Intellectual Property and Domestic Relations: Issues to Consider When There Is an Artist, Author, Inventor, or Celebrity in the Family

Family Law Quarterly

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 383-422

  Bartow, Ann ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035562984     PISSN: 0014729X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (270)

1. Though each major category of intellectual property is distinct, a single commercial product could simultaneously be comprised of an embodiment of a patented invention, contain copyrighted material, and bear a federally registered trademark. Consider, for example, a retail music compact disc or CD. The technology used to make and encode the compact disc itself may be patented. The box containing the CD itself could be constructed in a patented configuration. The performances fixed on the CD are undoubtedly copyrighted, and so too are the lyrics and musical compositions that comprise the songs. Most music CDs have a paper insert, or title page, visible through the translucent plastic on top of the CD box. This label insert usually contains the name of the recording artist or band, and the title of the CD, which identifies that particular grouping of musical works. Both the title of the work and the name of the person or group that recorded it could be trademarked as could a band logo. Artwork that is associated with a band or recording artist could be copyrighted as well as trademarked.
2. For example, many states have statutes pertaining to trade secrets; The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been enacted in one form or another by 40 states and the District of Columbia. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, 34 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter MERGES ET AL.].
3. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (2000).
4. Id. § 171.
5. The term of a design patent is 14 years from the date of grant. 35 U.S.C. § 173. By contrast, a copyrighted work created after January 1, 1978, can last the life of the author plus seventy years, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)(2000), or 120 years from the date of creation (or 95 years from the year of its first publication, if that causes an earlier expiration) if authored anonymously or by an entity rather than an individual. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c). Works created prior to January 1, 1978, are governed by 35 U.S.C. §§ 303-304.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 161; see generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-170.
7. See id. § 101.
8. Id. (This contrasts with copyrights, which protect only the expression of an idea.)
9. See infra p. 388.
10. See generally Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal for a New Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. LA. 1 (2000) (discussing reasons inventions are patented).
11. Id.
12. See generally, 35 U.S.C. § 101.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 118.
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
18. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 151-160.
19. See id. § 154(a)(2) (term of a patent). See also id. §§ 155-156 (Patent Term Extensions). Unless the invention is a pharmaceutical product or medical device or product that will be subject to testing and approval by the Food and Drug Administration, it is very unlikely that a patent will be valid enforceable longer than 20 years.
20. Recent Patent Act amendments give patentees some ability to bring suit based on intentional unauthorized use of an invention after a patent application is published but before the patent issues. However, this right cannot be exercised until after the affected patent issues. See the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Title IV of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113.
21. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Taking Stock: The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exporation of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2000).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 113.
23. See id. § 112.
24. See id. § 271.
25. See id. §§ 281, 283-285.
26. See id. § 282.
27. It is also possible for a party that has not been accused of patent infringement to challenge the validity of a patent by bringing an appropriate action for a declaratory judgment.
28. Bartow, supra note 10; Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 577 (1999).
29. Bartow, supra note 10; Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 577 (1999).
30. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2231-32 (2000).
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 262.
32. See Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World, Unite! A Call for Collective Action by Employee-Inventors, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673 (1997).
33. See 35 U.S.C. § 261.
34. See id.
35. Bartow, supra note 31, at 692. If an employee is deemed by the court to have been "hired to invent," anything invented by the employee belongs to the employer regardless of the existence of a pre-invention assignment agreement. See e.g. Mark B. Herskovitz, "Unhitching the Trailer Clause: The Right of Inventive Employees and their Employers," 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187, 194-95 (1995); Banks v. Unisys Corp, no. 98-70869, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22348 (E.D. Mich 1999).
36. Bartow, supra note 31, at 692. If an employee is deemed by the court to have been "hired to invent," anything invented by the employee belongs to the employer regardless of the existence of a pre-invention assignment agreement. See e.g. Mark B. Herskovitz, "Unhitching the Trailer Clause: The Right of Inventive Employees and their Employers," 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187, 194-95 (1995); Banks v. Unisys Corp, no. 98-70869, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22348 (E.D. Mich 1999).
37. Bartow, supra note 31, at 692. If an employee is deemed by the court to have been "hired to invent," anything invented by the employee belongs to the employer regardless of the existence of a pre-invention assignment agreement. See e.g. Mark B. Herskovitz, "Unhitching the Trailer Clause: The Right of Inventive Employees and their Employers," 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187, 194-95 (1995); Banks v. Unisys Corp, no. 98-70869, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22348 (E.D. Mich 1999).
38. For a comprehensive overview of cases in which intellectual property was at issue in marital dissolutions, see Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Copyright, Patent, or Other Intellectual Property as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Divorce Settlement, 80 A.L.R.5th 487 (2000). For a discussion of the need to hire experts to value intellectual property, see, e.g., Valuing Intellectual Property in Divorce: Don't Try This at Home, at www.divorceinfo.com/fambusintellectual property.htm (accessed 12/1/00). For a discussion of the complexities of valuing intellectual property in the context of bankruptcy, see Robert F. Reilly, Value & Cents: Putting the Right Price on Proprietary Technology, 1996 AM. BANKR. INST. J. (December 1996/January 1997). For discussions of intellectual property generally see, e.g., Mohammad S. Rahman, Patent Valuation: Impacts on Damages, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145 (1998); Gordon V. Smith & Russell L. Parr, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS, 70 (1989); Russell Hardin, Valuing Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659 (1993); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers & Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1998) (Part V - Appendix written by William Neese discussing accounting problems that arise in valuing intellectual property assets and liabilities).
39. For a comprehensive overview of cases in which intellectual property was at issue in marital dissolutions, see Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Copyright, Patent, or Other Intellectual Property as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Divorce Settlement, 80 A.L.R.5th 487 (2000). For a discussion of the need to hire experts to value intellectual property, see, e.g., Valuing Intellectual Property in Divorce: Don't Try This at Home, at www.divorceinfo.com/fambusintellectual property.htm (accessed 12/1/00). For a discussion of the complexities of valuing intellectual property in the context of bankruptcy, see Robert F. Reilly, Value & Cents: Putting the Right Price on Proprietary Technology, 1996 AM. BANKR. INST. J. (December 1996/January 1997). For discussions of intellectual property generally see, e.g., Mohammad S. Rahman, Patent Valuation: Impacts on Damages, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145 (1998); Gordon V. Smith & Russell L. Parr, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS, 70 (1989); Russell Hardin, Valuing Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659 (1993); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers & Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1998) (Part V - Appendix written by William Neese discussing accounting problems that arise in valuing intellectual property assets and liabilities).
