Arrears Crisis' and Opportunities for the Restoration of Solvency of Russian Enterprises," Report of Interdepartmental Balance; B. W Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1998): 53-67; and id., "An Accounting Model of the Virtual Economy in Russia," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 40:2 (1999): 79-97. For an earlier analysis of this situation, see IET, "Russian Enterprises in 1996-7," The Russian Economy: Tendencies and Prospects (Moscow: Institute of Economic Transtion, 1997).
28. This is the foundation of the "virtual economy" indicated in P. A. Karpov, "On the Causes of Low Tax Collection (Arrears in the Fiscal System), General Causes of the 'Arrears Crisis' and Opportunities for the Restoration of Solvency of Russian Enterprises," Report of Interdepartmental Balance; B. W Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1998): 53-67; and id., "An Accounting Model of the Virtual Economy in Russia," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 40:2 (1999): 79-97. For an earlier analysis of this situation, see IET, "Russian Enterprises in 1996-7," The Russian Economy: Tendencies and Prospects (Moscow: Institute of Economic Transtion, 1997).
29. This is the foundation of the "virtual economy" indicated in P. A. Karpov, "On the Causes of Low Tax Collection (Arrears in the Fiscal System), General Causes of the 'Arrears Crisis' and Opportunities for the Restoration of Solvency of Russian Enterprises," Report of Interdepartmental Balance; B. W Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1998): 53-67; and id., "An Accounting Model of the Virtual Economy in Russia," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 40:2 (1999): 79-97. For an earlier analysis of this situation, see IET, "Russian Enterprises in 1996-7," The Russian Economy: Tendencies and Prospects (Moscow: Institute of Economic Transtion, 1997).
30. This point is made in Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism, and is also clear from the enterprise survey work of S. J. Linz and G. Krueger, "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanism," Comparative Economic Studies 40:2 (1998): 5-52; S. J. Linz, "Russian Firms in Transition: Champions Challengers, and Chaff," ibid. 39:1 (1997): 1-36; K. Hendley, "Struggling to Survive: A Case Study of Adjustment at a Russian Enterprise," Europe-Asia Studies 50:1 (1998). 91-119; K. Hendley, B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, and R. Ryterman, "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," Post-Soviet Affairs (1997): 19-41; B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, R. Ryterman, "End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13:2 (April-June 1997): 105-33; and R. Ryterman and B. Weber "The Role of Attitudes in the Performance of the Legal System: Evidence from a Survey of Russian Firms," World Bank Policy Research Department (workking papers), 1996.
31. This point is made in Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism, and is also clear from the enterprise survey work of S. J. Linz and G. Krueger, "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanism," Comparative Economic Studies 40:2 (1998): 5-52; S. J. Linz, "Russian Firms in Transition: Champions Challengers, and Chaff," ibid. 39:1 (1997): 1-36; K. Hendley, "Struggling to Survive: A Case Study of Adjustment at a Russian Enterprise," Europe-Asia Studies 50:1 (1998). 91-119; K. Hendley, B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, and R. Ryterman, "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," Post-Soviet Affairs (1997): 19-41; B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, R. Ryterman, "End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13:2 (April-June 1997): 105-33; and R. Ryterman and B. Weber "The Role of Attitudes in the Performance of the Legal System: Evidence from a Survey of Russian Firms," World Bank Policy Research Department (workking papers), 1996.
32. This point is made in Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism, and is also clear from the enterprise survey work of S. J. Linz and G. Krueger, "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanism," Comparative Economic Studies 40:2 (1998): 5-52; S. J. Linz, "Russian Firms in Transition: Champions Challengers, and Chaff," ibid. 39:1 (1997): 1-36; K. Hendley, "Struggling to Survive: A Case Study of Adjustment at a Russian Enterprise," Europe-Asia Studies 50:1 (1998). 91-119; K. Hendley, B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, and R. Ryterman, "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," Post-Soviet Affairs (1997): 19-41; B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, R. Ryterman, "End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13:2 (April-June 1997): 105-33; and R. Ryterman and B. Weber "The Role of Attitudes in the Performance of the Legal System: Evidence from a Survey of Russian Firms," World Bank Policy Research Department (workking papers), 1996.
