Remodeling the multilateral financial institutions

Global Governance

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 75-93

  Bird, Graham ^a   Joyce, Joseph P ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0035530462     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-00701007     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. See Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), for a history of the international monetary system; and A. F. P. Bakker, International Financial Institutions (London: Addison Wesley, 1996), for a survey of multilateral financial institutions.
2. See Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), for a history of the international monetary system; and A. F. P. Bakker, International Financial Institutions (London: Addison Wesley, 1996), for a survey of multilateral financial institutions.
3. For a more detailed and structured discussion of the circumstances under which fundamental reform to the international monetary system may and may not take place, see Graham Bird, "From Bretton Woods to Halifax and Beyond: The Political Economy of International Monetary Reform," World Economy 19, no. 2 (1996): 149-172.
4. For example, Jeffrey Sachs, in The Economist (12 September 1998), writes about the shortcomings of global capitalism and the reforms necessary to make it work better.
5. Barry Eichengreen discusses many of the proposals that have been of-fered in the wake of the Asian crisis to reform the international financial institutions in Toward a New International Financial Architecture (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1999).
6. The benefits and risks of international capital flows are examined in IMF Occasional Paper No. 172, Capital Account Liberalization: Theoretical and Practical Aspects (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1998).
7. The experiences of commercial lenders in trying to organize their own conditionality in the case of Peru in 1976 are nicely summarized in Dani Rodrik, "Why Is There Multilateral Lending?" in Michael Bruno and Boris Pleskovic, eds., Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995 (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1996), pp. 167-193.
8. See, for example, Roland Vaubel's use of the public choice approach in "The Political Economy of the International Monetary Fund: A Public Choice Analysis," in Roland Vaubel and Thomas D. Wilett, eds., The Political Economy of International Organizations (Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 204-244.
9. Anne O. Krueger, "Whither the World Bank and the IMF?" Journal of Economic Literature 36, no. 4 (1998): 2016. Krueger derives this estimate for Bank lending to areas outside of Africa.
10. Mohsin Khan summarizes the evidence on the impact of Fund-supported adjustment programs in "The Macroeconomic Effects of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs," IMF Staff Papers 37, no. 2 (1990): 195-231;
11. "Do IMF-Supported Programs Work? A Survey of the Cross-Country Empirical Evidence," with Nadeem Ul Haque, IMF Working Paper No. 98/169, 1998.
12. The increase in conditionality is explained in Jacques J. Polak, "The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality," Essays in International Finance, No. 184, Princeton University, 1991.
13. Tony Killick, Moazzam Malik, and Marcus Manuel examine the reasons for noncompletion of IMF programs in "What Can We Know About the Effects of IMF Programmes?" World Economy 15, no. 5 (1992): 575-597.
14. Graham Bird analyzes the political economy of policy reform in "The Effectiveness of Conditionality and the Political Economy of Policy Reform: Is It Simply a Matter of Political Will?" Policy Reform 1, no. 1 (1998): 89-113.
15. An excellent analysis of policy-based lending by the World Bank is provided by Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye in their Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based Lending (London: Routledge, 1998).
16. For an analysis of IMF programs, see Tony Killick, IMF Programmes in Developing Countries: Design and Impact (London: Routledge, 1995).
17. For a fuller discussion of this general theme, see Graham Bird, "How Important Is Sound Domestic Macroeconomics in Attracting Capital Inflows to \Developing Countries?" Journal of International Development 11, no. 1 (1999): 1-26.
18. Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands, investigating whether involvement with multilateral institutions has a positive catalytic effect for a country, find evidence for such an effect only in the case of official lending. See Bird and Rowlands, "The Catalytic Effect of Lending by the International Financial Institutions," World Economy 20, no. 7 (1997): 917-991.
19. For a more detailed discussion of these ideas, with supporting evi-dence, see Graham Bird, "External Financing and Balance of Payments Adjustment in Developing Countries: Getting a Better Policy Mix," World Development 25, no. 9 (1997): 1409-1420.
20. See Killick, IMF Programmes in Developing Countries, for evidence on this issue.
21. See, for example, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Aaron Tornell, and Andrés Velasco, "Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from 1995," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1996): 147-198;
22. and Graciela L. Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart, "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems," American Economic Review 89, no. 3 (1999): 473-501.
23. Barry Eichengreen, Toward a New International Financial Architecture, provides further justification for this point of view.
24. For recent examination of this idea, see Graham Bird, "Economic Assistance to Low Income Countries: Should the Link Be Resurrected?" Essays in International Finance, No. 193, Princeton University, 1994.
25. For a brief analysis of capital account liberalization, see Graham Bird, "Convertibility and Volatility: The Pros and Cons of Liberalizing the Capital Account," Economic Notes 27, no. 2 (1998): 141-156.
26. See Roland Vaubel, "The Moral Hazard of IMF Lending," World Economy 6, no. 3 (1983): 291-303.
27. Adam Lerrick presents the case for IMF borrowing from the private sector in Private Sector Financing for the IMF: Now Part of an Optimal Funding Mix (Washington, D.C.: Bretton Woods Committee, 1999).
28. The Fund has moved to greater use of external evaluators. See, for example, External Evaluation of the ESAF (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1998).
29. U.S. treasury secretary Larry Summers recently advanced his own proposal for reforming the IMF, which included a reduction in the number of the Fund's lending facilities (The Economist, 18 December 1999), p. 123.