In the Name of National Security: US Counterterrorist Measures, 1960-2000

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 15-60

  Donohue, Laura K ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0035563347     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546550109609689     Document Type: Review

References (199)

1. Figures provided by the Office of Management and Budget, reprinted in Peter Eisler, 'This is only a test, but lives still at stake', USA Today (Friday, 7 July 2000) p.5A.
2. Figures for fiscal year 1997 from General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO/NSIAD-99-163 (Sept. 1999). Figures for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 are from the Office of Management of Budget, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism: Including Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection (18 May 2000) p.45.
3. Figures for fiscal year 1997 from General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO/NSIAD-99-163 (Sept. 1999). Figures for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 are from the Office of Management of Budget, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism: Including Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection (18 May 2000) p.45.
4. See also Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, 'America and the New Terrorism', Survival 42/1 (Spring 2000) p.59.
5. In the Senate, for instance, the Appropriations Committee, Armed Services Committee, Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, Environment and Public Works Committee, Foreign Relations Committee, Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, Judiciary Committee, and Select Committee on Intelligence all held hearings relating to terrorism. In the House the Armed Services Committee, Commerce Committee, Government Reform Committee, Intelligence Committee, International Relations Committee, Judiciary Committee, Science Committee, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and Joint Economic Committee became engaged in this issue.
6. The taxonomy avoids distinguishing measures along lines advocated in other counterterrorist typologies, for three reasons. First, many of the distinctions collapse under scrutiny. Accordingly, this article avoids focusing on strict international and domestic distinctions, the number of countries engaged in counterterrorist activity, and the temporal relationship that the use of such measures bears to the occurrence of an actual terrorist incident. In the first instance, the overlap between the domestic installment of international mechanisms and the consequent penalties levied on US citizens for infringement of the measures blurs the distinction between what might be considered international or domestic. The majority of attacks have occurred overseas. Three of the five categories - international diplomacy, international coercion, and overseas personnel and operations, focus on foreign countries, organizations, and individuals. Their effect on US citizens, companies, and organizations can hardly be ignored, however. The domestic criminal law and noncriminal measures categories devote substantial time to the ability of foreign nationals to launch attacks within the United States. Many of these provisions, however, apply equally to US entities. In the second instance, many of the measures within each category cross unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral mechanisms. In the third instance, although most are designed to respond to a particular event or series of events, to examine each provision in a temporal manner ignores the far-reaching impact of measures employed. Other authors have focused on three such approaches: the first centres on the distinction between short and long-term responses (see for instance Peter C. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality. [Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989]). Measures designed to solve an immediate crisis constitute the first area, with preventative or long-term reform measures filling the second. In many instances, though, short-term fixes become long-term default strategies. Their continued use makes these measures de facto long-term responses, substantially reducing the use of such a distinction. Second, a distinction is sometimes made between measures as being employed before, during, or after a future terrorist event. This approach fails to focus on the specific purpose of the measure, which was to respond to the immediate situation. Third, typologies that focus on reactive versus proactive policies claim that short-term, incident-specific policies tend to ignore the longer-term issues, while proactive measures account for the consequences resulting from particular measures (see the discussion in Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet', Western Responses to Terrorism [London: Frank Cass 1993] pp.307-40). These approaches suffer from the same limitations as the above two. The second reason for departing from traditional typological approaches is that it is often in the interplay of the dichotomies that the effectiveness of the measures can be evaluated. Separating them according to somewhat false distinctions removes the opportunity to assess the impact of the measures in their entirety. For instance, it may be that the combination of the international and domestic elements of a particular provision provides the key to mitigating the threat posed by a terrorist organization. Separating the phenomena early on may hamper effective evaluation later. This does not mean that the distinctions may not be helpful later in analyzing the catalogue of measures provided in this taxonomy. The distinction between conciliatory responses and repressive responses may shed light on how different government branches have viewed specific measures and subsequently used them (see Sederberg [note 12], Alex P. Schmid, 'Force or Conciliation? An Overview of Some Problems Associated with Current Anti-terrorist Response Strategies', Violence, Aggression and Terrorism 2/2 (May 1988) pp.149-78; Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled', in Wilkinson and Steward (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism 3/23; Ronald D. Crelinsten, Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats', Terrorism and Political Violence 1/2 (April 1989) pp.242-69; and Crelinsten and Schmid, op. cit.). Finally, a need currently exists for information to be collated on the breadth and depth of past US counterterrorist measures. In the final years of the twentieth century the United States concern with the terrorist threat significantly increased. Little has been written, however, that systematically lays out measures that have been taken to deal with it. Instead, the focus has been on evaluating the terrorist threat or analyzing responses in particular areas.
7. The taxonomy avoids distinguishing measures along lines advocated in other counterterrorist typologies, for three reasons. First, many of the distinctions collapse under scrutiny. Accordingly, this article avoids focusing on strict international and domestic distinctions, the number of countries engaged in counterterrorist activity, and the temporal relationship that the use of such measures bears to the occurrence of an actual terrorist incident. In the first instance, the overlap between the domestic installment of international mechanisms and the consequent penalties levied on US citizens for infringement of the measures blurs the distinction between what might be considered international or domestic. The majority of attacks have occurred overseas. Three of the five categories - international diplomacy, international coercion, and overseas personnel and operations, focus on foreign countries, organizations, and individuals. Their effect on US citizens, companies, and organizations can hardly be ignored, however. The domestic criminal law and noncriminal measures categories devote substantial time to the ability of foreign nationals to launch attacks within the United States. Many of these provisions, however, apply equally to US entities. In the second instance, many of the measures within each category cross unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral mechanisms. In the third instance, although most are designed to respond to a particular event or series of events, to examine each provision in a temporal manner ignores the far-reaching impact of measures employed. Other authors have focused on three such approaches: the first centres on the distinction between short and long-term responses (see for instance Peter C. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality. [Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989]). Measures designed to solve an immediate crisis constitute the first area, with preventative or long-term reform measures filling the second. In many instances, though, short-term fixes become long-term default strategies. Their continued use makes these measures de facto long-term responses, substantially reducing the use of such a distinction. Second, a distinction is sometimes made between measures as being employed before, during, or after a future terrorist event. This approach fails to focus on the specific purpose of the measure, which was to respond to the immediate situation. Third, typologies that focus on reactive versus proactive policies claim that short-term, incident-specific policies tend to ignore the longer-term issues, while proactive measures account for the consequences resulting from particular measures (see the discussion in Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet', Western Responses to Terrorism [London: Frank Cass 1993] pp.307-40). These approaches suffer from the same limitations as the above two. The second reason for departing from traditional typological approaches is that it is often in the interplay of the dichotomies that the effectiveness of the measures can be evaluated. Separating them according to somewhat false distinctions removes the opportunity to assess the impact of the measures in their entirety. For instance, it may be that the combination of the international and domestic elements of a particular provision provides the key to mitigating the threat posed by a terrorist organization. Separating the phenomena early on may hamper effective evaluation later. This does not mean that the distinctions may not be helpful later in analyzing the catalogue of measures provided in this taxonomy. The distinction between conciliatory responses and repressive responses may shed light on how different government branches have viewed specific measures and subsequently used them (see Sederberg [note 12], Alex P. Schmid, 'Force or Conciliation? An Overview of Some Problems Associated with Current Anti-terrorist Response Strategies', Violence, Aggression and Terrorism 2/2 (May 1988) pp.149-78; Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled', in Wilkinson and Steward (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism 3/23; Ronald D. Crelinsten, Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats', Terrorism and Political Violence 1/2 (April 1989) pp.242-69; and Crelinsten and Schmid, op. cit.). Finally, a need currently exists for information to be collated on the breadth and depth of past US counterterrorist measures. In the final years of the twentieth century the United States concern with the terrorist threat significantly increased. Little has been written, however, that systematically lays out measures that have been taken to deal with it. Instead, the focus has been on evaluating the terrorist threat or analyzing responses in particular areas.