33. This point is made in Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism, and is also clear from the enterprise survey work of S. J. Linz and G. Krueger, "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanism," Comparative Economic Studies 40:2 (1998): 5-52; S. J. Linz, "Russian Firms in Transition: Champions Challengers, and Chaff," ibid. 39:1 (1997): 1-36; K. Hendley, "Struggling to Survive: A Case Study of Adjustment at a Russian Enterprise," Europe-Asia Studies 50:1 (1998). 91-119; K. Hendley, B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, and R. Ryterman, "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," Post-Soviet Affairs (1997): 19-41; B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, R. Ryterman, "End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13:2 (April-June 1997): 105-33; and R. Ryterman and B. Weber "The Role of Attitudes in the Performance of the Legal System: Evidence from a Survey of Russian Firms," World Bank Policy Research Department (workking papers), 1996.
34. This point is made in Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism, and is also clear from the enterprise survey work of S. J. Linz and G. Krueger, "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanism," Comparative Economic Studies 40:2 (1998): 5-52; S. J. Linz, "Russian Firms in Transition: Champions Challengers, and Chaff," ibid. 39:1 (1997): 1-36; K. Hendley, "Struggling to Survive: A Case Study of Adjustment at a Russian Enterprise," Europe-Asia Studies 50:1 (1998). 91-119; K. Hendley, B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, and R. Ryterman, "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," Post-Soviet Affairs (1997): 19-41; B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, R. Ryterman, "End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13:2 (April-June 1997): 105-33; and R. Ryterman and B. Weber "The Role of Attitudes in the Performance of the Legal System: Evidence from a Survey of Russian Firms," World Bank Policy Research Department (workking papers), 1996.
35. This point is made in Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism, and is also clear from the enterprise survey work of S. J. Linz and G. Krueger, "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanism," Comparative Economic Studies 40:2 (1998): 5-52; S. J. Linz, "Russian Firms in Transition: Champions Challengers, and Chaff," ibid. 39:1 (1997): 1-36; K. Hendley, "Struggling to Survive: A Case Study of Adjustment at a Russian Enterprise," Europe-Asia Studies 50:1 (1998). 91-119; K. Hendley, B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, and R. Ryterman, "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," Post-Soviet Affairs (1997): 19-41; B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, R. Ryterman, "End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13:2 (April-June 1997): 105-33; and R. Ryterman and B. Weber "The Role of Attitudes in the Performance of the Legal System: Evidence from a Survey of Russian Firms," World Bank Policy Research Department (workking papers), 1996.
36. This point is made in Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism, and is also clear from the enterprise survey work of S. J. Linz and G. Krueger, "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanism," Comparative Economic Studies 40:2 (1998): 5-52; S. J. Linz, "Russian Firms in Transition: Champions Challengers, and Chaff," ibid. 39:1 (1997): 1-36; K. Hendley, "Struggling to Survive: A Case Study of Adjustment at a Russian Enterprise," Europe-Asia Studies 50:1 (1998). 91-119; K. Hendley, B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, and R. Ryterman, "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," Post-Soviet Affairs (1997): 19-41; B. W. Ickes, P. Murrell, R. Ryterman, "End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 13:2 (April-June 1997): 105-33; and R. Ryterman and B. Weber "The Role of Attitudes in the Performance of the Legal System: Evidence from a Survey of Russian Firms," World Bank Policy Research Department (workking papers), 1996.
37. See T. Frye and A Shleifer, "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review 87:2 (May 1997): 354-58; A. Shleifer, "Government in Transition," European Economic Review 41:3-5 (1997): 385-410; and A. Aslund, "Observations on theh Development of Small Private Enterprise in Russia," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 38:4 (1997): 191-205.
