Education after Foucault: The question of civility

Teachers College Record

Volumn 103, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 739-759

  Mourad Jr , Roger ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035540972     PISSN: 01614681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0161-4681.00133     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. Plato, The Republic, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968).
2. Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Random House, 1980), 133.
3. Foucault, "Truth and Power," in Power/Knowledge, 132.
4. "One "fictions" history starting from a political reality that renders it true, one "fictions" a politics that does not yet exist starting from a historical truth." Michel Foucault, "Interview with Lucette Finas," in Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy, ed. M. Morris and P. Patton (Sydney: Feral, 1979), 75.
5. While "natural law" has held various meanings in its long usage throughout Western legal and political histories, the different formulations of the concept have always referred to an autonomous objective standard distinct from enacted territorial law. Among its numerous guises in law since its appearance in Justinian Roman Law of the sixth century A.D. (which itself emanated from the Stoic notion of universal reason), it has signified divine law, law of reason, and law of nature, among others. In all instances, natural law theory has served an instrumental purpose as a means by which positive law, whether prescribed or enacted, can be critiqued and reformed. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, natural law theory achieved its greatest political potency as the terms upon which fundamental issues of legitimacy were fought among leading European intellectuals in the defense of, and challenges to, absolute royal monarchy and the "divine right" of kings. Modern natural law theory fell out of favor in the nineteenth century, with the rise of utilitarianism though there have been prominent works in the twentieth century. For a discussion of this history, see Julius Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965). See also Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
6. While "natural law" has held various meanings in its long usage throughout Western legal and political histories, the different formulations of the concept have always referred to an autonomous objective standard distinct from enacted territorial law. Among its numerous guises in law since its appearance in Justinian Roman Law of the sixth century A.D. (which itself emanated from the Stoic notion of universal reason), it has signified divine law, law of reason, and law of nature, among others. In all instances, natural law theory has served an instrumental purpose as a means by which positive law, whether prescribed or enacted, can be critiqued and reformed. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, natural law theory achieved its greatest political potency as the terms upon which fundamental issues of legitimacy were fought among leading European intellectuals in the defense of, and challenges to, absolute royal monarchy and the "divine right" of kings. Modern natural law theory fell out of favor in the nineteenth century, with the rise of utilitarianism though there have been prominent works in the twentieth century. For a discussion of this history, see Julius Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965). See also Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
7. While "natural law" has held various meanings in its long usage throughout Western legal and political histories, the different formulations of the concept have always referred to an autonomous objective standard distinct from enacted territorial law. Among its numerous guises in law since its appearance in Justinian Roman Law of the sixth century A.D. (which itself emanated from the Stoic notion of universal reason), it has signified divine law, law of reason, and law of nature, among others. In all instances, natural law theory has served an instrumental purpose as a means by which positive law, whether prescribed or enacted, can be critiqued and reformed. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, natural law theory achieved its greatest political potency as the terms upon which fundamental issues of legitimacy were fought among leading European intellectuals in the defense of, and challenges to, absolute royal monarchy and the "divine right" of kings. Modern natural law theory fell out of favor in the nineteenth century, with the rise of utilitarianism though there have been prominent works in the twentieth century. For a discussion of this history, see Julius Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965). See also Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
8. John Locke, "Some Thoughts Concerning Education" [1692], in English Philosophers of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, ed. Charles W. Eliot (New York: Collier, 1910), 3-18 3. See also Locke's Of the Conduct of the Understanding [1706], ed. Francis W. Garforth (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education [1762], trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979). Bloom calls this expansive work the first modern treatise on human psychology.
9. John Locke, "Some Thoughts Concerning Education" [1692], in English Philosophers of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, ed. Charles W. Eliot (New York: Collier, 1910), 3-18 3. See also Locke's Of the Conduct of the Understanding [1706], ed. Francis W. Garforth (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education [1762], trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979). Bloom calls this expansive work the first modern treatise on human psychology.
10. John Locke, "Some Thoughts Concerning Education" [1692], in English Philosophers of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, ed. Charles W. Eliot (New York: Collier, 1910), 3-18 3. See also Locke's Of the Conduct of the Understanding [1706], ed. Francis W. Garforth (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education [1762], trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979). Bloom calls this expansive work the first modern treatise on human psychology.