8. The taxonomy avoids distinguishing measures along lines advocated in other counterterrorist typologies, for three reasons. First, many of the distinctions collapse under scrutiny. Accordingly, this article avoids focusing on strict international and domestic distinctions, the number of countries engaged in counterterrorist activity, and the temporal relationship that the use of such measures bears to the occurrence of an actual terrorist incident. In the first instance, the overlap between the domestic installment of international mechanisms and the consequent penalties levied on US citizens for infringement of the measures blurs the distinction between what might be considered international or domestic. The majority of attacks have occurred overseas. Three of the five categories - international diplomacy, international coercion, and overseas personnel and operations, focus on foreign countries, organizations, and individuals. Their effect on US citizens, companies, and organizations can hardly be ignored, however. The domestic criminal law and noncriminal measures categories devote substantial time to the ability of foreign nationals to launch attacks within the United States. Many of these provisions, however, apply equally to US entities. In the second instance, many of the measures within each category cross unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral mechanisms. In the third instance, although most are designed to respond to a particular event or series of events, to examine each provision in a temporal manner ignores the far-reaching impact of measures employed. Other authors have focused on three such approaches: the first centres on the distinction between short and long-term responses (see for instance Peter C. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality. [Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989]). Measures designed to solve an immediate crisis constitute the first area, with preventative or long-term reform measures filling the second. In many instances, though, short-term fixes become long-term default strategies. Their continued use makes these measures de facto long-term responses, substantially reducing the use of such a distinction. Second, a distinction is sometimes made between measures as being employed before, during, or after a future terrorist event. This approach fails to focus on the specific purpose of the measure, which was to respond to the immediate situation. Third, typologies that focus on reactive versus proactive policies claim that short-term, incident-specific policies tend to ignore the longer-term issues, while proactive measures account for the consequences resulting from particular measures (see the discussion in Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet', Western Responses to Terrorism [London: Frank Cass 1993] pp.307-40). These approaches suffer from the same limitations as the above two. The second reason for departing from traditional typological approaches is that it is often in the interplay of the dichotomies that the effectiveness of the measures can be evaluated. Separating them according to somewhat false distinctions removes the opportunity to assess the impact of the measures in their entirety. For instance, it may be that the combination of the international and domestic elements of a particular provision provides the key to mitigating the threat posed by a terrorist organization. Separating the phenomena early on may hamper effective evaluation later. This does not mean that the distinctions may not be helpful later in analyzing the catalogue of measures provided in this taxonomy. The distinction between conciliatory responses and repressive responses may shed light on how different government branches have viewed specific measures and subsequently used them (see Sederberg [note 12], Alex P. Schmid, 'Force or Conciliation? An Overview of Some Problems Associated with Current Anti-terrorist Response Strategies', Violence, Aggression and Terrorism 2/2 (May 1988) pp.149-78; Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled', in Wilkinson and Steward (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism 3/23; Ronald D. Crelinsten, Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats', Terrorism and Political Violence 1/2 (April 1989) pp.242-69; and Crelinsten and Schmid, op. cit.). Finally, a need currently exists for information to be collated on the breadth and depth of past US counterterrorist measures. In the final years of the twentieth century the United States concern with the terrorist threat significantly increased. Little has been written, however, that systematically lays out measures that have been taken to deal with it. Instead, the focus has been on evaluating the terrorist threat or analyzing responses in particular areas.
