"Vanguard of the state": The Cuban armed forces in transition

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 48, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 19-30

  Espinosa, Juan Carlos ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035541559     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2001.11655957     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. Quoted in Cuba en el mes (April 1995): 44. Raúl Castro was designated minister of the FAR in October 1959 and has held the post ever since.
2. The start of a "Special Period in Time of Peace" was proclaimed by Fidel Castro in August 1990. The term described the critical social, economic, and political situation faced by the country after the collapse of the socialist bloc and the end of the Soviet subsidy.
3. The reference here is to active, inactive, and retired officers, and not to ranks below second lieutenant (or ensign).
4. Enrique A. Baloyra, "Twelve Monkeys: Cuban National Defense and the Military," Cuban Studies Association Occasional Paper Series 1, no. 4 (1996): 2. When the Cuban Communist Party was formed in 1965, 57 percent of the Central Committee was from the military.
5. Alvaro Alba, "Militarización de la sociedad cubana" (Militarization of Cuban Society), unpublished manuscript (Miami, 2000), p. 8.
6. Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 778-89. Writing more generally about military regimes, Perlmutter observed that "modern military regimes are not purely military in composition. Instead, they are fusionist, that is, they are military-civilian regimes." Amos Perlmutter, "The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements," World Politics 33, no. 1 (1980): 97. The nature of the relationship of the FAR and PCC was discussed in a special issue of Armed Forces and Society 1, no. 4 (1975). Irving Louis Horowitz was among the first to remark on the military-dominant nature of the Cuban regime in "The Stalinization of Fidel Castro," New Politics 4 (1965).
7. Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 778-89. Writing more generally about military regimes, Perlmutter observed that "modern military regimes are not purely military in composition. Instead, they are fusionist, that is, they are military-civilian regimes." Amos Perlmutter, "The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements," World Politics 33, no. 1 (1980): 97. The nature of the relationship of the FAR and PCC was discussed in a special issue of Armed Forces and Society 1, no. 4 (1975). Irving Louis Horowitz was among the first to remark on the military-dominant nature of the Cuban regime in "The Stalinization of Fidel Castro," New Politics 4 (1965).
8. Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 778-89. Writing more generally about military regimes, Perlmutter observed that "modern military regimes are not purely military in composition. Instead, they are fusionist, that is, they are military-civilian regimes." Amos Perlmutter, "The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements," World Politics 33, no. 1 (1980): 97. The nature of the relationship of the FAR and PCC was discussed in a special issue of Armed Forces and Society 1, no. 4 (1975). Irving Louis Horowitz was among the first to remark on the military-dominant nature of the Cuban regime in "The Stalinization of Fidel Castro," New Politics 4 (1965).
9. Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 778-89. Writing more generally about military regimes, Perlmutter observed that "modern military regimes are not purely military in composition. Instead, they are fusionist, that is, they are military-civilian regimes." Amos Perlmutter, "The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements," World Politics 33, no. 1 (1980): 97. The nature of the relationship of the FAR and PCC was discussed in a special issue of Armed Forces and Society 1, no. 4 (1975). Irving Louis Horowitz was among the first to remark on the military-dominant nature of the Cuban regime in "The Stalinization of Fidel Castro," New Politics 4 (1965).
10. These polities exhibit(ed) a remarkable heterogeneity that reflected local history, culture, and geopolitical realities. However, they shared basic characteristics common to all communist systems, and some unique to military-mobilizational regimes: (1) the creation of a party or movement by the army; (2) the adoption of Marxism-Leninism as an ideology, but in a local version, marked by the dictator's own recipe, combining cult of personality and scientific socialism with traditional political, historical, and cultural elements; (3) one-man, one-party rule with the military dominant over civilian party structures; (4) a centrally planned economy based on state ownership of the means of production; (5) reliance on mass mobilization and the militarization of public life and institutions; (6) politicization of the military and militarization of politics; and (7) high levels of improvisation and low levels of institutionalization (outside the armed forces).
