Partial justice

Political Theory

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 315-336

  Krause, Sharon ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035534117     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591701029003001     Document Type: Article

References (91)

1. On 7 January 1999, the chief justice administered the following oath to the members of the U.S. Senate in conformance with article 1, section 3, clause 6, of the Constitution and the Senate's impeachment rules: Do you solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, now pending, you will do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws, so help you God? (Congressional Record, vol. 145, no. 2 [7 January 1999], p. S41)
2. The courts are the favored example in this regard, as both judges and jurors in the American system are expected to carry out their deliberations impartially. Beyond that, however, the overtly partial, interest-based representation that was intended by the founders to predominate in the House of Representatives was combined by them with mechanisms that encourage greater degrees of impartiality in the Senate and presidency (such as larger district size and the visibility that comes with the singular executive). Similarly, citizens are expected to vote their interests -but not always, or not always exclusively so. On important matters such as welfare reform, the future of public education, or health care, we expect ourselves to think with some breadth.
3. Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1995), 124. For variations on the theme of justice as impartiality, see, for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
4. Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1995), 124. For variations on the theme of justice as impartiality, see, for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
5. Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1995), 124. For variations on the theme of justice as impartiality, see, for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
6. Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1995), 124. For variations on the theme of justice as impartiality, see, for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
7. Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1995), 124. For variations on the theme of justice as impartiality, see, for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
8. Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1995), 124. For variations on the theme of justice as impartiality, see, for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
9. Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1995), 124. For variations on the theme of justice as impartiality, see, for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
10. See Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 9.
11. The term is Scanlon's, but it is widely employed.
12. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1907), I.9. For an engaging account of the opposition between "attractive" and "imperative" conceptions of moral-ity, see Larmore, Morals of Modernity, chap. 1. Larmore elaborates the opposition with great care but ultimately seeks to overcome it, arguing that he "do[es] not think that a proper conception of morality as a whole must take over one of these forms to the exclusion of the other," p. 23. Although Larmore also includes utilitarianism as an imperative approach, this article focuses primarily on the Kantian version of the imperative morality because this version has been most influential for contemporary theories of justice as impartiality.
13. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1907), I.9. For an engaging account of the opposition between "attractive" and "imperative" conceptions of moral-ity, see Larmore, Morals of Modernity, chap. 1. Larmore elaborates the opposition with great care but ultimately seeks to overcome it, arguing that he "do[es] not think that a proper conception of morality as a whole must take over one of these forms to the exclusion of the other," p. 23. Although Larmore also includes utilitarianism as an imperative approach, this article focuses primarily on the Kantian version of the imperative morality because this version has been most influential for contemporary theories of justice as impartiality.
14. For criticism of the agreement motive, see James Johnson's review of Barry's Justice as Impartiality in Journal of Politics 59, no. 4 (November 1997): 1306-09. For similar criticism, see also Daniel A. Bell, "The Limits of Liberal Justice," Political Theory 26, no. 4 (August 1998): 557-82; and David Gauthier, "Mutual Advantage and Impartiality," in Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice, ed. Paul Kelly (Edinburgh, Scotland: University of Edinburgh Press, 1998), 146. Even Nagel, a proponent of one version of justice as impartiality, has emphasized that it "meets with severe obstacles from individual motivation at every step," p. 95. He identifies the agreement motive with "an impersonal desire for equality" (p. 95), which is theoretically viable but in need of more support than it presently enjoys. See especially chap. 10 of Equality and Partiality.
15. For criticism of the agreement motive, see James Johnson's review of Barry's Justice as Impartiality in Journal of Politics 59, no. 4 (November 1997): 1306-09. For similar criticism, see also Daniel A. Bell, "The Limits of Liberal Justice," Political Theory 26, no. 4 (August 1998): 557-82; and David Gauthier, "Mutual Advantage and Impartiality," in Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice, ed. Paul Kelly (Edinburgh, Scotland: University of Edinburgh Press, 1998), 146. Even Nagel, a proponent of one version of justice as impartiality, has emphasized that it "meets with severe obstacles from individual motivation at every step," p. 95. He identifies the agreement motive with "an impersonal desire for equality" (p. 95), which is theoretically viable but in need of more support than it presently enjoys. See especially chap. 10 of Equality and Partiality.
