From Eastern Empire to Western Hegemony: East Central Europe under two international regimes

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 221-249

  Janos, Andrew C ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035565924     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/088832501766276380     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. Francis Fukuyama, "Are We at the End of History?" Fortune, 15 January 1990, 75-77.
2. Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); or Lucian W. Pye, "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism," American Political Science Review 84:1 (March 1990): 3-19.
3. Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); or Lucian W. Pye, "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism," American Political Science Review 84:1 (March 1990): 3-19.
4. Kenneth Jowitt, "The Leninist Legacy," in Ivo Banac, ed., East Europe in Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 207-25.
5. See Jacques Rupnik, "Remapping Europe," Daedalus 123:8 (Summer 1994): 91-114; or Roman Szporluk, "After Empire What?" ibid., 21-39.
6. See Jacques Rupnik, "Remapping Europe," Daedalus 123:8 (Summer 1994): 91-114; or Roman Szporluk, "After Empire What?" ibid., 21-39.
7. For a review of this literature, see Philippe Schmitter, "Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation," Journal of Democracy 8:2 (April 1997): 168-74.
8. Jowitt, "Leninist Legacy," 207.
9. Steven M. Fish, "Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience," Post-Soviet Affairs 14 (July-September 1998): 21-48; also idem, "Postcommunist Subversion of Social Science and Democratization in Eastern Europe and Asia," Slavic Review 58:4 (Winter 1999): 799-802; and personal conversations.
10. Steven M. Fish, "Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience," Post-Soviet Affairs 14 (July-September 1998): 21-48; also idem, "Postcommunist Subversion of Social Science and Democratization in Eastern Europe and Asia," Slavic Review 58:4 (Winter 1999): 799-802; and personal conversations.
11. The term used by Parsons, translating Max Weber's Herrschaftssystem. See Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1947), 152, 324.
12. The term used by Parsons, translating Max Weber's Herrschaftssystem. See Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1947), 152, 324.
13. On external forces shaping internal politics, sec Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization 32 (Fall 1978); on hegemon-client relations, see G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization 44 (September 1990), 283-315.
14. On external forces shaping internal politics, sec Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization 32 (Fall 1978); on hegemon-client relations, see G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization 44 (September 1990), 283-315.
15. On this point, see Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, [1958], 1974), xlv.
16. For two excellent analyses of Soviet ethnopolitics, see Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," Slavic Review 53:2 (Summer 1994): 414-53; and Amir Weiner, "Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the Soviet Socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of Socialism," American Historical Review 104:4 (October 1999): 1114-55.
17. For two excellent analyses of Soviet ethnopolitics, see Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," Slavic Review 53:2 (Summer 1994): 414-53; and Amir Weiner, "Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the Soviet Socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of Socialism," American Historical Review 104:4 (October 1999): 1114-55.
18. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, [1960] 1967), 105-39.
19. This argument has been elaborated in considerable detail in Andrew C. Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre-to Postcommunism (Stanford, Cl.: Stanford University Press, 2000). Apart from the bibliography of this work, see Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
20. This argument has been elaborated in considerable detail in Andrew C. Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre-to Postcommunism (Stanford, Cl.: Stanford University Press, 2000). Apart from the bibliography of this work, see Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
21. For a classic statement on this process, see Gregory Grossman, "The Structure and Organization of the Soviet Economy," Slavic Review 21:3 (June 1962): 215-20.
22. For the period January 1990-December 1996, G-7 commitments of direct grants to East Central Europe are reported at $31.7 billion. See Wade Jacoby, "International Organization, Central European Elites and Western Models" (forthcoming article); see also "Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: the Impact on the European Union and Central Europe," Economic Policy 24 (April 1997), quoted in The Economist, 12 April 1997, 77. During the same period, U.S. defense spending fell from $324 billion (1990) to $239 billion (1997). In relation to the U.S. GNP, defense spending fell from 5.9 to 3.1 percent, for NATO Europe from 3.6 to 2.2 percent. See U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998), 339-41; see also NATO, On-Line Library Nato Handbook at nato.mt/ docu/handbook/1998 v155).
23. For the period January 1990-December 1996, G-7 commitments of direct grants to East Central Europe are reported at $31.7 billion. See Wade Jacoby, "International Organization, Central European Elites and Western Models" (forthcoming article); see also "Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: the Impact on the European Union and Central Europe," Economic Policy 24 (April 1997), quoted in The Economist, 12 April 1997, 77. During the same period, U.S. defense spending fell from $324 billion (1990) to $239 billion (1997). In relation to the U.S. GNP, defense spending fell from 5.9 to 3.1 percent, for NATO Europe from 3.6 to 2.2 percent. See U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998), 339-41; see also NATO, On-Line Library Nato Handbook at nato.mt/ docu/handbook/1998 v155).