11. Other philosophers who rejected natural law theory such as Charles Montesquieu and David Hume were also very influential as well. It should also be pointed out that Rousseau rejected the natural law concept, though not the state of nature.
12. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 15, 16.
13. There is "a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another . . . The cause whereof is, that the object of man's desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to assure forever, the way of his future desire." Hobbes, Leviathan, 70.
14. Hobbes, Leviathan, 87.
15. The idea of more than one authority is unreasonable because the authorities will seek to destroy each other, for the same reasons that people will seek to destroy each other in the state of nature. The only truly civil state is thus a state ruled by a single sovereign. Hobbes, Leviathan, 130, 131. For the same reason, the ideal single authority, that is, the form of sovereign authority that is most apt to produce a stable peace, is a monarchy.
16. Hobbes, Leviathan, 71, 72.
17. Hobbes, Leviathan, 70.
18. Hobbes, Leviathan, 130, 131.
19. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1689], ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 251. Ease is rare, for "a constant succession of uneasinesses . . . take the will in their turns." Essay, 261, 262.
20. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1689], ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 251. Ease is rare, for "a constant succession of uneasinesses . . . take the will in their turns." Essay, 261, 262.
21. John Locke, "The Second Treatise of Government" [1692], in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett rev. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 309-11; 349-52.
22. Will is "a power to think on its own Actions, and to preferr their doing or omission either to the other." Locke, Essay, 241.
23. Locke, Essay, 263, 264.
24. Rousseau's most salient exposition on this question is in "The Social Contract" [1762] trans. G.D.H. Cole, ed. J. H. Brumfitt and J. C. Hall, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract and Discourses rev. (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1973). "Men, from the mere fact that, while they are living in their primitive independence, they have no mutual relations stable enough to constitute either the state of peace or the state of war, cannot be naturally enemies." Rousseau, "Social Contract," 187.
25. Rousseau's most salient exposition on this question is in "The Social Contract" [1762] trans. G.D.H. Cole, ed. J. H. Brumfitt and J. C. Hall, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract and Discourses rev. (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1973). "Men, from the mere fact that, while they are living in their primitive independence, they have no mutual relations stable enough to constitute either the state of peace or the state of war, cannot be naturally enemies." Rousseau, "Social Contract," 187.
26. Rousseau, "Social Contract," 190.
27. Rousseau, "Social Contract," 190-96.
28. Rousseau, Emile, 212, 213.
29. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on a Subject proposed by the Academy of Dijon: What is the Origin of Inequality among Men, and is it authorized by Natural Law?" [1755], in Social Contract and Discourses, 71. See also Emile, 193.
30. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "A Discourse on a Subject proposed by the Academy of Dijon: What is the Origin of Inequality among Men, and is it authorized by Natural Law?" [1755], in Social Contract and Discourses, 71. See also Emile, 193.
31. The analysis presented in this section is not intended to suggest that Marx's rejection of the concepts of state of nature and natural law served a fatal blow to these concepts in modern political theory. Their fall from prominence in the nineteenth century is much more complicated. Its demise had more to do with the widespread recognition by Western intellectuals and authorities that when it came to laws of governance, the concept of "law" was not (or, for some, was not only) a matter of nature for the civil state to replicate, but instead a human creation, and a useful instrument to expand the reach of the civil state and to maintain the social order during rapid modernization. Since the nineteenth century, natural law theory has, for the most part, been relegated to the margins of formalistic legal philosophy.
32. There are many books that explore this theoretical transition. The classic treatment remains Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1950).
33. Eugene Kamenka, "Chronology: Marx's Life," in The Portable Karl Marx, ed. Eugene Kamenka (New York: Viking Penguin, 1983), 1xxix; editor's note, 76; Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Karl Marx, 114; Marx, "Grundrisse," in Karl Marx, 375, 376. Rousseau's social analysis was an important influence on Marx's early work.
34. Eugene Kamenka, "Chronology: Marx's Life," in The Portable Karl Marx, ed. Eugene Kamenka (New York: Viking Penguin, 1983), 1xxix; editor's note, 76; Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Karl Marx, 114; Marx, "Grundrisse," in Karl Marx, 375, 376. Rousseau's social analysis was an important influence on Marx's early work.
