Can no competition policy be better than some competition policy?

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 19, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 55-77

  Mattoo, Aaditya ^a  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust policy; Horizontal merger; L13; L40; L41; L42; Oligopoly; Vertical merger

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035545369     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00048-X     Document Type: Article

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