Derrida on law; or, poststructuralism gets serious

Political Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 395-423

  McCormick, John P ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035534118     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591701029003004     Document Type: Article

References (79)

1. Derrida presented the first part of "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundations of Authority'" at the conference, "Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, "convened at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 1-2 October 1989. The second part was discussed on that occasion but not officially presented until the following April at the conference, "Nazism and the 'Final Solution': Probing the Limits of Representation, "University of California, Los Angeles. The full-length essay first appeared in the Cardow Law Review 11, nos. 5-6 (July/August 1990): 919-1045; and subsequently in the conference volume, Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), 3-67. I cite the latter as FL in the text.
2. See James Atlas, "The Case of Paul de Man, "New York Times Magazine, August 28, 1988, 36-37, 60, 66, 68, 69; as well as the letters by Peter Brooks, Andrew Ward, Stanley Corngold, and Louis Simpson on page 10 of the 25 September 1988 issue.
3. Deconstruction is the literary theory wing of poststructuralism, a roughly described antifoundationalist intellectual movement originating in France in the 1960s. The volume The Structuralist Controversy, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), is still one of the best introductions to the concerns of this approach, generally, while Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979), is the most widely known social scientific example of this scholarship. I avoid use of the term postmodernism in reference to Derrida's work, as it seems to be the recourse of poststructuralism's worst informed opponents as well as its most uncritical adherents. Notable exceptions, one empirical, the other theoretical, are David Harvey's The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989); and Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Harvey situates the rise of poststructuralism in massive transformations of political economy over the past three decades, while White explores its ramifications for normative theory.
4. Deconstruction is the literary theory wing of poststructuralism, a roughly described antifoundationalist intellectual movement originating in France in the 1960s. The volume The Structuralist Controversy, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), is still one of the best introductions to the concerns of this approach, generally, while Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979), is the most widely known social scientific example of this scholarship. I avoid use of the term postmodernism in reference to Derrida's work, as it seems to be the recourse of poststructuralism's worst informed opponents as well as its most uncritical adherents. Notable exceptions, one empirical, the other theoretical, are David Harvey's The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989); and Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Harvey situates the rise of poststructuralism in massive transformations of political economy over the past three decades, while White explores its ramifications for normative theory.
5. Deconstruction is the literary theory wing of poststructuralism, a roughly described antifoundationalist intellectual movement originating in France in the 1960s. The volume The Structuralist Controversy, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), is still one of the best introductions to the concerns of this approach, generally, while Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979), is the most widely known social scientific example of this scholarship. I avoid use of the term postmodernism in reference to Derrida's work, as it seems to be the recourse of poststructuralism's worst informed opponents as well as its most uncritical adherents. Notable exceptions, one empirical, the other theoretical, are David Harvey's The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989); and Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Harvey situates the rise of poststructuralism in massive transformations of political economy over the past three decades, while White explores its ramifications for normative theory.
6. Deconstruction is the literary theory wing of poststructuralism, a roughly described antifoundationalist intellectual movement originating in France in the 1960s. The volume The Structuralist Controversy, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), is still one of the best introductions to the concerns of this approach, generally, while Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979), is the most widely known social scientific example of this scholarship. I avoid use of the term postmodernism in reference to Derrida's work, as it seems to be the recourse of poststructuralism's worst informed opponents as well as its most uncritical adherents. Notable exceptions, one empirical, the other theoretical, are David Harvey's The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989); and Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Harvey situates the rise of poststructuralism in massive transformations of political economy over the past three decades, while White explores its ramifications for normative theory.
