Popular sovereignty and nationalism

Political Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 517-536

  Yack, Bernard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

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EID: 0035535578     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591701029004003     Document Type: Article

References (84)

1. I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: The Contemporary Crisis of the Nation-State in Historical Perspective," Political Studies (1994), 166-231, 171.
2. See L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 21-22. Of course, one can get around this difficulty by expanding one's understanding of modernization to include earlier developments, like the emergence of the modern state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that precede the emergence of nationalism. But doing so seriously undermines the idea of modernization by identifying it with every new development in the past few centuries. On the problems created by confusing temporal and substantive understandings of modernity in this way, see B. Yack, The Fetishism of Modernities (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997).
3. See L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 21-22. Of course, one can get around this difficulty by expanding one's understanding of modernization to include earlier developments, like the emergence of the modern state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that precede the emergence of nationalism. But doing so seriously undermines the idea of modernization by identifying it with every new development in the past few centuries. On the problems created by confusing temporal and substantive understandings of modernity in this way, see B. Yack, The Fetishism of Modernities (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997).
4. H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 3, and H. Seton-Watson, Nations and States (London: Methuen, 1977), 445.
5. H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 3, and H. Seton-Watson, Nations and States (London: Methuen, 1977), 445.
6. For interesting exceptions, see Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism. 5-26; M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996); S. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: University of Harvard Press, 1993); and above all, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis."
7. For interesting exceptions, see Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism. 5-26; M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996); S. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: University of Harvard Press, 1993); and above all, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis."
8. For interesting exceptions, see Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism. 5-26; M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996); S. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: University of Harvard Press, 1993); and above all, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis."
9. For interesting exceptions, see Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism. 5-26; M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996); S. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: University of Harvard Press, 1993); and above all, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis."
10. M. Walzer, "The New Tribalism: Notes on a Difficult Problem." 206, ed., R. Beiner, Theorizing Nationalism (Albany: SUNY, 1998), 205-18.
11. See M. Finley, "The Ancient Greeks and Their Nation," in Finley, The Use and Abuse of History (New York: Viking, 1975); and B. Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation," ed., Beiner, Theorizing Nationalism, 111-14. One problem with many current studies of nationalism is that they include the claim to political sovereignty in their very definition of a nation, thereby making it very difficult to make sense of the distinction between national and political community that prevailed until recent centuries. See, for example, Benedict Anderson's definition of a nation as a community imagined as bounded and sovereign, in B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991), 6-7.
12. See M. Finley, "The Ancient Greeks and Their Nation," in Finley, The Use and Abuse of History (New York: Viking, 1975); and B. Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation," ed., Beiner, Theorizing Nationalism, 111-14. One problem with many current studies of nationalism is that they include the claim to political sovereignty in their very definition of a nation, thereby making it very difficult to make sense of the distinction between national and political community that prevailed until recent centuries. See, for example, Benedict Anderson's definition of a nation as a community imagined as bounded and sovereign, in B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991), 6-7.
13. See M. Finley, "The Ancient Greeks and Their Nation," in Finley, The Use and Abuse of History (New York: Viking, 1975); and B. Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation," ed., Beiner, Theorizing Nationalism, 111-14. One problem with many current studies of nationalism is that they include the claim to political sovereignty in their very definition of a nation, thereby making it very difficult to make sense of the distinction between national and political community that prevailed until recent centuries. See, for example, Benedict Anderson's definition of a nation as a community imagined as bounded and sovereign, in B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1991), 6-7.
14. See, in particular, R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 214.
15. E. Morgan, Inventing the People (New York: Norton, 1988), 83.
16. As we shall see below, French writers frequently use the term nation where English and American writers would use the term people.