16. For criticism of the agreement motive, see James Johnson's review of Barry's Justice as Impartiality in Journal of Politics 59, no. 4 (November 1997): 1306-09. For similar criticism, see also Daniel A. Bell, "The Limits of Liberal Justice," Political Theory 26, no. 4 (August 1998): 557-82; and David Gauthier, "Mutual Advantage and Impartiality," in Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice, ed. Paul Kelly (Edinburgh, Scotland: University of Edinburgh Press, 1998), 146. Even Nagel, a proponent of one version of justice as impartiality, has emphasized that it "meets with severe obstacles from individual motivation at every step," p. 95. He identifies the agreement motive with "an impersonal desire for equality" (p. 95), which is theoretically viable but in need of more support than it presently enjoys. See especially chap. 10 of Equality and Partiality.
17. Scanlon, What We Owe, 171-77.
18. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 3f, 6.
19. Larmore, Morals of Modernity, especially 136f, 144f, and 220.
20. Rawls, Political Liberalism, especially xx, xxvii, 125f, and 213ff. Rawls is an example of the first type, emphasizing that the use of public reason applies to decisions about basic structure and constitutional essentials. J. Donald Moon is an example of the second type. He defends a version of impartiality as a strategy of political liberalism "that offers us a way of reaching agreement on policies and institutions without requiring us to agree on the ends they will serve" (p. 35), but he also thinks that there are some areas in which "the state cannot be neutral" and yet must act (pp. 63-73). The implication is that the scope of impartiality, while limited, cannot be definitively fixed. See his Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
21. Rawls, Political Liberalism, especially xx, xxvii, 125f, and 213ff. Rawls is an example of the first type, emphasizing that the use of public reason applies to decisions about basic structure and constitutional essentials. J. Donald Moon is an example of the second type. He defends a version of impartiality as a strategy of political liberalism "that offers us a way of reaching agreement on policies and institutions without requiring us to agree on the ends they will serve" (p. 35), but he also thinks that there are some areas in which "the state cannot be neutral" and yet must act (pp. 63-73). The implication is that the scope of impartiality, while limited, cannot be definitively fixed. See his Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
22. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 11.
23. Scanlon, What We Owe, 4.
24. Although impartiality is thought to be, on the whole, a prudent policy for any regime to follow, in particular cases persons may have incentives to violate the norm of impartiality. For this reason, the agreement motive cannot be sustained simply on the basis of prudential reasoning or as a matter of mutual advantage.
25. The terminology is Barry's. For discussion of the differences between first- and second-order impartiality, see especially Justice as Impartiality, 11-12, 194-95, 233, 256-57. Barry maintains that confusion about this distinction is what underlies many critiques of impartiality, p. 191.
26. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 311. On the same point, see 31 and 277.
27. Those who criticize the theory of justice as impartiality for devaluing substantive conceptions of the good or particular individual and community identities include Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
28. Those who criticize the theory of justice as impartiality for devaluing substantive conceptions of the good or particular individual and community identities include Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
29. Those who criticize the theory of justice as impartiality for devaluing substantive conceptions of the good or particular individual and community identities include Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
30. Those who criticize the theory of justice as impartiality for devaluing substantive conceptions of the good or particular individual and community identities include Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
31. Those who criticize the theory of justice as impartiality for devaluing substantive conceptions of the good or particular individual and community identities include Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
32. These examples are intended to convey that partial attachments may be more or less reflective and more or less significant. The commitment to the principles of liberty and equality, although it reflects a certain partiality, clearly is not on par with the preference for chocolate cake.
33. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 22.
34. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 8.
35. Ibid., 8;
36. see also Larmore, Morals of Modernity: "Rationality as such, then, constitutes too slender a basis for establishing the validity of any moral obligation" (p. 51).
37. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 3. For Barry's reply, see Justice as Impartiality, 119-24.
38. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 3. For Barry's reply, see Justice as Impartiality, 119-24.
39. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 26.
40. Larmore, Morals of Modernity, 130.
41. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 8. The partiality inherent in the standard of reasonable rejectability has led one critic to conclude that "in practice the Scanlonian test for justice in Barry's hands seems to be a license to reach conclusions about justice on the basis of what Barry intuitively finds to be reasonable and unreasonable." Richard Arneson, "The Priority of the Right over the Good Rides Again," in Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice, 64.
42. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 8. The partiality inherent in the standard of reasonable rejectability has led one critic to conclude that "in practice the Scanlonian test for justice in Barry's hands seems to be a license to reach conclusions about justice on the basis of what Barry intuitively finds to be reasonable and unreasonable." Richard Arneson, "The Priority of the Right over the Good Rides Again," in Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice, 64.
43. Scanlon, What We Owe, 214.
44. The example is Barry's, Justice as Impartiality, 84.
45. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
46. Employment Div. Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
47. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). In this case, the Court found that the conflict between the Amish faith and the obligations imposed by the social security system did not justify exempting members of the Amish religion from payment of social security taxes. Other cases upholding restrictions on religious liberty in the name of a compelling governmental interest include Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); and Lying v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
48. Nagel alludes to this difficulty in the context of a discussion of toleration in Equality and Partiality, 156. Sandel discusses it directly in "Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality," California Law Review, 77:521-38.
49. Nagel alludes to this difficulty in the context of a discussion of toleration in Equality and Partiality, 156. Sandel discusses it directly in "Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality," California Law Review, 77:521-38.
50. Scanlon, What We Owe, 214. Larmore agrees, Morals of Modernity, 62, 75, 130, 135. Moon also maintains that deliberation always presupposes a background of prior commitments, Constructing Community, 49f, 95, 100.
51. Scanlon, What We Owe, 214. Larmore agrees, Morals of Modernity, 62, 75, 130, 135. Moon also maintains that deliberation always presupposes a background of prior commitments, Constructing Community, 49f, 95, 100.
52. Scanlon, What We Owe, 214. Larmore agrees, Morals of Modernity, 62, 75, 130, 135. Moon also maintains that deliberation always presupposes a background of prior commitments, Constructing Community, 49f, 95, 100.
53. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 106.
54. Ibid., 106.
55. The intrinsically exclusive character of the norm of impartiality is the subject of Young's critique in Justice and the Politics of Difference. Moon also acknowledges the potential exclusions of impartiality but concludes that politics inevitably involves exclusions and even "tragic conflicts." They must be rectified wherever possible but cannot be altogether avoided. See Constructing Community, especially 10-11, 98-102.
56. Scanlon emphasizes the distinction between hypothetical agreement and de facto consensus; for example, What We Owe, 155.
57. The ideas of liberty and equality that are presupposed by the impartial standpoint do have intrinsic revolutionary, or at least reformist, potential. But insofar as the standpoint of impartiality always interprets these ideas through the lens of prevailing agreements about what counts as "equal" treatment or legitimately "free" action, the revolutionary potential of these ideas is significantly constrained. Such constraints can be valuable insofar as they produce moderation. Political stability is both a public and a private good; nobody wants to live in a constant state of revolution. Still, the limits of impartiality in this regard are reason to resist the tempting belief that as long as we act by principles that no one could reasonably reject, according to the standards that we now hold, then we have done all we need do on behalf of liberty and equality.
58. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 76.
59. Ibid., 100.
60. Or, as Barry puts it, conceptions of the good have "intrinsic motivational force," ibid., 112.
61. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, IA: Peripatetic, 1984): And as for honor and pleasure and intellect and every virtue, we choose them for their own sake (for we might choose each of them when nothing else resulted from them), but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, believing that through these we shall be happy. (P. 1097b)
62. Ibid., 1094a.
63. Thus, it is "the pure thought of duty and of the moral law generally, unmixed with any extraneous addition of empirical inducements," that has "by way of reason alone (which first becomes aware hereby that it can of itself be practical) an influence on the human heart." Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 22.
