Centralized versus decentralized taxation of mobile polluting firms

Resource and Energy Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 327-341

  Tanguay, Georges A ^a   Marceau, Nicolas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MAINE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Fiscal competition; Location; Pollution

Indexed keywords

COSTS; ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT; TAXATION;

MARGINAL COSTS;

POLLUTION;

COST; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; INDUSTRIAL LOCATION; LOCATION DECISION; POLLUTION TAX;

EID: 0035489269     PISSN: 09287655     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0928-7655(01)00042-2     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Bidding for firms
2. Tax holidays as signals
3. North-South trade and the environment
4. Trade and transboundary pollution
5. Monitoring of pollution regulation: Do local conditions matter?
6. Taxation of foreign multinationals: A sequential bargaining approach to tax holidays
7. Environmental policy with endogenous plant locations
8. The effect of environmental regulation on international competitiveness: What the evidence tells us
9. Industrial blackmail: Dynamic tax competition and public investment
10. Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous
11. Auctions and bidding
12. Tightening environmental standards: The benefit-cost or the no-cost paradigm
13. Environmental regulation and the location of polluting industries
14. Bidding for polluting firms: The race for the bottom