40. For a comprehensive overview of cases in which intellectual property was at issue in marital dissolutions, see Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Copyright, Patent, or Other Intellectual Property as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Divorce Settlement, 80 A.L.R.5th 487 (2000). For a discussion of the need to hire experts to value intellectual property, see, e.g., Valuing Intellectual Property in Divorce: Don't Try This at Home, at www.divorceinfo.com/fambusintellectual property.htm (accessed 12/1/00). For a discussion of the complexities of valuing intellectual property in the context of bankruptcy, see Robert F. Reilly, Value & Cents: Putting the Right Price on Proprietary Technology, 1996 AM. BANKR. INST. J. (December 1996/January 1997). For discussions of intellectual property generally see, e.g., Mohammad S. Rahman, Patent Valuation: Impacts on Damages, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145 (1998); Gordon V. Smith & Russell L. Parr, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS, 70 (1989); Russell Hardin, Valuing Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659 (1993); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers & Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1998) (Part V - Appendix written by William Neese discussing accounting problems that arise in valuing intellectual property assets and liabilities).
41. For a comprehensive overview of cases in which intellectual property was at issue in marital dissolutions, see Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Copyright, Patent, or Other Intellectual Property as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Divorce Settlement, 80 A.L.R.5th 487 (2000). For a discussion of the need to hire experts to value intellectual property, see, e.g., Valuing Intellectual Property in Divorce: Don't Try This at Home, at www.divorceinfo.com/fambusintellectual property.htm (accessed 12/1/00). For a discussion of the complexities of valuing intellectual property in the context of bankruptcy, see Robert F. Reilly, Value & Cents: Putting the Right Price on Proprietary Technology, 1996 AM. BANKR. INST. J. (December 1996/January 1997). For discussions of intellectual property generally see, e.g., Mohammad S. Rahman, Patent Valuation: Impacts on Damages, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145 (1998); Gordon V. Smith & Russell L. Parr, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS, 70 (1989); Russell Hardin, Valuing Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659 (1993); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers & Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1998) (Part V - Appendix written by William Neese discussing accounting problems that arise in valuing intellectual property assets and liabilities).
42. For a comprehensive overview of cases in which intellectual property was at issue in marital dissolutions, see Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Copyright, Patent, or Other Intellectual Property as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Divorce Settlement, 80 A.L.R.5th 487 (2000). For a discussion of the need to hire experts to value intellectual property, see, e.g., Valuing Intellectual Property in Divorce: Don't Try This at Home, at www.divorceinfo.com/fambusintellectual property.htm (accessed 12/1/00). For a discussion of the complexities of valuing intellectual property in the context of bankruptcy, see Robert F. Reilly, Value & Cents: Putting the Right Price on Proprietary Technology, 1996 AM. BANKR. INST. J. (December 1996/January 1997). For discussions of intellectual property generally see, e.g., Mohammad S. Rahman, Patent Valuation: Impacts on Damages, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145 (1998); Gordon V. Smith & Russell L. Parr, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS, 70 (1989); Russell Hardin, Valuing Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659 (1993); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers & Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1998) (Part V - Appendix written by William Neese discussing accounting problems that arise in valuing intellectual property assets and liabilities).
43. For a comprehensive overview of cases in which intellectual property was at issue in marital dissolutions, see Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Copyright, Patent, or Other Intellectual Property as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Divorce Settlement, 80 A.L.R.5th 487 (2000). For a discussion of the need to hire experts to value intellectual property, see, e.g., Valuing Intellectual Property in Divorce: Don't Try This at Home, at www.divorceinfo.com/fambusintellectual property.htm (accessed 12/1/00). For a discussion of the complexities of valuing intellectual property in the context of bankruptcy, see Robert F. Reilly, Value & Cents: Putting the Right Price on Proprietary Technology, 1996 AM. BANKR. INST. J. (December 1996/January 1997). For discussions of intellectual property generally see, e.g., Mohammad S. Rahman, Patent Valuation: Impacts on Damages, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145 (1998); Gordon V. Smith & Russell L. Parr, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS, 70 (1989); Russell Hardin, Valuing Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659 (1993); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers & Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1998) (Part V - Appendix written by William Neese discussing accounting problems that arise in valuing intellectual property assets and liabilities).
44. For a comprehensive overview of cases in which intellectual property was at issue in marital dissolutions, see Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Copyright, Patent, or Other Intellectual Property as Marital Property for Purposes of Alimony, Support, or Divorce Settlement, 80 A.L.R.5th 487 (2000). For a discussion of the need to hire experts to value intellectual property, see, e.g., Valuing Intellectual Property in Divorce: Don't Try This at Home, at www.divorceinfo.com/fambusintellectual property.htm (accessed 12/1/00). For a discussion of the complexities of valuing intellectual property in the context of bankruptcy, see Robert F. Reilly, Value & Cents: Putting the Right Price on Proprietary Technology, 1996 AM. BANKR. INST. J. (December 1996/January 1997). For discussions of intellectual property generally see, e.g., Mohammad S. Rahman, Patent Valuation: Impacts on Damages, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145 (1998); Gordon V. Smith & Russell L. Parr, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS, 70 (1989); Russell Hardin, Valuing Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659 (1993); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers & Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 (1998) (Part V - Appendix written by William Neese discussing accounting problems that arise in valuing intellectual property assets and liabilities).
45. See Wozniak, supra note 35.
46. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2000).
47. See e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A, (Rights of Certain Authors to Attribution and Integrity).
48. Id. § 201(a).
49. An author who is an independent contractor (rather than an employee) can freely contract away ownership of a copyright, but effectively contracting away authorship requires an express writing, and that the work fall into one of the specific categories enumerated in § 101 of title 17, definition of work made for hire, sub point two. These categories include contributions to collective works, parts of motion pictures or other audiovisual works, translations, supplementary works, compilations, instructional texts, tests (including answer material), and atlases. A ninth category, sound recordings, was added briefly, and then removed amid great controversy. Large record companies lobbied Congress to have sound recordings added so that they could be deemed the authors as well as owners of songs written by the musicians they had under contract. Musicians objected to loss of authorship status, in part because without it they could not exercise termination rights with respect to copyright assignments they made to record companies, and successfully lobbied to have it removed from the statute. However, many of the contracts musicians have with record companies state that their songs are works for hire, and whether this designation is enforceable is expected to ultimately be the subject of intense litigation.