64. "The ground of [the categorical imperative] is this: rational nature exists as an end in itself. In this way man necessarily thinks of his own existence; thus far it is a subjective principle of human actions." Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics, 36. Larmore maintains that Kant "inferred that the interest that all persons must be supposed to have in morality is an empirically unconditioned one; it expresses our ability to act independently of the laws of cause and effect governing the world of experience," Morals of Modernity, 28. Similarly, Williams holds that for Kant, "the rational agent is committed to being free," in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 65, and has an "aspiration to be genuinely free and rational" (p. 66), which is what motivates adherence to the moral law. For an account of the unique teleology implicit in Kant's theory, see Patrick Riley, "The Elements of Kant's Practical Philosophy," in Kant & Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy, ed. Ronald Beiner and William James Booth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 9-37.
65. "The ground of [the categorical imperative] is this: rational nature exists as an end in itself. In this way man necessarily thinks of his own existence; thus far it is a subjective principle of human actions." Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics, 36. Larmore maintains that Kant "inferred that the interest that all persons must be supposed to have in morality is an empirically unconditioned one; it expresses our ability to act independently of the laws of cause and effect governing the world of experience," Morals of Modernity, 28. Similarly, Williams holds that for Kant, "the rational agent is committed to being free," in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 65, and has an "aspiration to be genuinely free and rational" (p. 66), which is what motivates adherence to the moral law. For an account of the unique teleology implicit in Kant's theory, see Patrick Riley, "The Elements of Kant's Practical Philosophy," in Kant & Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy, ed. Ronald Beiner and William James Booth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 9-37.
66. "The ground of [the categorical imperative] is this: rational nature exists as an end in itself. In this way man necessarily thinks of his own existence; thus far it is a subjective principle of human actions." Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics, 36. Larmore maintains that Kant "inferred that the interest that all persons must be supposed to have in morality is an empirically unconditioned one; it expresses our ability to act independently of the laws of cause and effect governing the world of experience," Morals of Modernity, 28. Similarly, Williams holds that for Kant, "the rational agent is committed to being free," in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 65, and has an "aspiration to be genuinely free and rational" (p. 66), which is what motivates adherence to the moral law. For an account of the unique teleology implicit in Kant's theory, see Patrick Riley, "The Elements of Kant's Practical Philosophy," in Kant & Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy, ed. Ronald Beiner and William James Booth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 9-37.
67. "The ground of [the categorical imperative] is this: rational nature exists as an end in itself. In this way man necessarily thinks of his own existence; thus far it is a subjective principle of human actions." Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics, 36. Larmore maintains that Kant "inferred that the interest that all persons must be supposed to have in morality is an empirically unconditioned one; it expresses our ability to act independently of the laws of cause and effect governing the world of experience," Morals of Modernity, 28. Similarly, Williams holds that for Kant, "the rational agent is committed to being free," in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 65, and has an "aspiration to be genuinely free and rational" (p. 66), which is what motivates adherence to the moral law. For an account of the unique teleology implicit in Kant's theory, see Patrick Riley, "The Elements of Kant's Practical Philosophy," in Kant & Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy, ed. Ronald Beiner and William James Booth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 9-37.
68. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics, 22.
69. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 27. On the same point, see Larmore, Morals of Modernity, 12f; and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 22.
70. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 27. On the same point, see Larmore, Morals of Modernity, 12f; and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 22.
71. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 27. On the same point, see Larmore, Morals of Modernity, 12f; and Rawls, Political Liberalism, 22.
72. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 76f.
