Can low-price guarantees deter entry?

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 19, Issue 9, 2001, Pages 1387-1406

  Arbatskaya, Maria ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Contestable market; Entry deterrence; L11; L41; Low price guarantee; M3

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035502117     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(00)00056-4     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Aghion P., Bolton P. Contracts as a barrier to entry. American Economic Review. 77:1987;388-401.
2. Arbatskaya M., Hviid M., Shaffer G. Promises to match or beat the competition: evidence from retail tire prices. Advances in Applied Microeconomics. Vol. 8:1999;123-138 JAI Press.
3. Arbatskaya M., Hviid M., Shaffer G. On the incidence and variety of low-price guarantees. 1999;Centre for Industrial Economics, University of Copenhagen. Discussion paper 99-10.
4. Bain J.S. A note on pricing in monopoly and oligopoly. American Economic Review. 39:1949;448-464.
5. Baye M., Kovenock D. How to sell a pickup truck: 'beat-or-pay' advertisements as facilitating devices. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 12:1994;21-33.
6. Belton T. A model of duopoly and meeting or beating competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 5:1987;399-417.
7. Chen Z. How low is a guaranteed-lowest-price? Canadian Journal of Economics. 28:1995;683-701.
8. Corts K. On the competitive effects of price-matching policies. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 15:1997;283-299.
9. Cooper T., Fries T. The most-favored-nation pricing policy and negotiated prices. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 9:1991;209-223.
10. Dixit A. The role of investment in entry deterrence. Economic Journal. 90:1980;95-106.
11. Edlin A. Do guaranteed-low-price policies guarantee high prices, and can antitrust rise to the challenge? Harvard Law Review. 111:1997;528-575.
12. Edlin A.S., Emch E.R. The welfare losses from price-matching policies. Journal of Industrial Economics. 47:1999;145-167.
13. Harrington J.E. Jr. Limit pricing when the potential entrant is uncertain of its cost function. Econometrica. 54:1986;429-437.
14. Hess J., Gerstner E. Price matching policies: an empirical case. Managerial Decision Economics. 12:1991;305-315.
15. Hviid M., Shaffer G. Hassle-costs, the Achilles heel of price matching guarantees. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 8:1999;489-521.
16. Milgrom P., Roberts J. Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information: an equilibrium analysis. Econometrica. 50:1982;443-460.
17. Modigliani F. New developments on the oligopoly front. Journal of Political Economy. 66:1958;215-232.
18. Neilson W., Winter H. Unilateral most-favored-customer pricing. A comparison with Stackelberg. Economics Letters. 38:1992;229-232.
19. Neilson W., Winter H. Enhancing bargaining power with most-favored-customer pricing. Economics Letters. 44:1994;61-66.
20. Png I.P.L., Hirschleifer D. Price discrimination through offers to match price. Journal of Business. 60:1987;365-383.
21. Salop S. Practices that (credibly) facilitate oligopoly coordination. Stiglitz J., Mathewson F. New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure. 1986;265-290 MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
22. Sargent M. Economics upside-down: low-price guarantees as mechanisms for facilitating tacit collusion. University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 141:1993;2055-2118.
23. Spence A.M. Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing. Bell Journal of Economics. 8:1977;534-544.