11. On communist regimes in Africa, see Edmond T. Kellar and Donald Rothchild, eds., Afro-Marxist Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1987); John Markaris and Michael Waller, eds., Military Marxist Regimes in Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1986). None of the Afro-Marxist regimes survived the extinction of the Soviet Union, the ultimate economic sponsor of the Cuban mobilizational model they had adopted. The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was the most successful example of the developing MMV. The Bolivarian Movement of Venezuela, led by Hugo Chavez Frías, appears to be an early phase of the MMV.
12. On communist regimes in Africa, see Edmond T. Kellar and Donald Rothchild, eds., Afro-Marxist Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1987); John Markaris and Michael Waller, eds., Military Marxist Regimes in Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1986). None of the Afro-Marxist regimes survived the extinction of the Soviet Union, the ultimate economic sponsor of the Cuban mobilizational model they had adopted. The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was the most successful example of the developing MMV. The Bolivarian Movement of Venezuela, led by Hugo Chavez Frías, appears to be an early phase of the MMV.
13. Jorge I. Domínguez, "The Civic Soldier in Cuba," in Armies and Politics in Latin America, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal and Samuel Fitch, rev. ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), p. 263.
14. Alba, "Militarización de la sociedad cubana," p. 1.
15. Domingo Amuchástegui, "Cuba's Armed Forces: Power and Reforms," in Cuba in Transition, ed. Jorge Pérez-López and José F. Alonso (Washington, DC: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 1999), p. 110.
16. The 10-million-ton sugar harvest of 1970 was an abysmal failure for the nation, for the military, and for Fidel Castro. The military was responsible for 20 percent of all sugar cane cut in the massive mobilization. Approximately 70,000 troops were involved in the harvest, representing 64 percent of the regular forces, and 28 percent of all the armed forces. See Domínguez, "Civic Soldier in Cuba," p. 279.
17. The term "bureaucratic socialist" was used by Guillermo O'Donnell in Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) and is borrowed here as used by Jorge I. Domínguez in "Comienza una transición hacia el autoritarismo en Cuba?" (Has a Transition Toward Authoritarianism Begun in Cuba?), Revista Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana, nos. 6/7 (1997).
18. The term "bureaucratic socialist" was used by Guillermo O'Donnell in Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) and is borrowed here as used by Jorge I. Domínguez in "Comienza una transición hacia el autoritarismo en Cuba?" (Has a Transition Toward Authoritarianism Begun in Cuba?), Revista Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana, nos. 6/7 (1997).
19. One measure of this process is the changing make-up of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. The FAR's percentage of seats on the Central Committee fell from 57 percent at the Party's founding to just under 30 percent at the time of the First Party Congress. The proportion continued to decline to a low of 12.5 percent after the Fourth Congress in 1991, but rose again with the Fifth Congress in 1997. One should be careful not to read too much into these changes in terms of conventional civil-military relations, however. The proportion of FAR is probably a better measure of the general militarization of society and Fidel Castro's perception of the threats and challenges faced by his regime. Today, the FAR is everywhere demonstrating the "overwhelming centrality of the FAR in every single area of policy making." Amuchastegui, "Cuba's Armed Forces," p. 111.
20. Richard L. Millett, "Cuba's Armed Forces: From Triumph to Survival," Georgetown University, Cuba Briefing Paper Series, no. 4 (September 1993): 6.
21. The first generation of Cuban military officers were históricos, men and women formed (more or less) in the guerrilla struggle against Batista, in the first internationalist missions, which began within months of the regime's accession to power in 1959, and in the extermination of anti-communist guerrillas (1960-66). The second generation of officers emerged from the professionalization of the 1970s and 1980s with military-academic training in Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other socialist bloc countries. The third generation is a product of the Special Period. There were defections of military and state security officers, while discontent among officers and enlisted men in Africa and among returning veterans was widely reported. The discord was intensified by the restructuring of the FAR as Cuban troops withdrew from Africa and began returning in great numbers in the mid-to late 1980s.
