Contractual restrictions on insider trading: A welfare analysis

Economic Theory

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 7-35

  Bernardo, Antonio E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Contracts; Insider trading; Investment policy; Rational expectations equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035533739     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/PL00004135     Document Type: Article

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