24. For the period January 1990-December 1996, G-7 commitments of direct grants to East Central Europe are reported at $31.7 billion. See Wade Jacoby, "International Organization, Central European Elites and Western Models" (forthcoming article); see also "Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: the Impact on the European Union and Central Europe," Economic Policy 24 (April 1997), quoted in The Economist, 12 April 1997, 77. During the same period, U.S. defense spending fell from $324 billion (1990) to $239 billion (1997). In relation to the U.S. GNP, defense spending fell from 5.9 to 3.1 percent, for NATO Europe from 3.6 to 2.2 percent. See U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998), 339-41; see also NATO, On-Line Library Nato Handbook at nato.mt/ docu/handbook/1998 v155).
25. For the period January 1990-December 1996, G-7 commitments of direct grants to East Central Europe are reported at $31.7 billion. See Wade Jacoby, "International Organization, Central European Elites and Western Models" (forthcoming article); see also "Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: the Impact on the European Union and Central Europe," Economic Policy 24 (April 1997), quoted in The Economist, 12 April 1997, 77. During the same period, U.S. defense spending fell from $324 billion (1990) to $239 billion (1997). In relation to the U.S. GNP, defense spending fell from 5.9 to 3.1 percent, for NATO Europe from 3.6 to 2.2 percent. See U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998), 339-41; see also NATO, On-Line Library Nato Handbook at nato.mt/ docu/handbook/1998 v155).
26. See Gertrude Himmelfarb, One Nation, Two Cultures (New York: Knopf, 1999); and an equally revealing review of the book by Terry Teachout, "We Lost, Now What?" National Review, 22 November 1999, 51-52.
27. See Gertrude Himmelfarb, One Nation, Two Cultures (New York: Knopf, 1999); and an equally revealing review of the book by Terry Teachout, "We Lost, Now What?" National Review, 22 November 1999, 51-52.
28. The discourse in the celebrated Élian Gonzáles case illustrates these points. Supporters of a speedy repatriation described Cuban communism as a "lifestyle" and no longer a "looming evil" (quoted in Newsweek, 1 May 2000, 80), while denouncing conservative columnist George Will for committing blasphemy by comparing Cuba to fascist states and the antebellum South (see "An Insult to History," editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, 13 April 2000).
29. The discourse in the celebrated Élian Gonzáles case illustrates these points. Supporters of a speedy repatriation described Cuban communism as a "lifestyle" and no longer a "looming evil" (quoted in Newsweek, 1 May 2000, 80), while denouncing conservative columnist George Will for committing blasphemy by comparing Cuba to fascist states and the antebellum South (see "An Insult to History," editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, 13 April 2000).
30. For a German source on this subject, see Heiner Moeller, "Die neue deutsche Gefahr: Grossmacht Deutschland, europäische Destabilisierung und Sicherheit in Europe nach dem kalten Krieg," in Andrea Komlosy, Hannes Hofbauer and Jürgen Elsasser, eds., Krisenherd Europa: Nationalismus, Regionalismus, Krieg (Göttingen: Die Werkstatt, 1994), 335-56.
31. In the words of The Economist of London, "inevitably, since victors dictate the terms of post-war order, the new post-cold war interventionism has reflected the views and values of the West, notably the United States." ("The Economist Review," 13 May 2000, 4).
32. In the words of The Economist of London, "inevitably, since victors dictate the terms of post-war order, the new post-cold war interventionism has reflected the views and values of the West, notably the United States." ("The Economist Review," 13 May 2000, 4).
33. András Sajó, "Universal Rights, Missionaries, Converts and Local Savages," East European Constitutional Review (EECR) 8:1 (Winter 1997): 46.
34. French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine in abstaining from voting for the Warsaw declaration on democratic principles; see RFE/RL Newsline, 27 June 2000.
35. See Alan Mayhew, Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 21-23; Kazimierz Poznanski, "The Morals of Transition: Decline of Public Interest and Runaway Reforms in Eastern Europe," in Sorin Antohi and Vladimir Tismaneanu, eds., Between Past and Future (Budapest/New York: Central European Press, 2000), 232.
36. See Alan Mayhew, Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 21-23; Kazimierz Poznanski, "The Morals of Transition: Decline of Public Interest and Runaway Reforms in Eastern Europe," in Sorin Antohi and Vladimir Tismaneanu, eds., Between Past and Future (Budapest/New York: Central European Press, 2000), 232.