7. Most prominently, Mark Lilla, "The Politics of Jacques Derrida, "The New York Review of Books 45, no. 11 (25 June 1998):36-41; and Richard Wolin, "Derrida on Marx, or the Perils of Left Heideggerianism, "in Labyrinths: Explorations in the Critical History of Ideas, ed. Wolin (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995), 231-40; Wolin, "Derrida as Political Romantic" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 27-30 August 1998); Wolin, "Down By Law: Deconstruction and the Problem of Justice" (unpublished manuscript, History Department, CUNY Graduate Center, 2000). In an encyclopedic work that painstakingly reconstructs the argument of virtually every major or recent contribution to the field of legal scholarship, Jürgen Habermas quickly dismisses "Force of Law" as an "aesthetic" approach to law; see Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 538, n. 21.
8. Most prominently, Mark Lilla, "The Politics of Jacques Derrida, "The New York Review of Books 45, no. 11 (25 June 1998):36-41; and Richard Wolin, "Derrida on Marx, or the Perils of Left Heideggerianism, "in Labyrinths: Explorations in the Critical History of Ideas, ed. Wolin (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995), 231-40; Wolin, "Derrida as Political Romantic" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 27-30 August 1998); Wolin, "Down By Law: Deconstruction and the Problem of Justice" (unpublished manuscript, History Department, CUNY Graduate Center, 2000). In an encyclopedic work that painstakingly reconstructs the argument of virtually every major or recent contribution to the field of legal scholarship, Jürgen Habermas quickly dismisses "Force of Law" as an "aesthetic" approach to law; see Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 538, n. 21.
9. Most prominently, Mark Lilla, "The Politics of Jacques Derrida, "The New York Review of Books 45, no. 11 (25 June 1998):36-41; and Richard Wolin, "Derrida on Marx, or the Perils of Left Heideggerianism, "in Labyrinths: Explorations in the Critical History of Ideas, ed. Wolin (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995), 231-40; Wolin, "Derrida as Political Romantic" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 27-30 August 1998); Wolin, "Down By Law: Deconstruction and the Problem of Justice" (unpublished manuscript, History Department, CUNY Graduate Center, 2000). In an encyclopedic work that painstakingly reconstructs the argument of virtually every major or recent contribution to the field of legal scholarship, Jürgen Habermas quickly dismisses "Force of Law" as an "aesthetic" approach to law; see Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 538, n. 21.
10. Most prominently, Mark Lilla, "The Politics of Jacques Derrida, "The New York Review of Books 45, no. 11 (25 June 1998):36-41; and Richard Wolin, "Derrida on Marx, or the Perils of Left Heideggerianism, "in Labyrinths: Explorations in the Critical History of Ideas, ed. Wolin (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995), 231-40; Wolin, "Derrida as Political Romantic" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 27-30 August 1998); Wolin, "Down By Law: Deconstruction and the Problem of Justice" (unpublished manuscript, History Department, CUNY Graduate Center, 2000). In an encyclopedic work that painstakingly reconstructs the argument of virtually every major or recent contribution to the field of legal scholarship, Jürgen Habermas quickly dismisses "Force of Law" as an "aesthetic" approach to law; see Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 538, n. 21.
11. Most prominently, Mark Lilla, "The Politics of Jacques Derrida, "The New York Review of Books 45, no. 11 (25 June 1998):36-41; and Richard Wolin, "Derrida on Marx, or the Perils of Left Heideggerianism, "in Labyrinths: Explorations in the Critical History of Ideas, ed. Wolin (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995), 231-40; Wolin, "Derrida as Political Romantic" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 27-30 August 1998); Wolin, "Down By Law: Deconstruction and the Problem of Justice" (unpublished manuscript, History Department, CUNY Graduate Center, 2000). In an encyclopedic work that painstakingly reconstructs the argument of virtually every major or recent contribution to the field of legal scholarship, Jürgen Habermas quickly dismisses "Force of Law" as an "aesthetic" approach to law; see Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 538, n. 21.
12. On the link between the decisionist theoretical positions of these authors and the authoritarianism of the notorious regime they both endorsed, see Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Entscheidung: Eine Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 1990).
13. The essay was originally published by the Cardozo Law Review with Derrida's own French text alongside the English version of his translator, Mary Quaintance.
