A locational gaming model with CO2 emission tax and limits

International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems

Volumn 23, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 451-457

  Yu, Z ^a   Preckel, P V ^a   Nderitu, G ^a   Sparrow, F T ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Carbon dioxide; Cournot; Electricity; Locational gaming; Nash equilibrium; Profit

Indexed keywords

CARBON DIOXIDE; ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION; GAS EMISSIONS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; TAXATION;

LOCATIONAL GAMING;

ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS;

EID: 0035427833     PISSN: 01420615     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0142-0615(00)00079-X     Document Type: Article

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