38. See T. Frye and A Shleifer, "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review 87:2 (May 1997): 354-58; A. Shleifer, "Government in Transition," European Economic Review 41:3-5 (1997): 385-410; and A. Aslund, "Observations on theh Development of Small Private Enterprise in Russia," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 38:4 (1997): 191-205.
39. See T. Frye and A Shleifer, "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review 87:2 (May 1997): 354-58; A. Shleifer, "Government in Transition," European Economic Review 41:3-5 (1997): 385-410; and A. Aslund, "Observations on theh Development of Small Private Enterprise in Russia," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 38:4 (1997): 191-205.
40. This is illustrated in most of the articles in J. D. Sachs and K. Pistor, eds., The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997).
41. This point is made in both K. Verdery, "A Transition from Socialism to Feudalism? Thoughts on the Postsocialist State," in What was Socialism and What Comes Next? chap. 8 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 204-28; and V. Shlapentokh, "Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for contemporary Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 48:3 (1996): 393-411; and is again reflected in Sachs and Pistor, Rule of Law and Economic Reform.
42. This point is made in both K. Verdery, "A Transition from Socialism to Feudalism? Thoughts on the Postsocialist State," in What was Socialism and What Comes Next? chap. 8 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 204-28; and V. Shlapentokh, "Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for contemporary Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 48:3 (1996): 393-411; and is again reflected in Sachs and Pistor, Rule of Law and Economic Reform.
43. This point is made in both K. Verdery, "A Transition from Socialism to Feudalism? Thoughts on the Postsocialist State," in What was Socialism and What Comes Next? chap. 8 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 204-28; and V. Shlapentokh, "Early Feudalism - The Best Parallel for contemporary Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 48:3 (1996): 393-411; and is again reflected in Sachs and Pistor, Rule of Law and Economic Reform.
44. The prevalence of corruption has been widely discussed in the wake of the "Fimaco," "Mabetex," and "Bank of NY" money-laundering scandals of mid-1999. Articles discussing the state of Swiss, U.S., and/or Russian investigations can be found in virtually every issue of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal from 10-24 September 1999. This is considered by most Russians to be just the tip of the iceberg.
45. The prevalence of corruption has been widely discussed in the wake of the "Fimaco," "Mabetex," and "Bank of NY" money-laundering scandals of mid-1999. Articles discussing the state of Swiss, U.S., and/or Russian investigations can be found in virtually every issue of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal from 10-24 September 1999. This is considered by most Russians to be just the tip of the iceberg.
46. This applies for example, to the work of public-sector employees, the provision of transportation services and energy, and the supply of military bases, all without (often even partial) payment.
47. I am, of course, questioning the implicit teleology of "transition" that dominates the economic discussion of change in the post-Soviet world. This involves speculation on just what might result (a third way?) if the current transformation is not ultimately to result in a transition to a modern market economy. Such a third way need not, of course, have any relation to the desirable combination of plan and market that was the object of third way speculation prior to the collapse of communism in Europe.
48. nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996); M. M. Postan, Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); id., The Medieval Economy and Society (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1975); F. L. Pryor, "Feudalism as an Economic System," Journal of Comparative Economics 4:1 (March 1980): 56-77; and T. Rader, The Economics of Feudalism (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1971).
49. nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996); M. M. Postan, Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); id., The Medieval Economy and Society (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1975); F. L. Pryor, "Feudalism as an Economic System," Journal of Comparative Economics 4:1 (March 1980): 56-77; and T. Rader, The Economics of Feudalism (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1971).
50. nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996); M. M. Postan, Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); id., The Medieval Economy and Society (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1975); F. L. Pryor, "Feudalism as an Economic System," Journal of Comparative Economics 4:1 (March 1980): 56-77; and T. Rader, The Economics of Feudalism (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1971).
51. nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996); M. M. Postan, Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); id., The Medieval Economy and Society (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1975); F. L. Pryor, "Feudalism as an Economic System," Journal of Comparative Economics 4:1 (March 1980): 56-77; and T. Rader, The Economics of Feudalism (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1971).
52. nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996); M. M. Postan, Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); id., The Medieval Economy and Society (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1975); F. L. Pryor, "Feudalism as an Economic System," Journal of Comparative Economics 4:1 (March 1980): 56-77; and T. Rader, The Economics of Feudalism (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1971).
53. nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996); M. M. Postan, Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); id., The Medieval Economy and Society (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1975); F. L. Pryor, "Feudalism as an Economic System," Journal of Comparative Economics 4:1 (March 1980): 56-77; and T. Rader, The Economics of Feudalism (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1971).
54. This felicitous phrase is due to Anderson, Absolutist State.
55. nd ed. (Boston, Mass,: Houghton Mifflin, 1985).
56. The classic analysis of the economic roles of LPOs in the Soviet Union is J. Hough, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).
57. Aslund has called this "a negotiated economy with ample privilege for large and powerful enterprises regardless of their economy efficiency" (see A. Aslund, Russia's Financial Crisis: Causes and Possible Remedies," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 30:6 [1998]: 300-28, 319).
58. Many of these are loosely called FIGs consisting of a network of related enterprises and their controlling or subordinate "pocket" bank(s). They include the financial empires of the so-called oligarchs (n. 8 above). For a clear discussion of the origin and varieties of FIG, see J. Johnson, "Russia's Emerging Financial-Industrial Groups," Post-Soviet Affairs 13:4 (October-December 1997): 333-65.
59. Moscow, in a singular defeat for Chubias and the State Privatization Program, was able to take control of federal as well as regional and local privatization within the city, with the explicit support of President Yeltsin for his friend, political supporter, and successor as mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov.
60. This point is well noted in Shleifer, "Government in Transition."
61. The ability of governments to grant or withhold access to use of such instruments as a means of controlling business behavior, income, and wealth is stressed by Yu. Latynina, "Holy Roman Empire," Izvestia, 23 April 1999.
62. Among other examples, Belgorod has taken over its iron ore combine, Sverdlovsk has taken a stake in Alkar Aluminum, Krasnoyarsk has bought into the Krasnoyarsky Metallurgichesky Zavod, Kursk has taken equity in Mikhailovsky Iron Works, the Moscow city government is buying into the local automobile firm, Tataria has bought into Kam Az and Tatneft Oil, and Samara into Avto Vaz (See Izvestia, 17 October 1997). More recently the Moscow Times has reported that St. Petersburg and Sverdlovsk, among other regions, are taking controlling interests in their leading regional banks, and Sverdlovsk is planning to take a 25 percent share in Nizhnii Tagil Metal in exchange for restructuring the company's tax and wage arrears (RFE/RL Newsline, 4 November 1998). The EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, has noted further take-overs in 1999 in Ul'ianovsk [no. 3]; Krasnoyarsk [no. 4]; Voronezh [no. 10]; Moscow [no. 11, no. 14]; Primorye [no. 13]; Sverdlovsk [no. 14]; and Chel'iabinsk [no. 15].
63. Among other examples, Belgorod has taken over its iron ore combine, Sverdlovsk has taken a stake in Alkar Aluminum, Krasnoyarsk has bought into the Krasnoyarsky Metallurgichesky Zavod, Kursk has taken equity in Mikhailovsky Iron Works, the Moscow city government is buying into the local automobile firm, Tataria has bought into Kam Az and Tatneft Oil, and Samara into Avto Vaz (See Izvestia, 17 October 1997). More recently the Moscow Times has reported that St. Petersburg and Sverdlovsk, among other regions, are taking controlling interests in their leading regional banks, and Sverdlovsk is planning to take a 25 percent share in Nizhnii Tagil Metal in exchange for restructuring the company's tax and wage arrears (RFE/RL Newsline, 4 November 1998). The EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, has noted further take-overs in 1999 in Ul'ianovsk [no. 3]; Krasnoyarsk [no. 4]; Voronezh [no. 10]; Moscow [no. 11, no. 14]; Primorye [no. 13]; Sverdlovsk [no. 14]; and Chel'iabinsk [no. 15].