22. Much has been written, but little is known for certain, about the case and its circumstances, including the documentary, 8-A by exile filmmaker Orlando Jiménez-Leal, a set of dueling memoirs, Norberto Fuentes, Dulces Guerreros Cubanos (Sweet Cuban Warriors) (Barcelona: Seix-Barral, 1999), and Jorge Massetti, El furor y el delirio: Itinerario de un hijo de la Revolución cubana (Furor and Delirium: The Itinerary of a Son of the Cuban Revolution) (Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, C.A., 1999), also Andrés Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); José Alonso, "The Ochoa Affair and Its Aftermath," in Cuban Communism, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989); and Enrique Baloyra, "The End of the Pajama Game? The Execution of General Ochoa," revised manuscript, 1989 (1996).
23. Much has been written, but little is known for certain, about the case and its circumstances, including the documentary, 8-A by exile filmmaker Orlando Jiménez-Leal, a set of dueling memoirs, Norberto Fuentes, Dulces Guerreros Cubanos (Sweet Cuban Warriors) (Barcelona: Seix-Barral, 1999), and Jorge Massetti, El furor y el delirio: Itinerario de un hijo de la Revolución cubana (Furor and Delirium: The Itinerary of a Son of the Cuban Revolution) (Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, C.A., 1999), also Andrés Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); José Alonso, "The Ochoa Affair and Its Aftermath," in Cuban Communism, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989); and Enrique Baloyra, "The End of the Pajama Game? The Execution of General Ochoa," revised manuscript, 1989 (1996).
24. Much has been written, but little is known for certain, about the case and its circumstances, including the documentary, 8-A by exile filmmaker Orlando Jiménez-Leal, a set of dueling memoirs, Norberto Fuentes, Dulces Guerreros Cubanos (Sweet Cuban Warriors) (Barcelona: Seix-Barral, 1999), and Jorge Massetti, El furor y el delirio: Itinerario de un hijo de la Revolución cubana (Furor and Delirium: The Itinerary of a Son of the Cuban Revolution) (Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, C.A., 1999), also Andrés Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); José Alonso, "The Ochoa Affair and Its Aftermath," in Cuban Communism, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989); and Enrique Baloyra, "The End of the Pajama Game? The Execution of General Ochoa," revised manuscript, 1989 (1996).
25. Much has been written, but little is known for certain, about the case and its circumstances, including the documentary, 8-A by exile filmmaker Orlando Jiménez-Leal, a set of dueling memoirs, Norberto Fuentes, Dulces Guerreros Cubanos (Sweet Cuban Warriors) (Barcelona: Seix-Barral, 1999), and Jorge Massetti, El furor y el delirio: Itinerario de un hijo de la Revolución cubana (Furor and Delirium: The Itinerary of a Son of the Cuban Revolution) (Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, C.A., 1999), also Andrés Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); José Alonso, "The Ochoa Affair and Its Aftermath," in Cuban Communism, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989); and Enrique Baloyra, "The End of the Pajama Game? The Execution of General Ochoa," revised manuscript, 1989 (1996).
26. Much has been written, but little is known for certain, about the case and its circumstances, including the documentary, 8-A by exile filmmaker Orlando Jiménez-Leal, a set of dueling memoirs, Norberto Fuentes, Dulces Guerreros Cubanos (Sweet Cuban Warriors) (Barcelona: Seix-Barral, 1999), and Jorge Massetti, El furor y el delirio: Itinerario de un hijo de la Revolución cubana (Furor and Delirium: The Itinerary of a Son of the Cuban Revolution) (Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, C.A., 1999), also Andrés Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); José Alonso, "The Ochoa Affair and Its Aftermath," in Cuban Communism, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989); and Enrique Baloyra, "The End of the Pajama Game? The Execution of General Ochoa," revised manuscript, 1989 (1996).
