Explanatory Pluralism and Macro-Causation

Theory & Psychology

Volumn 11, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 761-772

  Meyering, Theo ^a  

^a LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

autonomy of psychology; downward causation; reductionism; supervenience; systems

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035565739     PISSN: 09593543     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0959354301116003     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Bechtel, W., & Mundale, J. (1999). Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states. Philosophy of Science, 66, 175-207.
2. Berlin, I.(1953). The hedgehog and the fox. New York: Simon & Schuster.
3. Block, N., & Fodor, J. A. (1980). What psychological states are not. In N. Block (Ed.), Readings in philosophy of psychology, Vol. 1 (pp. 237-250). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1972.)
4. Dretske, F.(1993). Mental events as structuring causes of behavior. In H. Mele (Ed.), Mental causation (pp. 121-136). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5. Fodor, J. A.(1981). Special sciences, or the disunity of science as a working hypothesis. In Representations: Philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science (pp. 127-145). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Original work published 1974.)
6. Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1988). Functionalism and broad content. Mind, XCVII(387), 381-400.
7. Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1990). Program explanation: A general perspective. Analysis, 50, 107-117.
8. Kelso, J.A.S.(1995). Dynamic patterns: The self-organization of brain and behavior. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9. Kim, J.(1984). Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9, 257-270.
10. MacDonald, G.(1998). Reduction and the unity of science. Paper presented at the OSW conference on Reductionism, Oisterwijk, The Netherlands.
11. McCauley, R., & Bechtel, W. (2001). Explanatory pluralism and heuristic identity theory. Theory & Psychology, 11(6), 736-760.
12. Menzies, P.(1988). Against causal reductionism. Mind, XCVII, 551-574.
13. Meyering, T. C.(2000). Physicalism and downward causation in psychology and the special sciences. Inquiry, 43, 181-202.
14. Nagel, E.(1961). The structure of science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
15. Putnam, H.(1980). The nature of mental states. In N. Block (Ed.), Readings in philosophy of psychology, Vol. 1 (pp. 223-231). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1967 as: Psychological predicates.)
16. van Gulick, R.(1995). Who's is in charge here? And who's doing all the work? In J. Heil & A. Mele (Eds.), Mental causation (pp. 233-256). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
17. Wilson, R. A.(1994). Causal depth, theoretical appropriateness, and individualism in psychology. Philosophy of Science, 61(1), 55-75.