14. Plato, The Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997).
15. See Leo Strauss, "On Plato's Republic, "in The City and Man, ed. Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 50-133.
16. The most formidable cases are made by Catherine H. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); and Steven B. Smith, "Leo Strauss's Platonic Liberalism, "Political Theory 28, no. 6 (December 2000): 787-809.
17. The most formidable cases are made by Catherine H. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); and Steven B. Smith, "Leo Strauss's Platonic Liberalism, "Political Theory 28, no. 6 (December 2000): 787-809.
18. If Straussians point to these incommensurabilities as caveats against programmatic social change, poststructuralists tend to dwell on them or even celebrate them, aesthetically, if professedly in the service of a less than clearly defined progressive agenda. I hesitate to contribute to gratuitous "po-mo" bashing rampant in many circles today; but if I must provide an exemplar of the kinds of deficiencies of poststructuralism that I criticize here, I suppose that the later writings of Richard Rorty serve that purpose. See, for example, Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
19. I do not, of course, think that the question of Plato's relationship to democracy is closed. I merely grapple here with the interpretation of Plato that has been dominant in American political science for the past two generations. For an alternative to the narrowly oligarchic reading of Plato, see S. Sara Monoson, Plato's Democratic Entanglements (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
20. Thus, this interpretation of "Force of Law" suggests that the essay signals the kind of turning to radical Ideologiekritik in Derrida's oeuvre that Foucault's "What Is Enlightenment?" portended for his own. See Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 32-50. The question of whether Derrida can be "judged" to have successfully followed through on the kind of turn that mortality prevented Foucault from fully pursuing would depend on an evaluation of Derrida's recent work, especially The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997). Space constraints prevent me from undertaking such an evaluation here, but a provisional investigation in this vein is Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996). Richard J. Bernstein argues that a substantive moral agenda has always pervaded Derrida's work: see "Serious Play: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Derrida, "in The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Modernity/Postmodernity, ed. Bernstein (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 172-98.
21. Thus, this interpretation of "Force of Law" suggests that the essay signals the kind of turning to radical Ideologiekritik in Derrida's oeuvre that Foucault's "What Is Enlightenment?" portended for his own. See Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 32-50. The question of whether Derrida can be "judged" to have successfully followed through on the kind of turn that mortality prevented Foucault from fully pursuing would depend on an evaluation of Derrida's recent work, especially The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997). Space constraints prevent me from undertaking such an evaluation here, but a provisional investigation in this vein is Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996). Richard J. Bernstein argues that a substantive moral agenda has always pervaded Derrida's work: see "Serious Play: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Derrida, "in The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Modernity/Postmodernity, ed. Bernstein (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 172-98.
22. Thus, this interpretation of "Force of Law" suggests that the essay signals the kind of turning to radical Ideologiekritik in Derrida's oeuvre that Foucault's "What Is Enlightenment?" portended for his own. See Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 32-50. The question of whether Derrida can be "judged" to have successfully followed through on the kind of turn that mortality prevented Foucault from fully pursuing would depend on an evaluation of Derrida's recent work, especially The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997). Space constraints prevent me from undertaking such an evaluation here, but a provisional investigation in this vein is Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996). Richard J. Bernstein argues that a substantive moral agenda has always pervaded Derrida's work: see "Serious Play: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Derrida, "in The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Modernity/Postmodernity, ed. Bernstein (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 172-98.
23. Thus, this interpretation of "Force of Law" suggests that the essay signals the kind of turning to radical Ideologiekritik in Derrida's oeuvre that Foucault's "What Is Enlightenment?" portended for his own. See Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 32-50. The question of whether Derrida can be "judged" to have successfully followed through on the kind of turn that mortality prevented Foucault from fully pursuing would depend on an evaluation of Derrida's recent work, especially The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997). Space constraints prevent me from undertaking such an evaluation here, but a provisional investigation in this vein is Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996). Richard J. Bernstein argues that a substantive moral agenda has always pervaded Derrida's work: see "Serious Play: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Derrida, "in The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Modernity/Postmodernity, ed. Bernstein (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 172-98.