35. Eugene Kamenka, "Chronology: Marx's Life," in The Portable Karl Marx, ed. Eugene Kamenka (New York: Viking Penguin, 1983), 1xxix; editor's note, 76; Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Karl Marx, 114; Marx, "Grundrisse," in Karl Marx, 375, 376. Rousseau's social analysis was an important influence on Marx's early work.
36. "In this freely competitive society the individual appears as released from the natural ties, etc., which, in earlier epochs of history, made him an appendage of a distinct, limited human conglomerate. For the prophets of the eighteenth century, on whose shoulders Smith and Ricardo firmly stand, this eighteenth century individual - the product, on the one hand, of the breaking up of feudal social patterns and, on the other, of the new productive powers developed since the sixteenth century - hovers as an ideal of a past existence. . . . Natural Man, conformable to their idea of human nature, not as arising historically but as determined by nature. This illusion has occurred in each successive epoch until now." Marx, "Grundrisse," in Karl Marx, 375, 376.
37. Marx "On the Jewish Question," in Karl Marx, 100-14.
38. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy [1867], trans. Ben Fowkes, intro. Ernest Mandel. (New York: Vintage, 1977), vol. 1, ch. 26-33.
39. Note that this argument does not depend on a critique of Marx's historicism per se.
40. A focus on the economic context and the production site for group conflict is often supplemented by attention to disparities in other contexts, such as political and most recently, cultural contexts, and on other sites, including organized public education.
41. Nothing in this statement is intended to suggest that this failure is the result of any shortcomings in the scholarship within the Marxian tradition, if the assumptions described herein are made.
42. Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren are probably the best known Marxian-based critical theorists in education who incorporate postmodern critique in their work. Henry Giroux, "Modernism, Postmodernism, and Feminism: Rethinking the Boundaries of Educational Discourse," and "Postmodernism as Border Pedagogy: Redefining the Boundaries of Race and Ethnicity," in Postmodernism, Feminism, and Cultural Politics: Redrawing Educational Boundaries, ed Henry Giroux (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 1-59, 217-56; Peter McLaren, "Multiculturalism and the Postmodern Critique: Toward a Pedagogy of Resistance and Transformation," in Between Borders, ed. Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren (New York: Routledge 1994), 192-222. For a discussion of their viewpoints and others as well, see William B. Stanley, Curriculum for Utopia: Social Reconstructionism and Critical Pedagogy in the Postmodern Era (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).
43. Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren are probably the best known Marxian-based critical theorists in education who incorporate postmodern critique in their work. Henry Giroux, "Modernism, Postmodernism, and Feminism: Rethinking the Boundaries of Educational Discourse," and "Postmodernism as Border Pedagogy: Redefining the Boundaries of Race and Ethnicity," in Postmodernism, Feminism, and Cultural Politics: Redrawing Educational Boundaries, ed Henry Giroux (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 1-59, 217-56; Peter McLaren, "Multiculturalism and the Postmodern Critique: Toward a Pedagogy of Resistance and Transformation," in Between Borders, ed. Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren (New York: Routledge 1994), 192-222. For a discussion of their viewpoints and others as well, see William B. Stanley, Curriculum for Utopia: Social Reconstructionism and Critical Pedagogy in the Postmodern Era (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).
44. Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren are probably the best known Marxian-based critical theorists in education who incorporate postmodern critique in their work. Henry Giroux, "Modernism, Postmodernism, and Feminism: Rethinking the Boundaries of Educational Discourse," and "Postmodernism as Border Pedagogy: Redefining the Boundaries of Race and Ethnicity," in Postmodernism, Feminism, and Cultural Politics: Redrawing Educational Boundaries, ed Henry Giroux (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 1-59, 217-56; Peter McLaren, "Multiculturalism and the Postmodern Critique: Toward a Pedagogy of Resistance and Transformation," in Between Borders, ed. Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren (New York: Routledge 1994), 192-222. For a discussion of their viewpoints and others as well, see William B. Stanley, Curriculum for Utopia: Social Reconstructionism and Critical Pedagogy in the Postmodern Era (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).