27. See Julio Carranza Valdés, Luis Gutiérrez Urdaneta, and Pedro Monreal González, Cuba: la reestructuración de la economía. Una propuesta para el debate (Cuba: The Restructuring of the Economy, A Proposal for Debate) (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1997); Angela Ferriol Muruaga, Alfredo González Gutiérrez, Didio Quintana Mendoza, and Victoria Pérez Izquierdo, Cuba: crisis, ajuste y situación social (1990-1996) (Cuba: Crisis, Adjustment, and the Social Situation [1990-1996]) (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1998); Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Economic Effects on Cuba of the Downfall of Socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe," in Cuba After the Cold War, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993). For a more extensive report on the economy, see CEPAL 1997, 2000. The published proceedings of the annual meetings of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), vols. 1-9 (1989-1999) are probably the best source of information and analysis on the Cuban economy.
28. See Julio Carranza Valdés, Luis Gutiérrez Urdaneta, and Pedro Monreal González, Cuba: la reestructuración de la economía. Una propuesta para el debate (Cuba: The Restructuring of the Economy, A Proposal for Debate) (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1997); Angela Ferriol Muruaga, Alfredo González Gutiérrez, Didio Quintana Mendoza, and Victoria Pérez Izquierdo, Cuba: crisis, ajuste y situación social (1990-1996) (Cuba: Crisis, Adjustment, and the Social Situation [1990-1996]) (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1998); Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Economic Effects on Cuba of the Downfall of Socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe," in Cuba After the Cold War, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993). For a more extensive report on the economy, see CEPAL 1997, 2000. The published proceedings of the annual meetings of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), vols. 1-9 (1989-1999) are probably the best source of information and analysis on the Cuban economy.
29. See Julio Carranza Valdés, Luis Gutiérrez Urdaneta, and Pedro Monreal González, Cuba: la reestructuración de la economía. Una propuesta para el debate (Cuba: The Restructuring of the Economy, A Proposal for Debate) (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1997); Angela Ferriol Muruaga, Alfredo González Gutiérrez, Didio Quintana Mendoza, and Victoria Pérez Izquierdo, Cuba: crisis, ajuste y situación social (1990-1996) (Cuba: Crisis, Adjustment, and the Social Situation [1990-1996]) (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1998); Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Economic Effects on Cuba of the Downfall of Socialism in the USSR and Eastern Europe," in Cuba After the Cold War, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993). For a more extensive report on the economy, see CEPAL 1997, 2000. The published proceedings of the annual meetings of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), vols. 1-9 (1989-1999) are probably the best source of information and analysis on the Cuban economy.
30. Carmelo Mesa-Lago notes that "the decline in the Cuban economy is much worse than the deterioration suffered by any country in market transition in Eastern Europe, even though Cuba has not yet begun a full process of marketization." See Are Economic Reforms Propelling Cuba to the Market? (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami/North-South Center, 1994), p. 9. Another analyst asserts that the shock was greater than that experienced by any Latin American country during the 1980s and was comparable only to the depression-era crisis of 1933. Ferriol et. al., Cuba, p. 35.
31. Carmelo Mesa-Lago notes that "the decline in the Cuban economy is much worse than the deterioration suffered by any country in market transition in Eastern Europe, even though Cuba has not yet begun a full process of marketization." See Are Economic Reforms Propelling Cuba to the Market? (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami/North-South Center, 1994), p. 9. Another analyst asserts that the shock was greater than that experienced by any Latin American country during the 1980s and was comparable only to the depression-era crisis of 1933. Ferriol et. al., Cuba, p. 35.
32. Félix Báez, Granma (September 17, 1994): 1.
33. The decline in size and resources was drastic, but it does not tell the whole story. As the size of the active military shrank, the reserve forces were expanded and the responsibility for the defense of the revolution was spread to the civilian population to an extent not seen since the early 1960s, when an American invasion seemed imminent and anti-communist guerrillas were operating throughout the country. Cubans now took part more often in mass mobilizations and civil defense exercises, faced increased vigilance by the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the Single System for Vigilance and Protection, and spent more and more of their time hunting and gathering for their daily sustenance.
34. Defense Intelligence Agency, "The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security" (November 18, 1997) (www.defenselink.mil/pubs/cubarpt.htm).