17. I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 172.
18. As Edmond Morgan notes (Inventing the People, 60), although the new doctrine of popular sovereignty "encouraged greater popular participation, its purpose remained the same" as the ideologies it was designed to replace: "to persuade the many to submit to the few." Much of the history of the doctrine "can be read as a history of the successive efforts of different generations to bring the facts into closer conformity with the fiction, efforts that have gradually transformed the very structure of society" (ibid., 152). As a result, the modern notion of popular sovereignty is frequently attacked by supporters of participatory democracy in the name of an older, more direct understanding of the concept. See, for example, J. Mostov, Power, Process, and Popular Sovereignty (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
19. As Edmond Morgan notes (Inventing the People, 60), although the new doctrine of popular sovereignty "encouraged greater popular participation, its purpose remained the same" as the ideologies it was designed to replace: "to persuade the many to submit to the few." Much of the history of the doctrine "can be read as a history of the successive efforts of different generations to bring the facts into closer conformity with the fiction, efforts that have gradually transformed the very structure of society" (ibid., 152). As a result, the modern notion of popular sovereignty is frequently attacked by supporters of participatory democracy in the name of an older, more direct understanding of the concept. See, for example, J. Mostov, Power, Process, and Popular Sovereignty (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
20. As Edmond Morgan notes (Inventing the People, 60), although the new doctrine of popular sovereignty "encouraged greater popular participation, its purpose remained the same" as the ideologies it was designed to replace: "to persuade the many to submit to the few." Much of the history of the doctrine "can be read as a history of the successive efforts of different generations to bring the facts into closer conformity with the fiction, efforts that have gradually transformed the very structure of society" (ibid., 152). As a result, the modern notion of popular sovereignty is frequently attacked by supporters of participatory democracy in the name of an older, more direct understanding of the concept. See, for example, J. Mostov, Power, Process, and Popular Sovereignty (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).
21. On the theory of constituent sovereignty, see J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty; I. Hont, Permanent Crisis," 201; M. Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People," Political Studies 29 (1981), 191-203: O. Béaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1994), 208-27; S. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 312-21: and P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998).
22. On the theory of constituent sovereignty, see J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty; I. Hont, Permanent Crisis," 201; M. Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People," Political Studies 29 (1981), 191-203: O. Béaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1994), 208-27; S. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 312-21: and P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998).
23. On the theory of constituent sovereignty, see J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty; I. Hont, Permanent Crisis," 201; M. Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People," Political Studies 29 (1981), 191-203: O. Béaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1994), 208-27; S. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 312-21: and P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998).
24. On the theory of constituent sovereignty, see J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty; I. Hont, Permanent Crisis," 201; M. Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People," Political Studies 29 (1981), 191-203: O. Béaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1994), 208-27; S. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 312-21: and P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998).
25. On the theory of constituent sovereignty, see J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty; I. Hont, Permanent Crisis," 201; M. Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People," Political Studies 29 (1981), 191-203: O. Béaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1994), 208-27; S. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 312-21: and P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998).
26. On the theory of constituent sovereignty, see J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty; I. Hont, Permanent Crisis," 201; M. Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People," Political Studies 29 (1981), 191-203: O. Béaud, La puissance de l'état (Paris: PUF, 1994), 208-27; S. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 312-21: and P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998).
27. Nevertheless, this distinction between the people's two bodies strongly influences even modern restatements of direct popular rule, such as Rousseau's. For example, it informs Rousseau's famous distinction between the general will of the people and the express will of all or of a majority in the legislative assembly. The former, Rousseau argues, is never wrong and remains the source of all legitimate authority. The latter errs and needs to be corrected with reference to this general will of the imagined people.
28. In English, the term nation tends to have more of a cultural connotation, the people more of a political connotation. In German, it is the other way around, although as Emmerich Francis points out, that is the result of a long evolution that reversed the use of the terms. See E. Francis, Ethnos und Demos (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1965), 61.
29. That French political tradition tends to follow Sieyès in calling this form of community "the nation," rather than Rousseau in calling it "the people," should not be allowed to interfere with the distinction that I am making here. As Sieyès himself makes clear, "a political society, a people, a nation are synonymous terms." E. J. Sieyès, "Contre la ré-totale," in P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France, 175. In another place, he insists that public authority "comes from the people, that is to say, the nation," adding that "these two terms ought to by synonymous." E. J. Sieyès, Écrits Politiques (Paris: Editions des Archives Contemporaines, 1985), 200. The revolutionaries' preference for the term nation reflects the lingering negative associations of the term the people with the plebs or mob. See E. Fehrenbach, "Nation," in Handbuch der Politische-Soziale Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1782 7(1986), 75-107, 83-84, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 194-250, and L. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 6-8. One consequence of this development is that French legal and political thought has long distinguished between national and popular sovereignty, even though by national sovereignty, what is meant is the kind of indirect or constituent sovereignty associated with the new doctrine of popular sovereignty that I have been describing. See G. Bacot, Carré de Malberg et l'origine de la distinction entre souveraineté du peuple et souveraineté nationale (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985).