9. The taxonomy avoids distinguishing measures along lines advocated in other counterterrorist typologies, for three reasons. First, many of the distinctions collapse under scrutiny. Accordingly, this article avoids focusing on strict international and domestic distinctions, the number of countries engaged in counterterrorist activity, and the temporal relationship that the use of such measures bears to the occurrence of an actual terrorist incident. In the first instance, the overlap between the domestic installment of international mechanisms and the consequent penalties levied on US citizens for infringement of the measures blurs the distinction between what might be considered international or domestic. The majority of attacks have occurred overseas. Three of the five categories - international diplomacy, international coercion, and overseas personnel and operations, focus on foreign countries, organizations, and individuals. Their effect on US citizens, companies, and organizations can hardly be ignored, however. The domestic criminal law and noncriminal measures categories devote substantial time to the ability of foreign nationals to launch attacks within the United States. Many of these provisions, however, apply equally to US entities. In the second instance, many of the measures within each category cross unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral mechanisms. In the third instance, although most are designed to respond to a particular event or series of events, to examine each provision in a temporal manner ignores the far-reaching impact of measures employed. Other authors have focused on three such approaches: the first centres on the distinction between short and long-term responses (see for instance Peter C. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality. [Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989]). Measures designed to solve an immediate crisis constitute the first area, with preventative or long-term reform measures filling the second. In many instances, though, short-term fixes become long-term default strategies. Their continued use makes these measures de facto long-term responses, substantially reducing the use of such a distinction. Second, a distinction is sometimes made between measures as being employed before, during, or after a future terrorist event. This approach fails to focus on the specific purpose of the measure, which was to respond to the immediate situation. Third, typologies that focus on reactive versus proactive policies claim that short-term, incident-specific policies tend to ignore the longer-term issues, while proactive measures account for the consequences resulting from particular measures (see the discussion in Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet', Western Responses to Terrorism [London: Frank Cass 1993] pp.307-40). These approaches suffer from the same limitations as the above two. The second reason for departing from traditional typological approaches is that it is often in the interplay of the dichotomies that the effectiveness of the measures can be evaluated. Separating them according to somewhat false distinctions removes the opportunity to assess the impact of the measures in their entirety. For instance, it may be that the combination of the international and domestic elements of a particular provision provides the key to mitigating the threat posed by a terrorist organization. Separating the phenomena early on may hamper effective evaluation later. This does not mean that the distinctions may not be helpful later in analyzing the catalogue of measures provided in this taxonomy. The distinction between conciliatory responses and repressive responses may shed light on how different government branches have viewed specific measures and subsequently used them (see Sederberg [note 12], Alex P. Schmid, 'Force or Conciliation? An Overview of Some Problems Associated with Current Anti-terrorist Response Strategies', Violence, Aggression and Terrorism 2/2 (May 1988) pp.149-78; Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled', in Wilkinson and Steward (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism 3/23; Ronald D. Crelinsten, Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats', Terrorism and Political Violence 1/2 (April 1989) pp.242-69; and Crelinsten and Schmid, op. cit.). Finally, a need currently exists for information to be collated on the breadth and depth of past US counterterrorist measures. In the final years of the twentieth century the United States concern with the terrorist threat significantly increased. Little has been written, however, that systematically lays out measures that have been taken to deal with it. Instead, the focus has been on evaluating the terrorist threat or analyzing responses in particular areas.
10. The taxonomy avoids distinguishing measures along lines advocated in other counterterrorist typologies, for three reasons. First, many of the distinctions collapse under scrutiny. Accordingly, this article avoids focusing on strict international and domestic distinctions, the number of countries engaged in counterterrorist activity, and the temporal relationship that the use of such measures bears to the occurrence of an actual terrorist incident. In the first instance, the overlap between the domestic installment of international mechanisms and the consequent penalties levied on US citizens for infringement of the measures blurs the distinction between what might be considered international or domestic. The majority of attacks have occurred overseas. Three of the five categories - international diplomacy, international coercion, and overseas personnel and operations, focus on foreign countries, organizations, and individuals. Their effect on US citizens, companies, and organizations can hardly be ignored, however. The domestic criminal law and noncriminal measures categories devote substantial time to the ability of foreign nationals to launch attacks within the United States. Many of these provisions, however, apply equally to US entities. In the second instance, many of the measures within each category cross unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral mechanisms. In the third instance, although most are designed to respond to a particular event or series of events, to examine each provision in a temporal manner ignores the far-reaching impact of measures employed. Other authors have focused on three such approaches: the first centres on the distinction between short and long-term responses (see for instance Peter C. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality. [Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989]). Measures designed to solve an immediate crisis constitute the first area, with preventative or long-term reform measures filling the second. In many instances, though, short-term fixes become long-term default strategies. Their continued use makes these measures de facto long-term responses, substantially reducing the use of such a distinction. Second, a distinction is sometimes made between measures as being employed before, during, or after a future terrorist event. This approach fails to focus on the specific purpose of the measure, which was to respond to the immediate situation. Third, typologies that focus on reactive versus proactive policies claim that short-term, incident-specific policies tend to ignore the longer-term issues, while proactive measures account for the consequences resulting from particular measures (see the discussion in Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet', Western Responses to Terrorism [London: Frank Cass 1993] pp.307-40). These approaches suffer from the same limitations as the above two. The second reason for departing from traditional typological approaches is that it is often in the interplay of the dichotomies that the effectiveness of the measures can be evaluated. Separating them according to somewhat false distinctions removes the opportunity to assess the impact of the measures in their entirety. For instance, it may be that the combination of the international and domestic elements of a particular provision provides the key to mitigating the threat posed by a terrorist organization. Separating the phenomena early on may hamper effective evaluation later. This does not mean that the distinctions may not be helpful later in analyzing the catalogue of measures provided in this taxonomy. The distinction between conciliatory responses and repressive responses may shed light on how different government branches have viewed specific measures and subsequently used them (see Sederberg [note 12], Alex P. Schmid, 'Force or Conciliation? An Overview of Some Problems Associated with Current Anti-terrorist Response Strategies', Violence, Aggression and Terrorism 2/2 (May 1988) pp.149-78; Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled', in Wilkinson and Steward (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism 3/23; Ronald D. Crelinsten, Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats', Terrorism and Political Violence 1/2 (April 1989) pp.242-69; and Crelinsten and Schmid, op. cit.). Finally, a need currently exists for information to be collated on the breadth and depth of past US counterterrorist measures. In the final years of the twentieth century the United States concern with the terrorist threat significantly increased. Little has been written, however, that systematically lays out measures that have been taken to deal with it. Instead, the focus has been on evaluating the terrorist threat or analyzing responses in particular areas.