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of work made for hire) and § 201(2).
51. MERGES ET AL., supra note 2.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
53. Id.
54. Registration can be obtained during the subsistence of the first term of copyright for works copyrighted before January 1, 1978, and anytime during the copyright term for copyrightable works created after that date. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a); see generally, id. §§ 408-412.
55. Id § 411.
56. Id § 412.
57. See, e.g., MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 407 (3d Ed. 1999).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
59. For example, the "Die Hard" series, the "Lethal Weapon" movies, the "48 Hours" movies, the "Beverly Hills Cop" movies, etc.
60. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 103 (compilations of facts can be copyrighted).
61. E.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, Wired Archive 4.01 - Jan 1996 accessed at http://Wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 519 (1999); Niva Elkin- Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH 47 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
62. E.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, Wired Archive 4.01 - Jan 1996 accessed at http://Wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 519 (1999); Niva Elkin- Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH 47 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
63. E.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, Wired Archive 4.01 - Jan 1996 accessed at http://Wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 519 (1999); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH 47 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
64. E.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, Wired Archive 4.01 - Jan 1996 accessed at http://Wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 519 (1999); Niva Elkin- Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH 47 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
65. E.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, Wired Archive 4.01 - Jan 1996 accessed at http://Wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 519 (1999); Niva Elkin- Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH 47 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996).
66. Salinger v. Random House, Inc. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), see generally, Teri N. Hollander, Comment: Enjoining Unauthorized Biographies and Docudramas, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 133 (1995).
67. Salinger v. Random House, Inc. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), see generally, Teri N. Hollander, Comment: Enjoining Unauthorized Biographies and Docudramas, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 133 (1995).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
69. Id. §§ 201, 204-205.
70. See id. § 201 ("copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the contribution").
71. Id. § 101 (definition of "joint work").
72. Id. § 201(a).
73. Gary H. Moore, Strategic Alliances: Selected Issues in Structuring Research and Development Arrangements, 1002 PRAC. L. INST./CORP. 87, 111 (1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the 'Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1471 (1995); Kenneth D. Salmon, A Primer on Distant Learning and Intellectual Property Issues, 96 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 305, 311 (1995).
74. Gary H. Moore, Strategic Alliances: Selected Issues in Structuring Research and Development Arrangements, 1002 PRAC. L. INST./CORP. 87, 111 (1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the 'Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1471 (1995); Kenneth D. Salmon, A Primer on Distant Learning and Intellectual Property Issues, 96 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 305, 311 (1995).
75. Gary H. Moore, Strategic Alliances: Selected Issues in Structuring Research and Development Arrangements, 1002 PRAC. L. INST./CORP. 87, 111 (1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the 'Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1471 (1995); Kenneth D. Salmon, A Primer on Distant Learning and Intellectual Property Issues, 96 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 305, 311 (1995).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
77. See id, § 103.
78. MERGES ET AL., supra note 2, at 362-63.
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 501.
80. See id. §§ 502-504.
81. The DMCA has been incorporated in to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C., at § 512.
82. See Martin F. Smit & Alan Bruggerman, Internet and Web Site Management under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 612 PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 363, 365 (2000).
83. See Jonathan A Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to Limit Potential Copyright Liability Online, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 18, n.86 (1999-2000).
84. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), 305. In the case of joint authorship, the copyright endures for 70 years following the death of the last surviving author. Id. §§ 302(b), 305. In the case of works copyrighted prior to Jan. 1, 1978, see id. §§ 303, 304-305.
85. Id. § 302(c).
86. Id. § 201(d)(1).
87. Id. § 201(d)(2).
88. See sections 303 and 304 of the Copyright Act.
89. See id. § 101.
90. Id. § 103.
91. See id. § 202.
92. This is known as the First Sale Doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109.
93. See id
94. In one case, CCNV v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), a sculpture owner was required to give easement-like access to the sculptor after protracted copyright litigation that ultimately reached the Supreme Court. However, the facts of the case were somewhat unusual, and other copyright holders cannot count on obtaining court-mandated access to material objects they have sold.
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of work of visual art).
96. See id. § 106A.
97. Id. § 106A(e)(1).
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (2001).
99. O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980).
100. See e.g., A Confederacy of Dunces, for which author John Kennedy Toole was posthumously awarded the Pulitzer, when (after his suicide) his mother convinced Walker Percy to read the manuscript, and Percy subsequently persuaded a small academic press to publish it. John Kennedy Toole, A CONFEDERACY OF DUNCES (1980).
101. See e.g., A Confederacy of Dunces, for which author John Kennedy Toole was posthumously awarded the Pulitzer, when (after his suicide) his mother convinced Walker Percy to read the manuscript, and Percy subsequently persuaded a small academic press to publish it. John Kennedy Toole, A CONFEDERACY OF DUNCES (1980).
102. See infra Part III. I.
103. Congress deemed termination capability important because authors tend to be in unequal bargaining positions when they license or assign their copyrights to others, in part because the value of a work is generally not known until it is released to the public. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
104. Section 203 (a) expressly states that termination rights do not apply to grants made pertaining to works made for.
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5).
106. Id. § 203(a)(3). If the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier. Id. 90. See generally id. §§ 203(a)(4)(B), 203, 304(c)-(d); and CFR § 201.10.
107. See id. § 203(b)(6).
108. See id. § 203(b).
109. See, e.g., Francis M. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute on the Prairie: Unbumping the Will of Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 919 (2000); Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163 (1997); Francis M. Nevins, The Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 77 (1988).
110. See, e.g., Francis M. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute on the Prairie: Unbumping the Will of Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 919 (2000); Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163 (1997); Francis M. Nevins, The Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 77 (1988).
111. See, e.g., Francis M. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute on the Prairie: Unbumping the Will of Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 919 (2000); Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict Between Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163 (1997); Francis M. Nevins, The Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 77 (1988).