30. That French political tradition tends to follow Sieyès in calling this form of community "the nation," rather than Rousseau in calling it "the people," should not be allowed to interfere with the distinction that I am making here. As Sieyès himself makes clear, "a political society, a people, a nation are synonymous terms." E. J. Sieyès, "Contre la ré-totale," in P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France, 175. In another place, he insists that public authority "comes from the people, that is to say, the nation," adding that "these two terms ought to by synonymous." E. J. Sieyès, Écrits Politiques (Paris: Editions des Archives Contemporaines, 1985), 200. The revolutionaries' preference for the term nation reflects the lingering negative associations of the term the people with the plebs or mob. See E. Fehrenbach, "Nation," in Handbuch der Politische-Soziale Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1782 7(1986), 75-107, 83-84, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 194-250, and L. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 6-8. One consequence of this development is that French legal and political thought has long distinguished between national and popular sovereignty, even though by national sovereignty, what is meant is the kind of indirect or constituent sovereignty associated with the new doctrine of popular sovereignty that I have been describing. See G. Bacot, Carré de Malberg et l'origine de la distinction entre souveraineté du peuple et souveraineté nationale (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985).
31. That French political tradition tends to follow Sieyès in calling this form of community "the nation," rather than Rousseau in calling it "the people," should not be allowed to interfere with the distinction that I am making here. As Sieyès himself makes clear, "a political society, a people, a nation are synonymous terms." E. J. Sieyès, "Contre la ré-totale," in P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France, 175. In another place, he insists that public authority "comes from the people, that is to say, the nation," adding that "these two terms ought to by synonymous." E. J. Sieyès, Écrits Politiques (Paris: Editions des Archives Contemporaines, 1985), 200. The revolutionaries' preference for the term nation reflects the lingering negative associations of the term the people with the plebs or mob. See E. Fehrenbach, "Nation," in Handbuch der Politische-Soziale Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1782 7(1986), 75-107, 83-84, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 194-250, and L. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 6-8. One consequence of this development is that French legal and political thought has long distinguished between national and popular sovereignty, even though by national sovereignty, what is meant is the kind of indirect or constituent sovereignty associated with the new doctrine of popular sovereignty that I have been describing. See G. Bacot, Carré de Malberg et l'origine de la distinction entre souveraineté du peuple et souveraineté nationale (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985).
32. That French political tradition tends to follow Sieyès in calling this form of community "the nation," rather than Rousseau in calling it "the people," should not be allowed to interfere with the distinction that I am making here. As Sieyès himself makes clear, "a political society, a people, a nation are synonymous terms." E. J. Sieyès, "Contre la ré-totale," in P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France, 175. In another place, he insists that public authority "comes from the people, that is to say, the nation," adding that "these two terms ought to by synonymous." E. J. Sieyès, Écrits Politiques (Paris: Editions des Archives Contemporaines, 1985), 200. The revolutionaries' preference for the term nation reflects the lingering negative associations of the term the people with the plebs or mob. See E. Fehrenbach, "Nation," in Handbuch der Politische-Soziale Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1782 7(1986), 75-107, 83-84, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 194-250, and L. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 6-8. One consequence of this development is that French legal and political thought has long distinguished between national and popular sovereignty, even though by national sovereignty, what is meant is the kind of indirect or constituent sovereignty associated with the new doctrine of popular sovereignty that I have been describing. See G. Bacot, Carré de Malberg et l'origine de la distinction entre souveraineté du peuple et souveraineté nationale (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985).