11. The taxonomy avoids distinguishing measures along lines advocated in other counterterrorist typologies, for three reasons. First, many of the distinctions collapse under scrutiny. Accordingly, this article avoids focusing on strict international and domestic distinctions, the number of countries engaged in counterterrorist activity, and the temporal relationship that the use of such measures bears to the occurrence of an actual terrorist incident. In the first instance, the overlap between the domestic installment of international mechanisms and the consequent penalties levied on US citizens for infringement of the measures blurs the distinction between what might be considered international or domestic. The majority of attacks have occurred overseas. Three of the five categories - international diplomacy, international coercion, and overseas personnel and operations, focus on foreign countries, organizations, and individuals. Their effect on US citizens, companies, and organizations can hardly be ignored, however. The domestic criminal law and noncriminal measures categories devote substantial time to the ability of foreign nationals to launch attacks within the United States. Many of these provisions, however, apply equally to US entities. In the second instance, many of the measures within each category cross unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral mechanisms. In the third instance, although most are designed to respond to a particular event or series of events, to examine each provision in a temporal manner ignores the far-reaching impact of measures employed. Other authors have focused on three such approaches: the first centres on the distinction between short and long-term responses (see for instance Peter C. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality. [Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989]). Measures designed to solve an immediate crisis constitute the first area, with preventative or long-term reform measures filling the second. In many instances, though, short-term fixes become long-term default strategies. Their continued use makes these measures de facto long-term responses, substantially reducing the use of such a distinction. Second, a distinction is sometimes made between measures as being employed before, during, or after a future terrorist event. This approach fails to focus on the specific purpose of the measure, which was to respond to the immediate situation. Third, typologies that focus on reactive versus proactive policies claim that short-term, incident-specific policies tend to ignore the longer-term issues, while proactive measures account for the consequences resulting from particular measures (see the discussion in Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, 'Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet', Western Responses to Terrorism [London: Frank Cass 1993] pp.307-40). These approaches suffer from the same limitations as the above two. The second reason for departing from traditional typological approaches is that it is often in the interplay of the dichotomies that the effectiveness of the measures can be evaluated. Separating them according to somewhat false distinctions removes the opportunity to assess the impact of the measures in their entirety. For instance, it may be that the combination of the international and domestic elements of a particular provision provides the key to mitigating the threat posed by a terrorist organization. Separating the phenomena early on may hamper effective evaluation later. This does not mean that the distinctions may not be helpful later in analyzing the catalogue of measures provided in this taxonomy. The distinction between conciliatory responses and repressive responses may shed light on how different government branches have viewed specific measures and subsequently used them (see Sederberg [note 12], Alex P. Schmid, 'Force or Conciliation? An Overview of Some Problems Associated with Current Anti-terrorist Response Strategies', Violence, Aggression and Terrorism 2/2 (May 1988) pp.149-78; Ronald D. Crelinsten, 'Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled', in Wilkinson and Steward (eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism 3/23; Ronald D. Crelinsten, Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats', Terrorism and Political Violence 1/2 (April 1989) pp.242-69; and Crelinsten and Schmid, op. cit.). Finally, a need currently exists for information to be collated on the breadth and depth of past US counterterrorist measures. In the final years of the twentieth century the United States concern with the terrorist threat significantly increased. Little has been written, however, that systematically lays out measures that have been taken to deal with it. Instead, the focus has been on evaluating the terrorist threat or analyzing responses in particular areas.
12. For an early discussion of this problem see John Dugard, 'International Terrorism: Problems of Definition,' International Affairs (London) 50/1 (Jan. 1974).
13. For discussion of issues involved in defining terrorism see for instance Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman et al. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books 1988) pp.1-39.
14. Robert H. Kupperman and Darell Trent, Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press 1979) p.142.
15. Thomas M. Franck and Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., 'Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism,' American Journal of International Law (January 1974), 69, cited in Mark A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies. (New York: Greenwood Press 1987) p.97.
16. Thomas M. Franck and Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., 'Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism,' American Journal of International Law (January 1974), 69, cited in Mark A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies. (New York: Greenwood Press 1987) p.97.
17. US Congress, House, Committee on Internal Security, Terrorism, Part 2, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. (16 May 1974), 3310. For further discussion of UN efforts to address terrorism, see Celmer (note 9) pp.95-111.
18. 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 17, embodied in regulations located at 14 CFR 107-108.
19. 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Offenses Commilted on board Aircraft; embodied in PL 91-449; 84 Stat. 921.
20. 16 Dec. 1970, 22 UST 1641, 10 ILM 133.
21. 23 Sept. 1971, 24 UST 565, 10 ILM 1151.
22. 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation, Section 60021 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, PL 103-322.
23. Celmer (note 9) p.99.
24. Note that the. 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations required states to preserve diplomatic relations. (The Vienna Convention, 18 April 1961, 23 UST 3227, TIAS 7502.)
25. 27 UST 3949, TIAS 8413.
26. USC, Congressional and Administrative News, 94th Congress, 2nd sess., vol.4 (St Paul: West Publishing Co. 1976) 4481.
27. 28 UST 77, TIAS 6820. Internationally-protected individuals include foreign ministers, heads of state, heads of government, and family members accompanying the official who, at the time (he crime is committed, 'is entitled pursuant to international law to special protection from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity' (Art. 1(1), 28 UST 77, TIAS 6820).
28. UN GAOR Supp. No.46 (A/3443), 1979, 245-7, UN Doc. A/RES/34/146. Embedded in domestic law via PL 98-473, 18 USC § 1203.
29. The US implemented this measure in 1982 via PL 97-351, 18 USC § 831.
30. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (26 March 1975), TIAS 8062; 26 UST 583.
31. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 26 U.S.T. 571.
32. .
33. This instrument, however, has not yet passed the House (Michael Kraft, Office of State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 'Existing U.S. Legal Authorities Relating to Terrorism' [18 Dec. 1999] p.20).
34. 1988 IIMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, implemented in domestic law as sec.60019 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (PL 103-322).
35. See Jan S. Breemer, 'Offshore Energy Terrorism: Perspectives on a Problem', Terrorism: An International Journal 6/3 (1983) pp.455-65.
36. For European Conventions relating to terrorism see for instance the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (27 Jan. 1977, 15 ILM 1272), and the Agreement on the Application of the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (4 Dec. 1979, 19 ILM 325).
37. SC Res. 579,40 US SCOR (2637 mtg.) 24-5, UN Doc. S/17,685 (1985).
38. Dennis A. Pluchinsky, Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (1 Sept. 2000).
39. US Department of State, Combatting [sic] Terrorism: American Policy and Organization (Department of State bulletin August 1982) 4. Anti-terrorism training programs located in the 1983 Foreign Assistance Act, sec.8.
40. Celmer(note9)p.31.
41. Celmer (note 9) p.32.
42. For instance, the 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act lifted restrictions in the law that allowed for only certain courses to be taught overseas and limited the amount of time instructors could be based abroad. (1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, sec.328)
43. Pluchinsky (note 31).
44. Michael A. Sheehan's Senate Testimony on Terrorism commission Report, 15 June 2000, at .
45. See for instance the 1999 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (PL 105-277) and the 1997 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (PL 104-208).
46. 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, PL 98-533; 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act, PL 99-399.
47. 'The Counterterrorism Rewards Program', Department of State Diplomatic Security Service (Dec. 1998).
48. The internet site, , receives approximately 100,000 hits per month.
49. 1998 Extradition Treaties Interpretation Act of 1998, PL 105-323; amending the 1956 State Department Basic Authorities Act, PL 84-885.