112. See 17 U.S.C. § (a)(5).
113. See 17 U.S.C. 203(a)(1) ("in the case of two or more authors . . .").
114. Termination rights vest when timely notice is served on a grantee (which can occur up to 10 years before commencement of the termination period per section 203(a)(4)(A) of the Copyright Act), and the other requirements of section 203 are complied with.
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 203.
116. See id. §§ 203(a)(1)-(2) outline majority and per stirpes rules for exercises of termination with respect to grants by more than one author of a joint work as well as to grants by a deceased author.
117. See id. § 203(a)(1).
118. Id. § 203(b)(3).
119. As proscribed in section 203 of the Copyright Act.
120. Id. § 203(a).
121. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 203.
122. It is important to pay attention to when termination rights vest. Because notice can be sent up to 10 years early, see id. 203(a)(4)(A), if the author lives until 25 years after the grant and serves the required notice before death, the termination rights vest in the author and recaptured rights can be enforceably bequeathed by will to someone other than a statutory heir. See id., (203(b)(2)). This would be the case even if the author dies the day after properly serving the termination notice in compliance with the requirements of the statute, more than 9 years before the actual termination date.
123. Id. § 203(a)(2)(D).
124. See Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1).
126. Id. § 203(b)(1).
127. See id. § 304(c)(3).
128. See id. § 304(c)(2).
129. Id.
130. See id. § 304(c)(1).
131. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 304 (c) (1) and 304 (c) (6).
132. See id. § 304(c)(2).
133. Larry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774, 778 (2d Cir. 1992).
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(d).
135. Id. § 304(c)(4)(A).
136. Id. § 304(c)(6)(B). These termination rights might be alternately described as a future interest in the copyright rights that will be recaptured when the termination occurs.
137. Note that under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a), pertaining to grants made after Jan. 1, 1978, only transfers and licenses granted by authors can be terminated.
138. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
139. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
140. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
141. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
142. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
143. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
144. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
145. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
146. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
147. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
148. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at §
149. Id. § 304(c)(6)(2). See also Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1998) ("however, an author's termination rights are not unlimited. The 1976 Act's Derivative Works Exception permits a grantee or licensee who prepares a derivative work before termination to continue to utilize the derivative work during the extended renewal term 'under the terms of the grant.' " 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . sound recording . . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " Id. at § 101. The exception seeks to protect public access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have invested in creating the derivative work); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995); Burroughs v. MGM, 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View of "Rear Window" Is for the Birds, 60 MISS. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1990); Eileen Siegeltuch, Case Note, Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. - Post-Termination Licensing of Pre-Termination Derivative Works: Whose Song Is It Anyway? 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (1999); Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1987); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Exception to the Termination Clause, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97 (1996); Kathleen M. Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is It Time to Alienate It or Amend It? 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769 (2000); Michael H. Davis, The Screenwriter's Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of Copyright: Once a Story Is "Pitched," a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93 (2000); Daniel A. Saunders, Comment, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1992).
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 302.
151. Id.
152. See id. §§ 303-304.
153. Works created on or after Jan. 1, 1950 were still in their first term of copyright on Jan. 1, 1978, and endure for a 28-year first term and a 67-year renewal term. Works created earlier than Jan. 1, 1950 would have been in their renewal terms on Jan. 1, 1978, and subsist for a total of 95 years from the date copyright was secured, per 17 U.S.C. § 304(b). Works that enjoy automatic renewal are those first published between 1964 and 1977(inclusive) under the Automatic Renewal Amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992).
154. Id. § 304.
155. Under section 304(a) of the Copyright Act, there are incentives (pertaining to the moment of vesting) to obtaining voluntary rather than automatic renewal rights, through registration of a claim. An author or her statutory heirs can register a claim to the copyright for the renewal term with the Copyright Office, within one year before the original 28-year term of copyright expires, pursuant to the dictates of section 304(a).
156. Id.
157. JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW (5th ed.).
158. Id. at 365-66.
159. Unlike termination, the renewal is not inalienable and it is automatic (for works published after 1964).
160. The copyright in works eligible for renewal on or after June 26, 1992, will vest in the name of the renewal claimant on the effective date of any renewal registration made during the 28th year of the original term. Otherwise, the renewal copyright will vest in the party entitled to claim renewal as of December 31st of the 28th year.
161. See, e.g., Fred Fisher Music Co, v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943); Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, Inc., 981 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1993).
162. Id. See also, Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d 364, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("the policy underlying the creation of renewal rights influences the extent to which the author is free to contract away those rights or bequeath them. Under the 1909 and 1976 Acts, the author may, during the first term of the copyright, assign his or her expectancy of the renewal rights to a third party by contract. If the author survives until the time the renewal copyright vests, then the assignment to the third party is binding (although terminable through exercise of the termination right)").
163. Statutory heirs under section 304(a)(C) of the Copyright Act differ slightly from statutory heirs under section 203, and in addition to widow or widower and surviving children and grandchildren, include "the author's next of kin, in the absence of a will of the author."
164. Miller Music Corp. v. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960); see also, Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 371 ("should the author die while the work is in its first term, the rights to future renewal copyrights do not follow contractual or testamentary dispositions made by the author. Instead, regardless of prior assignments by the author, the expectancy of the renewal rights vests in the categories of persons enumerated by the Copyright Act"); see also, Francis M. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute on the Unbumping the Will of Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. LOUIS L.J. 919 (2000) ("if you are entering into a contract with an author, what can you do to keep the contract from being bumped? The only feasible strategy is to require the author's spouse and children at the time of the deal to execute contingent assignments of the relevant rights in the work during that work's renewal term. If the author lives to renew, he is bound by his contract under Fred Fisher and there can be no bumping. If he doesn't live to renew and those who signed the contingent assignments make up the entire statutory successor class, they too are bound under Fred Fisher and there can be no bumping. But if the successor class turns out to include someone who didn't execute a contingent assignment - for example, if the author remarried or had one or more new children after the movie deal was completed - at the beginning of the renewal term the contract is pro tanto bumped. In other words, the threat of contract bumping can be reduced but never completely eliminated").