64. Among other examples, Belgorod has taken over its iron ore combine, Sverdlovsk has taken a stake in Alkar Aluminum, Krasnoyarsk has bought into the Krasnoyarsky Metallurgichesky Zavod, Kursk has taken equity in Mikhailovsky Iron Works, the Moscow city government is buying into the local automobile firm, Tataria has bought into Kam Az and Tatneft Oil, and Samara into Avto Vaz (See Izvestia, 17 October 1997). More recently the Moscow Times has reported that St. Petersburg and Sverdlovsk, among other regions, are taking controlling interests in their leading regional banks, and Sverdlovsk is planning to take a 25 percent share in Nizhnii Tagil Metal in exchange for restructuring the company's tax and wage arrears (RFE/RL Newsline, 4 November 1998). The EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, has noted further take-overs in 1999 in Ul'ianovsk [no. 3]; Krasnoyarsk [no. 4]; Voronezh [no. 10]; Moscow [no. 11, no. 14]; Primorye [no. 13]; Sverdlovsk [no. 14]; and Chel'iabinsk [no. 15].
65. Among other examples, Belgorod has taken over its iron ore combine, Sverdlovsk has taken a stake in Alkar Aluminum, Krasnoyarsk has bought into the Krasnoyarsky Metallurgichesky Zavod, Kursk has taken equity in Mikhailovsky Iron Works, the Moscow city government is buying into the local automobile firm, Tataria has bought into Kam Az and Tatneft Oil, and Samara into Avto Vaz (See Izvestia, 17 October 1997). More recently the Moscow Times has reported that St. Petersburg and Sverdlovsk, among other regions, are taking controlling interests in their leading regional banks, and Sverdlovsk is planning to take a 25 percent share in Nizhnii Tagil Metal in exchange for restructuring the company's tax and wage arrears (RFE/RL Newsline, 4 November 1998). The EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, has noted further take-overs in 1999 in Ul'ianovsk [no. 3]; Krasnoyarsk [no. 4]; Voronezh [no. 10]; Moscow [no. 11, no. 14]; Primorye [no. 13]; Sverdlovsk [no. 14]; and Chel'iabinsk [no. 15].
66. In December 1998, Krasnoyarsk and Kemerova regions joined Tatarstan, Altai, and the Volgograd region in introducing new restrictions on food trade and grain transportation (Moscow Times, 12 December 1998). On earlier actions see S. Krayukhin, T. Zil'ber, "Regiony v bor'be s krizison," Izvestia, 12 September 1998.
67. In December 1998, Krasnoyarsk and Kemerova regions joined Tatarstan, Altai, and the Volgograd region in introducing new restrictions on food trade and grain transportation (Moscow Times, 12 December 1998). On earlier actions see S. Krayukhin, T. Zil'ber, "Regiony v bor'be s krizison," Izvestia, 12 September 1998.
68. Moscow has been particularly active in wooing foreign investors and cutting deals with other regions for the exchange of food or energy for manufacturers. Other leaders have been Veliki Novgorod, Samara, the "autonomous" republics, such as Tatarstan and Sakha (Yakutia) and the industrialized regions of the Urals and western Siberia. Over a half dozen regions had issued Eurobonds, and another four had central permission to do so, when the August financial crisis struck. Among the earliest and largest borrowers was Tatarstan, which defaulted in November on $100 million of debt (see J. Ingram, "Projects Halted in Tatar Republic," AP, 10 January 1999). Both Moscow and Nizhny-Novgorod are, in early 1999, also in technical default and renegotiation with creditors (see EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, no. 13 and no. 17.).