50. Pluchinsky (note 31).
51. For discussion of extraterritorial powers in relation to foreign searches by US federal officials of non-resident aliens see Mark Gibney, 'Policing the World: the Long Reach of US Law and the Short Arm of the Constitution', Connecticut Journal of International Law 6/103.
52. 1979 Export Administration Act, PL 96-72, 50 USC App. §2405 (6)(j).
53. 1989 Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act, PL 101-222, 22 USCA §§1732, 2364, 2371, 2753, 2776, 2778, 2780 and 50 USCA §2405.
54. House Foreign Affairs Committee Report 101-296, p.7 and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report 101-173, p.5. See also Kraft and Pluchinsky.
55. House Foreign Affairs Committee Report 101-296, p.7 and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report 101-173, p.5. See also Kraft and Pluchinsky.
56. Procedure secured by 1989 AAEAA.
57. 1989 Arms Export Amendments Act, PL 101-222, 22 USCA, §§1732, 2364, 2371, 2753, 2776, 2778, 2780 and 50 USCA §2405 (banning military sales to terrorist list countries); 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, §327 (requiring US Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the International Monetary Fund, the InterAmerican Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African Development Bank, and the African Development Fund to use America's 'voice and vote' to oppose aid to any of the countries listed as state sponsors of terrorism). Prior to these measures, in the late 1970s Congress passed legislation prohibiting foreign assistance (1976), security assistance (1977), and other aid (1977 and 1978) to states supporting terrorism. Seen as ineffective, in 1979 Congress introduced the Fenwick Amendment to the Export Administration Act, requiring the secretary of state to notify Congress before export licenses were extended to any items worth more than $7000 and en route to terrorist sponsors. Libya, Syria, Iraq, and south Yemen formed the first list of such states. (Pluchinsky [note 31].)
58. See for instance EO 12924 (19 Aug. 1994), Continuation of Export Control Regulations.
59. See Lookout and Forged Documents Identification Programs. (US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, International Terrorism: Hearings on S.873, p.39) The first system, in which the Immigration and Naturalization Service played a key role, screened individuals for possible terrorist links. It derived from Nixon's directive in September 1972, that 'visa procedures, immigration laws and customs procedures ... be immediately tightened to screen more carefully potential terrorists seeking to enter the United States' (US Department of State, 'President Nixon Established Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism', Department of State Bulletin [23 Oct. 1972], p.478). See also EO 12801 (15 April 1992), Barring Overflight, Takeoff, and Landing of Aircraft, Flying to or from Libya.
60. See Lookout and Forged Documents Identification Programs. (US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, International Terrorism: Hearings on S.873, p.39) The first system, in which the Immigration and Naturalization Service played a key role, screened individuals for possible terrorist links. It derived from Nixon's directive in September 1972, that 'visa procedures, immigration laws and customs procedures ... be immediately tightened to screen more carefully potential terrorists seeking to enter the United States' (US Department of State, 'President Nixon Established Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism', Department of State Bulletin [23 Oct. 1972], p.478). See also EO 12801 (15 April 1992), Barring Overflight, Takeoff, and Landing of Aircraft, Flying to or from Libya.
61. See for instance 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, §321; EO 13067 (3 Nov. 1997), blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan; EO 13059 (19 Aug. 1997), Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran; EO 12959 (6 May 1995), Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran; EO 12957, (15 March 1995), Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources; EO 12543 (7 Jan. 1986), Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Involving Libya; EO 12538, (15 Nov. 1985), Imports of Refined Petroleum Products from Libya.
62. See for instance EO 12544, (8 Jan. 1986), Blocking Libyan Government Property in the United States or Held by US Persons.
63. This has been one of the most contentious areas, as recent legislation allows US citizens to sue foreign corporations doing business with countries on the terrorist list. The assumption of such extraterritorial powers is abhorrent both to allied and non-allied countries alike.
64. For discussion of extradition and criminal cases resulting from failure of states to extradite see Remarks, 'Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Law', American Society of International Law Proceedings (1991) pp.383-400.
65. 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, §§325 (assistance), 326 (military aid), 329 (defining assistance). These sections include a waiver for instances in which the assistance is determined to be in the national interest of the United States.
66. Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (PL 101-222) 22 USCA, §§1732, 2364, 2371, 2753, 2776, 2778, 2780 and 50 USCA § 2405.
67. Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780, § 40) and 1961 Foreign Assistance Act §620A (22 USC 2371). (Export Administration Act of 1979, § 6(j) [PL 96-72, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2405 (6)0)].)
68. 1990 Iraq Sanctions Act, PL 101-513; 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-proliferation Act, as amended, Title XVI of PL 102-484; and 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, PL 104-172.
69. 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, sec.330.
70. Operation El Dorado Canyon (the strikes against Libya initiated after the 1985 Le Belle disco bombing) resulted in an increase in Libyan terrorist attacks against Americans.
71. See Christopher Harmon, Terrorism Today (London: Frank Cass 2000).
72. This incident was the most expensive apprehension of a criminal in the history of American law enforcement (Pluchinsky [note 31]).
73. For discussion of the incident and the consequent fallout, see Washington Post (17 Oct. 1985) p.1, col. 5; New York Times (22 Oct. 1985) p.Al, col. 6; and Newsweek (21 Oct. 1985) p.32. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal, see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', Whittier Law Review 17/327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', Boston University International Law Journal 14/1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: US Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 18/915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad', Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 17/457.
74. For discussion of the incident and the consequent fallout, see Washington Post (17 Oct. 1985) p.1, col. 5; New York Times (22 Oct. 1985) p.Al, col. 6; and Newsweek (21 Oct. 1985) p.32. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal, see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', Whittier Law Review 17/327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', Boston University International Law Journal 14/1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: US Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 18/915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad', Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 17/457.
75. For discussion of the incident and the consequent fallout, see Washington Post (17 Oct. 1985) p.1, col. 5; New York Times (22 Oct. 1985) p.Al, col. 6; and Newsweek (21 Oct. 1985) p.32. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal, see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', Whittier Law Review 17/327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', Boston University International Law Journal 14/1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: US Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 18/915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad', Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 17/457.
76. For discussion of the incident and the consequent fallout, see Washington Post (17 Oct. 1985) p.1, col. 5; New York Times (22 Oct. 1985) p.Al, col. 6; and Newsweek (21 Oct. 1985) p.32. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal, see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', Whittier Law Review 17/327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', Boston University International Law Journal 14/1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: US Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 18/915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad', Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 17/457.
