Initial state regulation of investor-owned utilities

Energy Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 683-695

  Savitski, David W ^a  

^a NORTHERN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Electric utilities; State regulation

Indexed keywords

DATA ACQUISITION; POPULATION STATISTICS; PROBABILITY; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

HAZARD MODEL;

PUBLIC UTILITIES;

ENERGY MARKET; PUBLIC SERVICE; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; UTILITY SECTOR;

EID: 0035500310     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0140-9883(01)00084-6     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence
2. Electing regulators: The case of public utility commissioners
3. Separating economic from political influences on government decisions
4. Why regulate utilities?
5. Franklin D. Roosevelt, electric utilities, and the power of competition
6. The demand for state regulation of the electric utility industry
7. Inflation and environmental concern: Structural change in the process of public utility
8. The political economy of deregulation: The case of intrastate long distance
9. An empirical test of the Ramsey theory and Stigler-Peltzman theory of public utility pricing
10. Testing theories of regulatory behavior
11. Introducing competition into the electric utility industry, an economic appraisal
12. Toward a more general theory of regulation
13. Taxation by regulation
14. The theory of regulation
15. What can regulators regulate? The case of electricity
16. Economic efficiency and income distribution in the electric utility industry