69. Moscow has been particularly active in wooing foreign investors and cutting deals with other regions for the exchange of food or energy for manufacturers. Other leaders have been Veliki Novgorod, Samara, the "autonomous" republics, such as Tatarstan and Sakha (Yakutia) and the industrialized regions of the Urals and western Siberia. Over a half dozen regions had issued Eurobonds, and another four had central permission to do so, when the August financial crisis struck. Among the earliest and largest borrowers was Tatarstan, which defaulted in November on $100 million of debt (see J. Ingram, "Projects Halted in Tatar Republic," AP, 10 January 1999). Both Moscow and Nizhny-Novgorod are, in early 1999, also in technical default and renegotiation with creditors (see EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, no. 13 and no. 17.).
70. This is reflected in prevailing attitudes and behavior during privatization discussed in S. Clarke, P. Fairbrother, V. Borisov, Bizyukov, "The Privatization of Industrial Enterprises in Russia: Four Case Studies," Europe-Asia Studies 46:2 (1994): 179-214; Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism; and Hendley, "Struggling to Survive."
71. This is reflected in prevailing attitudes and behavior during privatization discussed in S. Clarke, P. Fairbrother, V. Borisov, Bizyukov, "The Privatization of Industrial Enterprises in Russia: Four Case Studies," Europe-Asia Studies 46:2 (1994): 179-214; Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism; and Hendley, "Struggling to Survive."
72. This is reflected in prevailing attitudes and behavior during privatization discussed in S. Clarke, P. Fairbrother, V. Borisov, Bizyukov, "The Privatization of Industrial Enterprises in Russia: Four Case Studies," Europe-Asia Studies 46:2 (1994): 179-214; Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism; and Hendley, "Struggling to Survive."
73. Well-functioning markets have a "separation property" which tends to localize the consequences of decisions, disentangling the fates of different economic agents.
74. Evidence appears at least weekly in the Russian press. See, for example, RFE/RL Newsline, 4 and 7 September 1998; 18 November 1998; and 9, 11, and 14 December 1998. Indeed the tax system is most reminiscent of medieval "tax farming," as noted in Aslund, "Russia's Financial Crisis," 321.
75. Evidence appears at least weekly in the Russian press. See, for example, RFE/RL Newsline, 4 and 7 September 1998; 18 November 1998; and 9, 11, and 14 December 1998. Indeed the tax system is most reminiscent of medieval "tax farming," as noted in Aslund, "Russia's Financial Crisis," 321.
76. This nature of the privatization is discussed in Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism; Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; Boicko et al., much criticized in Russia, particularly by those who were "left out," and is noted as a defining systemic characteristic by Sutela.
77. This nature of the privatization is discussed in Blasi et al., Kremlin Capitalism; Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy; Boicko et al., much criticized in Russia, particularly by those who were "left out," and is noted as a defining systemic characteristic by Sutela.
78. This involves efforts to "protect" local markets by blocking outside supply and by forbidding export by local producers. See the references in n. 26 and n. 27 above.
79. Enterprise transactions in the Soviet Union were essentially demonetized, and that is again becoming the case in much of basic Russian industry. See Ickes et al., "End of the Tunnel?"; S. Aukutsionek, "Barter v Rossiiskoi promyshlennosti" (Barter in Russian industry), Voprosy ekonomiki 70:2 (1998): 51-60; and Aslund, "Russia's Financial Crisis."
80. Enterprise transactions in the Soviet Union were essentially demonetized, and that is again becoming the case in much of basic Russian industry. See Ickes et al., "End of the Tunnel?"; S. Aukutsionek, "Barter v Rossiiskoi promyshlennosti" (Barter in Russian industry), Voprosy ekonomiki 70:2 (1998): 51-60; and Aslund, "Russia's Financial Crisis."
81. Enterprise transactions in the Soviet Union were essentially demonetized, and that is again becoming the case in much of basic Russian industry. See Ickes et al., "End of the Tunnel?"; S. Aukutsionek, "Barter v Rossiiskoi promyshlennosti" (Barter in Russian industry), Voprosy ekonomiki 70:2 (1998): 51-60; and Aslund, "Russia's Financial Crisis."