73. Scanlon, What We Owe, 7; Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 164.
74. Scanlon, What We Owe, 7; Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 164.
75. Scanlon, What We Owe, 163; Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 168.
76. Scanlon, What We Owe, 163; Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 168.
77. Consider, for example, the wide scope given by Rawls to his version of first-order impartiality. Citizens can "enter the Original Position any time, simply by reasoning for principles of justice in accordance with the enumerated restrictions on information" (Political Liberalism, 27), and they are obliged to do so when voting on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice (p. 215), when engaging in political advocacy in the public forum, in conducting political campaigns, in serving as public and government officers in official forums, when they debate and vote on the floor of the legislature, and as judges [and presumably jurors] in juridical proceedings (p. 252f). Moreover, while strictly speaking political justice requires the use of public reason only in the matters listed above, it nevertheless "is usually highly desirable to settle political questions by invoking the values of public reason" (p. 215), which requires reasoning from within the original position (pp. 213, 223). Thus, the sense of justice entails widespread first-order impartiality in the form of a continuing readiness to carry out the procedures specified by the original position, which serves as a means of public reflection and self-clarification ... as a mediating idea by which all our considered convictions, whatever their level of generality - whether they concern fair conditions for situating the parties or reasonable constraints on reasons, or first principles and precepts, or judgments about particular institutions and actions - can be brought to bear on one another. (P. 26)
78. Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 2d ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), 53.
79. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, 164, cited in Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 28.
80. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, 164, cited in Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 28.
81. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 114.
82. Ibid.: Whether somebody's conception of the good be partial or impartial, I take it to be unproblematic that it has motivational force. The problem is, rather, to explain why people might do anything else. Why should somebody deliberately draw back from the pursuit of the good? (P. 112)
83. Barry agrees that any theory of justice must include a compelling account of motivations, and he criticizes other theories of justice for failing to adequately connect the principles of justice to the motivation for justice (Justice as Impartiality, 46f, 40). Yet, he nevertheless expresses doubts as to how compelling the agreement motive really is, saying, "how strong the desire to behave justly actually is, when it comes into competition with other desires, I leave open. I claim only to tell you what justice is; what you do about it, if you believe me, is up to you" (p. 115). Rawls also emphasizes the importance of an accurate moral psychology for a theory of justice, saying that if its assumptions about the moral psychology of persons are mistaken, "there is a serious problem with justice as fairness," Political Liberalism, 252.
84. Barry agrees that any theory of justice must include a compelling account of motivations, and he criticizes other theories of justice for failing to adequately connect the principles of justice to the motivation for justice (Justice as Impartiality, 46f, 40). Yet, he nevertheless expresses doubts as to how compelling the agreement motive really is, saying, "how strong the desire to behave justly actually is, when it comes into competition with other desires, I leave open. I claim only to tell you what justice is; what you do about it, if you believe me, is up to you" (p. 115). Rawls also emphasizes the importance of an accurate moral psychology for a theory of justice, saying that if its assumptions about the moral psychology of persons are mistaken, "there is a serious problem with justice as fairness," Political Liberalism, 252.
85. Proponents of this view include Hobbes, Hume, and (more recently) David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1986).
86. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 34.
87. Or even "internally inconsistent," according to Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 40. For Barry's critique of justice as mutual advantage, see especially 37-45. For a reply in defense of justice as mutual advantage, see Gauthier, "Mutual Advantage and Impartiality." The problem of instability explains in part why Rawls emphasizes that the content of the political conception of justice is not based on a compromise between different comprehensive doctrines but rather is freestanding. See Political Liberalism, especially 141f.
88. Or even "internally inconsistent," according to Barry, Justice as Impartiality, 40. For Barry's critique of justice as mutual advantage, see especially 37-45. For a reply in defense of justice as mutual advantage, see Gauthier, "Mutual Advantage and Impartiality." The problem of instability explains in part why Rawls emphasizes that the content of the political conception of justice is not based on a compromise between different comprehensive doctrines but rather is freestanding. See Political Liberalism, especially 141f.
89. This is essentially Nagel's conclusion, as well. He spends the bulk of chapters 10 through 15 of Equality and Partiality ruminating on "what transformations of motive might make possible the realization of a more egalitarian social ideal," 96.
90. Larmore, Morals of Modernity, 33. Rawls also finds support for the agreement motive in "the public political culture" (Political Liberalism, 85, note 33).
91. Larmore, Morals of Modernity, 33. Rawls also finds support for the agreement motive in "the public political culture" (Political Liberalism, 85, note 33).