33. That French political tradition tends to follow Sieyès in calling this form of community "the nation," rather than Rousseau in calling it "the people," should not be allowed to interfere with the distinction that I am making here. As Sieyès himself makes clear, "a political society, a people, a nation are synonymous terms." E. J. Sieyès, "Contre la ré-totale," in P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France, 175. In another place, he insists that public authority "comes from the people, that is to say, the nation," adding that "these two terms ought to by synonymous." E. J. Sieyès, Écrits Politiques (Paris: Editions des Archives Contemporaines, 1985), 200. The revolutionaries' preference for the term nation reflects the lingering negative associations of the term the people with the plebs or mob. See E. Fehrenbach, "Nation," in Handbuch der Politische-Soziale Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1782 7(1986), 75-107, 83-84, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 194-250, and L. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 6-8. One consequence of this development is that French legal and political thought has long distinguished between national and popular sovereignty, even though by national sovereignty, what is meant is the kind of indirect or constituent sovereignty associated with the new doctrine of popular sovereignty that I have been describing. See G. Bacot, Carré de Malberg et l'origine de la distinction entre souveraineté du peuple et souveraineté nationale (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985).
34. That French political tradition tends to follow Sieyès in calling this form of community "the nation," rather than Rousseau in calling it "the people," should not be allowed to interfere with the distinction that I am making here. As Sieyès himself makes clear, "a political society, a people, a nation are synonymous terms." E. J. Sieyès, "Contre la ré-totale," in P. Pasquino, Sieyes et l'invention de la constitution en France, 175. In another place, he insists that public authority "comes from the people, that is to say, the nation," adding that "these two terms ought to by synonymous." E. J. Sieyès, Écrits Politiques (Paris: Editions des Archives Contemporaines, 1985), 200. The revolutionaries' preference for the term nation reflects the lingering negative associations of the term the people with the plebs or mob. See E. Fehrenbach, "Nation," in Handbuch der Politische-Soziale Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1782 7(1986), 75-107, 83-84, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 194-250, and L. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 6-8. One consequence of this development is that French legal and political thought has long distinguished between national and popular sovereignty, even though by national sovereignty, what is meant is the kind of indirect or constituent sovereignty associated with the new doctrine of popular sovereignty that I have been describing. See G. Bacot, Carré de Malberg et l'origine de la distinction entre souveraineté du peuple et souveraineté nationale (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985).
35. Needless to say, I present here a sketch of conclusions rather than an elaboration of the evidence that might support my distinction. This is especially true with regard to the definition of national community, a field of vast controversy that I deal with in "The Myth of the Civic Nation" and in the first chapters of my forthcoming book, Nation and Individual. With regard to the people, in contrast, there is a relative dearth of serious reflection. See M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (p. 16) for an interesting discussion of why this is so.
36. Needless to say, I present here a sketch of conclusions rather than an elaboration of the evidence that might support my distinction. This is especially true with regard to the definition of national community, a field of vast controversy that I deal with in "The Myth of the Civic Nation" and in the first chapters of my forthcoming book, Nation and Individual. With regard to the people, in contrast, there is a relative dearth of serious reflection. See M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (p. 16) for an interesting discussion of why this is so.
37. Although I employ Benedict Anderson's expression (Imagined Communities, pp. 1-7), I use it here in a somewhat different manner than Anderson does. Anderson focuses on lack of familiarity and thus defines an imagined community as a community whose members have no direct interaction with each other. As I am using the concept, however, an imagined community is a community whose existence is derived from its members' imagination of their connections, rather than through shared processes or interactions. The nation is an imagined community in both Anderson's and my sense because it is a community based on an imagined heritage shared by widely separated groups of individuals. But as I am using the term, there can be large, impersonal communities that are based on shared interactions and procedures that are not imagined communities. When, for example, we speak of the urban or even the world community, we can be speaking about shared interdependence or interaction, rather than any kind of image of sharing a community. And there can be small communities that are based on imagined connections rather than on any direct interaction or interdependence.
38. Accordingly, the people is conceived with reference to the state, in particular to the modern state that integrates all coercive authority within a territory in a single hierarchical structure. When scholars suggest that it is "pointless to talk about nations apart from the state" (Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 9), they are conflating the nation with this image of the people.
39. See M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, 22, and B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 9-12.
40. See M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, 22, and B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 9-12.
41. On this point, see R. Scruton, "In Defence of the Nation," in Scruton, The Philosopher on Dover Beach (Manchester, CT: Carcanet, 1990), 301.
42. M. Canovan (Nationhood and Political Theory, 107) notes this absence. Rogers Smith tries to correct for this absence in "Trust and Worth: The Politics of People-Building" (the 1999 Charles E. Lindblom Lecture at Yale University).