77. For discussion of the incident and the consequent fallout, see Washington Post (17 Oct. 1985) p.1, col. 5; New York Times (22 Oct. 1985) p.Al, col. 6; and Newsweek (21 Oct. 1985) p.32. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal, see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', Whittier Law Review 17/327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', Boston University International Law Journal 14/1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: US Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 18/915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad', Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 17/457.
78. For discussion of the incident and the consequent fallout, see Washington Post (17 Oct. 1985) p.1, col. 5; New York Times (22 Oct. 1985) p.Al, col. 6; and Newsweek (21 Oct. 1985) p.32. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal, see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', Whittier Law Review 17/327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', Boston University International Law Journal 14/1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: US Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 18/915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad', Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 17/457.
79. For discussion of the incident and the consequent fallout, see Washington Post (17 Oct. 1985) p.1, col. 5; New York Times (22 Oct. 1985) p.Al, col. 6; and Newsweek (21 Oct. 1985) p.32. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal, see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', Whittier Law Review 17/327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', Boston University International Law Journal 14/1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: US Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 18/915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad', Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 17/457.
80. 'Senators Ask Legality of Assassinating suspected Terrorists,' Dallas Morning News (4 Sept. 1998) P.13A, EO 12333, 3 CFR 213 (1981).
81. EO 11905, 3 CFR sec.5(g) at 90,101 (1977).
82. EO 12036, 3 CFR sec.2-305, at 112, 129 (1978).
83. Paul Richter, 'Deadly force Against Terror Leaders is Legal, Administration Says', Miami Herald (29 Oct. 1998), at .
84. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, PL 95-511; 50 USC 1801(a).
85. Also of importance, but not here discussed, in the legislative realm has been the use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in seizing organizations' money and assets upon defendant's conviction for pattern of criminal activity related to an organization. This statute has been applied to cases involving generic criminal acts that were part of a terrorist agenda, and it is expected that it will be used more heavily in the future. See for instance Bryan Denson, 'Two Oregon House Members Propose to Punish Offenders Under the State's Racketeering Law', The Oregonian (16 Feb. 2000).
86. 18 USC sec.2339A.
87. EO 12947, 3 CFR 319, 319-320 (1996). Quote from 'President's Message to the Congress on Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process', PUB. PAPERS 95, 95 (1995). The twelve were: the Abu Nidal Organization, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hizballah, the Islamic Gama'at, the Islamic Resistance Movement, Jihad, Kach, Kahane Chai, Palestinian Islamic Jihad - the Shiqaqi faction, the Palestine Liberation Front - Abu Abbas faction, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command.
88. EO 13099, 63 Fed. Reg. at 45,167.
89. EO 13129 (4 July 1999), Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the Taliban.
90. At time of writing this document is available on the web at
91. May 1976 Department of Defense Directive 2000, 12. US Department of the Army, Personal Security Precautions against Acts of Terrorism, 1978, I-1, cited in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., 'The State of the Operational Art: A Critical Review of Anti-terrorist Program,' Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management, in Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Stephen Sloan (eds.) (New York: Pergamon Press 1980) p.21.
92. May 1976 Department of Defense Directive 2000, 12. US Department of the Army, Personal Security Precautions against Acts of Terrorism, 1978, I-1, cited in Richard H. Shultz, Jr., 'The State of the Operational Art: A Critical Review of Anti-terrorist Program,' Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management, in Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Stephen Sloan (eds.) (New York: Pergamon Press 1980) p.21.
93. Celmer (note 9) p.33.
94. Pluchinsky (note 31).
95. Jay Robert Nash, 'The American Response to Terrorism', Terrorism in the 20th Century : A Narrative Encyclopedia from the Anarchists, Through the Weathermen, to the Unabomer (New York: M. Evans & Co. 1988) p.644, and Simon (note 3) pp.176-86.
96. 'GAO Found Delays in Security Improvements,' The Washington Post (30 Sept. 1984), p.A27, Cited in Celmer (note 9) p.42.
97. In January 1985 the State Department sought to eliminate the high degree of overlap - and consequent confusion - by creating the Bureau of Administration and Security.
98. The Department of State focused on installations in Cyprus, Jordan, and Honduras. (Celmer [note 9] p.34).
99. Pluchinsky (note 31).
100. 'Program Guide for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security', US Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, June 1997, p.9.
101. Ibid., p.23.
102. Ibid., p.24.
103. US Congress, House, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism (16 Aug. 1978) p.36.
104. US President, EO 12333, §1348.
105. Ibid., §1338.
106. The FBI is required to follow the Attorney General's foreign counter-intelligence guidelines against 'foreign inspired terrorists or foreign based terrorists' (US Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, An Act to Combat International Terrorism: Hearings on S. 2236 [22 Feb. 1978] p.223).
107. See US Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, An Act to
108. Celmer (note 9) p.32.
109. Nash (note 79) p.641.
110. 1987 State Department Authorization Act, PL 100-204,22 USC §2656f.
111. 1977 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, PL 95-511; 50 USC §1801(a).
112. 1977 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, PL 95-511; 50 USC §1801(a), subsection (c).
113. 1986 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism Act, PL 99-399, §1202: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Terrorist Acts Abroad Against US Nationals, 18 USC §2332. Kraft (note 26) p.18.
114. The conference clearly stated that participation in a past terrorist activity was not necessary for a group planning terrorist operations to be considered a terrorist organization. Point made by Michael Kraft, citing Congressional Record (26 Oct. 1990) page H 13239. Note also that the 1994 Violence Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, PL 103-322, while it does not define terrorism, cites legislation implementing international agreements. Statute of Limitations, Sec. 120001, extends the statute of limitations for certain terrorism crimes to 8 years, and Material Support, Sec. 120005, makes it a crime to provide material support for acts of terrorism (Kraft [note 26]). Outside of federal circles, in their study of the field of terrorism, Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman found over 100 different working definitions of terrorism in the literature on the subject. (Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature. With the collaboration of Michael Stohl, Jan Brand, Peter A. Flemming, Angela van der Poel and Rob Thijsse. [Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company 1988] esp. 5, 6.)
115. Alien Act of 25 June 1798 (1 Stat. 570 [expired 1800]); Alien Act of July 6, 1798 (1 Stat. 577); The Sedition Act of July 14,1798, (1 Stat. 596 [expired 1801]); Section 1; Espionage Act of 15 June 1917 (PL 24, c.30,40 Stat. 217 [1917]); 1950 Internal Security Act (c.1024, 64 Stat. 987[195O]).