24. See Christopher Norris, Derrida (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
25. See James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms; Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap, 1996); and James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
26. See James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms; Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap, 1996); and James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
27. See James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms; Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap, 1996); and James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
28. See James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms; Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap, 1996); and James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
29. This less than coherent movement is well reflected by the following: James Boyle, "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, "University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (April 1985): 685-780; J. M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, "Yale Law Journal 96 (March 1987): 743-86; Claire Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, "Yale Law Journal 94 (April 1985): 999-1114; Gerald Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, "Harvard Law Review 97 (April 1984): 1276-388; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997): Mark Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, "Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1515-44; and Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Excellent critical accounts include Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
30. This less than coherent movement is well reflected by the following: James Boyle, "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, "University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (April 1985): 685-780; J. M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, "Yale Law Journal 96 (March 1987): 743-86; Claire Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, "Yale Law Journal 94 (April 1985): 999-1114; Gerald Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, "Harvard Law Review 97 (April 1984): 1276-388; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997): Mark Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, "Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1515-44; and Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Excellent critical accounts include Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
31. This less than coherent movement is well reflected by the following: James Boyle, "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, "University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (April 1985): 685-780; J. M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, "Yale Law Journal 96 (March 1987): 743-86; Claire Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, "Yale Law Journal 94 (April 1985): 999-1114; Gerald Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, "Harvard Law Review 97 (April 1984): 1276-388; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997): Mark Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, "Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1515-44; and Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Excellent critical accounts include Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
32. This less than coherent movement is well reflected by the following: James Boyle, "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, "University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (April 1985): 685-780; J. M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, "Yale Law Journal 96 (March 1987): 743-86; Claire Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, "Yale Law Journal 94 (April 1985): 999-1114; Gerald Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, "Harvard Law Review 97 (April 1984): 1276-388; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997): Mark Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, "Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1515-44; and Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Excellent critical accounts include Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
33. This less than coherent movement is well reflected by the following: James Boyle, "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, "University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (April 1985): 685-780; J. M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, "Yale Law Journal 96 (March 1987): 743-86; Claire Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, "Yale Law Journal 94 (April 1985): 999-1114; Gerald Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, "Harvard Law Review 97 (April 1984): 1276-388; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997): Mark Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, "Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1515-44; and Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Excellent critical accounts include Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
34. This less than coherent movement is well reflected by the following: James Boyle, "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, "University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (April 1985): 685-780; J. M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, "Yale Law Journal 96 (March 1987): 743-86; Claire Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, "Yale Law Journal 94 (April 1985): 999-1114; Gerald Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, "Harvard Law Review 97 (April 1984): 1276-388; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997): Mark Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, "Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1515-44; and Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Excellent critical accounts include Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
35. This less than coherent movement is well reflected by the following: James Boyle, "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, "University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (April 1985): 685-780; J. M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, "Yale Law Journal 96 (March 1987): 743-86; Claire Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, "Yale Law Journal 94 (April 1985): 999-1114; Gerald Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, "Harvard Law Review 97 (April 1984): 1276-388; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997): Mark Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, "Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1515-44; and Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Excellent critical accounts include Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
36. This less than coherent movement is well reflected by the following: James Boyle, "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, "University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (April 1985): 685-780; J. M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, "Yale Law Journal 96 (March 1987): 743-86; Claire Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, "Yale Law Journal 94 (April 1985): 999-1114; Gerald Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, "Harvard Law Review 97 (April 1984): 1276-388; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997): Mark Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, "Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1515-44; and Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Excellent critical accounts include Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
37. This less than coherent movement is well reflected by the following: James Boyle, "The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, "University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (April 1985): 685-780; J. M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, "Yale Law Journal 96 (March 1987): 743-86; Claire Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, "Yale Law Journal 94 (April 1985): 999-1114; Gerald Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, "Harvard Law Review 97 (April 1984): 1276-388; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997): Mark Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, "Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1515-44; and Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). Excellent critical accounts include Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
38. See John P. McCormick, "Three Ways of Thinking 'Critically' about the Law, "American Political Science Review 93, no. 2 (June 1999): 413-28.