43. M. Canovan (Nationhood and Political Theory, 107) notes this absence. Rogers Smith tries to correct for this absence in "Trust and Worth: The Politics of People-Building" (the 1999 Charles E. Lindblom Lecture at Yale University).
44. R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation, 90.
45. I want to emphasze here that I am not endorsing the dubious claims that so many nations make about the antiquity of their national traditions. I am definitely not suggesting that all or even most nations are old, with their roots in the mists of some distant primordial age. I am merely saying that the nation, as a distinctive form of community, is, relatively old, while the people represents a relatively new way of thinking about community.
46. On this point, see especially L. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 6-8.
47. "Opposed to the sovereignty of the monarch, the sovereignty of the people is one of the confused notions based on the wild idea of the "people." Taken without its monarch . . . the people is a formless mass and no longer a state. It lacks every one of those determinate characteristics - sovereignty, government, judges, magistrates, class-divisions, etc. - [by which] a people cease to be that indeterminate abstraction which, when represented in a quite general way, as the 'people.'" G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1967), §279. On this passage, see J. Stevens, Reproducing the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 79-80.
48. "Opposed to the sovereignty of the monarch, the sovereignty of the people is one of the confused notions based on the wild idea of the "people." Taken without its monarch . . . the people is a formless mass and no longer a state. It lacks every one of those determinate characteristics - sovereignty, government, judges, magistrates, class-divisions, etc. - [by which] a people cease to be that indeterminate abstraction which, when represented in a quite general way, as the 'people.'" G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1967), §279. On this passage, see J. Stevens, Reproducing the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 79-80.
49. "The word most on its lips is the 'people;' but the special mark which it carries on its brow is the hatred of law." For law "is the shibboleth which marks out these false friends and comrades of what they call the 'people.'" G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Preface, 6-7.
50. It also continues to inspire more radical democrats, who are attracted to the idea that "the will of the people resists all representation." See P. Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy: On Constitutional Patriotism," Political Theory 28 (2000), 38-63, 50.
51. "A king, however dubious his divinity might seem, did not have to be imagined. He was a visible presence, wearing his crown and carrying his scepter. The people, on the other hand, are never visible as such. Before we ascribe sovereignty to the people, we have to imagine that there is such a thing, something we personify as though it were a single body." (E. Morgan, Inventing the People, 153)
52. J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty, 124. See also, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 201, and M. Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People," Political Studies 29 (1981), 191-203, 191.
53. J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty, 124. See also, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 201, and M. Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People," Political Studies 29 (1981), 191-203, 191.
54. J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty, 124. See also, I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 201, and M. Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People," Political Studies 29 (1981), 191-203, 191.
55. Accordingly, one might argue that the emergence of the modern sovereign state as a form of political organization is a necessary condition for the emergence of this new idea of the people.
56. This is my formula for a truce between the "modernist" and "primordialist" understandings of nationalism. I repeat that I am not suggesting that all or most nations are old; I mean only to suggest that the nation as a form of community is, unlike nationalism, relatively old.
57. See J. Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
58. The classic statement of the traditional, activist understanding of citizenship is found in Aristotle's Politics (1275a23), that the citizen is someone who shares in "judgment and office" and takes turns in ruling and being ruled.
59. I. Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 184-85.
60. I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of Greenfeld's argument in "Reconciling Nationalism and Liberalism," Political Theory (1995), 165-82, 175-80.
61. See especially L. Colley, Britons: The Making of a Nation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
62. L. Greenfeld, Nationalism, 3-14, 76-77.
63. Ibid., 76-77. The quotations are mostly from Milton's most famous and influential political essay, Areopagitica. 39. This argument is presented most effectively by J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 62, 390.
64. Ibid., 76-77. The quotations are mostly from Milton's most famous and influential political essay, Areopagitica. 39. This argument is presented most effectively by J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 62, 390.
65. Ibid., 76-77. The quotations are mostly from Milton's most famous and influential political essay, Areopagitica. 39. This argument is presented most effectively by J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 62, 390.