165. Miller Music Corp. v. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960); see also, Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 371 ("should the author die while the work is in its first term, the rights to future renewal copyrights do not follow contractual or testamentary dispositions made by the author. Instead, regardless of prior assignments by the author, the expectancy of the renewal rights vests in the categories of persons enumerated by the Copyright Act"); see also, Francis M. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute on the Unbumping the Will of Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. LOUIS L.J. 919 (2000) ("if you are entering into a contract with an author, what can you do to keep the contract from being bumped? The only feasible strategy is to require the author's spouse and children at the time of the deal to execute contingent assignments of the relevant rights in the work during that work's renewal term. If the author lives to renew, he is bound by his contract under Fred Fisher and there can be no bumping. If he doesn't live to renew and those who signed the contingent assignments make up the entire statutory successor class, they too are bound under Fred Fisher and there can be no bumping. But if the successor class turns out to include someone who didn't execute a contingent assignment - for example, if the author remarried or had one or more new children after the movie deal was completed - at the beginning of the renewal term the contract is pro tanto bumped. In other words, the threat of contract bumping can be reduced but never completely eliminated").
166. Miller Music Corp. v. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960); see also, Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 371 ("should the author die while the work is in its first term, the rights to future renewal copyrights do not follow contractual or testamentary dispositions made by the author. Instead, regardless of prior assignments by the author, the expectancy of the renewal rights vests in the categories of persons enumerated by the Copyright Act"); see also, Francis M. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute on the Unbumping the Will of Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. LOUIS L.J. 919 (2000) ("if you are entering into a contract with an author, what can you do to keep the contract from being bumped? The only feasible strategy is to require the author's spouse and children at the time of the deal to execute contingent assignments of the relevant rights in the work during that work's renewal term. If the author lives to renew, he is bound by his contract under Fred Fisher and there can be no bumping. If he doesn't live to renew and those who signed the contingent assignments make up the entire statutory successor class, they too are bound under Fred Fisher and there can be no bumping. But if the successor class turns out to include someone who didn't execute a contingent assignment - for example, if the author remarried or had one or more new children after the movie deal was completed - at the beginning of the renewal term the contract is pro tanto bumped. In other words, the threat of contract bumping can be reduced but never completely eliminated").
167. See, e.g., Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, 73 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
168. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 906 [c] (1999).
169. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
170. Hill & Range Songs, Inc. v. Fred Rose Music, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 420 (M.D. Tenn. 1975), aff'd 570 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1978).
171. Lucy Saroyan and Aram Saroyan v. William Saroyan Foundation, 675 F.Supp 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Saroyan, 675 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
174. See Nevins, supra note 135.
175. See, e.g., id. at 930 ("the days of copyright law's meddling with authors' testamentary freedom are drawing to a close. Each year until the end of 2005, authors run the risk that their testamentary bequest of pre-1978 works entering their renewal term that year will be bumped. But at the close of business on December 31, 2005, the last date on which any pre-1978 copyright can conceivably begin its renewal term, most, if not all, of the will-bumping phenomenon will have faded forever into history" ).
176. Worth v. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 139-40 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1987); see also, Range Road Music, Inc. v. Stoller, 76 F. Supp 2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (If couple married before issuance of copyrights at issue, copyrights may be community property).
177. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property 60 LA. L. REV. 127 (Fall 1999); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1087 (1995); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153 (1995); Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 382 (1990); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 383 (1988); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 ENT. L. 3 (1988); William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 COMT. PROP. J. 205 (1981)); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
178. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property 60 LA. L. REV. 127 (Fall 1999); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1087 (1995); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153 (1995); Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 382 (1990); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 383 (1988); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 ENT. L. 3 (1988); William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 COMT. PROP. J. 205 (1981)); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
179. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property 60 LA. L. REV. 127 (Fall 1999); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1087 (1995); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153 (1995); Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 382 (1990); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 383 (1988); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 ENT. L. 3 (1988); William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 COMT. PROP. J. 205 (1981)); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
180. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property 60 LA. L. REV. 127 (Fall 1999); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1087 (1995); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153 (1995); Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 382 (1990); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 383 (1988); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 ENT. L. 3 (1988); William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 COMT. PROP. J. 205 (1981)); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
181. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property 60 LA. L. REV. 127 (Fall 1999); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1087 (1995); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153 (1995); Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 382 (1990); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 383 (1988); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 ENT. L. 3 (1988); William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 COMT. PROP. J. 205 (1981)); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
182. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property 60 LA. L. REV. 127 (Fall 1999); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1087 (1995); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153 (1995); Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 382 (1990); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 383 (1988); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 ENT. L. 3 (1988); William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 COMT. PROP. J. 205 (1981)); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
183. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property 60 LA. L. REV. 127 (Fall 1999); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1087 (1995); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153 (1995); Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 382 (1990); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 383 (1988); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 ENT. L. 3 (1988); William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 COMT. PROP. J. 205 (1981)); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
184. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property 60 LA. L. REV. 127 (Fall 1999); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1087 (1995); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153 (1995); Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 382 (1990); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 383 (1988); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 ENT. L. 3 (1988); William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 COMT. PROP. J. 205 (1981)); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
185. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property 60 LA. L. REV. 127 (Fall 1999); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1087 (1995); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153 (1995); Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 382 (1990); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 383 (1988); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 ENT. L. 3 (1988); William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 COMT. PROP. J. 205 (1981)); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
186. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property 60 LA. L. REV. 127 (Fall 1999); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community Property Rights in Copyright, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 1087 (1995); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153 (1995); Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y" Decision: The Characterization of a Copyright as Community Property, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 382 (1990); David Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 383 (1988); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 ENT. L. 3 (1988); William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 COMT. PROP. J. 205 (1981)); Carla M. Roberts, Note, Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 YALE L.J. 1053 (1991).
187. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. La. 1999) (copyrights are not community property).
188. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000).
189. Id. at 437.
190. Id.
191. Dane S. Ciolino, How Copyrights Became Community Property (Sort of): Through the Rodrigue v. Rodrigue Looking Glass, 47 LOY. L. REV. 631, 633 (Summer 2001).
192. See, e.g., Tom Clancy's Cold War: The Author's Divorce Involves a Custody Dispute Over a Fictional Character, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Aug. 9, 1990, at D16 (dispute over who gets custody of Tom Clancy's literary alter ego, Jack Ryan, arose in Maryland, an equitable-distribution jurisdiction, but highlights the way in which many related issues arise in allocating copyrights and copyright revenues can arise during termination of an author's marriage).