39. See Shadia Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).
40. John P. McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chaps. 2 and 6.
41. Nancy Fraser levels a version of what I would call the "insubstantial" or "inefficacious" critique against the essay. It differs from the straightforward "nihilism" critique by emphasizing Derrida's inability to criticize actual practice from such a high level of abstraction rather than accuse him of culpability in the unjust practices that he fails to adequately criticize. See Fraser, "The Force of Law: Metaphysical or Political?" Cardozo Law Review 13 (December 1991): 1325-31.
42. See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses on Livy, trans. Peter Bondanella (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), III. 1; and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), XIII. Studies of Machiavelli and Hobbes that pose challenges to my prioritizing of this aspect of these authors are Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989).
43. See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses on Livy, trans. Peter Bondanella (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), III. 1; and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), XIII. Studies of Machiavelli and Hobbes that pose challenges to my prioritizing of this aspect of these authors are Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989).
44. See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses on Livy, trans. Peter Bondanella (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), III. 1; and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), XIII. Studies of Machiavelli and Hobbes that pose challenges to my prioritizing of this aspect of these authors are Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989).
45. See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses on Livy, trans. Peter Bondanella (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), III. 1; and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), XIII. Studies of Machiavelli and Hobbes that pose challenges to my prioritizing of this aspect of these authors are Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989).
46. Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence" (1921), in Reflections, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1978), 277-300.
47. Ellen Kennedy, for instance, is generally accused of exaggerating this connection; see Kennedy, "Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School, "Telos 71 (spring 1987): 37-66.
48. See The Gospel According to John 1:1, in The New English Bible (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1976); and Aristotle, The Politics, trans. and ed. Peter Simpson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), I.2.
49. See The Gospel According to John 1:1, in The New English Bible (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1976); and Aristotle, The Politics, trans. and ed. Peter Simpson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), I.2.
50. The version of the Greek-Hebraic distinction most familiar to students of political theory is likely Strauss's invocation of the tension between Athens and Jerusalem. See Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Strauss reputedly adopted it from Jacob Klein; see Klein, Lectures and Essays, ed. Robert B. Williamson and Elliott Zuckerman (Annapolis: Saint John's College Press, 1985). Other formulations of the opposition include Matthew Arnold, "Hebraism and Hellenism, "in Culture and Anarchy, ed. Arnold (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 86-95; and George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New York: Knopf, 1961).
51. The version of the Greek-Hebraic distinction most familiar to students of political theory is likely Strauss's invocation of the tension between Athens and Jerusalem. See Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Strauss reputedly adopted it from Jacob Klein; see Klein, Lectures and Essays, ed. Robert B. Williamson and Elliott Zuckerman (Annapolis: Saint John's College Press, 1985). Other formulations of the opposition include Matthew Arnold, "Hebraism and Hellenism, "in Culture and Anarchy, ed. Arnold (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 86-95; and George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New York: Knopf, 1961).
52. The version of the Greek-Hebraic distinction most familiar to students of political theory is likely Strauss's invocation of the tension between Athens and Jerusalem. See Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Strauss reputedly adopted it from Jacob Klein; see Klein, Lectures and Essays, ed. Robert B. Williamson and Elliott Zuckerman (Annapolis: Saint John's College Press, 1985). Other formulations of the opposition include Matthew Arnold, "Hebraism and Hellenism, "in Culture and Anarchy, ed. Arnold (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 86-95; and George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New York: Knopf, 1961).
53. The version of the Greek-Hebraic distinction most familiar to students of political theory is likely Strauss's invocation of the tension between Athens and Jerusalem. See Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Strauss reputedly adopted it from Jacob Klein; see Klein, Lectures and Essays, ed. Robert B. Williamson and Elliott Zuckerman (Annapolis: Saint John's College Press, 1985). Other formulations of the opposition include Matthew Arnold, "Hebraism and Hellenism, "in Culture and Anarchy, ed. Arnold (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 86-95; and George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New York: Knopf, 1961).