82. This is the primary subject of the Karpov Report.
83. The Duma again twice rejected a land code with presidential revisions on 23 December 1998, leaving Russia without enabling legislation for a land market (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 December 1998). A number of regions are attempting to impose their own "land codes" without enabling legislation from the center, e.g., Samara (EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, n. 13) and Perm (ibid., no. 11).
84. The Duma again twice rejected a land code with presidential revisions on 23 December 1998, leaving Russia without enabling legislation for a land market (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 December 1998). A number of regions are attempting to impose their own "land codes" without enabling legislation from the center, e.g., Samara (EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, n. 13) and Perm (ibid., no. 11).
85. The Duma again twice rejected a land code with presidential revisions on 23 December 1998, leaving Russia without enabling legislation for a land market (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 December 1998). A number of regions are attempting to impose their own "land codes" without enabling legislation from the center, e.g., Samara (EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, n. 13) and Perm (ibid., no. 11).
86. See, for example, the discussion of the banking system in RECEP's Russian Economic Trends, 11 November 1998; or L. Sycheva and L Mikhailov, "Moscow Banks' Balance Sheet Portfolios in 1995-97," IET@online.ru, June 1998.
87. See, for example, the discussion of the banking system in RECEP's Russian Economic Trends, 11 November 1998; or L. Sycheva and L Mikhailov, "Moscow Banks' Balance Sheet Portfolios in 1995-97," IET@online.ru, June 1998.
88. In particular, there was a limited investment in the critical, energy sector because the Duma failed to approve a reasonable production-sharing agreement and pass enabling legislation before mid-1999 (see the discussion of FDI in RECEP's Russian Economic Trends, 11 March 1999).
89. The best recent discussion of new small business in Russia is Aslund, "Observations on the Development of Small Private Enterprise in Russia." For evidence on the political problems of small business in Ul'ianovsk, see the IEW Regional Report, vol. 4, nos. 3 and 10.
90. The changes in industry are investigated in detail in M. Kuboniwa, E. Gavrilenkov, Development of Capitalism in Russia: The Second Challenge (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1997), chap. 4; while general sectoral and price changes are discussed in OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1995 (Paris: OECD, 1995), chap. 1, which also makes the point about the lack of significant change when Soviet structure is measured in world prices.
91. The changes in industry are investigated in detail in M. Kuboniwa, E. Gavrilenkov, Development of Capitalism in Russia: The Second Challenge (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1997), chap. 4; while general sectoral and price changes are discussed in OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1995 (Paris: OECD, 1995), chap. 1, which also makes the point about the lack of significant change when Soviet structure is measured in world prices.
92. Grossman offers the classic statement of the nature of planning and valuation in a command economy in G. Grossman, "Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy," Soviet Studies 15:2 (1963): 101-23. The argument is further developed in R. E. Ericson, "The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implication for Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:4 (Fall 1991): 11-27; id., "The Structural Barrier to Transition Hidden in Input-Output Tables of Centrally Planned Economies," Economic Systems 23:3 (September 1999): 199-224.
93. Grossman offers the classic statement of the nature of planning and valuation in a command economy in G. Grossman, "Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy," Soviet Studies 15:2 (1963): 101-23. The argument is further developed in R. E. Ericson, "The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implication for Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:4 (Fall 1991): 11-27; id., "The Structural Barrier to Transition Hidden in Input-Output Tables of Centrally Planned Economies," Economic Systems 23:3 (September 1999): 199-224.
94. Grossman offers the classic statement of the nature of planning and valuation in a command economy in G. Grossman, "Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy," Soviet Studies 15:2 (1963): 101-23. The argument is further developed in R. E. Ericson, "The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implication for Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:4 (Fall 1991): 11-27; id., "The Structural Barrier to Transition Hidden in Input-Output Tables of Centrally Planned Economies," Economic Systems 23:3 (September 1999): 199-224.