37. Poznanski, "The Morals of Transition," 234-42.
38. Although western trade with Eastern Europe (including the European members of the former USSR) increased three times between 1990 and 1997, it still represents only 7 percent of EU trade with Japan, the United States, and other "developed capitalist" countries, and amounts to a mere 1.6 percent of the EU countries' aggregate GDP (See UN International Trade Statistical Yearbook [New York, 1997], 522-25, and EU Facts and Figures, 1998 [eurounion.org/profile/facts]).
39. Although western trade with Eastern Europe (including the European members of the former USSR) increased three times between 1990 and 1997, it still represents only 7 percent of EU trade with Japan, the United States, and other "developed capitalist" countries, and amounts to a mere 1.6 percent of the EU countries' aggregate GDP (See UN International Trade Statistical Yearbook [New York, 1997], 522-25, and EU Facts and Figures, 1998 [eurounion.org/profile/facts]).
40. For a long list of these public admonitions see Janos, East Central Europe, 367-71. For more recent examples concerning the Roma-Gypsy minority, see RFE/RL Newsline, 24 February and 13 March 2000.
41. For a long list of these public admonitions see Janos, East Central Europe, 367-71. For more recent examples concerning the Roma-Gypsy minority, see RFE/RL Newsline, 24 February and 13 March 2000.
42. The worldwide relevance of this phenomenon and the potential clash between the ethnic agendas of universalism and particularism is described in vivid colors in Yoram Hazony, "Anti-Social Texts: Israel's Zionism-Free Textbooks," New Republic, 17-21 April 2000, 46-55.
43. See Csaba Gombár, "By the Time Sovereignty Fell Into Our Laps It had Become Obsolete," in Gombár, ed., The Appeals of Sovereignty (Highland Lakes, N.J./New York: Atlantic Publications/Columbia University Press, 1998), 7-48.
44. Steven Weber, "European Union Conditionality," in Barry Eichengreen, Jeffrey Frieden, Jürgen von Hagen, eds., Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe (Berlin: Springer, 1995), 192-202.
45. RFE/RL Newsline, 11 February 2000
46. See Joseph T. Bombelles, "Federal Aid to the Less Developed Regions of Yugoslavia," East European Politics and Society 5:3 (Fall 1991): 459-60; Paul Shoup, Yugoslavia and the National Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), esp. 235-36, 243-45.
47. See Joseph T. Bombelles, "Federal Aid to the Less Developed Regions of Yugoslavia," East European Politics and Society 5:3 (Fall 1991): 459-60; Paul Shoup, Yugoslavia and the National Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), esp. 235-36, 243-45.
48. Wiktor Osyatinski, Review of Legal Reform in Post-Communist Europe: The View from Within, by Stanislaw Frankowski and Paul B. Stephen in East European Constitutional Review (EECR) 5:1 (Winter 1996): 79-81.
49. Wiktor Osyatinski, Review of Legal Reform in Post-Communist Europe: The View from Within, by Stanislaw Frankowski and Paul B. Stephen in East European Constitutional Review (EECR) 5:1 (Winter 1996): 79-81.
50. For Hungary, see András Sajó on the "perverse effects of the rule of law" in "How the Constitutional Court Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform," EECR 5:1 (Winter 1996): 31-41; for Poland, Jerzy Wiatr, "Constitutional Accountability in Poland after 1989," ibid., 42-46. For Slovakia, Cass R. Sunstein, "The Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts: Notes on Theory and Practice," EECR 7:1 (Winter 1998): 61-62. Also, "Interviews with the Area Judiciary," East European Constitutional Review 6:1 (Winter 1997): 64-90.
51. For Hungary, see András Sajó on the "perverse effects of the rule of law" in "How the Constitutional Court Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform," EECR 5:1 (Winter 1996): 31-41; for Poland, Jerzy Wiatr, "Constitutional Accountability in Poland after 1989," ibid., 42-46. For Slovakia, Cass R. Sunstein, "The Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts: Notes on Theory and Practice," EECR 7:1 (Winter 1998): 61-62. Also, "Interviews with the Area Judiciary," East European Constitutional Review 6:1 (Winter 1997): 64-90.
52. For Hungary, see András Sajó on the "perverse effects of the rule of law" in "How the Constitutional Court Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform," EECR 5:1 (Winter 1996): 31-41; for Poland, Jerzy Wiatr, "Constitutional Accountability in Poland after 1989," ibid., 42-46. For Slovakia, Cass R. Sunstein, "The Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts: Notes on Theory and Practice," EECR 7:1 (Winter 1998): 61-62. Also, "Interviews with the Area Judiciary," East European Constitutional Review 6:1 (Winter 1997): 64-90.