54. It is certainly surprising that the kinds of rhetorical or performative strategies that Derrida deploys in the essay have not been noticed and elaborated on in the poststructuralist literature. On the other hand, Straussians would seem to be the best equipped interpreters outside the poststructuralist community to recognize and engage the immanent - but not esoteric - expository strategy of Derrida's essay. In this regard, the most likely and capable candidate, Zuckert's Postmodern Platos, proves to be something of a missed opportunity in her treatment of Derrida on Plato. Thus, despite an ever-increasing preoccupation with what they call postmodernism, Straussians have failed to fully explore the affinities and differences between the deconstructive and esoteric hermeneutic methods. Perhaps a superficially familiar expositional method suggests deeper, more substantive affinities between "postmodernism" and Straussianism than many adherents of the latter can bear to consider. From the Straussian perspective, poststructuralism trumpets as progressive and liberating the very same "nihilism" that Straussians had worked so hard to maintain as the preserve of a philosophic class. The former would disperse the lovely but socially corrosive pearls of nihilism among the swinish general population. Their own fixation on, but seldom real engagement with, this movement betrays the sense in which contemporary Straussianism can be understood as "don't ask, don't tell" postmodernism.
55. One would have thought that Arendt's place in the political-philosophic quest for a notion of freedom far removed from authoritarian taint had been secured by now. See George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987). But the recent conflating of the philosophical positions of Arendt with those of her teacher, Heidegger, have inspired renewed demonstrations of her commitment to enlightenment and of her differences with Heidegger: see Richard J. Bernstein, "Provocation and Appropriation: Hannah Arendt's Response to Martin Heidegger, "Constellations 4, no. 2 (1997): 153-71; and Seyla Benhabib, "The Personal Is Not the Political: The Public Life of Hannah Arendt's Private Life, "Boston Review 24, no. 5 (October/November 1999): 42-49.
56. One would have thought that Arendt's place in the political-philosophic quest for a notion of freedom far removed from authoritarian taint had been secured by now. See George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987). But the recent conflating of the philosophical positions of Arendt with those of her teacher, Heidegger, have inspired renewed demonstrations of her commitment to enlightenment and of her differences with Heidegger: see Richard J. Bernstein, "Provocation and Appropriation: Hannah Arendt's Response to Martin Heidegger, "Constellations 4, no. 2 (1997): 153-71; and Seyla Benhabib, "The Personal Is Not the Political: The Public Life of Hannah Arendt's Private Life, "Boston Review 24, no. 5 (October/November 1999): 42-49.
57. One would have thought that Arendt's place in the political-philosophic quest for a notion of freedom far removed from authoritarian taint had been secured by now. See George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987). But the recent conflating of the philosophical positions of Arendt with those of her teacher, Heidegger, have inspired renewed demonstrations of her commitment to enlightenment and of her differences with Heidegger: see Richard J. Bernstein, "Provocation and Appropriation: Hannah Arendt's Response to Martin Heidegger, "Constellations 4, no. 2 (1997): 153-71; and Seyla Benhabib, "The Personal Is Not the Political: The Public Life of Hannah Arendt's Private Life, "Boston Review 24, no. 5 (October/November 1999): 42-49.
58. See Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1931); Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); and The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, ed. Tracy Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). For a discussion of these aspects of Schmitt's thought, see McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism, chaps. 3 and 5.
59. See Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1931); Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); and The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, ed. Tracy Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). For a discussion of these aspects of Schmitt's thought, see McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism, chaps. 3 and 5.
60. See Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1931); Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); and The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, ed. Tracy Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). For a discussion of these aspects of Schmitt's thought, see McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism, chaps. 3 and 5.