95. See the case study of the Saratov Aviation plant's struggle to survive in Hendley, "Struggling to Survive;" the work of the British sociologist Simon Clarke and his collective in Clarke et al., "Privatization of Industrial Enterprises in Russia;" and the study of the fate of Soviet
96. See the case study of the Saratov Aviation plant's struggle to survive in Hendley, "Struggling to Survive;" the work of the British sociologist Simon Clarke and his collective in Clarke et al., "Privatization of Industrial Enterprises in Russia;" and the study of the fate of Soviet military industry by Gaddy, Price of the Past.
97. See the case study of the Saratov Aviation plant's struggle to survive in Hendley, "Struggling to Survive;" the work of the British sociologist Simon Clarke and his collective in Clarke et al., "Privatization of Industrial Enterprises in Russia;" and the study of the fate of Soviet military industry by Gaddy, Price of the Past.
98. Gaddy and Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy;" and id., "An Accounting Model of the Virtual Economy in Russia."
99. Gaddy and Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy;" and id., "An Accounting Model of the Virtual Economy in Russia."
100. This behavior is analyzed in Gaddy and Ickes, "To Restructure or Not to Restructure: Informal Activities and Enterprise Behavior in Transition," WDI Working Paper 134, February 1998.
101. As Aslund notes, Menatep evolved from a bank to an industrial holding company, Rosprom, to an energy company based on Yukos. Similarly, Bank Rossiiskii Kredit has become a holding company in the metallurgical industry and Oneximbank has combined Noril'sk Nikel with Sidanko oil (Aslund, "Russia's Financial Crisis").
102. Regional and city bosses are beginning to move to reduce or eliminate the authority of elected "inconvenient" subordinates in Nizhny-Novgorod, Rostov, Saratov, Voronezh, and Ul'ianovsk (see EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, nos. 12 and 14-16). Most recently, we have seen moves by the presidential administration and "family" to cement control over the major industrial fiefdoms of Gazprom, UES, Transneft, and the railroads in preparation for the 1999 Duma and 2000 presidential elections (see A. Peresvet, "The Electorate's Votes will Flow by the 'Pipe,'" Rossiia, 9 July 1999).
103. Regional and city bosses are beginning to move to reduce or eliminate the authority of elected "inconvenient" subordinates in Nizhny-Novgorod, Rostov, Saratov, Voronezh, and Ul'ianovsk (see EWI Regional Report, vol. 4, nos. 12 and 14-16). Most recently, we have seen moves by the presidential administration and "family" to cement control over the major industrial fiefdoms of Gazprom, UES, Transneft, and the railroads in preparation for the 1999 Duma and 2000 presidential elections (see A. Peresvet, "The Electorate's Votes will Flow by the 'Pipe,'" Rossiia, 9 July 1999).
104. The Gazprom, UES, or Lukoil might be considered single feudal domains, extraordinarily large manors, integrating the political, social, and economic life of their members. With recent appointments, they seem to be moving onto the presidential demesne (Peresvet, ibid.).
105. The end of 1999 brought the abdication of the president and his appointment of a successor, Vladimir V. Putin, who as a young and vigorous leader, may well alter this configuration of political forces. He will still, however, have to deal with the underlying structural characteristics outlined above.
106. Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy.
107. The idea that Russia is entering (has entered?) a new feudal period is central to a number of recent articles by Russian economists. See, for example, I. Khakamada, "Quasi-Taxes for a Quasi-Feudal State," Kommersant' Daily, 19 March 1999; and Latynia, "Holy Roman Empire."
108. The idea that Russia is entering (has entered?) a new feudal period is central to a number of recent articles by Russian economists. See, for example, I. Khakamada, "Quasi-Taxes for a Quasi-Feudal State," Kommersant' Daily, 19 March 1999; and Latynia, "Holy Roman Empire."