116. Immigration Act of 3 March 1903, c.1012, 32 Stat. 121 (PL 162, c.1012, 32 Stat. 1213 [1903]); 1940 Alien Registration (Smith) Act [c.439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940)]; 1952-53 Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act [8 USC Sections 1101-1525 (1953)]. See also court cases: United States ex. Rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 US 279, 291 (1904); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 US 1, 103, 114 (1961).
117. 1990 Immigration Act, PL 101-649.
118. 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, §411 (amending the 1952-53 Immigration and Nationality [McCarran-Walter] Act [8 USC §§1101-25 (1953)], §212(a)(3)(B) to provide for aliens associated with designated FTOs).
119. See for instance Denson (note 70).
120. Vietnam protests that had been active in the 60s were put under government surveillance. See Roberta Smith, 'America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: the US Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-terrorism Law and International Response', Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 5 (1997) pp.249, 259.
121. COINTELPRO opened over 500,000 domestic intelligence files, while Operation Chaos led to the creation of 13,000 files and the collection of various materials (Smith [note 104] p.259).
122. FBI Access to Telephone Subscriber Information 1993, PL 103-142; Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC.
123. Brent L. Smith and Kelly R. Damphousse, 'The Prosecution and Punishment of American Terrorists: 1980-1996', presented at the Terrorism and Beyond ... the 21st Century Conference, hosted by RAND and the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (17 April 2000), Table 6.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid., p.9. See also Austin Turk. Political Criminality: The Defiance and Defense of Authority (Newbury Park: Sage 1982).
126. Smith and Damphousse (note 107) p.13.
127. Ibid.
128. Pluchinsky (note 31).
129. The US State Department claims 12 cases of extradition and rendition. The FBI cites 13. (Statistics obtained from Dennis Pluchinsky, US Department of State, [27 Nov. 2000].)
130. David Johnston, 'US and British Demand the Two Libyans', New York Times International (28 Nov. 1991), p.A3; Libya v. UK, 1992 ICJ at 11, para.28.
131. 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, §702.
132. 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, §323 (material support defined as 'currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials').
133. 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, §704.
134. 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, §21.
135. 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, PL 103-322, §120004.
136. 1998 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, PL 105-318.
137. 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PL 104-132, §§502, 511, 521; 1989 Biological Weapons Anti-terrorist Act (PL 101-298), §2.
138. Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States, PL 92-539.
139. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, An Act to Combat International Terrorism: Hearings on S.2236 (22 Feb. 1978), p.200.
140. US Congress, House, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Federal Capabilities in Crisis Management and Terrorism (16 Aug. 1978), p.58.
141. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, An Act to Combat International Terrorism: Hearings on S. 2236 (25 Jan. 1978), p.54.
142. Celmer (note 9) p.44.
143. The subsequent inquiry into the crash determined that a short circuit transferred excess voltage into a fuel tank, causing the explosion. (Eric Malnic, 'Fuel tank explosion led to TWA Flight 800 crash, probe finds', The Boston Globe [23 Aug. 2000] p.A7.)
144. Report available at .
145. 1998 Immigrant Visa Processing Period Extension Act, PL105-360.
146. 1993 Pan Am Flight 103 Memorial Act, PL103-158.
147. 1998 Oklahoma City Memorial Act, PL 105-58.
148. 1992 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 92 and FY 93, PL 102-138.
149. 1992 Federal Courts Administration Act, PL 102-572.
150. 1996 AEDPA, PL 104-132, sec.231.
151. Steven Flatow v. the Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Order and Judgment, US District Court for the District of Columbia, CA. No.97-396 (RCL) (4 March 1998).
152. Pluchinsky (note 31).
153. Tom Raum, 'Terrorism Bill', Washington, DC, Associated Press (3 March 2000).
154. 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Title II, subtitle A: Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 and subtitle C: Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 1996, PL 104-132.
155. Richard A. Falkenrath, The Problems of Preparedness: Challenges Facing the US Domestic Preparedness Program' (Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness Discussion Paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2000) p.1.
156. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-related Activities 1995-98. GAO-GGD-99-7 (Nov. 1998) p.2.
157. Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act as lodged in FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act, PL 104-201.
158. On 6 April 2000 the Executive Branch officially transferred this programme to the Department of Justice. .
159. Presidential Directive 62: Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas.
160. OSLDPS programs include financial assistance to state and local jurisdictions, training, technical assistance, assessment mechanisms, and exercises. See .
161. Topoff, an abbreviation for Top Officials, consisted of a set of exercises held during a 10-day period in May 2000 in Portsmouth, NH, Washington, DC, and Denver, Colorado. Run by the Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support within the Office of Justice Programs, these exercises tested the degree of preparedness at a local level for a possible WMD terrorist incident. NCR-2000 (National Capital Region 2000), was conducted in the District of Columbia and Prince George's County, MD as separate, but concurrent exercises with Topoff. For more information on these programmes see .
162. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits willful use of the armed forces to uphold the law unless specified by either an act of Congress or the Constitution. The Act and subsequent legislation applies to the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines and the National Guard when employed in federal service. Statutory exceptions include coast guard law enforcement powers, Presidential use of the military to suppress insurrection, and the Department of Defense's provision of information and equipment to federal, state, and local police (10 USC 331-334 and 10 USC 371-381). For discussion of the use of the military in the event of terrorist attack and the principle of posse comitatus see Charles Doyle, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law, Congressional Research Service (2 Sept. 1995), and Gregory D. Grove, 'The US Military and Civil Infrastructure Protection: Restrictions and Discretion under the Posse Comitatus Act' (Center for International Security and Cooperation: Stanford University 1999).
163. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits willful use of the armed forces to uphold the law unless specified by either an act of Congress or the Constitution. The Act and subsequent legislation applies to the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines and the National Guard when employed in federal service. Statutory exceptions include coast guard law enforcement powers, Presidential use of the military to suppress insurrection, and the Department of Defense's provision of information and equipment to federal, state, and local police (10 USC 331-334 and 10 USC 371-381). For discussion of the use of the military in the event of terrorist attack and the principle of posse comitatus see Charles Doyle, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law, Congressional Research Service (2 Sept. 1995), and Gregory D. Grove, 'The US Military and Civil Infrastructure Protection: Restrictions and Discretion under the Posse Comitatus Act' (Center for International Security and Cooperation: Stanford University 1999).