35. The DIA (p. 1) report gives the estimated figures as "about 50,000 to 65,000 regular troops."
36. At 1987 levels, Cuba's armed forces would have ranked twentieth, between Syria and Brazil, and was the largest army in Latin America. Today it ranks seventy-fourth in the world, eighth-largest in Latin America. As of 1997, Cuba ranked seventieth in the world in the number of military personnel per thousand of population with 5.0. That was above the regional average of 2.7, but lower than the United States (number 59 at 5.7), and much lower than its former Warsaw Pact allies, who averaged 7.2 per 1,000. See World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1998) (www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ bureau_vc/wmeat98fs.html).
37. The military has played an economic-development role in Cuba since the earliest colonial days, and has been an agent of state- and nation-building since the beginning of modern Western history. Starting in the nineteenth century, it has been an engine for industrialization and modernization from Prussia to Japan. Militarization of the economy and popular mobilization for economic development typified twentieth-century nations wanting to make leaps forward, such as Russia under Stalin, Third Reich Germany, and Peronist Argentina, not always with great success.
38. On the topic of the military in the economy, see the proceedings of the conference "Soldiers in Business: The Military as an Economic Player," Jakarta, Indonesia, October 16-19, 2000 (www.bicc.de/budget/events/ milbus/jakarta.html).
39. The EJT focused primarily on basic construction, manufacturing, and agriculture. Damián J. Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Coral Gables, FL: Institute for Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1989), p. 10.
40. The dual strategy provided Cuba with new opportunities and pledges for foreign investment, but also created strong contradictory effects. The announcement of measures that had been previously rejected as dregs of Cuba's neo-colonial past, such as tourism and direct foreign investment, created odd contrasts with the campaigns for ideological purity and revolutionary morality. Second, it promoted rising expectations and frustrations, resulting in an increase in crime, vandalism, and grumbling, as well as a strong contraction of demand in the first economy and a boom in the black market.
41. In 1993, the regime legalized the possession and use of dollars, limited self-employment, and the opening of tiny twelve-chair restaurants, and promised more reforms. The reform process stalled in early 1994, stopped by Fidel Castro himself. The violence of the summer of 1994, the murder of forty-two Cubans fleeing on a stolen tugboat, the Malecón riots of August 5, and other events compelled the regime to announce further reforms in September, including the opening of farmers' markets. The government wanted to avoid another confrontation between the people and the regime. It did not want a Cuban Tiananmen. Interviews with Maida Donate, Pedro Pablo Cuscó, and Domingo Amuchástegui, Miami, FL, 1995-96.
42. Phyllis Greene Walker points out that by the time the Special Period hit, virtually all military enterprises (and a few civilian ones) had adopted the new managerial techniques. Phyllis Greene Walker, "Challenges Facing the Cuban Military," Georgetown University, Cuba Briefing Paper Series, no. 12 (October 1996): 4.
43. Juan Hermida, "Perfeccionamiento Empresarial a lo cubano" (Enterprise Perfectioning Cuban-Style), Tribuna de La Habana, 1999 (www.tribuna.islagrande.cu/economial.htm).
44. Ibid.
45. Quoted by Héctor Maseda, "El perfeccionamiento empresarial: otra ilusión perdida" (Enterprise Perfectioning: Another Lost Illusion), CubaNet (July 7, 2000) (www.cubanet.org/CNews/y00/jul00/07a7.htm).
46. Domingo Amuchástegui, "FAR: Mastering Reforms," in Cuba in Transition (Washington, DC: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 2000), p. 441, calls it a success "given the Cuban context."
47. Granma (May 18, 2001): 1.
48. See Frank Díaz-Pou, "El Perfeccionamiento Empresarial: desarrollo y potencial" (Enterprise Perfectioning: Development and Potential) (unpublished manuscript, Miami, FL, 2001).
49. The correlation between the sharp reduction in forces and the rise of commercial enterprises run and staffed primarily by active and retired military is quite clear.
50. Domínguez, "Civic Soldier in Cuba," p. 263.
51. Juan Carlos Espinosa, "Markets Redux: The Politics of Farmers' Markets in Cuba," in Cuba in Transition (Washington, DC: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 1995); Domingo Amuchástegui, "FAR: Mastering Reforms," in Cuba in Transition (Washington, DC: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 2000).