61. See Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1931); Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); and The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, ed. Tracy Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). For a discussion of these aspects of Schmitt's thought, see McCormick, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism, chaps. 3 and 5.
62. See Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1985).
63. On this aspect of Schmitt's critique of parliamentarism, as well as a comparison of his theory of representation with that of Benjamin, see John P. McCormick, "Feudalism, Fascism, and Fordism: Weimar Conceptions of Representation and Their Legacy in the Bonn Republic, "in From Liberal Democracy to Nazism: Political and Legal Theory in the Weimar Republic, ed. Peter C. Caldwell and William E. Scheuerman (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 2000).
64. For a fresh interpretation of the Socratic-democratic predicament, see Fonna Dubin, "Why Socrates Stayed" (paper presented at the Conference for the Study of Political Thought on "Cosmopolitanism, "Madison, Wisconsin, 6-8 November 1998).
65. Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung.
66. Two recent attempts to understand law through the prism of Hebraic law generally are Arthur J. Jacobson, "The Idolatry of Rules: Writing Law according to Moses, with Reference to Other Jurisprudences, "Cardozo Law Review 11, nos. 5-6 (July/August 1990): 1079-132; and George P. Fletcher, Our Secret Constitution: From the Gettysburg Address to the Politics of Compassion (New York: Norton, 2000). The former was, in fact, presented at the same conference as Derrida's essay.
67. Two recent attempts to understand law through the prism of Hebraic law generally are Arthur J. Jacobson, "The Idolatry of Rules: Writing Law according to Moses, with Reference to Other Jurisprudences, "Cardozo Law Review 11, nos. 5-6 (July/August 1990): 1079-132; and George P. Fletcher, Our Secret Constitution: From the Gettysburg Address to the Politics of Compassion (New York: Norton, 2000). The former was, in fact, presented at the same conference as Derrida's essay.
68. The pagan quality of crucifixion iconography is fairly obvious. Freud's study of Moses suggests, on the contrary, the rationalizing function of circumcision: Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1939). Although, as we will see below, Derrida's analysis points to the abolition of any practice that involves bloodletting, including the eating of meat, and presumably, circumcision. See also Derrida's "Circonfession, "in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993): 65-66. The political significance of circumcision, particularly in the distinction between Judaism and Christianity, is discussed in William E. Connolly, "Memory Traces, Mystical States and Deep Pluralism, "manuscript, Johns Hopkins University (Summer 1999), and Anne Norton, Blood Rites of the Poststructuralists: Word, Flesh and Revolution, (monograph, University of Pennsylvania, 2001).
69. The pagan quality of crucifixion iconography is fairly obvious. Freud's study of Moses suggests, on the contrary, the rationalizing function of circumcision: Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1939). Although, as we will see below, Derrida's analysis points to the abolition of any practice that involves bloodletting, including the eating of meat, and presumably, circumcision. See also Derrida's "Circonfession, "in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993): 65-66. The political significance of circumcision, particularly in the distinction between Judaism and Christianity, is discussed in William E. Connolly, "Memory Traces, Mystical States and Deep Pluralism, "manuscript, Johns Hopkins University (Summer 1999), and Anne Norton, Blood Rites of the Poststructuralists: Word, Flesh and Revolution, (monograph, University of Pennsylvania, 2001).
70. The pagan quality of crucifixion iconography is fairly obvious. Freud's study of Moses suggests, on the contrary, the rationalizing function of circumcision: Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1939). Although, as we will see below, Derrida's analysis points to the abolition of any practice that involves bloodletting, including the eating of meat, and presumably, circumcision. See also Derrida's "Circonfession, "in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993): 65-66. The political significance of circumcision, particularly in the distinction between Judaism and Christianity, is discussed in William E. Connolly, "Memory Traces, Mystical States and Deep Pluralism, "manuscript, Johns Hopkins University (Summer 1999), and Anne Norton, Blood Rites of the Poststructuralists: Word, Flesh and Revolution, (monograph, University of Pennsylvania, 2001).