164. The Act and subsequent legislation applies includes the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines and the National Guard when employed in federal service.
165. 10 USC 331-334 and 10 USC 371-381.
166. Pluchinsky (note 31).
167. Celmer (note9)p.31.
168. Edward A. Lynch, 'International Terrorism: The Search for a Policy', Terrorism: An International Journal 9/1 (1987) p.2, cited in Celmer (note 9) p.25, fn.52. This failure was due less to organizational inadequacies and more to characteristics of terrorism itself that confounded efforts to establish a predetermined hierarchy with ultimate accountability vested in one individual.
169. PDD No.39 (1995). PDD 39 allocated $300m for sole use for chemical and biological defence, with another $100m to be put towards distributing diagnostic, detection, protective equipment to state and local agencies. As with past bureaucratic reorganization, the primary component of this directive was to enhance communication and coordination. The emphasis in this case, however, was not just between different branches of the federal government, but between federal and local government, international organizations, and the United States and foreign governments.
170. The Bureau manages joint terrorism task forces in 18 cities across the States, with particular emphasis on intelligence and operations.
171. PDD No.62 (1998).
172. .
173. See US Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, An Act to Combat International Terrorism: Hearings on S. 2236 (27 Jan. 1978) p.107.
174. Celmer (note 9) Appendix A, p.119.
175. 'Program Guide for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security', US Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (June 1997).
176. See House Judiciary Committee hearings on HR 2121 'Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999' (23 May 2000); Juliette N. Kayyem, National Commission on Terrorism, Letter to Senator Kyl, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information (27 June 2000) (relating to FISA, wiretaps, and secret evidence).
177. See House Judiciary Committee hearings on HR 2121 'Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999' (23 May 2000); Juliette N. Kayyem, National Commission on Terrorism, Letter to Senator Kyl, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information (27 June 2000) (relating to FISA, wiretaps, and secret evidence).
178. Letter from Juliette N. Kayyem, National Commission on Terrorism, to Senator Jon Kyl, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information (27 June 2000).
179. Laura K. Donohue, Emergency Powers and Counterterrorist Law in the United Kingdom, 1922-2000 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2000).
180. See for example threats issued by Iraq, attached to US missile strikes: Lee Hockstadcr, 'Extremists Issue Threat to Israel; Hamas Warns of Strike if US Attacks Iraq', The Washington Post (18 Feb. 1998).
181. For the Clinton Administration's assertion of the right to bomb state sponsors of terrorism, see 'US asserts right to bomb regimes that harbor terrorists,' CNN Interactive (7 Feb. 1999) at.
182. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', 17 Whittier L. Rev. 327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', 14 BU Int'l L. J. 1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: U.S. Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad,' 17 Hastings Int'l & Camp. L Rev 457.
183. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', 17 Whittier L. Rev. 327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', 14 BU Int'l L. J. 1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: U.S. Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad,' 17 Hastings Int'l & Camp. L Rev 457.
184. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', 17 Whittier L. Rev. 327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', 14 BU Int'l L. J. 1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: U.S. Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad,' 17 Hastings Int'l & Camp. L Rev 457.
185. For discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to forced removal see Arthur E. Shin, 'On the Borders of Law Enforcement: The Use of Extraterritorial Abduction as a Means of Attaining Jurisdiction over the International Criminal', 17 Whittier L. Rev. 327; Jeanne M. Woods, 'Presidential Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial Arrests', 14 BU Int'l L. J. 1; Catherine Collier Fisher, 'Recent Development: U.S. Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 915; Jimmy Gurulé, 'Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad,' 17 Hastings Int'l & Camp. L Rev 457.
186. For discussion of extraterritorial powers in relation to foreign searches by US federal officials of non-resident aliens see Mark Gibney, 'Policing the World: The Long Reach of US Law and the Short Arm of the Constitution,' 6 Conn. J. Int'l L 103.
187. For discussion of the legality of assassination of terrorists overseas see Paul Richter, 'Deadly force against terror leaders is legal, administration says', Miami Herald (29 Oct. 1998) at .
188. See 'Notes: Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National Interests, and Transnational Norms', 103 Harvard L. R. 6 (April 1990); Adam W. Wegner, 'Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under International Law: The Yunis Decision as a Model for the Prosecution of Terrorists in US Courts', 22 Law and Policy in International Business 409.
189. See 'Notes: Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National Interests, and Transnational Norms', 103 Harvard L. R. 6 (April 1990); Adam W. Wegner, 'Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under International Law: The Yunis Decision as a Model for the Prosecution of Terrorists in US Courts', 22 Law and Policy in International Business 409.
190. For general discussion of extraterritorial powers see Tyler Raimo, 'Note and Comment: Winning at the Expense of Law: The Ramifications of Expanding Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Jurisdiction Overseas', 14 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1473.
191. Catherine Collier Fisher, 'US Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 917; Time (21 Oct. 1985) at 24; Washington Post (18 Oct. 1985) at Al, col. 6 (cited in Fisher, fn.4).
192. Catherine Collier Fisher, 'US Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 917; Time (21 Oct. 1985) at 24; Washington Post (18 Oct. 1985) at Al, col. 6 (cited in Fisher, fn.4).
193. Catherine Collier Fisher, 'US Legislation to Prosecute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?' 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 917; Time (21 Oct. 1985) at 24; Washington Post (18 Oct. 1985) at Al, col. 6 (cited in Fisher, fn.4).
194. See Washington Post (17 Oct. 1985) col.5; New York Times (22 Oct. 1985) Al, col. 6, and Newsweek (21 Oct. 1985), 32.
195. See Washington Post (17 Oct. 1985) col.5; New York Times (22 Oct. 1985) Al, col. 6, and Newsweek (21 Oct. 1985), 32.
196. See Washington Post (17 Oct. 1985) col.5; New York Times (22 Oct. 1985) Al, col. 6, and Newsweek (21 Oct. 1985), 32.
197. New York Times (20 Oct. 1985), sec.4 (the Week in Review) at 1. col.1.
198. See for instance CBW Evening News (12 Dec. 1999) 'State Department - World Terrorism' (5:04:50-5:06:50), noting that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright is concerned about the threat posed to Americans abroad.
199. Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State, 'Post-Millennium Terrorism Review', Speech at the Brookings Institution Washington, DC (10 Feb. 2000).