52. Juan Carlos Espinosa, "Markets Redux: The Politics of Farmers' Markets in Cuba," in Cuba in Transition (Washington, DC: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 1995); Domingo Amuchástegui, "FAR: Mastering Reforms," in Cuba in Transition (Washington, DC: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 2000).
53. Frank O. Mora, "Raulismo and the Technocrat-Soldier: The Economic Role of the FAR and Its Implications for Transition in Cuba" (paper presented at the conference "The Politics of Military Extrication in Comparative Perspective: Lessons for Cuba," Arrábida, Portugal, September 21-22, 2000), p. 10.
54. On the entrepreneur-soldier see, Juan Carlos Espinosa and Robert C. Harding, "Olive-Green Parachutes and Slow-Motion Piñatas: The Cuban Armed Forces in Comparative Perspective" (paper presented at the conference on "The Politics of Military Extrication in Comparative Perspective").
55. These are industries that did not exist before the revolution, such as biotechnology, computers and information systems, and digital communications. These kinds of enterprises are less likely to be complicated by claims from expropriated American or Cuban exile companies.
56. Gaviota, S.A. is one of the best-known of these companies. Operated by retired and active military officers, it controls ten enterprises: Hoteles Gaviota, Gaviota Tour, Arcoiris, Marinas Gaviota, Via Auto Rentals, Transgaviota (small aircraft and helicopter rentals), Tiendas Gaviota, Inversiones Gaviota, Parques Naturales Gaviota, and Comercial Gaviota. In 1998, it controlled 7 percent of the country's hotel rooms and garnered 10 percent of the tourist trade. Armando Mastrapa III, "Soldiers and Businessmen: The FAR During the Special Period" (paper presented at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Coral Gables, FL, August 5-7, 2000).
57. The income-generating activities of the Ministry of Interior were "designed" by Colonel José Luis Padrón and took place overseas. Department MC was run by Colonel Tony de la Guardia, who in turn helped run a number of enterprises, such as CIMEX, Tecun, and Treviso. Promotora, S.A., a Panama-based operation that owned and operated a number of firms, including Banco Financiero Internacional (BFI). Most of these entities were created in the late 1970s and early 1980s. All of them came under FAR control or supervision after 1989. See Jesús M. Fernández, "Participación de los militares cubanos en la economía cubana" (The Participation of the Cuban Military in the Economy) (unpublished manuscript, Miami, FL, 2000).
58. History has provided numerous examples from the beginning of the revolution. However, because of the nature of the regime, evidence of these kinds of problems is rarely current, and relies on the testimony of defectors, rumors, informed speculation, imaginative readings of the Cuban press, and post-facto analysis of personnel changes announced by the Cuban government. Few cases are as dramatic as the Huber Matos case in October 1959 or the Ochoa case in 1989. Sometimes rumor and speculation are "confirmed" later by government media or by foreign intelligence, but often there is no official detailed explanation for a demotion or dismissal. There are always new reports of trouble in the higher ranks.
59. Despite his almost absolute control over the military, Fidel Castro has been distrustful of it from almost the start. A recent example was the government's reaction to President Clinton's offer of help for a peaceful transition in Cuba, included a reassuring message letting the Cuban military know that it would have a bright future in a democratic Cuba. The regime had all active and reserve personnel publicly swear an oath of allegiance to Fidel and Raúl. Bill Clinton, Support for a Democratic Transition in Cuba (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States, 1997).
60. The phrase was used by the internal opposition leaders known as "the Four" (Vladimiro Roca, Marta Beatriz Roque, René Gómez Manzano, and Félix Bonne Carcasses), in the seminal document "La patria es de todos" (The Homeland Belongs to All), 1997 (www.cubanet.org).