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
194. Id. § 1053.
195. See id. §§ 1127 (definition of person), 1051.
196. Id. § 1111.
197. See id. § 1114.
198. See id. § 1125.
199. See id. § 1051.
200. Id. § 1053.
201. U.S. registration may provide an early priority date that is useful when a mark owner pursues registration in other nations.
202. Ann Sturtz Viksnins, Comment, Amgen, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission: Designer Genes Don't Fit, 76 MINN. L. REV. 161.48 (1991).
203. One can use the databases available at the PTO Web site, www.uspto.gov, to perform certain trademark searches.
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
205. Id. § 1052(a).
206. Id. § 1063.
207. Jessica Litman provides these examples in The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. 149, 153 (2000).
208. Quality Inns Int'l v. McDonalds Corp., 695 F.Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988).
209. Id.
210. See Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 235 (1999).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
212. Id. § 1127 (definition of the term dilution).
213. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Keith Aoki, Using Law and Identity to Script Cultural Production: How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections on the Relationship between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523 (1997); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution and the Whittling away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997).
214. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Keith Aoki, Using Law and Identity to Script Cultural Production: How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections on the Relationship between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523 (1997); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution and the Whittling away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997).
215. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Keith Aoki, Using Law and Identity to Script Cultural Production: How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections on the Relationship between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523 (1997); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution and the Whittling away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997).
216. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Keith Aoki, Using Law and Identity to Script Cultural Production: How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections on the Relationship between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523 (1997); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution and the Whittling away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997).
217. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Keith Aoki, Using Law and Identity to Script Cultural Production: How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections on the Relationship between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523 (1997); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution and the Whittling away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997).
218. See Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
219. See, e.g., Micheal Mahoney, Madonna Wins Domain Name Dispute, E-COMMERCE TIMES Oct. 17, 2000, available at www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/ 4560.html; Steven Bonisteel, I Cann Domain-name disputes Getting Personal, COMPUTER USER.COM, May 31, 2000, available at www.computeruser.com/news/00/05/ 31/news14.html (author's right to her own name, although never registered, effectively constituted a trademark); Ivan Hoffman, Domain Name Disputes Over Celebrity Names, avialable at www.gigalaw.com/articles/hoffman-2000-09-pl.html; Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, WIPO Domain Name Dispute case D2000-0210 available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html; but see Gordon Sumner, p/k/a Sting v. Michael Uruan, WIPO Domain Name Dispute Case D2000- 0096, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html.
220. See, e.g., Micheal Mahoney, Madonna Wins Domain Name Dispute, E- COMMERCE TIMES Oct. 17, 2000, available at www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/ 4560.html; Steven Bonisteel, I Cann Domain-name disputes Getting Personal, COMPUTER USER.COM, May 31, 2000, available at www.computeruser.com/news/00/05/ 31/news14.html (author's right to her own name, although never registered, effectively constituted a trademark); Ivan Hoffman, Domain Name Disputes Over Celebrity Names, avialable at www.gigalaw.com/articles/hoffman-2000-09-pl.html; Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, WIPO Domain Name Dispute case D2000-0210 available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html; but see Gordon Sumner, p/k/a Sting v. Michael Uruan, WIPO Domain Name Dispute Case D2000- 0096, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html.
221. See, e.g., Micheal Mahoney, Madonna Wins Domain Name Dispute, E- COMMERCE TIMES Oct. 17, 2000, available at www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/ 4560.html; Steven Bonisteel, I Cann Domain-name disputes Getting Personal, COMPUTER USER.COM, May 31, 2000, available at www.computeruser.com/news/00/05/ 31/news14.html (author's right to her own name, although never registered, effectively constituted a trademark); Ivan Hoffman, Domain Name Disputes Over Celebrity Names, avialable at www.gigalaw.com/articles/hoffman-2000-09-pl.html; Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, WIPO Domain Name Dispute case D2000-0210 available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html; but see Gordon Sumner, p/k/a Sting v. Michael Uruan, WIPO Domain Name Dispute Case D2000- 0096, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html.
222. See, e.g., Micheal Mahoney, Madonna Wins Domain Name Dispute, E- COMMERCE TIMES Oct. 17, 2000, available at www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/ 4560.html; Steven Bonisteel, I Cann Domain-name disputes Getting Personal, COMPUTER USER.COM, May 31, 2000, available at www.computeruser.com/news/00/05/ 31/news14.html (author's right to her own name, although never registered, effectively constituted a trademark); Ivan Hoffman, Domain Name Disputes Over Celebrity Names, avialable at www.gigalaw.com/articles/hoffman-2000-09-pl.html; Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, WIPO Domain Name Dispute case D2000-0210 available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html; but see Gordon Sumner, p/k/a Sting v. Michael Uruan, WIPO Domain Name Dispute Case D2000- 0096, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html.
223. See, e.g., Micheal Mahoney, Madonna Wins Domain Name Dispute, E- COMMERCE TIMES Oct. 17, 2000, available at www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/ 4560.html; Steven Bonisteel, I Cann Domain-name disputes Getting Personal, COMPUTER USER.COM, May 31, 2000, available at www.computeruser.com/news/00/05/ 31/news14.html (author's right to her own name, although never registered, effectively constituted a trademark); Ivan Hoffman, Domain Name Disputes Over Celebrity Names, avialable at www.gigalaw.com/articles/hoffman-2000-09-pl.html; Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, WIPO Domain Name Dispute case D2000-0210 available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html; but see Gordon Sumner, p/k/a Sting v. Michael Uruan, WIPO Domain Name Dispute Case D2000-0096, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html.
224. See e.g., MERGES ET AL., supra note 2, at 654-57.
225. See 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(B).
226. See 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).
227. Id.
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). For a critique of the Restatement, see Paul J. Heald, Filling Two Gaps in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: Mixed-Use Trademarks and the Problem With Vanna, 47 S.C. L. REV. 783 (1996).
229. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). For a critique of the Restatement, see Paul J. Heald, Filling Two Gaps in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: Mixed-Use Trademarks and the Problem With Vanna, 47 S.C. L. REV. 783 (1996).
230. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). See Sudakshina Sen, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59 ALB. L. REV. 739, 740 (1995): Commentators have advanced three general justifications for the right of publicity. First, the celebrity's right of publicity is justified in terms of John Locke's labor theory of property. In his Second Treatise, Locke posits that an individual has "a property [right] in [her] own person" and thus in "the labor of [her] body." Melville Nimmer's influential 1954 article takes Locke's "moral" argument further, stating that a famous person who has "long and laboriously nurtured the fruit of publicity values" should benefit from those values herself. According to this modern application of Locke's labor theory of property, since the celebrity spends time, money, and energy in developing a commercially lucrative persona, that persona is the fruit of the celebrity's labor and entitles her to its rewards. Moreover, in line with the labor theory of property, it is often argued that advertisers who appropriate celebrity personas without permission, much like "pirates" or "free riders," improperly reap what others have sown. The second justification of the right of publicity is the economic incentive argument, which holds that protection of the celebrity's economic interest in her identity fosters creativity. The assurance that the celebrity will be able to gain from what she produces will encourage artistic creation that enriches our culture. Because society "encourages socially valuable activities and achievements," the celebrity's legal entitlement provides the necessary motivation to produce work. The third justification is the unfair trade practices rationale, which stems from a consumer protection perspective. The advocates of this rationale contend that, in the context of advertising, the celebrity should have exclusive control of her right of publicity in order to protect consumers from possible misrepresentation, deception, and false advertising.
231. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). See Sudakshina Sen, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59 ALB. L. REV. 739, 740 (1995): Commentators have advanced three general justifications for the right of publicity. First, the celebrity's right of publicity is justified in terms of John Locke's labor theory of property. In his Second Treatise, Locke posits that an individual has "a property [right] in [her] own person" and thus in "the labor of [her] body." Melville Nimmer's influential 1954 article takes Locke's "moral" argument further, stating that a famous person who has "long and laboriously nurtured the fruit of publicity values" should benefit from those values herself. According to this modern application of Locke's labor theory of property, since the celebrity spends time, money, and energy in developing a commercially lucrative persona, that persona is the fruit of the celebrity's labor and entitles her to its rewards. Moreover, in line with the labor theory of property, it is often argued that advertisers who appropriate celebrity personas without permission, much like "pirates" or "free riders," improperly reap what others have sown. The second justification of the right of publicity is the economic incentive argument, which holds that protection of the celebrity's economic interest in her identity fosters creativity. The assurance that the celebrity will be able to gain from what she produces will encourage artistic creation that enriches our culture. Because society "encourages socially valuable activities and achievements," the celebrity's legal entitlement provides the necessary motivation to produce work. The third justification is the unfair trade practices rationale, which stems from a consumer protection perspective. The advocates of this rationale contend that, in the context of advertising, the celebrity should have exclusive control of her right of publicity in order to protect consumers from possible misrepresentation, deception, and false advertising.
232. John Gibeaut, Image Conscious, A.B.A. J. 48 (June 1999). See also, Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y, 227 (1999); J. Eugene Salomon Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1987); Paul Cirino, Note: Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in New York and California, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 763 (1994); Edward C. Wilde, The Scope of Liability Under California's Right of Publicity Statutes: CIVIL CODE §§ 990, 3344, 5 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 167 (1998).
233. John Gibeaut, Image Conscious, A.B.A. J. 48 (June 1999). See also, Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y, 227 (1999); J. Eugene Salomon Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1987); Paul Cirino, Note: Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in New York and California, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 763 (1994); Edward C. Wilde, The Scope of Liability Under California's Right of Publicity Statutes: CIVIL CODE §§ 990, 3344, 5 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 167 (1998).
234. John Gibeaut, Image Conscious, A.B.A. J. 48 (June 1999). See also, Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y, 227 (1999); J. Eugene Salomon Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1987); Paul Cirino, Note: Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in New York and California, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 763 (1994); Edward C. Wilde, The Scope of Liability Under California's Right of Publicity Statutes: CIVIL CODE §§ 990, 3344, 5 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 167 (1998).
235. John Gibeaut, Image Conscious, A.B.A. J. 48 (June 1999). See also, Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y, 227 (1999); J. Eugene Salomon Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1987); Paul Cirino, Note: Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in New York and California, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 763 (1994); Edward C. Wilde, The Scope of Liability Under California's Right of Publicity Statutes: CIVIL CODE §§ 990, 3344, 5 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 167 (1998).
236. John Gibeaut, Image Conscious, A.B.A. J. 48 (June 1999). See also, Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y, 227 (1999); J. Eugene Salomon Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179 (1987); Paul Cirino, Note: Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in New York and California, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 763 (1994); Edward C. Wilde, The Scope of Liability Under California's Right of Publicity Statutes: CIVIL CODE §§ 990, 3344, 5 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 167 (1998).
237. But see, Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 406-07 (1999) (Second Circuit Judge Jerome Frank severed the right of publicity from the right of privacy).
238. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, n.150 (1997).
239. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Publicity Rights and Political Aspiration: Mass Culture, Gender Identity and Democracy, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (1992). A good overview of the evolution of right of publicity jurisprudence is found in Patti T. Cotten, Recent Development: Torts - The Right of Publicity - Protecting a Celebrity's Identity, 52 TENN. L. REV. 123 (1984).
240. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Publicity Rights and Political Aspiration: Mass Culture, Gender Identity and Democracy, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1221, 1225 (1992). A good overview of the evolution of right of publicity jurisprudence is found in Patti T. Cotten, Recent Development: Torts - The Right of Publicity - Protecting a Celebrity's Identity, 52 TENN. L. REV. 123 (1984).
241. Coombe, supra note 185, at 1226.
242. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
243. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
244. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
245. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
246. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
247. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
248. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
249. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
250. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
251. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
252. Articles generally advocating broad rights include Kwall, supra note 181; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995); Navin Katya, The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet. . . In the Flesh, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739 (1998); Holly M. Levinson, Image Is Everything. . .But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 83 (1996/1997); James M. Left, Not For Just Another Pretty Face: Providing Full Protection Under the Right of Publicity, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 321 (1994). Articles that are less positive about expansive rights of publicity include: Steven C. Clay, Note: Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1994); David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); Coombe, supra note 173; Sen, supra note 181; Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37 (1997); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity? 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L.& POL'Y 35 (Fall 1998).