45. Foucault, "Truth and Power," in Power/Knowledge, 119.
46. Power relations are not structural, but "rooted deep in the social nexus." Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 222. There is not "something called Power. . . . which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form." "Subject and Power," in Beyond Structuralism, 219. Further, power is not understood in terms of a dichotomous relationship between those who exclusively possess and retain it, and those who do not have it and submit to it." Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, 98.
47. Power relations are not structural, but "rooted deep in the social nexus." Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 222. There is not "something called Power. . . . which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form." "Subject and Power," in Beyond Structuralism, 219. Further, power is not understood in terms of a dichotomous relationship between those who exclusively possess and retain it, and those who do not have it and submit to it." Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, 98.
48. Power relations are not structural, but "rooted deep in the social nexus." Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 222. There is not "something called Power. . . . which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form." "Subject and Power," in Beyond Structuralism, 219. Further, power is not understood in terms of a dichotomous relationship between those who exclusively possess and retain it, and those who do not have it and submit to it." Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, 98.
49. Institutions are not the "fundamental point of anchorage" of power relationships. Rather, power emerges "from the starting points of local conditions and particular needs." Foucault, "The Eye of Power," in Power/Knowledge, 159.
50. The "modern project" is expressed succinctly by the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas: "The project of modernity formulated in the eighteenth century by the philosophers of the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic. . . . for the rational organization of everyday social life." "Modernity - An Incomplete Project," in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (Port Townsend, Wash.: Bay Press, 1983), 9.
51. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Beyond Structuralism, 212.
52. Foucault, "Questions on Geography," in Power/Knowledge, 73, 74.
53. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, 95-8, 103-4; Foucault, "Revolutionary Action: Until Now," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 221, 222.
54. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, 95-8, 103-4; Foucault, "Revolutionary Action: Until Now," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 221, 222.
55. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, 101, 102.
56. Foucault, "Truth and Power," in Power/Knowledge, 119.
57. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1979). In an earlier work, Foucault identifies alleged shortcomings of the human sciences that, he claims, are fatal to the idea that they are justified as autonomous realms of knowledge. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. A. Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1970).
58. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1979). In an earlier work, Foucault identifies alleged shortcomings of the human sciences that, he claims, are fatal to the idea that they are justified as autonomous realms of knowledge. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. A. Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1970).
59. The individual is not created by the exercise of power upon an inert being. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, 98. Instead, power is "always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action." Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Beyond Structuralism, 220. "Power exists only when it is put into action." "Subject and Power," 219. "Power is exercised only over free subjects. . . . individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized." "Subject and Power," 221.
60. The individual is not created by the exercise of power upon an inert being. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, 98. Instead, power is "always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action." Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Beyond Structuralism, 220. "Power exists only when it is put into action." "Subject and Power," 219. "Power is exercised only over free subjects. . . . individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized." "Subject and Power," 221.
61. The individual is not created by the exercise of power upon an inert being. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, 98. Instead, power is "always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action." Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Beyond Structuralism, 220. "Power exists only when it is put into action." "Subject and Power," 219. "Power is exercised only over free subjects. . . . individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized." "Subject and Power," 221.
62. The individual is not created by the exercise of power upon an inert being. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge, 98. Instead, power is "always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action." Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Beyond Structuralism, 220. "Power exists only when it is put into action." "Subject and Power," 219. "Power is exercised only over free subjects. . . . individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized." "Subject and Power," 221.
63. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 137, 138. "Genealogy . . . is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body. Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 82, 83.
64. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 137, 138. "Genealogy . . . is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body. Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 82, 83.
65. One of the hallmarks of Marx's work is its persistent emphasis on analyzing the human actor in its ordinary material existence. The modern state of nature theorists also focused on the human being in its practical, "lived" experience. This was a very important break from classical natural law theory, which derived justice from transcendent metaphysical principles and emphasized human reason apart from emotion.
66. Note that this point is not dependent upon an assumption that the body of the individual human being is essentially real, ideal, formal, instrumental, or some other basic existential state.
67. Jay Farrar, lyrics from the song "Out of the Picture," in the musical recording Son Volt: Trace, Copyright Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp. 1995. Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
68. Jay Farrar, lyrics from the song "Out of the Picture," in the musical recording Son Volt: Trace, Copyright Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp. 1995. Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
69. Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).