66. I add "sites of past greatness" to emphasize, with Istvan Bibo, that it is the memory of connection to territory, not just present dwelling, that leads to nationalist conflicts. The intermixing of peoples in the Balkans, Bibo suggests, might have been sorted out with far less violence if it were not for the fact that these peoples were sustained by tales of past greatness in the same territories. See I. Bibo, "The Distress of East European Small States," in Bibo, Democracy, Revolution, and Self-Determination (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 13-86, 22-23.
67. Quoted in R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation, 43.
68. A. Hamilton, J. Jay, and J. Madison, The Federalist Papers, no. 1.
69. "Natural divisions, the spontaneous tendencies of the peoples will replace the arbitrary divisions sanctioned by bad governments. The countries of the People will rise, defined by the voice of the free, upon the ruins of the countries of Kings and privileged castes." (G. Mazzini, The Duties of Man [London: Dent, 1907], 52)
70. See F. Whelan, "Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem," eds., J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman, Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy (New York: NYU Press, 1983), 13-47, 13, and M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, 17-18.
71. See F. Whelan, "Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem," eds., J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman, Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy (New York: NYU Press, 1983), 13-47, 13, and M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, 17-18.
72. This ambiguity between collective self-determination and the determination of collective selves plagues most attempts to justify the right to national self-determination.
73. For example, see M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging (New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 1993), 7-13. For similar arguments, see Bogdan Denitch's defense of civic nationalism in Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1994), Liah Greenfeld's distinction between Anglo-American and continental European forms of nationalism in Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, and Dominique Schnapper's defense of the idea of the civic nation, in which she attempts to prove that the "very notion of an ethnic nation is a contradiction in terms," in La communauté des citoyens: sur l'idée moderne de la nation (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 24-30, 95, 178.
74. For example, see M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging (New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 1993), 7-13. For similar arguments, see Bogdan Denitch's defense of civic nationalism in Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1994), Liah Greenfeld's distinction between Anglo-American and continental European forms of nationalism in Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, and Dominique Schnapper's defense of the idea of the civic nation, in which she attempts to prove that the "very notion of an ethnic nation is a contradiction in terms," in La communauté des citoyens: sur l'idée moderne de la nation (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 24-30, 95, 178.
75. For example, see M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging (New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 1993), 7-13. For similar arguments, see Bogdan Denitch's defense of civic nationalism in Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1994), Liah Greenfeld's distinction between Anglo-American and continental European forms of nationalism in Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, and Dominique Schnapper's defense of the idea of the civic nation, in which she attempts to prove that the "very notion of an ethnic nation is a contradiction in terms," in La communauté des citoyens: sur l'idée moderne de la nation (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 24-30, 95, 178.
76. For example, see M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging (New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 1993), 7-13. For similar arguments, see Bogdan Denitch's defense of civic nationalism in Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1994), Liah Greenfeld's distinction between Anglo-American and continental European forms of nationalism in Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, and Dominique Schnapper's defense of the idea of the civic nation, in which she attempts to prove that the "very notion of an ethnic nation is a contradiction in terms," in La communauté des citoyens: sur l'idée moderne de la nation (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 24-30, 95, 178.
77. In "The Myth of the Civic Nation," ed., R. Beiner, Theorizing Nationalism, 103-18.
78. Rebecca West, Black Lamb, Grey Falcon (London: Penguin, 1988), 843. Like Tamir, West is indebted to Herder's celebration of cultural pluralism in her vision of liberal cultural nationalism.
79. A different, but equally terrible irony hung over the book at the time of its publication. For West published Black Lamb, Grey Falcon shortly after the Nazis invaded Yugoslavia and destroyed so many of the people and forms of life that she had so lovingly described. See her remarks in the book's preface.
80. A different, but equally terrible irony hung over the book at the time of its publication. For West published Black Lamb, Grey Falcon shortly after the Nazis invaded Yugoslavia and destroyed so many of the people and forms of life that she had so lovingly described. See her remarks in the book's preface.
81. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 57-58. I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of Tamir's argument more generally in "Reconciling Liberalism and Nationalism," 170-75.
82. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 57-58. I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of Tamir's argument more generally in "Reconciling Liberalism and Nationalism," 170-75.
83. J. Kristeva, Nations without Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); G. Gottlieb, Nations against States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).
84. J. Kristeva, Nations without Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); G. Gottlieb, Nations against States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).