53. For Hungary, see András Sajó on the "perverse effects of the rule of law" in "How the Constitutional Court Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform," EECR 5:1 (Winter 1996): 31-41; for Poland, Jerzy Wiatr, "Constitutional Accountability in Poland after 1989," ibid., 42-46. For Slovakia, Cass R. Sunstein, "The Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts: Notes on Theory and Practice," EECR 7:1 (Winter 1998): 61-62. Also, "Interviews with the Area Judiciary," East European Constitutional Review 6:1 (Winter 1997): 64-90.
54. William H. Buiter, "Challenges of the Second Transition Decade in Russia," Transition 11:5 (August-October 2000): 24.
55. Osyatinski, 79.
56. Monica Macovei, "Legal Culture in Romania," EECR 7:1 (Winter 1998): 79.
57. Sunstein, "The Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts," 62.
58. "Corruption: An International Comparison," Transition (World Bank) 7:7 (July-August 1996): 16-17.
59. "Knocking on the Union's Door," The Economist, 13 May 2000, 49.
60. On 26 April 2000, the Polish Senate reaffirmed the country's commitment to "a Europe of sovereign and equal states." The vote came on the 1000th anniversary of Polish statehood (RFE/RL Newsline, 27 April 2000).
61. More recently on the issue of expelling Russia from the Council of Europe and on the Council's resolution to abrogate the "Beneš decrees" of 1945 (on German and Hungarian collective guilt). On this last matter, Foreign Minister Jan Kavan advised pointedly that the "EU has not been established to solve anew problems of those defeated in World War II," adding that Germany could never be admitted to the EU if judged by its history (See RFE/RL Newsline, 20 and 27 April 2000). Shortly thereafter Vaclav Klaus, former premier and current leader of the opposition, opined that "Europe has reached the stage where the sovereignty of states is fundamentally challenged," and remonstrated against the moral-cultural agenda of the West as one that would lead to the breakup of the family and the traditional model of society (See RFE/RL Newsline, 24 June 2000).
62. More recently on the issue of expelling Russia from the Council of Europe and on the Council's resolution to abrogate the "Beneš decrees" of 1945 (on German and Hungarian collective guilt). On this last matter, Foreign Minister Jan Kavan advised pointedly that the "EU has not been established to solve anew problems of those defeated in World War II," adding that Germany could never be admitted to the EU if judged by its history (See RFE/RL Newsline, 20 and 27 April 2000). Shortly thereafter Vaclav Klaus, former premier and current leader of the opposition, opined that "Europe has reached the stage where the sovereignty of states is fundamentally challenged," and remonstrated against the moral-cultural agenda of the West as one that would lead to the breakup of the family and the traditional model of society (See RFE/RL Newsline, 24 June 2000).
63. For a summary of these reactions, see "Publisher's Column"; Andrew Stroehlein, "The Issue;" Pete Baumgartner, "Moscow, Minsk and Milosević;" Milan Znoj, "Kosova and Munich;" and several other articles in The New Presence (The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs), May 1999, 1-14.
64. For a summary of these reactions, see "Publisher's Column"; Andrew Stroehlein, "The Issue;" Pete Baumgartner, "Moscow, Minsk and Milosević;" Milan Znoj, "Kosova and Munich;" and several other articles in The New Presence (The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs), May 1999, 1-14.
65. For a summary of these reactions, see "Publisher's Column"; Andrew Stroehlein, "The Issue;" Pete Baumgartner, "Moscow, Minsk and Milosević;" Milan Znoj, "Kosova and Munich;" and several other articles in The New Presence (The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs), May 1999, 1-14.
66. For a summary of these reactions, see "Publisher's Column"; Andrew Stroehlein, "The Issue;" Pete Baumgartner, "Moscow, Minsk and Milosević;" Milan Znoj, "Kosova and Munich;" and several other articles in The New Presence (The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs), May 1999, 1-14.
67. For a summary of these reactions, see "Publisher's Column"; Andrew Stroehlein, "The Issue;" Pete Baumgartner, "Moscow, Minsk and Milosević;" Milan Znoj, "Kosova and Munich;" and several other articles in The New Presence (The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs), May 1999, 1-14.
68. Dobrica Ćosić, Stvarno i moguče, (Ljubljana-Zagreb: Cankarjeva založba, 1988), 143. Referred to by Svobodan Milošević while laying flowers at the national monument at Avala, Ilustrovana Politika, 1 May 1999.
69. Dobrica Ćosić, Stvarno i moguče, (Ljubljana-Zagreb: Cankarjeva založba, 1988), 143. Referred to by Svobodan Milošević while laying flowers at the national monument at Avala, Ilustrovana Politika, 1 May 1999.