61. Arnaldo Ochoa, Hero of the Republic, African war hero, executed under charges related to drug trafficking in 1989. José Abrahantes, interior minister purged in 1989, died of a heart attack while in prison. Carlos Aldana, PCC ideological chief was removed in 1992 and sent to work as a bookkeeper at a health resort. Ramiro Valdés, a Rebel Army veteran, former interior minister, leading "captain of industry," controls a sizable portion of emerging virgin industries like telecommunications.
62. Fernández, "Participación de los militares cubanos en la economía cubana." They do so not so much for direct access to dollars, but for the other fringe benefits, especially jabitas, bonuses paid in shopping bags containing scarce essentials like soap and toothpaste, and the under-the-table incentives in dollars. The legalization of hard currency in 1993 expressly forbade active military personnel from having dollars. They are also barred from even part-time self-employment.
63. Resentment and cynicism among FAR personnel are reported by recent defectors and by exiles who have visited the island and had contact with military men in their families.
64. Peter Lock, "Exploring the Changing Role of the Military in the Economy" (paper presented at the conference on "Soldiers in Business: The Military as an Economic Actor," Jakarta, Indonesia, October 17-19, 2000), p. 2 (www.bicc.de/budget/events/milbus/jakarta.html).
65. See János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Socialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Maria Lo's, ed., The Second Economy in Marxist States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Jorge F. Pérez-López, Cuba 's Second Economy: From Behind the Scenes to Center Stage (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995).
66. See János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Socialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Maria Lo's, ed., The Second Economy in Marxist States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Jorge F. Pérez-López, Cuba 's Second Economy: From Behind the Scenes to Center Stage (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995).
67. See János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Socialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Maria Lo's, ed., The Second Economy in Marxist States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Jorge F. Pérez-López, Cuba 's Second Economy: From Behind the Scenes to Center Stage (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995).
68. Tai Ming Cheung, "The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex" (paper presented at the conference "Soldiers in Business: Military as an Economic Actor," Jakarta, Indonesia, Octobr 17-19, 2000), p. 3.
69. Emilio Ichikawa, "Cuba: Corruption as a Moral Standard" (unpublished manuscript, Washington, DC, 2001).
70. Haroldo Dilla, "Comrades and Investors: The Uncertain Transition in Cuba," in Global Capitalism Versus Democracy: Socialist Register, ed. Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1999), pp. 229-234.
71. He says further that "the collapse of the Soviet empire left the nomenklatura in control of most of the large state-run enterprises, farms and military-industrial complexes. Subsequent involvement in the smuggling of Russian oil, arms, narcotics, and nuclear materials has provided opportunities to improve their financial positions." Thomas Kelly, "Corrupting Democracy: Lessons from Russia, Lessons for Cuba," Journal of Latin American Affairs 4, no. 1 (1996): 24.
72. Exiles regularly appeal to the military as "guardians of the nation" and call for a coup. Others see the armed forces as taking a protagonistic role for change while assuring stability. Those who hold this view include the American government, former secretaries of state, defense, and diplomats, as well as the Cuban American Military Council. The Castro regime obviously sees the military as the carriers of its revolutionary legacy.
73. Domingo Amuchástegui, "Cuba's Armed Forces: Power and Reforms," in Cuba in Transition, ed. Jorge Pérez-López and José F. Alonso (Washington, DC: Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 1999), p. 112.
74. Quoted in Ákos Róna-Tas and József Böröcz, "Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland: Presocialist and Socialist Legacies Among Business Elites," in Elites After State Socialism: Theories and Analysis, ed. John Higley and György Lengyel (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).
75. Fifty-four years of direct military-dominant rule, with only four presidents who were doctores: Tomás Estrada Palma (1902-6), Alfredo Zayas (1921-25), Ramón Grau San Martín (1944-48), and Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948-52). The rest had their origins as military leaders in the war for independence: José Miguel Gómez (1909-13), Mario García Menocal (1913-21), Gerardo Machado (1925-33). Republican Army Sergeant Fulgencio Batista ruled behind the scenes from 1934 to 1940, was elected president (1940-44), came back to power in a coup in 1952, and ruled until he was replaced by Fidel Castro in 1959.