253. Halpern, supra note 187 at 872.
254. See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993).
255. At present the First Amendment offers some protection to "authors without authorization" who write about celebrities, but is less likely to shield those who use images of famous people, because a non-permissive utilization of words gets more First Amendment protection than an unauthorized use of pictures or sounds, especially when digital technologies have been employed. When Dustin Hoffman sued Los Angeles Magazine for merging an old photograph of him with a contemporary photograph of a fashion model, the judge found that the photographs contained in the disputed feature, which also featured the merged visages of other entertainers, "were manipulated and cannibalized to such an extent that the celebrities were commercially exploited and robbed of their dignity, professionalism and talent. To be blunt, the celebrities were violated by technology. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C. D. Cal. 1999).
256. See, e.g., D. Scott Gurney, Note, Celebrities and the First Amendment: Broader Protection Against the Unauthorized Publication of Photographs, 61 IND. L.J. 697 (Fall, 1986); Jamie E. Nordhaus, Note, Celebrities' Rights to Privacy: How Far Should the Paparazzi Be Allowed to Go? 18 REV. LITIG. 285 (1999); Lena Reed VanHoornbeek, Notes and Comments, Protection from Paparazzi: Possible or Preposterous? 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203 (1997).
257. See, e.g., D. Scott Gurney, Note, Celebrities and the First Amendment: Broader Protection Against the Unauthorized Publication of Photographs, 61 IND. L.J. 697 (Fall, 1986); Jamie E. Nordhaus, Note, Celebrities' Rights to Privacy: How Far Should the Paparazzi Be Allowed to Go? 18 REV. LITIG. 285 (1999); Lena Reed VanHoornbeek, Notes and Comments, Protection from Paparazzi: Possible or Preposterous? 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203 (1997).
258. See, e.g., D. Scott Gurney, Note, Celebrities and the First Amendment: Broader Protection Against the Unauthorized Publication of Photographs, 61 IND. L.J. 697 (Fall, 1986); Jamie E. Nordhaus, Note, Celebrities' Rights to Privacy: How Far Should the Paparazzi Be Allowed to Go? 18 REV. LITIG. 285 (1999); Lena Reed VanHoornbeek, Notes and Comments, Protection from Paparazzi: Possible or Preposterous? 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203 (1997).
259. See Madow, supra note 189, at n.12.
260. Michael Madow provides the (lengthy but worthwhile) example: A few years ago, a bill was introduced in the New York Legislature to create a broad and descendable right of publicity. During hearings on the bill, some of the testimony referred to a greeting card, said to be sold chiefly in gay bookstores. The card bears a picture of John Wayne, wearing a cowboy hat and bright red lipstick, above the caption "it's such a bitch being butch." Wayne's children, among others, objected to the card not only on the ground that its sellers were making money from The Duke's image - money that should go to them, or, in this case, to the charity of their choosing. They objected also, indeed primarily, because in their view the card was "tasteless" and demeaned their father's (hard-earned) conservative macho image. To his children, as to most of his fans, John Wayne epitomizes traditional America's mythic and idealized view of itself, its history, and its national character. What Wayne stands for - what his image means in the mainstream cultural grammar - is rugged individualism, can-do confidence, physical courage, and untroubled masculinity. That is the "preferred meaning" of John Wayne. It was on this preferred meaning that [then] President Bush drew easily and effectively in communicating his military plans in the [Persian] Gulf. It is on that meaning, too, that Wayne Enterprises drew when it licensed the Franklin Mint to sell (for $395) a "serially numbered, non-firing" replica of the .45-caliber automatic pistol that Wayne "carried in so many great military films." Nevertheless, against-the-grain readings of John Wayne are also possible. For instance, in a course on how to survive as a prisoner of war, the U.S. Navy uses the term "John Wayning it" to mean trying foolishly to hold out against brutal torture. The particular greeting card that Wayne's children and others objected to so strenuously represents an even more subversive inflection of Wayne's image. The card uses his image to interrogate and challenge mainstream conceptions of masculinity and heterosexuality. It re-codes Wayne's image so as to make it carry a cultural meaning that presumably works for gay men, among others, but which Wayne's children (and no doubt many of his fans) find deeply offensive. If the New York Legislature were to make John Wayne's right of publicity descendable, however, it would confer on Wayne Enterprises the power to determine that this particular appropriation of the John Wayne image is "illegitimate," and to enforce that determination by denying a license to the greeting card maker. Wayne Enterprises would henceforth have the power to fix, or at least try to fix, the meaning that "John Wayne" has in our culture; his meaning for us. Madow, supra note 189, at 129.
261. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 182.
262. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986); J. Graham Matherne, Descendibility of Publicity Rights in Tennessee Summer, 53 TENN. L. REV. 753 (1986); Timothy P. Terrell and Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, (1985); Brent W. Stricker, In Memory of Lost Heroes: Protecting the Persona Rights of Deceased Celebrities, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 611 (2000).
263. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986); J. Graham Matherne, Descendibility of Publicity Rights in Tennessee Summer, 53 TENN. L. REV. 753 (1986); Timothy P. Terrell and Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, (1985); Brent W. Stricker, In Memory of Lost Heroes: Protecting the Persona Rights of Deceased Celebrities, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 611 (2000).
264. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986); J. Graham Matherne, Descendibility of Publicity Rights in Tennessee Summer, 53 TENN. L. REV. 753 (1986); Timothy P. Terrell and Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, (1985); Brent W. Stricker, In Memory of Lost Heroes: Protecting the Persona Rights of Deceased Celebrities, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 611 (2000).
265. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986); J. Graham Matherne, Descendibility of Publicity Rights in Tennessee Summer, 53 TENN. L. REV. 753 (1986); Timothy P. Terrell and Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, (1985); Brent W. Stricker, In Memory of Lost Heroes: Protecting the Persona Rights of Deceased Celebrities, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 611 (2000).
266. See e.g, Robin P. Rosen, Note: A Critical Analysis of Celebrity Careers as Property Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (1993); Jonathan L. Kranz, Sharing the Spotlight: Equitable Distribution of the Right of Publicity, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 917 (1995).
267. See e.g, Robin P. Rosen, Note: A Critical Analysis of Celebrity Careers as Property Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (1993); Jonathan L. Kranz, Sharing the Spotlight: Equitable Distribution of the Right of Publicity, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 917 (1995).
268. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRET ACT at section 1(4).
269. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS section 757 comment b (1939).
270. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT section 5 (1985), "In an action under this [Act], a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court approval."