71. The pagan quality of crucifixion iconography is fairly obvious. Freud's study of Moses suggests, on the contrary, the rationalizing function of circumcision: Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1939). Although, as we will see below, Derrida's analysis points to the abolition of any practice that involves bloodletting, including the eating of meat, and presumably, circumcision. See also Derrida's "Circonfession, "in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993): 65-66. The political significance of circumcision, particularly in the distinction between Judaism and Christianity, is discussed in William E. Connolly, "Memory Traces, Mystical States and Deep Pluralism, "manuscript, Johns Hopkins University (Summer 1999), and Anne Norton, Blood Rites of the Poststructuralists: Word, Flesh and Revolution, (monograph, University of Pennsylvania, 2001).
72. Here, Derrida seems to signal a reluctance to fetishize blood: he refuses to adhere firmly to a blood-fixated criterion for evaluating violence. (It should be noted that he curiously foregoes a consideration of historical-empirical evidence that dispels any notion of the Holocaust as a "bloodless" phenomenon.) This opens the possibility of Derrida's essay contributing to the critique of kinds of violence that are ostensibly "bloodless, "such as those that are operationalized through injustices of distribution and status. I return to this point in the conclusion.
73. But why have so many misinterpreted Derrida's essay, if obfuscation - whether unsavory or aesthetic - is not its purpose? Certainly, there are sufficient indications on the surface of Derrida's text to make plain the main thrusts of his account and point to the more allegorical and performative elements that would further underscore them. Unfortunately, a "love it or leave it" climate has dominated academic debates over the Enlightenment in the late eighties and throughout the nineties, such that works and authors must be approved as "for or agin us" by liberals and their critics. They must be identified and claimed as liberal or anti-, modern or post-, and so forth. The complexities and possibilities of a text such as "Force of Law" do not stand much of a chance for a fair hearing and unbiased consideration in such an environment. The work has been unreflectively consigned to one side of the debate. There are, of course, many reasons why one might write political or social theory in a less than straightforward manner: see James Miller, "Is Bad Writing Necessary? George Orwell, Theodor Adorno, and the Politics of Literature, "Lingua Franca 9, no. 9 (December/January 2000): 22-33.
74. Over the past decade or so, Stephen Holmes and Richard Wolin have been the most tireless liberal and social democratic watchdogs of the Enlightenment in this regard: see Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Wolin, Labyrinths: Explorations in the Critical History of Ideas.
75. Over the past decade or so, Stephen Holmes and Richard Wolin have been the most tireless liberal and social democratic watchdogs of the Enlightenment in this regard: see Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Wolin, Labyrinths: Explorations in the Critical History of Ideas.
76. On the trajectory of such arguments, see Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
77. For criticisms of CLS along these lines, see McCormick, "Three Ways of Thinking Critically about the Law." For an elaboration of the differences between CLS and Derrida, see McCormick, "Schmittian Positions on Law and Politics? CLS and Derrida, "Cardozo Law Review 21, no. 1 (June 2000): 128-30. The present essay is partly motivated by a belief that left-poststructuralist scholars, when faced with these kinds of arguments, are capable of responding like Derrida when confronted with l'affaire de Man. Like Derrida, and Thrasymachus for that matter, I think that most poststucturalists would blush if confronted with certain political ramifications of their philosophical/pedagogical practices. I am, obviously, less confident that the capacity for shame required to blush under these circumstances inheres in many adherents to the other hermeneutical school criticized in this essay. This, of course, raises the enormous question of possibly "persuading the unpersuadable, "which ranges far beyond the confines of this essay.
78. Derrida, in fact, calls for the development of international strategies against global violence and injustice in Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994). For an account of the possibilities and limits of this vision, see
79. Moishe Postone, "Deconstruction as Social Critique: Derrida on Marx and the New World Order, "History and Theory 37, no. 3 (October 1998): 370-87.