Reinforcement learning rules in a repeated game

Computational Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 89-110

  Bell, Ann Maria ^a  

^a NASA AMES RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Complex systems; Learning in games; Reinforcement learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035435869     PISSN: 09277099     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013818611576     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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